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202 Ky. 357

Shaw v. Morrison

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

Decided March 7, 1924

Court of Appeals of Kentucky · decided 1924-03-07

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1924-03-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently May 2016

6 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Opinion op the Court by

Judge Clarke

¶2Affirming.

¶3By this action, appellant sought a mandatory injunction to compel appellees to remove a tile, wholly upon the latter’s land and designed to drain a pond thereon. It was alleged the tile interfered with the natural drainage and caused water to flow upon appellant’s land unnaturally and in increased volume, thereby injuring his land permanently and irreparably.

¶4Appellees’ answer denies irreparable injury, and avers that the tile was constructed at the instance and cost of the fiscal court for the protection of a fill in the public highway, and that the damage, if any, to appellant’s land is small, permanent, and easily ascertainable, and that the appellees are financially able to respond in damages.

¶5*358The averments of the answer, except as to appellees’ financial responsibility, were traversed, and proof taken. Upon submission, the chancellor found the injury, if any, was not irreparable, refused the injunction, and transferred the cause to the common law docket to permit plaintiff to assert and try his claim, if any, for damages. Declining to assert damages and electing to stand on his right to injunctive relief, appellant’s petition was dismissed, and he has appealed.

¶6It stands admitted that the injury is permanent and that appellees are able to respond in damages, and we concur in the chancellor’s finding that the injury, if any, is not irreparable but slight and easily ascertainable.

¶7Dealing with an analogous situation in Devou v. Pence, 106 S. W. 874, 32 R. 697, we held, upon many authorities there cited that “As the injury to appellant’s property is not an irreparable one but one for which the damages can be ascertained, and appellees are solvent, she was not entitled to the (injunctive) relief sought.”

¶8We are therefore of the opinion the court did not err in denying the injunction, and the judgment is affirmed.

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