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← 202 WIS 58 - Piper v. State

Piper v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1930

Citation profile

11
cited by 11 later decisions
2
states following
January 1998
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 10 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently January 1998

1 federal appellate · 10 state decisions

301930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Topolewski v. State · Koscak v. State · Kellar v. State · Taylor v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““While direct proof of venue should be made, absence of it does not defeat conviction', where inference of it may properly be drawn from circumstantial evidence. Where no witness testifies directly to the venue, it is sufficiently .proved if there is reference in the evidence to the locality known or probably familiar to the jury where the act constituting the offense was committed from which the jury may reasonably have concluded that the place was in the county alleged. Kellar v. State, 174 Wis. 67 , 69, 182 N.W. 321 ; 16 Corp.Jur. p. 769. The defendant’s shop, where the transaction involved occurred, was located on Eon du Lac avenue at least probably known to the jurors as a street in Milwaukee. A city policeman testified that it was on his beat. The jury were warranted in concluding from this that the offense was committed in Milwaukee county. [ 202 Wis. at 61 , 231 N.W. at 164 .1””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““ ‘Merely setting a trap to catch a would-be criminal by affording him the freest opportunity to commit the offense’ does not sacrifice any element of the offense. Topolewski Case, supra, p. 253. [Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244 , 109 N. W. 1037 .] ‘The fact that the party against whom a crime is contemplated suggests, aids, encourages, or abets the commission of the offense or sets a trap for the accused is not a defense where the accused has done every act essential to the completion of the offense.’ The quotation is from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Barnes in the Koscak Case, supra, p. 270 [Koscak v. State, 160 Wis. 255 , 152 N. W. 181 ], but it is a correct statement of the rule, as the authorities there cited in support show, and is not at all in conflict with anything held or stated in the majority opinion. The inspector did nothing to relieve the defendant from any element of the offense. The situation is analogous to those involving illegal sales, ordering of obscene books by mail, and detecting fraudulent use of the mails. The conduct of the defendant, not the motive or deception of the inspector, is considered. 1 Bishop, Crim. Law (9th ed.) 686, 687.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.