Herbel v. Endres’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““K. S. A. 60-259 (a) sets forth, in plain and unmistakable language, the grounds on which .a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties. There are six of them. We see no need to list them now. It is sufficient, here, to say that the reason assigned by the trial court in this case, ‘that the Court cannot approve the verdict of the jury, period,’ is not one of the six grounds listed in the statute. “We deem the grounds delineated by statute to be exclusive and to con stitute a limiting factor upon the authority of a trial court to grant a. new trial. . . . (pp. 132, 133.) “. . . The former statutes governing the granting of new trials (G. S. 1949, 60-3001, et seq.) placed no limitation upon the trial court’s power to grant new trials on its own motion, provided its action was taken within the term of court at which judgment was rendered. The present statute is in sharp contrast. It has effected important changes in the former procedure. While a trial court still has a high duty to grant a new trial on its own initiative when it disapproves the verdict, its disapproval must be bottomed on one of the statutory groundsi, and its reasons therefor must be set out in its order specifically, not generally. These changes in past procedure are not to be ignored; the limitations effected thereby are binding upon courts. . . . “We are constrained to hold that the trial court’s order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial did not comply with the requirements of K. S.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mettee v. Urban Renewal Agency

2. ““ . . I have made a review of the evidence. I have weighed the testimony on the question of the plaintiff, Mr. Herbel’s contributory negligence, and I have considered the discretionary powers vested in the trial court and I have come up with the following result, and again this is case law that if a trial court is dissatisfied with the verdict, it not only has the authority but it is its duty to set such verdict aside. In the event his matter should be appealed to the Supreme Court, and so the record is clear at this point, the Court is sustaining the motion for a new trial.’ (Emphasis added.) “ ‘. . . [I]t is the ruling of the Court that the motion by Norman Dean Herbel for a new trial is hereby granted on the basis the Court is dissatisfied with the verdict.’ ” (p. 735.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mettee v. Urban Renewal Agency

3. ““K.S.A. 60-259(a) sets forth, in plain and unmistakable language, the grounds on which a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties. There are six of them. We see no need to list them now. It is sufficient, here, to say that the reason assigned by the trial court in this case, ‘that the Court cannot approve the verdict of the jury, period,’ is not one of the six grounds listed in the statute. “We deem the grounds delineated by statute to be exclusive and to constitute a limiting factor upon the authority of a trial court to grant a new trial. . . .” (197 Kan. at 132-133.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 2 Kan. App. 2d 59 - Smith v. Morris