State v. Cesar B.

                                                            Office of the Director      New Mexico
                                                             09:29:56 2020.11.18        Compilation
                                                                           '00'07-      Commission


          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 

Filing Date: August 12, 2020

No. A-1-CA-38448

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CESAR B.,

      Child-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY
Marci E. Beyer, District Judge

Released for Publication November 24, 2020.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Anne Minard, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
B. Douglas Wood, III, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

                                        OPINION

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1}    We withdraw the opinion filed June 8, 2020, and substitute this opinion in its
place.

{2}    Child appeals from a conditional plea agreement, wherein he pled no contest to
the delinquent act of unlawful carrying of a deadly weapon on school premises, contrary
to NMSA 1978, Section 30-7-2.1 (1994) and NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-3(A) (2009,
amended 2019). Child entered into the agreement following the district court’s partial
denial of his motion to suppress certain statements he made to the assistant principal at
his school. Child argues that the district court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress
was based on an erroneous interpretation of NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-14(F) (2009),
a provision of the Delinquency Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-2-1 to -33 (1993, as amended
through 2019). Child further argues that if this Court concludes that his statements are
presumptively inadmissible under Section 32A-2-14(F), we should also conclude that
the State has failed to rebut that presumption. We agree with Child that the district
court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress was based on an erroneous
interpretation of Section 32A-2-14(F) and reverse on that basis. However, because the
district court did not determine whether the State rebutted the presumptive
inadmissibility of Child’s statements under Section 32A-2-14(F), we leave that question
for the district court to answer on remand.

BACKGROUND

{3}    No evidence was presented at the hearing on Child’s motion to suppress. The
parties and the district court, however, relied on the following stipulated facts when
arguing and deciding the motion.

{4}     Child, a thirteen-year-old middle school student, showed a knife to a classmate
on school grounds. Another student witnessed this and reported what she saw. Child
was called into the assistant principal’s office, and the assistant principal questioned
him. Child admitted he had brought the knife to school. The assistant principal relayed
what she learned to the school’s resource officer. The officer also questioned Child and
elicited incriminating statements about the knife.

{5}    The State subsequently filed a petition alleging that Child committed the
delinquent act of unlawfully carrying a deadly weapon on school premises. Child moved
to suppress his statements to school officials and to the school resource officer.
Following a hearing on Child’s motion, the district court entered an order granting the
suppression of Child’s statement to the officer but otherwise denied the motion. Child
then entered into a conditional plea and dispositional agreement, reserving his right to
appeal the district court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

{6}    Following our opinion dismissing Child’s appeal on mootness grounds, Child filed
a timely motion for rehearing. Having granted Child’s motion and after full consideration
of the briefing submitted by the parties, we are persuaded that we should review this
case—even if it is moot—as it presents an issue of substantial interest and that is also
capable of repetition yet evading review. See Gunaji v. Macias, 

,

, 

 (“[Appellate courts] may review moot cases that present
issues of substantial public interest or which are capable of repetition yet evade
review.”); State v. Jones, 

, 

, 

 (“In
determining whether the requisite degree of public interest exists to prevent dismissal
on mootness grounds, we consider among other factors . . . the desirability of an
authoritative determination for future guidance of public officers[] and the likelihood that
the question will recur in the future.”); cf. State v. Sergio B., 

, 

, 

 (noting that the short-term commitments involved in many
children’s court cases would allow issues to evade review unless appellate courts
invoked the exception to the general rule that they should not decide moot cases).
Accordingly, we withdraw our previous opinion and address the merits of Child’s appeal.

{7}    This case requires us to determine whether Child’s statements, made when he
was thirteen years old, to the assistant principal of his school are presumptively
inadmissible under Section 32A-2-14(F). 1 Because this determination requires us to
interpret Section 32A-2-14(F), our review is de novo. State v. Jade G., 2007-NMSC-
010, ¶ 15, 

, 

. “When interpreting Section 32A-2-14(F), we
seek to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Jade G., 

. “In
discerning legislative intent, we look first to the language used and the plain meaning of
that language.” State v. Trujillo, 

, 

, 

.
“However, we look not only to the language used in the statute[] but also to the purpose
to be achieved and the wrong to be remedied.” State v. DeAngelo M., 

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In doing so, we
examine the plain language of the statute as well as the context in which it was
promulgated, including the history of the statute and the object and purpose the
Legislature sought to accomplish.” 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

I.      Child’s Statements to the Assistant Principal Are Presumptively
        Inadmissible Under Section 32A-2-14(F)

{8}     “The Children’s Code . . . provides a child greater protections than those
constitutionally afforded adults with regard to the admissibility of a child’s statements or
confessions.” State v. Adam J., 

, 

, 

. In
line with those greater protections, Section 32A-2-14(F) establishes “a rebuttable
presumption that any confessions, statements or admissions made by a child thirteen or
fourteen years old to a person in a position of authority are inadmissible.” Whether
Child’s statements to the assistant principal are entitled to this presumption of
inadmissibility turns on whether our Legislature intended assistant principals to be
included as persons in a “position of authority.”

{9}    Our Legislature has not defined “position of authority” within the Delinquency Act
or, more broadly, the Children’s Code. Acknowledging as much, Child urges this Court
to adopt the definition of “position of authority” contained in NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-
10(E) (2005). There, our Legislature defined “position of authority” as “that position
occupied by a parent, relative, household member, teacher, employer or other person

1On appeal, Child’s suppression arguments concern only the statements Child made to the assistant principal. This
appears to be a limitation on the relief requested by Child at the district court, where Child sought suppression of
“any and all statements [he made] to all school officials[.]” However, based on the limited record before us, we are
unable to tell if this is a meaningful limitation—that is, we do not know whether Child made any statements to any
school officials other than the assistant principal. Nevertheless, because Child’s appellate arguments concern only
his statements to the assistant principal, we limit our analysis accordingly.
who, by reason of that position, is able to exercise undue influence over a child.” Id.;
see Adam J., 

 (Alarid, J., specially concurring) (citing Section 30-
9-10(E) when suggesting that “position of authority” as used in Section 32A-2-14(F) “is
broad enough to include . . . parents, other adult relatives, employers, private security
guards or teachers”). Child acknowledges that our Legislature specifically limited the
definition in Section 30-9-10(E) to the uses of that phrase within Sections 30-9-10
through -16, which criminalize sexual offenses against children. Nevertheless, Child
argues that the definition is applicable here because, like the statutes criminalizing
sexual offenses against children, Section 32A-2-14(F)’s objective is to “protect[] children
from the coercive effects of adults in positions of authority seeking to take advantage of
the immaturity and inexperience of a child.”

{10} Although Child urges us to adopt the broad definition of “position of authority”
found in Section 30-9-10(E), we again note that this appeal involves only statements
made to an assistant principal. We therefore need not, and do not, address whether
parents, relatives, household members, and employers, among others, are persons in
positions of authority under Section 32A-2-14(F). Addressing only the factual scenario
presented here, we conclude that our Legislature intended assistant principals to be
included as persons in a “position of authority.” We explain.

{11} As the State points out, our relevant existing case law discussing Section 32A-2-
14(F) involves statements made by thirteen- and fourteen-year-old children to law
enforcement. See, e.g., DeAngelo M., 

 (involving a thirteen-yearold’s statements to three law enforcement officers during a custodial interrogation);
Adam J., 

 (involving a thirteen-year-old’s statement to a law
enforcement officer). Based on this, the State argues that expanding Section 32A-2-
14(F)’s protections beyond law enforcement would be absurd. However, the State cites
no authority indicating that the factual limitations of the cases presented to New
Mexico’s appellate courts are suggestive of legislative intent. See State v. Vigil-Giron,

, 

 (“[A]ppellate courts will not consider an issue if
no authority is cited in support of the issue and that, given no cited authority, we
assume no such authority exists.”). Further, contrary to the State’s position, the plain
language used by our Legislature in Section 32A-2-14(F) does not limit the presumptive
inadmissibility to confessions, statements, or admissions made to law enforcement by
thirteen- and fourteen-year-old children. Instead, it expressly applies to all “person[s] in
a position of authority.” Section 32A-2-14(F). If the Legislature intended the limitation
the State advances, it certainly could have drafted the statute accordingly. Cf. State v.
Lopez, 

, 

, 

 (“If the Legislature had
intended great bodily harm to be a necessary element of the underlying felony before
criminal commitment can be imposed, the Legislature could have drafted the statute
using such language.”). And this Court previously has recognized—at least implicitly—
that the meaning of “a person in a position of authority” is not limited to law enforcement
officers, but includes them. See Adam J., 

 (discussing how the
term “a person in a position of authority . . . would include a law enforcement officer”
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{12} Just as the language of the statute does not limit persons in a position of
authority to law enforcement, the recognized goal of the statute furthers our belief that
our Legislature did not intend to so limit the presumptive inadmissibility under Section
32A-2-14(F). Our Supreme Court has recognized that Section 32A-2-14(F) has a “goal
of encouraging free communication between children and adults.” Jade G., 2007-
NMSC-010, ¶ 19. We must then ask whether it would further that goal of free
communication to include assistant principals as persons “in a position of authority.”
See Lopez v. Emp’t Sec. Div., 

, ¶ 7, 

, 

 (stating
“that statutes are to be interpreted in order to facilitate their operation and the
achievement of their goals”). We believe that it would.

{13} New Mexico has “recognize[d] the value of preserving the informality of the
student-teacher relationship.” State v. Antonio T., 

, 

 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). This is “[b]ecause
maintaining security and order in schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school
disciplinary procedures[.]” 

 (omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
In furtherance of school security and order, we do not question that an assistant
principal should be able to compel answers from a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child
for the purposes of school discipline. See 

 (stating that the principal “was entitled to
act on her suspicion and compel answers from [the child] for the purposes of school
discipline”). However, when the state then seeks to use those same answers in a
criminal proceeding, our Legislature has provided additional safeguards for the thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child—the rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility under Section
32A-2-14(F). See Antonio T., 

 (acknowledging that certain school
disciplinary violations can also lead to an adjudication of delinquency).

{14} For these reasons, we hold that assistant principals are included as “person[s] in
a position of authority” under Section 32A-2-14(F). As such, the district court erred by
not concluding that Child’s statements to the assistant principal were presumptively
inadmissible under Section 32A-2-14(F).

II.    The District Court Shall Determine Whether the State Can Overcome the
       Presumption of Inadmissibility on Remand

{15} Having concluded that the district court erred by not applying Section 32A-2-
14(F)’s presumptive inadmissibility to Child’s statements to the assistant principal, the
next question is whether the State has overcome that presumption. Child argues that
the State has failed to rebut the presumption and invites us to so hold. We decline this
invitation.

{16} At the district court, the focus was not on whether the State could overcome the
presumptive inadmissibility of Child’s statements under Section 32A-2-14(F) but rather
on the threshold question of whether that presumptive inadmissibility was even
applicable in this case. When the district court concluded that it was not, the State
necessarily did not need to put on rebuttal evidence as there was no presumption to
rebut. Accordingly, because the State has not had the opportunity to put on rebuttal
evidence and because the district court has yet to rule on whether the State can
overcome the presumptive inadmissibility under Section 32A-2-14(F), we remand for
further proceedings to determine whether the State can overcome the presumption.

{17} Recognizing the need to provide guidance to the district court as it makes that
determination, we turn to our Supreme Court’s opinion in DeAngelo M. In that case, our
Supreme Court held that

       Section 32A-2-14(F) requires the [s]tate to prove by clear and convincing
       evidence that at the time a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old child makes a
       statement, confession, or admission to a person in a position of authority,
       the child (1) was warned of his constitutional and statutory rights, and (2)
       knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived each right.

DeAngelo M., 

. Regarding the second element, the state must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the child, at the time the statements
were made, “had the maturity to understand his or her constitutional and statutory rights
and the force of will to assert those rights.” Id. ¶ 17. The district court on remand should
apply these principles, as set out in DeAngelo M., to determine whether the
presumption has been rebutted.

{18} Finally, we note that nothing in this opinion should be read as limiting the
school’s use of Child’s statements in a school disciplinary proceeding because that
question is not before us. See Antonio T., 

 (stating that
“maintaining security and order in schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in
school disciplinary procedures” (omission, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted)); In re Doe, 

, ¶ 29, 

, 

 (stating that inschool disciplinary matters, unlike criminal proceedings, do not require Miranda
warnings).

CONCLUSION

{19} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

{20}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge