State ex rel. Sparkman v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude persons from a jury based on their race violates the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. The Louisiana legislature passed LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 795(C) which prohibits the use of peremptory challenges based solely on race or gender. There are a number of steps that must each be proven in order to prevail on a Batson claim. In addition to the high burden of proving counsel was ineffective, the court also finds the petitioner’s reliance on Batson misplaced. To prevail on a Batson claim, it must be proven that the peremptory challenges on race or gender were in fact made, if so, the prosecutor is given an opportunity to state a race-neutral reason for the strike. If the prosecutor fails to do so, the trial court must decide if the defendant met his burden of proving intentional racial discrimination. See State v. Green, 655 So.2d 272, 287 (La. 1995). None of the necessary steps were proven in this case. The record establishes that the petitioner was represented at trial by an experienced criminal defense attorney, Marquita Naquin. As counsel for the petitioner, it was her duty to raise issues before and during the trial, if she believed them to be well-founded. In addition, in his memorandum, the petitioner asserts four black jurors were struck, demonstrating discrimination. However, within the record, there is no reflect”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 217 So. 3d 484 - State v. Griffin

2. “In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly observed that appellate counsel “need not advance every argument, regardless of merit, [”] urged by the defendant. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 , 105 S.Ct. 830 [835,], 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). The Court gives great deference to professional appellate strategy and applauds counsel for “winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, and at most a few key issues.[”] Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 [746], 103 S.Ct. 3308 [3310], 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). This is true even where the weaker arguments have merit. Id. at 751-2 , 103 S.Ct. 3308 . When the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is based on failure to raise the issue on appeal, the prejudice prong of the | Strickland test requires the petitioner to establish that the appellate court would have granted relief, had the issue been raised. United States v. Phillips, 210 F.3d 345, 350 (5 Cir. 2000).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 224 So. 3d 1226 - State v. Ceasar