The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
November 12, 2020
2020COA160
No. 18CA1156, People v. Torline — Constitutional Law — First
Amendment — Freedom of Religion; Crimes — Uniform
Controlled Substances Act of 2013 — Offenses Relating to
Marijuana and Marijuana Concentrate
The defendant, an ordained minister in a cannabis ministry,
challenges his convictions for growing and dispensing marijuana on
the ground that he uses marijuana for religious purposes. A
division of the court of appeals concludes that applying Colorado’s
law criminalizing the possession and growing of marijuana to a
person who conducts such activities for religious reasons does not
violate the person’s rights under the Free Exercise Clauses of the
United States and Colorado Constitutions. Therefore, the division
affirms the defendant’s convictions.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA160
Court of Appeals No. 18CA1156
Mesa County District Court No. 16CR6064
Honorable Brian J. Flynn, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Aaron Snyder Torline,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO
Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
Announced November 12, 2020
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Shelby Krantz, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Tanja Heggins, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 As a matter of first impression, we conclude that applying a
Colorado statute criminalizing the possession and growing of
marijuana to a person who conducts such activities for religious
reasons does not violate the person’s rights under the Free Exercise
Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. As a
result, we affirm the judgment of conviction entered against
defendant, Aaron Snyder Torline.
I. Factual and Procedural History
¶2 In July 2016, Mesa County police officers noticed Torline and
another person walking in and out of a garage and loading trash
bags into the bed of a pickup truck, which the other person then
drove away. Officers stopped the truck for a traffic infraction. A
police dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and police discovered
that the trash bags contained marijuana.
¶3 Officers contacted Torline, who said there was a marijuana
growing operation inside the garage. Torline consented to a search
and explained his operation. He estimated that he was growing
approximately one hundred and fifteen plants, and that he
processed about ten plants per month with a yield of about two
ounces per plant.
1
¶4 The prosecution charged Torline with cultivation of marijuana,
thirty or more plants, and possession with intent to manufacture or
distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate, more than five
pounds but not more than fifty pounds. See § 18-18-406(2)(b)(I),
(2)(b)(III)(B), (3)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2016.1 Torline’s counsel expressed his
wish to raise an “affirmative defense” to the charges on the ground
that section 18-18-406 violates Torline’s constitutional rights
because he engaged in the charged conduct pursuant to a sincerely
held religious belief. Defense counsel also asked the trial court to
instruct the jury on that defense.
¶5 In support, Torline’s attorney argued the following. Torline is
an ordained minister with the Hawaii Cannabis Ministry, an
organization professing the belief that the cannabis plant is a gift
from God and can aid in the experience of spirituality. The ministry
incorporates cannabis into its religious practices, including its
prayers, rituals, and sacraments. It has registered members, a
hierarchy, a system of beliefs, and holy days. As a “ganja minister,”
1 The statute has since been amended; we cite the provisions in
effect at the time of Torline’s charged conduct.
2
Torline provides marijuana to members of his congregation, which
numbers approximately thirty people in Grand Junction.
¶6 The trial court concluded that Colorado law does not support
Torline’s proposed defense and denied his motion to instruct the
jury on the defense. Torline then waived his right to a jury trial,
was tried by the court, and was convicted as charged.
II. The Free Exercise Clauses
¶7 Torline contends that section 18-18-406 was
“unconstitutionally applied to him” in violation of the Free Exercise
Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. Relatedly, he
argues that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on
his defense that his conduct was privileged under the
Constitutions.
A. Standard of Review and Foundational Principles
¶8 The constitutionality of a statute is a legal question that we
review de novo. People v. Graves, 2016 CO 15, ¶ 9. Statutes are
presumed to be constitutional, and the challenger bears the burden
to prove their unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
¶9 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides,
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise
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[of religion].” U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause has
been made applicable to the states by incorporation into the
Fourteenth Amendment. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990). Article II, section 4 of the Colorado
Constitution provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without
discrimination, shall forever hereafter be
guaranteed; and no person shall be denied any
civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on
account of his opinions concerning religion;
but the liberty of conscience hereby secured
shall not be construed to . . . justify practices
inconsistent with the good order, peace or
safety of the state. . . . Nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious
denomination or mode of worship.
Because the federal and state constitutional provisions embody
similar values, we look for guidance in applying the Colorado
provision to the body of law developed in the federal courts with
respect to the meaning and application of the First Amendment.
Conrad v. City & Cty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 670-71 (Colo. 1982).
¶ 10 “The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the
right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one
4
desires.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. The exercise of religion can also
involve the “performance of (or abstention from) physical acts.”
Id.
¶ 11 The Free Exercise Clause is not so limited in scope as to
protect only those beliefs that are tenets of a traditional or
“established religion.” Martinez v. Indus. Comm’n of Colo.,
618 P.2d
738, 740 (Colo. App. 1980). If a person’s religious beliefs are
“sincere and meaningful,” they fall within the ambit of First
Amendment protection. United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 166
(1965). A person’s claim “that his belief is an essential part of a
religious faith must be given great weight.”
Id. at 184; Martinez,
618 P.2d at 740.
B. Analysis
¶ 12 At the time of Torline’s conduct, section 18-18-406(3)(a)
provided that, with exceptions not applicable here, “[i]t is unlawful
for a person to knowingly cultivate, grow, or produce a marijuana
plant or knowingly allow a marijuana plant to be cultivated, grown,
or produced on land that the person owns, occupies, or controls.”
Section 18-18-406(2)(b)(1) provided that, with exceptions not
applicable here, “it is unlawful for a person to knowingly dispense,
5
sell, distribute, or possess with intent to manufacturer, dispense,
sell, or distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate . . . .”
¶ 13 Torline acknowledges that sections 18-18-406(3)(a) and 18-18-
406(2)(b) are neutral laws of general applicability. Still, he
maintains that applying them to his charged conduct violates his
rights under the Free Exercise Clause because the laws “prohibit
conduct that was undertaken for religious reasons.” He also
asserts that less restrictive means exist to enforce “the
government’s compelling interest in marijuana laws.” (He does not,
however, identify any other means.) Torline is mistaken.
¶ 14 The Free Exercise Clause proscribes laws that “single out the
religious for disfavored treatment.” Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, ___,
137 S. Ct. 2012, 2020
(2017). The Free Exercise Clause, however, does not excuse a
person from “compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate.” Smith,
494 U.S. at 878-
79. In other words, while the protection for religious belief and the
profession of that belief is absolute, the protection for religious
conduct is not. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940); Sanderson v. People,
12 P.3d 851, 853 (Colo. App. 2000).
6
¶ 15 To illustrate, in Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, two men were denied
unemployment benefits after their employment was terminated for
using peyote, a controlled substance. They challenged that decision
on the ground that they had ingested the peyote for sacramental
purposes at a Native American church to which they belonged.
Id.
Like Torline, they contended that “their religious motivation for
using peyote places them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is
not specifically directed at their religious practice, and that is
concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for
other reasons.”
Id. at 878.
¶ 16 The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that
neutral laws of general applicability do not offend the Free Exercise
Clause even when they have an incidental effect on religious
practices. Id.; see also Sanderson,
12 P.3d at 853 (recognizing this
holding of Smith). Hence, the right of free exercise does not relieve a
person from complying with a “valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Smith,
494
U.S. at 879 (citation omitted). The Court reasoned that to make a
person’s obligation to obey such a law “contingent upon the law’s
7
coincidence with his religious beliefs . . . permit[s] him, by virtue of
his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto himself.’” Id. at 885 (citation
omitted).
¶ 17 Section 18-18-406 is similar to the law challenged in Smith.
Because, as in Smith, the statute is a neutral law of general
applicability, we have no trouble rejecting Torline’s free exercise
challenge. The statute advances the legitimate interests of public
health and safety and is rationally related to that end. See Colo.
Const. art. XVIII, § 16(1)(b) (finding that regulation of marijuana is
in the interest of public health and safety); Town of Dillon v. Yacht
Club Condos. Home Owners Ass’n,
2014 CO 37, ¶ 31 (noting a
legitimate interest in public health and safety). Therefore, the
availability of less burdensome alternatives, if any exist, is
irrelevant. See Yacht Club Condos., ¶ 31.
¶ 18 Moreover, although there can be circumstances where a
facially neutral law violates the Free Exercise Clause, Torline does
not allege or identify any such circumstances surrounding section
18-18-406. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 536-40 (1993) (holding that a facially
neutral law banning animal sacrifice was unconstitutional because
8
its exceptions for secular conduct and the surrounding
circumstances showed that the city adopted the ordinance because
of animus toward the Santería church). He does not argue that the
legislature enacted section 18-18-406 with the object of restricting
religious practices. Nor are we aware of circumstances suggesting
that the legislation was motivated by religious animus.
¶ 19 As a result, we join the many jurisdictions that have rejected
cannabis ministries’ members’ free-exercise challenges to marijuana
convictions. See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.
2002); United States v. Meyers,
95 F.3d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir.
1996); Hutchinson v. Maine,
641 F. Supp. 2d 40, 47 (D. Me. 2009);
Rheuark v. State,
601 So. 2d 135, 139 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992);
People v. Trippet,
66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 565 (Ct. App. 1997); Nesbeth
v. United States,
870 A.2d 1193, 1198 (D.C. 2005); State v.
Sunderland,
168 P.3d 526, 534 (Haw. 2007); State v. Fluewelling,
249 P.3d 375, 379 (Idaho 2011); State v. Venet,
797 P.2d 1055,
1057 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Burton v. State,
194 S.W.3d 686, 688
(Tex. App. 2006).
¶ 20 We also note that Colorado is friendlier than most states to
marijuana use. Unlike the absolute prohibition in Smith, the
9
statutes under which Torline was convicted are subject to article
XVIII, section 16 of the Colorado Constitution, which permits a
person to possess, grow, and use marijuana in small amounts for
personal use and authorizes a person to conduct larger-scale
activities with a license. The Free Exercise Clause does not require
a further exception for all religiously motivated uses of marijuana.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (noting that, although states may create
statutory exemptions for religious uses of controlled substances,
they are not required to do so).
¶ 21 In sum, the incorporation of marijuana and marijuana
concentrate into religious rituals is subject to regulation on equal
terms with secular marijuana use. Colorado law does not penalize
such conduct because of its religious character. See Lyng v. Nw.
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,
485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988) (finding
no free-exercise violation where governmental action did not
“penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of
the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens”). We
therefore hold that the Free Exercise Clause does not excuse people
and organizations from complying with section 18-18-406.
10
¶ 22 Because applying section 18-18-406 to Torline’s conduct does
not violate his constitutional rights, there was no legal basis for his
proposed defense. So the trial court correctly rejected the defense,
his jury instructions, and his proffered evidence in support of the
defense. See Hoggard v. People, 2020 CO 54, ¶ 27 (noting that a
trial court has a duty to instruct the jury correctly on the applicable
law); People v. Smith,
77 P.3d 751, 756 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[A] trial
court may refuse to give a defendant’s theory of the case instruction
that misstates the law . . . .”); see also CRE 402 (“Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.”); People v. Evans,
710 P.2d 1167,
1169 (Colo. App. 1985) (holding that evidence of the defendant’s
personal religious belief was irrelevant to the charge of distribution
of marijuana to others).
III. Proof that the Offense Was Committed In Colorado
¶ 23 Finally, Torline contends that the prosecution did not prove
that his conduct occurred within Colorado. See § 18-1-201(1)(a),
C.R.S. 2019.
¶ 24 We review the record de novo to determine whether the
evidence presented was sufficient in both quantity and quality to
sustain a defendant’s conviction. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,
11
¶ 63. We consider whether the relevant evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support
a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of
the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
¶ 25 Two officers testified that they investigated Torline’s conduct
“here in Mesa County.” Torline contends that this evidence was
sufficient to prove that the offenses occurred in Mesa County but
not to prove that they occurred in Colorado. We are not persuaded.
¶ 26 “Here” referred to the place where the witnesses were
testifying. Torline’s trial was held in the District Court of Mesa
County, Colorado (also known as the Twenty-First Judicial District
Court). It is therefore clear from the context of the testimony that
“here in Mesa County” was referring to Mesa County, Colorado.
Consequently, sufficient evidence supports the court’s finding that
the charged conduct occurred in Colorado.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 27 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.
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