Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

202 Ga. 135

42 S.E.2d 450

Goodrum v. Goodrum

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided April 16, 1947

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1947-04-16

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The theory upon which the right of a court to punish for contempt is [based], [is] that “Every court has power to compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and processes.” [Cit.] It necessarily follows that, “Only the court offended . . . has power to punish for the contempt, or to entertain proceedings to that end.” [Cit.]”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Mathis v. Corrugated Gear & Sprocket, Inc.

“Only the court offended . . . has power to punish for the contempt, or to entertain proceedings to that end.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Gore v. Gore

Relies on Girtman v. Girtman · In re Fite · Van Dyke v. Van Dyke

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1947-04-16

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently January 2014 · most notably Connell v. Connell (1966), Lipton v. Lipton (1955)

28 state decisions

8019471950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Jenkins, Chief Justice.

¶1 1. Formerly, an order granting alimony could he enforced by attachment only. Goss v. Goss, 29 Ga. 109 (2).

¶2 2. Under the law as it now is, a decree for alimony may be enforced by attachment for contempt. Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 125 Ga. 491, 492 (2) (54 S. E. 537).

¶3 3. Where, in a suit for divorce and alimony, the superior court has jurisdiction on the face of the record, and where after service on the defendant no plea to the jurisdiction is filed and the court awards alimony, it retains jurisdiction to enforce its judgment by attachment for contempt, notwithstanding the fact that subsequently to the rendition of the judgment the defendant may have removed his residence to another county; and this is true even though the defendant may then attempt to show that the court rendering the decree never did in fact have jurisdiction over his person.

¶4 A fortiori, is this true where the validity of the judgment granting divorce and alimony is not attacked at all. Here the wife, in whose favor the decree for alimony was rendered, herself seeks to enforce it by an attachment for contempt, but institutes her proceeding in another and different county from that in whose superior court the decree was rendered, thereby seeking to give one court jurisdiction to enforce by attachment for contempt the decree rendered by another and different court, on the ground that the defendant since the decree was rendered has removed his residence to the county in which she now seeks such relief.

¶5 4. Not only does the superior court rendering such a decree retain jurisdiction to enforce the same by attachment for contempt, but since “the jurisdiction of the contempt proceeding is an incident of the alimony suit” (Bilbo v. Bilbo, 167 Ga. 602, 146 S. E. 446), it is not concurrent but exclusive jurisdiction which it has. See also Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 178 (11 S. E. 2d, 782) ; Curtright v. Curtright, 187 Ga. 122 (200 S. E. 711). The theory upon which the right of a court to punish for contempt is, that “Every court has power to compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and processes.” Gaston v. Shunk Plow Co., 161 Ga. 287, 298 (130 S. E. 580). It necessarily follows that “Only the court offended . . has power to punish for the contempt, or to entertain proceedings to that end.” In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665 (3) (76 S. E. 397).

¶6 5. The court did not err in sustaining the written motion to dismiss, on the ground that the court in which the attachment proceeding for contempt was instituted was without jurisdiction.

¶7 Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices eoneur. .
/202/ga/135 · .json · Public domain