Slip opinions decided 2020 — Colorado Public Domain Citations

This case required the Supreme Court to answer the following certified question from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: May the Colorado General Assembly delegate power to an interstate administrative commission to approve insurance policies sold in Colorado under a standard that differs from Colorado statute? Answering the certified question narrowly, the Court concluded that the General Assembly did not have the authority to delegate to the Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission the power to issue a standard authorizing the sale of life insurance policies in Colorado containing a two-year suicide exclusion when a Colorado statute prohibits insurers doing business in Colorado from asserting suicide as a defense against payment on a life insurance policy after the first year of that policy.

This case arose out of a zoning dispute involving the propriety of constructing a gravity-based mountain roller coaster in the Estes Valley. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the local authorities tasked with making and reviewing zoning determinations abused their discretion in interpreting and applying the Estes Valley Development Code when they determined that the proposed mountain coaster could be constructed. Applying the deferential standard of review required for an action brought pursuant to CRCP 106(a)(4), the Court concluded there was no abuse of discretion. The Court was also asked to consider whether the constitutionality of the Estes Valley Development Code could be appropriately raised or considered on appeal to district court in a suit brought exclusively as a CRCP 106 claim. CRCP 106 proceedings are reserved for challenges to the judicial and quasi-judicial actions of government actors rather than the law itself. As such, the Court concluded that the constitutionality of the Estes Valley Development Code could not be appropriately raised or considered in district court in a CRCP 106 action. Accordingly, the district court's judgment was reversed.

This is a companion case to Yakutat Land Corp. v. Langer III, 2020 CO 30, __ P.3d __, decided the same day. Both cases were before the Supreme Court on a transfer from the Court of Appeals pursuant to C.A.R. 50. Here, the Court was asked to decide whether the Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) misconstrued applicable law and abused its discretion in finding that defendant's mountain coaster project was properly classified as a "park and recreation facility" rather than an "outdoor commercial recreation or entertainment establishment." The Court concluded that the BOCC correctly construed the applicable code provisions and, applying the deferential standard of review mandated here, that the BOCC did not abuse its discretion in classifying the mountain coaster project as a park and recreation facility. Accordingly, district court's judgment was affirmed.

The People petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment reversing Williams's conviction for distributing a schedule II controlled substance. At trial, the district court admitted evidence pursuant to CRE 404(b) of a prior incident in which Williams pleaded guilty to selling cocaine. The Court of Appeals found that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence for the limited purposes of demonstrating "modus operandi and common plan, scheme, or design," largely on the grounds that the evidence in question did not meet the strictures imposed by prior case law for admitting uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to CRE 404(b) for these particular purposes, and because the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, although for different reasons. The Court held that because the incremental probative value of this evidence relative to any material issue in the case was substantially outweighed by the danger that it would be unfairly prejudicial, the district court abused its discretion in admitting it.

The Supreme Court held that prior DUI convictions are substantive elements of a felony DUI offense that must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than sentence enhancers to be proved to a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Finding the language of CRS § 42-4-1301(1)(a) to be ambiguous, the Court examined the General Assembly's intent by looking at the entirety of the statutory scheme, traditional treatment of the fact of prior convictions, and the risk of unfairness. Based on those factors, the Court concluded that the General Assembly intended the fact of prior convictions to be a substantive element of the felony offense. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for resentencing.