¶1dissenting:
¶2For the reasons which I stated in In re Splett (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 391 (Reinhard, J., dissenting), appeal allowed (1990), 132 Ill. 2d 553, I continue to dissent from the holding that the failure of the record to show that notice of the time and place of the involuntary admission hearing was served on respondent and his attorney requires reversal of the commitment even where respondent and his attorney appeared at the scheduled hearing and did not raise any issue of the lack of proper notice.
¶3I also dissent from the balance of the opinion which holds that the judgment must be reversed because the State failed to file a current treatment plan as required by section 3—813 of the Mental Health Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91½, par. 3—813). Although the record does not show that a current treatment plan was formally filed in strict compliance with section 3 — 813 of the Code, the point was not raised below, and the transcript of Dr. Fogata’s testimony at the commitment hearing indicates that a current treatment plan exists on which he was questioned by the assistant State’s Attorney and defendant’s counsel. While I do not approve of the failure to file formally the treatment plan, I would find there has been substantial compliance with the statute, and respondent has not suggested how he was prejudiced in these circumstances. Cf. In re Smoots (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 289, 292.
¶4Finally, although not reached in the majority opinion, the respondent contends that the trial court’s order for involuntary admission was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. On this record, I disagree and would affirm the order of commitment.