Public-domain · open source

202 S.W. 1034

Griffin v. Bell

Court of Appeals of Texas

Decided February 20, 1918

Court of Appeals of Texas · decided 1918-02-20

<p>1. Contbacts <&wkey;91 — Option — Consideration.</p> <p>Seventy dollars cash actually paid for an option to explore and develop oil lands was sufficient to make the issue of valuable and adequate consideration one of fact to be passed on by the court or the jury.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error <&wkey;909(l) — Presumptions — Decision of Issues.</p> <p>The Court of Civil Appeals must presume that the trial court decided all controverted issues of fact not submitted to the jury in harmony with the judgment rendered.</p> <p>3. Contracts <&wkey;59 —Option or Privilege —Cash Consideration — Lack of Mutuality.</p> <p>Where the $76 cash paid by defendants to plaintiffs, was a valuable and adequate consideration for an option or exclusive privilege to explore and develop the mineral resources of plaintiffs’ oil land which plaintiffs gave to defendants, though defendants did not bind themselves to exercise their option or privilege, or to do anything toward development of the mineral resources of the land, the contract was not subject to cancellation on account of its unilateral character on its face, imposing an obligation only on plaintiffs, since mutual promises are necessary only when there is no other consideration.</p> <p>4. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;75 — Option to Develop Mineral Lands — Consideration.</p> <p>The $70 cash paid by defendants was not only the consideration for the privilege extending over the first term of six months, but for all the rights and privileges, conditional or unconditional, which the contract conferred, including the conditional right of claiming an extension of the option; payment of the $70 being what induced the execution of the contract, and being the consideration for all the rights and- privileges therein granted.</p> <p>5. Contracts <&wkey;143 — Construction.</p> <p>In construing a contract, it must be viewed (n its entirety. . ,</p> <p>6. Mines and Minerals &wkey;>59 — Option to Develop Oil Land — Lack of Intention to Drill.</p> <p>Where defendants acquired from plaintiffs for cash an option to develop plaintiffs’ land for oil with a view to sell the privilege at a profit, not binding themselves to sink wells, violating no agreement by failing to do so, the fact that they acquired the option without intention to drill is no ground for cancellation at plaintiffs’ suit.</p> <p>7. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;59-OiL Option or Lease — Failure oe Wipe to Sign.</p> <p>Whore the wife of a joint owner of land having a homestead right failed to sign lease or option to develop the land for oil, her failure could only be invoked to limit the rights the lessees or optionees might claim, not as ground for cancellation at suit of tho lessors.</p> <p>On Motion for Rehearing.</p> <p>8. Contracts <&wkey;53 — Consideration — Adequacy.</p> <p>Where the consideration is sufficient to be denominated valuable, courts do not concern themselves with the relative value of tho properties exchanged, a rule subject to some exceptions, as where the consideration is so grossly out of proportion to the property conveyed as to shock the conscience, or bear evidence of fraud on its face.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1918-02-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently November 1947

8 state decisions

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1On Motion for Rehearing.

¶2[8] Lest some misunderstanding should arise from the language employed relative to the matter of determining the adequacy and character of the consideration upon which this lease is founded, we think it proper to modify some of the expressions used in the original opinion. We do not mean to hold that the consideration must be both valuable and adequate, or that its sufficiency should be measured by the relative value of the property conveyed; nor do we mean to hold that in every case the character and the sufficiency of the consideration should be treated as questions of fact to he passed upon by the jury. We recognize and adhere to the general rule that where the consideration is sufficient to be denominated “valuable” the courts do not concern themselves with the relative value of the properties exchanged. 1 Elliott on Con*1038tracts, §§ 209 and 210. This rule, however, is subject to some exceptions, as where the consideration is so grossly out of proportion to the property conveyed as to shock the conscience or to bear upon its face evidences of fraud. 2 Pbmeroy, § 918. .In saying that we regard the sum of $70 cash as sufficient to make the issue of valuable and adequate consideration one of fact to be passed upon by the jury, we were perhaps more liberal than necessary. That liberality, however, was indulged in because the record showed that in this case either the court or the jury had determined those questions in favor of the ap-pellees. Had the question arisen in a different form, and no issue of fact been determined, we might have treated the matter in a different manner.

¶3The motion for a rehearing is overruled.