State v. Martinez

                                                        Office of the Director        New Mexico
                                                         08:01:23 2021.03.30          Compilation
                                                                       '00'06-        Commission

            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 

Filing Date: February 25, 2021

No. S-1-SC-37378

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LORENZO MARTINEZ,

      Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY
Fred T. Van Soelen, District Judge

Released for Publication April 6, 2021.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

                                          OPINION

THOMSON, Justice.

{1}    Defendant Lorenzo Martinez asks this Court to reverse his convictions for first-degree murder and third-degree criminal sexual penetration (CSP) of the victim (Victim)
after she died. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994); NMSA 1978, § 30-9-11(A) (2009).
Defendant challenges his convictions on multiple grounds, most of which are controlled
by precedent. However, we review one argument as a matter of first impression.
Defendant’s challenge to his CSP conviction requires us to determine whether a
decedent constitutes a “person” as that term is defined and used in Section 30-9-11(A).
Based on the following reasoning, we determine that Victim constitutes a person under
the unique circumstances of CSP in this case, and we hereby affirm Defendant’s
convictions.

I.     BACKGROUND

{2}     At approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 13, 2017, Victim came over to
Defendant’s house, and they began to drink. Defendant had been acquainted with
Victim for one year. Victim had been “bugging” Defendant for a “week and a half,” and
Defendant tried to avoid her that day. Defendant stated that he drank three beers and
that Victim became intoxicated after consuming several shots and began to yell and get
“out of control.” Defendant attempted to quiet her due to concerns about violating his
probation. Frustrated, Defendant went to the bathroom to shave, telling Victim to “shut
up” as she continued to raise her voice.

{3}    After returning to the bathroom at approximately 6:00 p.m., Defendant reported
that he “just . . . snapped.” Defendant left the bathroom, retrieved a knife from the
kitchen where Victim was seated on a chair, and said, “You know what girl? I’ve got a
present for you.” Victim responded, “What’s that?” Defendant then stabbed her multiple
times in the neck.

{4}      After killing Victim, Defendant went to his neighbor’s house and calmly told her
that there was a dead body in his house and that he killed Victim because “she was
“irritating the shit out of him.” According to Defendant, at approximately 7:00 p.m. he
then moved her body to his bedroom, undressed her, and had sexual intercourse with
her twice. He reported that he did not ejaculate. It is undisputed that Victim was
deceased at the time of penetration. Defendant also admitted that he beat Victim in the
face and stomach after moving her body to the bedroom.

{5}     After the murder and sexual penetration, Defendant called a mental health
resources hotline to report the homicide. He also called the police and gave them a
detailed statement of the events that took place. Defendant told police that he killed this
“fucking, stupid-ass bitch who was annoying” him and that her body was lying on his
bed. Over a recording, Defendant can be heard saying, “she just pissed me off and I
killed her.”

{6}    When the police came, they found Victim on Defendant’s bed, naked from the
waist down with breasts partially exposed. The police also found a pentagram on the
wall that Defendant said he drew with Victim’s blood. During the investigation,
Defendant shared with police that he idolized serial killers and had wanted to kill
someone for a long time but had not acted on previous homicidal ideations. He also
stated that he would kill again if given the chance. Defendant further expressed how
much he enjoyed killing Victim, describing the feeling as “pure joy.”

{7}    The autopsy revealed that Victim suffered from one stab wound on the left side of
her neck and at least eight stab wounds on the right side. Vaginal and anal swabs taken
from the deceased Victim revealed no male DNA. Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, third-degree CSP, and third- or fourth-degree tampering with evidence.
{8}    At trial, both sides called mental health experts to testify to Defendant’s sanity.
Defendant was diagnosed with the psychotic disorder of schizophrenia. This disorder is
longstanding, and Defendant has experienced symptoms since he was nineteen years
old. For much of his life, Defendant was often admitted to the hospital because he
reported hearing voices that told him to harm himself or others, and he often
experienced “command hallucinations” that ordered him to take his own life or the life of
another person.

{9}    Defendant’s expert concluded that Defendant was insane at the time he killed
Victim and that he acted in response to a command hallucination. He further testified
that the circumstances on the day of Victim’s murder differed from Defendant’s previous
command hallucinations due to the chaos and stress he experienced, explaining that
schizophrenics are sensitive to environmental stimuli. The State’s expert agreed that
Defendant suffered from schizophrenia. However, he testified that Defendant
demonstrated an ability to stop himself from acting on command hallucinations in the
past and thus could have stopped himself from stabbing Victim.

{10} The jury ultimately found Defendant to be sane and convicted him of first-degree
murder and third-degree CSP. The district court sentenced him to life in prison. He now
asserts his right to directly appeal both of his convictions pursuant to Rule 12-102(A)(1)
NMRA (directing that appeals from the district courts in which a sentence of life
imprisonment is imposed are taken to the Supreme Court).

II.    DISCUSSION

{11} Defendant challenges his CSP conviction on four grounds: (1) most significantly,
Victim was dead before the alleged CSP, and thus he could not have violated Section
30-9-11; (2) the district court erred by instructing the jury that it could convict even if
Victim was deceased at the time of penetration; (3) his punishment for both CSP and
first-degree murder violates double jeopardy; and (4) there was insufficient evidence of
CSP because there was no physical evidence that corroborated his confession.
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that supports his first-degree
murder conviction. He asserts that the State presented insufficient evidence of
deliberation and also failed to prove that he was sane, or capable of controlling himself,
when he killed Victim and when he later sexually penetrated her body. For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm both of Defendant’s convictions.

A.     CSP Conviction

{12} Defendant presents four challenges to his conviction for third-degree CSP. We
take each in turn.

1.     Legal Sufficiency

{13} Concerning whether the crime of CSP requires the victim to be alive at the time
of penetration, the statute provides, “Criminal sexual penetration is the unlawful and
intentional causing of a person to engage in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or
anal intercourse or the causing of penetration, to any extent and with any object, of the
genital or anal openings of another, whether or not there is any emission.” Section 30-9-
11(A) (emphasis added). It further provides that third-degree CSP is “all criminal sexual
penetration perpetrated through the use of force or coercion not otherwise specified in
this section.” Section 30-9-11(F). Defendant argues that the Legislature’s use of the
term “person” in the statute requires that the victim be alive at the time of penetration.
Thus, Defendant contends, the crime of CSP is a legal impossibility in this case
because Victim was no longer alive.

{14} In resolving matters such as this, we review de novo questions of statutory
interpretation. State v. Almanzar, 

, ¶ 9, 

. New Mexico’s
principles of statutory construction instruct that “[t]he text of a statute or rule is the
primary, essential source of its meaning.” NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-19 (1997). However,
“[i]n addition to looking at the statutory language, we also consider the history and
background of the statute,” and “[t]he plain meaning rule must yield when equity,
legislative history, or other sources demonstrate that applying the plain meaning would
result in a construction contrary to the spirit of the statute.” GandyDancer, LLC v. Rock
House CGM, LLC, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting State v. Smith, 

, 

, 

).

{15} The parties apply the test articulated in State v. Montoya, 

, 

, in support of their respective answers to the question presented. In Montoya,
the defendant robbed and killed the victim, left the scene, and then returned hours later
to empty the victim’s pockets and set fire to the victim’s home with the body inside. Id. ¶
2. The Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for the second robbery of the dead body,
because “the second robbery and the subsequent arson were ‘clean-up’ activities
directly connected with the original robbery and killing, and therefore the second
robbery can rationally be linked to the murder that enabled the robbery.” Id. ¶ 8
(emphasis added). Here, Defendant argues that the CSP was not rationally linked to the
murder, and the State argues that it was.

{16} Because of the distinctions between the purpose and intent of the robbery and
CSP statutes, we decline to extend the Montoya test to our analysis of the CSP statute.
Compare NMSA 1978, § 30-16-2 (1973) (Robbery), with § 30-9-11 (CSP). Instead, a
clearer path to resolving this question is determining the meaning of the word “person”
pursuant to Section 30-9-11(A) in conjunction with the purpose and intent of this specific
CSP statute.

{17} When used within the New Mexico Criminal Code, person is defined as “any
human being or legal entity, whether incorporated or unincorporated, including the
United States, the state of New Mexico or any subdivision thereof.” NMSA 1978, § 30-1-
12(E) (1963). Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary 1376 (11th ed. 2019) defines person as
a “human being.” The term human being is not used in the CSP statute, but it appears
that the Legislature has used the term to describe both a living and a deceased person.
Compare NMSA 1978, § 30-12-13 (1989) (prohibiting defacing of the “place of burial of
any human being”), with NMSA 1978, § 30-2-3 (1994) (“Manslaughter is the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice.”).
{18} Because the CSP statute, § 30-9-11, does not specify whether the word “person”
in Subsection A includes a deceased person in the context of criminal sexual
penetration, we look next to the statute’s “obvious spirit or reason.” See State v. Boyse,

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We
conclude, consistent with precedent, that based on its plain meaning, the purpose of the
CSP statute is to protect against forcible, nonconsensual sexual penetration of a
person’s body.

{19} We have previously determined that “[t]he felonious purpose of CSP—other than
to injure the victim—can be described as the imposition of sexual activity on those who
are not willing participants in fact or in law.” State v. Marquez, 

,

 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Stevens, 2014-NMSC-
011, ¶ 38, 

). That is, “The legislative intent underlying CSP is the
protection of people from unlawful intrusions into enumerated areas of the body.” Id. ¶
20. Similarly, the Court of Appeals has also concluded that “the legislatively-protected
interest under the CSP and [criminal sexual contact] statutes is the bodily integrity and
personal safety of the individual.” State v. Williams, 

, ¶ 9, 

, 

. “The CSP sanction was to prevent forcible, nonconsensual sexual
activity and to protect a person’s important interests in uncoerced choice of sexual
partners.” State v. Jensen, 

, 

, 

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our reading is
consistent with the clear legislative intent to protect a victim’s bodily integrity from
unlawful, coerced intrusions.

{20} The heart of the question therefore rests on whether, under any circumstances,
the protections defined in the CSP statute terminate upon death. To answer this
question, we turn to an analysis of whether the statutory meaning of “the use of force or
coercion” may be read to include killing someone. See § 30-9-11(F). “[F]orce or
coercion” is defined in part as “the use of physical force or physical violence,” “the use
of threats,” and “the perpetration of criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual
contact when the perpetrator knows or has reason to know that the victim is
unconscious, asleep or otherwise physically helpless . . . .” NMSA 1978, § 30-9-
10(A)(1), (2), (4) (emphasis added).

{21} Defendant incorrectly argues that Section 30-9-10(A) “provides an exhaustive list
of circumstances when force or coercion is used against someone unable to physically
consent.” The statute makes clear that “[p]hysical or verbal resistance of the victim is
not an element of force or coercion.” Section 30-9-10(A). Thus, the use of force or
coercion is inherent in the sexual penetration of a victim who is unable to consent.
Rather than excluding additional forms of incapacitation as stated by Defendant, we
apply the canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis, meaning of the same kind, in
concluding that the statutory term “or otherwise physically helpless” was intended to
provide for the limited inclusion of other forms of incapacitation not previously listed.
See State v. Off. of Pub. Def. ex rel. Muqqddin, 

, 

(describing ejusdem generis as requiring “that where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things of a particular and specific meaning, the general
words are not construed in their widest extent but are instead construed as applying to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-20(A)(2) (1997)
(“[T]he meaning of a general word or phrase following two or more specific words or
phrases may be limited to the category established by the specific words or phrases.”).

{22} Although the Court has never directly addressed this issue, other jurisdictions
have predominately concluded that a victim need not be alive to uphold a CSP
conviction. Several of these states base their reasoning, as we do, in death as a form of
incapacitation. See, e.g., Lipham v. State, 

 (Ga. 1988)
(“‘[A]gainst her will’ has been interpreted to mean ‘without her consent,’ and has been
satisfied in cases in which the victim was drugged, asleep, unconscious, or in a coma.
We see no reason why it should be any less applicable in a case in which the defendant
has rendered the victim permanently unconscious by killing her.” (citation omitted)). In
State v. Grunke, the court reasoned that nonconsent “is subject to simple proof when
the victim is a corpse.” 

, 

; see also State v. Brobeck,

 (Tenn. 1988) (concluding that reading “‘live only’ into the statute
encourages rapists to kill their victims”); State v. Solek, 

 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2001) (“Clearly, a person who is deceased is physically unable to communicate
an unwillingness to act.”); State v. Collins, 

 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(“[T]he fact that the victim may have been dead when the [criminal] sexual conduct
occurred does not, in itself, lessen the defendant’s culpability.”).

{23} It is critical to articulate that the CSP statute, § 30-9-11, extends protections to
victims who are unable to express consent. We therefore determine that it would be
contrary to the spirit of the statute to exclude victims who were unable to consent or
resist solely because the perpetrator “rendered the victim permanently unconscious” by
killing the victim. See Lipham, 

. This is true even when the murder
was not committed in direct furtherance of the CSP. Therefore, in circumstances where
the perpetrator rendered the victim physically helpless by killing the victim before
committing the CSP, the deceased victim is a legal person for the limited purpose of
applying the CSP statute. As in situations where the perpetrator causes a victim to
become unconscious through violent means or by deliberate incapacitation using drugs
or alcohol before committing CSP, the perpetrator may not then benefit from the victim’s
inability to consent. Any other result would be contrary to the purpose and intent of the
statute to protect victims from forcible sexual penetration that they did not, or could not,
consent to. We therefore affirm Defendant’s conviction.

{24} Further, ensuring that the law affords due respect and dignity to the dead in
cases where the body of a dead person is sexually penetrated or otherwise used for
sexual purposes where the perpetrator did not first kill the victim is a responsibility that
we invite the Legislature to undertake. At this time, New Mexico law does not prohibit
the act of necrophilia or abuse of a corpse.

2.     The district court’s jury instruction was not error

{25} Defendant objected to all the CSP jury instructions at trial, preserving these for
review on appeal. Defendant also argued that the district court improperly instructed the
jury that a deceased person may qualify as a victim and asks this Court to remand for a
new trial with a “properly instructed jury.” We review preserved jury instructions for
reversible error. See State v. Benally, 

, 

, 

. In doing so, this Court seeks to determine “whether a reasonable juror would
have been confused or misdirected” by the challenged jury instruction. State v.
Cunningham, 

, 

, 

, (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Parish, 

, ¶ 4, 

, 

). “[J]uror confusion or misdirection may stem not only from instructions that are
facially contradictory or ambiguous, but from instructions which, through omission or
misstatement, fail to provide the juror with an accurate rendition of the relevant law.”
Benally, 

.

{26} The district court instructed the jury that CSP “requires a live victim at the time of
penetration because a dead body is not a person unless you are unanimously satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the [CSP] was linked to the [m]urder of [Victim].”
(Emphasis added.) Although the jury instruction reflects the test articulated in Montoya
and not the rule announced herein, we nonetheless hold that it was not error. Because
the jury was instructed on and convicted Defendant of first-degree murder and was
instructed on all elements of third-degree CSP, we conclude that a reasonable juror
would not have been confused or misdirected by the challenged instruction. The verdict
is consistent with the outcome mandated under the rule we have presently announced.

3.     Defendant’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy

{27} Next, Defendant argues that his convictions for CSP and first-degree murder
violate double jeopardy, constituting a “double description” case. A “double-description”
double jeopardy violation can occur when the same conduct results in multiple
convictions under different statutes. State v. Torres, 

, 

.

{28} With regard to our newly announced rule articulating when a deceased person is
a victim pursuant to the CSP statute, Defendant’s convictions rest on unmistakably
distinct conduct. Defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder is based on his act of
stabbing Victim to death, while the CSP conviction is based on his subsequent
nonconsensual sexual penetration of Victim. There is also sufficient evidence that these
offenses were temporally distinct because the record clearly establishes that the killing
of Victim was completed at least one hour before the sexual penetration took place.
This Court’s holding therefore does not invoke the question of double jeopardy.

4.     The State sufficiently established the corpus delicti of CSP

{29} Finally, Defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that
he committed CSP because it failed to establish the corpus delicti, or body of the crime.
The corpus delicti rule requires the State to produce some evidence that a crime has
been committed, in addition to “extrajudicial confessions or admissions of the accused,”
to support a conviction. State v. Weisser, 

, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds as
recognized by State v. Bregar, 

, ¶ 49, 

. This rule has
evolved throughout our judicial history “to prevent the conviction of those who
confessed to non-existent crimes as a result of coercion or mental illness.” David A.
Moran, In Defense of the Corpus Delicti Rule, 

, 817 (2003).

{30} Despite its compelling purpose, many state and federal courts no longer apply
the traditional corpus delicti rule due to concerns that it had become merely a “doctrinal
obstacle[] whereby the guilty can escape just punishment.” State v. Wilson, 2011-
NMSC-001, ¶ 10, 

, 

 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Harris, 

 (Conn. 1990)), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 

, ¶ 37 & n.6, 

. In
Opper v. United States, the Supreme Court considered “the extent of the corroboration
of admissions necessary as a matter of law for a judgment of conviction.” 

 (1954). There, the Supreme Court supplanted the traditional corpus delicti rule with a
modified trustworthiness doctrine. Opper, 

 (“[T]he independent evidence
. . . is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to
justify a jury inference of their truth.”). “The federal trustworthiness doctrine differs from
the traditional corpus delicti rule in that it emphasizes the reliability of the defendant’s
confession over the independent evidence of the corpus delicti.” Wilson, 2011-NMSC-
001, ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{31} New Mexico applies a modified trustworthiness rule: “[A]n extrajudicial statement
may be used to establish the corpus delicti where the statement is shown to be
trustworthy and where there is some independent evidence to confirm the existence of
the alleged loss or injury.” Weisser, 

 (reviewing the rule
announced in State v. Paris, 

, ¶¶ 11, 13, 

, 

).
Although subsequent decisions raised questions as to whether Paris was still the
correct standard, the Paris rule was ultimately adopted by the Court of Appeals in
Weisser, 

, and by this Court in Wilson, 

.
Now, “[u]nder New Mexico’s modern approach, a defendant’s extrajudicial statements
may be used to establish the corpus delicti when the prosecution is able to demonstrate
the trustworthiness of the confession and introduce some independent evidence of a
criminal act.” Wilson, 

 (citing Weisser, 

).
“This independent evidence can consist of either ‘direct or circumstantial evidence, but
such evidence must be independent of a defendant’s own extrajudicial statements.’”
State v. Bregar, 

, 

 (quoting Weisser, 2007-NMCA-
015, ¶ 12).

{32} “We review de novo any claim that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti of
the charged offense, but we take all findings of fact that support a conviction as given if
supported by substantial evidence.” Id.; see also Wilson, 

.
Additionally, “where the determination of the corpus delicti rests on disputed facts, we
will defer to the district court’s findings of fact, provided that such findings are supported
by substantial evidence.” Weisser, 

 (citing State v. Jason L., 2000-
NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 

, 

).
{33} Here, Defendant argues that the State did not prove the corpus delicti of the
crime and asserts that the only evidence of CSP was Defendant’s own statement. No
male DNA was detected on vaginal and anal swabs taken from Victim to corroborate
Defendant’s confession. The State, however, argues that the corpus delicti is satisfied
by independent physical evidence, despite the lack of DNA evidence, and points to the
postmortem condition of Victim’s body lying on the bed, naked from the waist down with
her breasts exposed. The State further asserts that Victim’s position on Defendant’s bed
was “consistent with sexual intercourse.”

{34} Here, this Court recognizes that Defendant’s uncontested schizophrenia
diagnosis likely places him in the category of defendants that the corpus delicti rule was
historically enacted to protect. However, this is not a case “where the defendant’s
confession is so unreliable that there is little or no evidence other than the confession
that a crime has occurred at all.” Moran, supra, at 819. Additionally, this case is
distinguishable from Weisser, where the Court concluded that the corpus delicti was not
met because the only evidence of the crime in addition to the defendant’s statements
was that the child he confessed to having sexual contact with displayed two out of
twelve symptoms corroborative of sexual abuse. 

. Here, the
independent circumstantial evidence is highly corroborative of Defendant’s statement of
events, including his report of moving Victim to his bedroom and his subsequent acts.
Although the independent evidence presented to satisfy corpus delicti must be
assessed on a case-by-case basis when there is no DNA evidence to corroborate a
defendant’s statement, with regard to this case we conclude that the postmortem
condition and location of Victim’s body is sufficient to corroborate the truthfulness of
Defendant’s statements. We accordingly reject Defendant’s corpus delicti challenge.

B.     First-Degree Murder Convictions

{35} We next address Defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence of
his sanity followed by his argument that there was insufficient evidence of deliberation
to support his first-degree murder conviction. See State v. Fekete, 

, ¶¶
1-2, 15, 28, 52, 

, 

 (affirming a schizophrenic defendant’s
conviction of first-degree murder, addressing the defendant’s challenges that included
insufficient evidence of his deliberate intent and the district court’s refusal to instruct the
jury, as requested by the defendant, on diminished capacity from drug withdrawal and
on the verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity”).

1.     Standard of review

{36} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether “any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Holt, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “New Mexico appellate courts will not invade the jury’s province as
fact-finder by second-guess[ing] the jury’s decision concerning the credibility of
witnesses, reweigh[ing] the evidence, or substitut[ing] its judgment for that of the jury.”
State v. Garcia, 

, 

, 

 (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Although our review never
serves as a substitution for the jury’s fact-finding role, it is our duty to scrutin[ize] . . . the
evidence and supervision of the jury’s fact-finding function to ensure that, indeed, a
rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required
for conviction.” State v. Tafoya, 

, 

 (alteration in
original) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Garcia, 

, ¶ 27, 

, 

). In addition, we view “the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Weidler v. Big J Enters., Inc.,

, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

2.     Defendant’s insanity defense

{37} Defendant asks this Court to hold that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence that he was sane at the time the crimes were committed. In any criminal case,
there is an initial presumption that a defendant is sane. See State v. Dorsey, 1979-
NMSC-097, ¶ 3, 

, 

. However, a defendant may rebut the
presumption of sanity by introducing evidence to support an allegation of insanity. Id. ¶
3. “To rebut the presumption of sanity a defendant must only introduce some competent
evidence to support the allegation of insanity.” State v. Lopez, 

, ¶ 4, 

, 

 (citing State v. Hartley, 

, ¶ 7, 

, 

). Once a defendant rebuts the presumption, “[t]he burden then shifts to the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane at the time the act
was committed.” 

 However, “the state [is] not required to affirmatively prove sanity but
could rather rely on the presumption.” State v. Wilson, 

, ¶ 19, 

, 

.

{38} The district court instructed the jury that the State was required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Defendant was sane at the time the crimes were committed.
The jury instruction on sanity directed that the Defendant should be considered “insane
at the time of the commission of the crime if, because of a mental disease, . . .
[Defendant] did not know what he was doing or understand the consequences of his
act; or did not know that his act was wrong; or could not prevent himself from
committing the act.” The only element at issue here is whether Defendant should have
been found insane because he “could not prevent himself from committing the act.”

{39} Our legal tradition has long espoused that, with regard to insanity, “[o]ur
collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame.” Jonas
Robitscher Andrew & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 

 (1982) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Durham
v. United States, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1954), abrogated on other grounds by
United States v. Brawner, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). It is uncontested that
Defendant is schizophrenic, and the record clearly establishes that Defendant lived with
this mental illness, often requiring medical treatment, for decades of his life. However,
“[a] person is not legally insane simply because he suffers from schizophrenia,” and
defendants suffering from mental illness may still retain agency over their actions for
purposes of determining sanity.
               An insanity defense is commonly provided when a mental disease
       or defect impairs an actor’s ability to control his conduct to such an extent
       that he can no longer be fairly held accountable for it.
               . . . Impairment of control . . . is the least dramatic, least compelling
       excusing condition because all persons are regularly exposed to
       pressures and temptations to engage in prohibited conduct. Each of us is
       expected to resist these pressures and temptations. But, if an actor can
       demonstrate that his mental illness created a sufficient compulsion or
       sufficiently impaired his ability to resist the prohibited conduct, then the
       actor should be and generally is excused. He has distinguished his lack of
       control from a [nonmentally ill] person’s failure to control his self-gratifying
       or self-serving urges.

Paul H. Robinson et al., 2 Crim. L. Def. § 173(e)(1), (3) at 301 (1984 and Supp. 2020)
(footnotes omitted). Thus, this case questions whether Defendant’s actions were the
result of the command hallucinations as symptoms of schizophrenia that he was unable
to resist, or of his own volition in furtherance of self-gratification.

{40} Defendant argues that he rebutted the presumption of sanity when Defendant’s
expert testified that Defendant was insane at the time of the murder and was not able to
prevent himself from committing the act because of a strong command hallucination he
experienced at the time. The State’s expert testified that Defendant could have
prevented himself from committing the crimes, and was thus sane, based on
Defendant’s calm demeanor and statements made subsequent to the acts. The State’s
expert also opined that Defendant’s ability to overcome past command hallucinations
and control himself made it more likely that he could have prevented himself from killing
Victim in this case.

{41} Although there was ample evidence of Defendant’s schizophrenia diagnosis and
mental illness, whether he could have prevented himself from committing the acts is
disputed by the party’s experts. It is a well-settled notion that where the evidence is
disputed, it poses a question of fact best decided by the jury. Further, “[i]f the jury . . .
disbelieves the evidence, then the presumption stands.” Id.

{42} Here, after hearing from both experts, the jury determined that Defendant could
have prevented himself from acting and was therefore sane. We conclude that the State
has met its burden by presenting evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that
Defendant could have stopped himself from killing Victim, despite Defendant’s
schizophrenia diagnosis. In particular, the evidence of enjoyment that Defendant
experienced by killing Victim points not to a lack of self-control due to insanity but to an
affirmative indulgence in self-gratification. We therefore decline to upset the jury’s
finding of sanity.

3.     Deliberate intent for first-degree murder

{43} Finally, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he deliberated
and was therefore guilty of first-degree murder. See § 30-2-1(A)(1) (providing that first-
degree murder is a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing”). In contrast, a second-degree murder is murder “committed without such deliberation and premeditation but
with knowledge that the killer’s acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm.” Garcia, 

, ¶ 22. If the evidence indicates only “that the accused
acted rashly or impulsively, rather than deliberately, and if the accused acted
intentionally and without justification or provocation, then the facts would only support
second-degree murder.” State v. Adonis, 

, 

, 

.

{44} To convict on first-degree murder, the jury had to find that Defendant acted with
deliberate intent to take away Victim’s life. Section 30-2-1(A)(1); UJI 14-201 NMRA. The
distinction between a first- and second-degree murder conviction therefore rests on the
definition of deliberate intent. See Tafoya, 

. The jury was
instructed as follows:

              A deliberate intention refers to the state of mind of the defendant. A
       deliberate intention may be inferred from all of the facts and
       circumstances of the killing. The word deliberate means arrived at or
       determined upon as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the
       consideration for and against the proposed course of action. A calculated
       judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time. A mere
       unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is
       not a deliberate intention to kill. To constitute a deliberate killing, the slayer
       must weigh and consider the question of killing and his reasons for and
       against such a choice.

UJI 14-201; see also Tafoya, 

; Adonis, 

.

{45} Defendant maintains that there is not sufficient evidence that he acted with the
deliberate intent to take Victim’s life. In short, Defendant argues that he lacked the
capacity to form deliberate intent due to his mental illness, because he had consumed
three beers, and because the act occurred within a short period of time.

{46} Defendant argues that schizophrenia limited his capacity to form the deliberate
intent to kill required to sustain a first-degree murder conviction. While mental illness
may be a factor considered in the question of deliberation for purposes of a first-degree
murder conviction, the State correctly articulated that Adonis did not hold that
individuals with mental illnesses are always too limited in mental capacity to form
deliberate intent. See Adonis, 

 (asserting that a defendant
may not “rel[y] on a lack of mental capacity to form the intent required to commit” first-degree murder). Here, whether Defendant’s schizophrenia diagnosis hindered his ability
to form deliberate intent to kill Victim was a question properly decided by the fact-finder.

{47} Next, Defendant relies on State v. Garcia, 

, where the Court
determined that there was no evidence to support deliberate intent for first-degree
murder when the defendant had been drinking. In contrast to Garcia, where the
defendant had consumed at least ten beers and three shots of whiskey, id. ¶ 9,
Defendant here only consumed three beers, and there was no evidence that he showed
signs of intoxication. A reasonable jury could have thus found that Defendant’s ability to
form deliberate intent was not hindered by his alcohol consumption.

{48} Last, Defendant argues that the time period in question was too brief to allow for
the formation of deliberate intent. Defendant cites Tafoya, 

,
where this Court vacated a conviction for attempted first-degree murder and remanded
for entry of judgment of attempted second-degree murder and where only “a second or
two at most” passed between the shooting of the first and the second victim. Id. ¶ 52.

{49} While Tafoya does not explicitly hold as Defendant argues that “a killing that
occurred within a short time span is more likely to support a conviction for second-degree murder than deliberate intent [first-degree murder],” Tafoya does discuss the
potentially complex temporal considerations posed by the deliberate intent standard. Id.
¶ 41. However, in Tafoya, this Court concluded, “The notion that careful reasoning can
occur in a short period of time seems somewhat counterintuitive, and rash and
impulsive killings are far more likely to be the product of an expedited decision-making
process than are carefully contemplated killings.” Id.

{50} Despite the brevity of time that passed between when Defendant formed the
intent to kill Victim, or when he “just . . . snapped,” and when Defendant killed victim, we
agree with the State that sufficient evidence of deliberation was presented. After
Defendant developed the intent to kill, he then took conscious steps to walk through his
house to retrieve a knife, address Victim in a theatrical manner saying that he had a
“present” for her, and finally manipulate her neck before stabbing her. Further, the State
points to Defendant’s descriptions of mounting tension between himself and Victim
throughout the week and a half before the killing as evidence of deliberation. Defendant
nevertheless argues that the State’s evidence may be indicative of the intentionality of
the crime but not of careful deliberation.

{51} With regard to the temporal distinction between deliberate intent of first-degree
murder and the “rash impulse” killings categorized under second-degree murder, a short
time period may not be dispositive where there is evidence that a defendant “weigh[ed]
and consider[ed] the question of killing,” UJI 14-201, despite how brief this consideration
may have been. While this Court stated in Tafoya that “rash and impulsive killings” are
often linked to a hasty period of consideration, the inverse reasoning does not
consistently apply. Even a momentary decision can support a conviction for first-degree
murder where there is evidence that a defendant engaged in “careful thought and the
weighing of the consideration for and against the proposed course of action.” UJI 14-
201.

{52} While there may be a time period so short that it necessarily precludes a
defendant’s ability to form deliberate intent, the brevity of the time frame of a purported
deliberation must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Here, we conclude that
sufficient evidence demonstrated that Defendant recognized his desire to kill Victim, had
an awareness of the consequences of the decision before him, and then proceeded to
take multiple steps to implement this decision. Thus, based on our review of the
cumulative evidence and in deference to the jury’s role as fact-finder, we hold that a
reasonable jury could have found that Defendant possessed the requisite level of
deliberate intent to be convicted of first-degree murder, and we affirm his conviction.

III.   CONCLUSION

{53}   Based on the foregoing, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.

{54}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice

WE CONCUR:

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Justice

BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice