State v. Foster’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

124 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 124 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]o be guilty of attempt, a defendant’s conscious objective must be to cause the result which would constitute the substantive crime. A person cannot attempt to commit a crime which requires that an unintended result occur, such as involuntary manslaughter, because it is logically impossible for one to intend to bring about an unintended result. Similarly, to be guilty of conspiracy, the defendant, upon entering an agreement, must intend that his conduct achieve the requisite criminal result. When the substantive crime requires an unintended result, a person cannot conspire to commit that crime because it is logically impossible to agree to achieve a specific result unintentionally. Contrary to the [appellant's] assertions, and unlike attempt or conspiratorial liability, accessorial liability does not require that a defendant act with the conscious objective to cause the result described by a statute. [[Image here]] [The accomplice statute] merely requires that a defendant have the mental state required for the commission of a crime while intentionally aiding another.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Fisher · Commonwealth v. Roebuck

2. “[t]o be guilty as an accessory one must share the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with the perpetrator of the crime .... In accordance with our murder statute, a conviction of murder as an accessory thus requires, inter alia, that the accessory shared the perpetrator's intent to cause the death of another person .... General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). A person acts intentionally with respect to a result ... described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result .... General Statutes § 53a-3 (11).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 180 Conn. App. 205 - State v. Soyini

3. “[o]ne who is present when a crime is committed but neither assists in its commission nor shares in the criminal intent of its perpetrator cannot be convicted as an accessory.... Mere presence as an inactive companion, passive acquiescence, or the doing of innocent acts which may in fact aid the one who commits the crime must be distinguished from the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose shared by one who knowingly and wilfully assists the perpetrator of the offense in the acts which prepare for, facilitate, or consummate it.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 180 Conn. App. 205 - State v. Soyini