Office of the Director New Mexico
15:21:35 2022.03.14 Compilation
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: 2022-NMCA-013
Filing Date: November 2, 2021
No. A-1-CA-37662
KEVIN RAWLINGS,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
MICHELLE RAWLINGS,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY
Angie K. Schneider, District Judge
Certiorari Granted, January 13, 2022, No. S-1-SC-39107. Released for Publication
March 22, 2022.
Law Office of Jane B. Yohalem
Jane B. Yohalem
Santa Fe, NM
Erinna M. Atkins
Alamogordo, NM
Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
Jocelyn Drennan
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Durham, Pittard & Spalding, L.L.P.
Caren I. Friedman
Santa Fe, NM
Egolf + Ferlic + Martinez + Harwood LLC
Kristina Martinez
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
OPINION
DUFFY, Judge.
{1} The dispute in this appeal centers on the nature of the review required by Rule 1-
053.2(H)(1)(b) NMRA, which states that “[i]f a party files timely, specific objections to the
recommendations [of a domestic relations hearing officer], the court shall conduct a
hearing appropriate and sufficient to resolve the objections. The hearing shall consist of
a review of the record unless the court determines that additional evidence will aid in the
resolution of the objections.” Michelle Rawlings (Mother) argues that the district court
erred in failing to hold a hearing on her objections to the domestic relations hearing
officer’s recommendations before entering the final decree of dissolution of marriage
and division of assets, debts, and custody. We agree and reverse.
BACKGROUND
{2} In 2016, Kevin Rawlings (Father) filed a petition for the dissolution of his
marriage to Mother. One of the disputed issues concerned the primary physical custody
of the couple’s two young children. After the parties separated in 2015, Mother moved
with the children to Las Vegas, Nevada, and although Father apparently consented to
the move, the parties dispute whether the move was intended to be permanent. In the
divorce and custody proceedings, Father sought to have the children live with him fulltime in Alamogordo.
{3} The district court referred the case to a domestic relations hearing officer for
hearing and adjudication pursuant to Rule 1-053.2. The hearing officer conducted a
day-long hearing on the merits and submitted his recommendations to the district court.
Of note, the hearing officer recommended joint legal custody, but that the children
should reside primarily with Father in New Mexico. Mother timely filed objections to the
hearing officer’s recommendations and requested a hearing on three issues, including
child custody. Father filed a response to Mother’s objections and asked the district court
to adopt the hearing officer’s recommendations.
{4} Without conducting a hearing, the district court entered a final decree that
adopted the hearing officer’s recommendations in full. The final decree made no
reference to Mother’s objections. Mother initially filed a motion to reconsider, arguing
that the district court violated Rule 1-053.2(H) by entering the final decree without
conducting a hearing and without making an independent determination of Mother’s
objections. Two days later, however, Mother withdrew the motion and filed a notice of
appeal instead. Mother also submitted an emergency motion to stay enforcement of
judgment pending appeal.
{5} The district court held a hearing on Mother’s emergency motion to stay
approximately three weeks later. The district court began the hearing by addressing the
issue of Mother’s objections, stating that it wanted to make a record with regard to the
objections. The district court stated that it viewed the hearing requirement in Rule 1-
053.2(H)(1)(b) as discretionary and had made a determination that a hearing was not
necessary to resolve the objections in this case. The court stated that it adopted the
hearing officer’s recommendations after reviewing the record and the parties’ filings.
{6} After Mother’s attorney made a brief record of why he believed a hearing was
required, Father’s attorney argued that the district court had, in fact, conducted a
hearing pursuant to Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) because the court had reviewed the record
and made an independent determination to adopt the hearing officer’s
recommendations. Father characterized the omission as a clerical mistake and made an
oral motion to amend the final decree pursuant to Rule 1-060(A) NMRA to reflect that
the court had reviewed the objections, made an independent review of the record, and
determined that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. The district court agreed and
granted Father’s oral motion.
{7} The district court entered an amended final decree, which differed from the
original decree only in that it stated the district court had “conducted an independent
review hearing under [Rule] 1-053.2(H)(1)(b), which included proper review of [Mother’s]
Objections, an independent review of the record, an independent determination that an
additional evidentiary hearing and oral argument was unnecessary,” and that it “made
an independent determination to approve and adopt the Recommendations of the
Hearing Officer.” The amended final decree also expressly denied Mother’s objections.
Mother appeals.
DISCUSSION
{8} The issue presented in this appeal requires us to interpret a rule of civil
procedure, a matter we review de novo. See Becenti v. Becenti, 2004-NMCA-091, ¶ 6,
136 N.M. 124,
94 P.3d 867. “We approach the interpretation of rules adopted by the
Supreme Court in the same way that we approach the interpretation of legislative
enactments, by seeking to determine the underlying intent[.]” State v. Miller, 2008-
NMCA-048, ¶ 11,
143 N.M. 777,
182 P.3d 158. “We first look to the language of the
rule, and if the rule is unambiguous, we give effect to its language and refrain from
further interpretation.” Rodriguez ex rel. Rodarte v. Sanchez,
2019-NMCA-065, ¶ 12,
451 P.3d 105 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). We also seek
guidance from the rule’s history and background, see Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-
001, ¶ 11,
267 P.3d 806, and when dealing with a rule that has been amended, as is the
case with Rule 1-053.2, “the amended language must be read within the context of the
previously existing language, and the old and new language, taken as a whole,
comprise the intent and purpose of the statute or rule.” Rodriguez,
2019-NMCA-065,
¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “When the Supreme Court amends
its rules, we presume it is aware of this Court’s and its own existing interpretations of
the rules and that it intends to change or clarify existing law governing procedural
practice in state courts.”
Id.
I. Rule 1-053.2
{9} Rule 1-053.2 sets forth the procedure a district court must follow after receiving a
domestic relations hearing officer’s recommendations. The subsection of the rule at
issue in this appeal was added in 2006 following this Court’s decision in Buffington v.
McGorty, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 29-30,
136 N.M. 226,
96 P.3d 787, which held that due
process requires that parties be given an opportunity to submit objections to a hearing
officer’s report and recommendations and outlined the procedure for addressing them.
We begin with an overview of our holding in Buffington as it informs our understanding
of the subsequent amendments to the rule.
{10} Before Buffington, Rule 1-053.2 addressed only the duties and powers of
domestic relations hearing officers and “did not provide a means for a party who
disagreed with the recommendations of the hearing officer to voice those objections to
the judge who was to consider whether to adopt the recommendations.” Rule 1-053.2
comm. cmt.; see also Buffington, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 30 (noting that the prior version of
Rule 1-053.2 “contain[ed] no express provision giving the parties a right to object to the
report and recommendations of the hearing officer”). We took issue with this aspect of
the former rule, holding that “it is required that the parties be given an opportunity to
submit objections to a hearing officer’s report and recommendations. This is
fundamental to the due process concept of having an opportunity to be heard by a
judicial officer.” Buffington,
2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 30.
{11} Buffington also discussed the necessity of holding “a hearing on the merits of the
issues before the [district] court, including the hearing officer’s recommendations and
the parties’ objections thereto.” Id. ¶ 31. While noting that the nature of the hearing and
review to be conducted is discretionary, Buffington stated that “the record of the hearing
held before the district court must demonstrate that the court in fact considered the
objections and established the basis for the court’s decision.” Id. This process, the Court
noted, “is implicit in the requirement of the Rule that all orders must be signed by a
district judge before the recommendations of a domestic relations hearing officer
become effective[,]” and serves two important functions. Id. (alteration, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted). First, “the parties are assured that the issues
have been decided by a judge vested with judicial power.” Id. (noting that “[t]he hearing
officer assists the district court in determining the factual and legal issues, and the core
judicial function is independently performed by the district judge”). Second, “an
appropriate record is made to allow for appellate review of the district court’s decision.”
Id.
{12} The New Mexico Supreme Court subsequently amended Rule 1-053.2 and
codified the common law requirements announced in Buffington as express provisions
in the rule. Rule 1-053.2 now provides a comprehensive procedure for district court
proceedings after the court receives the domestic relations hearing officer’s
recommendations. It states:
[T]he court shall take the following actions:
(1) Review of recommendations.
(a) The court shall review the recommendations of the domestic
relations hearing officer and determine whether to adopt the
recommendations.
(b) If a party files timely, specific objections to the
recommendations, the court shall conduct a hearing appropriate and
sufficient to resolve the objections. The hearing shall consist of a review of
the record unless the court determines that additional evidence will aid in
the resolution of the objections.
(c) The court shall make an independent determination of the
objections.
(d) The court may adopt the recommendations, modify them, reject
them in whole or in part, receive further evidence, or recommit them to the
domestic relations hearing officer with instructions.
(2) Findings and conclusions; entry of final order. After the
hearing, the court shall enter a final order. When required by Rule 1-052
NMRA, the court also shall enter findings and conclusions.
Rule 1-053.2(H) (emphases added).
II. The Hearing Requirement
{13} With this history in mind, we turn to the parties’ competing interpretations of the
hearing requirement in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b). Mother argues that the rule plainly
requires the district court to “conduct a hearing,” a term that connotes a court session
where the district court will hear arguments or take evidence. Father argues that a court
session is not required and states that in some circumstances, “an appropriate hearing
consists of a thorough review of the written record.” The parties’ differing views stem
from the fact that they assign different meanings to Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b)’s second
sentence—construing it either as a statement that the hearing need not be evidentiary,
as Mother argues, or a definition of the term “hearing,” as Father argues. As we explain,
Mother’s interpretation is the most plausible expression of the drafter’s intent, and we
adopt it here.
{14} We begin by examining the language used in the in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b), giving
the words their ordinary meaning. See Flores v. Herrera, 2016-NMSC-033, ¶ 8,
384
P.3d 1070. At the outset, we note that although the phrase “conduct a hearing” is
ubiquitous in cases, statutes, and rules, we have found no authority construing or
defining what it means generally. New Mexico courts have previously considered what it
means to “hear” a case and have concluded that “the district court is not necessarily
required to conduct an adjudicatory hearing in order to ‘hear’ a case, although it may if it
so desires.” N.M. Transp. Dep’t v. Yazzie,
1991-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 11-12,
112 N.M. 615,
817 P.2d 1257 (evaluating what “shall hear the case” means according to NMSA 1978,
Section 66-8-112(G) (1991, amended 2015)). This Court noted in Yazzie that
“ ‘[h]earing’ has been defined in older New Mexico decisions as every step where the
judge is called upon to rule for or against any party.”
1991-NMCA-098, ¶ 12. We drew
the definition from State ex rel. Shufeldt v. Armijo,
1935-NMSC-078,
39 N.M. 502,
50
P.2d 852, overruled on other grounds by Gray v. Sanchez,
1974-NMSC-011, ¶ 12,
86
N.M. 146,
520 P.2d 1091, where the New Mexico Supreme Court evaluated whether an
affidavit seeking to disqualify a district court judge was timely filed under the
disqualification statute then in force. The statute required the affidavit to be filed at least
ten days before the beginning of the court’s term, “if said case is at issue.” Id. ¶ 11
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court had previously interpreted
the quoted phrase to mean “an action or proceeding to be tried or heard.” Id. ¶ 12
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court adopted a
broad definition for “tried or heard,” stating:
A hearing is contemplated. Whether such hearing be on a motion,
demurrer, plea, or answer is immaterial. It is a hearing on an “issue.” In a
broad sense, a hearing includes every step therein where the judge is
called upon to rule for or against any party to the cause. It is the judicial
examination of the “issue” in the broad sense that is contemplated by [the
disqualification statute].
Id. ¶ 13. The Court then held that an affidavit is timely only if filed before the district
court has made any ruling on any litigated or contested matter whatsoever in the case.
Id. ¶ 14.
{15} In the few unpublished cases that have since applied this definition, none have
considered what it means to “conduct a hearing,” nor have they addressed a rule or
statute that specifically requires the district court do so. See Britton v. Off. of Att’y Gen.,
2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 24,
433 P.3d 320 (stating that “[t]he general rule is that cases are
not authority for propositions not considered”). We agree with Mother, however, that the
common understanding of the phrase is that parties are afforded an opportunity to
appear before the judge and present argument. That understanding finds support in
both the legal and the nonlegal definitions of the term “hearing.” See Hearing, Black’s
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “hearing” as “[a] judicial session, [usually] open
to the public, held for the purpose of deciding issues of fact or of law, sometimes with
witnesses testifying”); Hearing, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hearing (last visited Sept. 28, 2021) (defining “hearing” as
“listening to arguments”); see also State v. Rogers,
1926-NMSC-028, ¶ 24,
31 N.M.
485,
247 P. 828 (noting that “Webster’s New International Dictionary defines ‘hearing’
as ‘a listening to facts and evidence, for the sake of adjudication’ ”); Lopez v. K. B.
Kennedy Eng’g Co.,
1981-NMCA-011, ¶ 5,
95 N.M. 507,
623 P.2d 1021 (collecting
definitions of “hearing” from other jurisdictions, including that “[a] hearing ordinarily is
defined, in matters not associated with full trials, as a proceeding in which the parties
are afforded an opportunity to adduce proof and to argue, in person or by counsel, as to
the inferences flowing from the evidence” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
{16} While the ordinary and usual meaning of a word or phrase is an important
consideration in the construction of a rule, Blue Canyon Well Ass’n v. Jevne, 2018-
NMCA-004, ¶ 9, 410 P.3d 251, we must determine whether our Supreme Court
intended a different meaning in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b)’s second sentence, which states,
“The hearing shall consist of a review of the record unless the court determines that
additional evidence will aid in the resolution of the objections.” According to Mother,
“[t]he second sentence of the rule implies that at the required hearing, the district court
may decide whether to take evidence.” Father acknowledges the same, writing that
“[t]he [r]ule establish[ed] a presumption that new evidence need not be taken unless the
district court finds that the particular circumstances . . . demand an evidentiary hearing.”
However, Father also argues that “[t]he [c]ommittee [c]ommentary makes clear . . . that
the ‘hearing’ referred to in Buffington ‘need not always consist of oral presentations
before the court.’ When written objections and responses have been submitted and the
nature of the objections do not require either additional evidence or oral argument for
their resolution, an appropriate hearing consists of a thorough review of the written
record.”
{17} The committee commentary states:
Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) . . . mandates a hearing to consider the
recommendations and the objections. The Buffington [C]ourt noted that
the nature of the hearing and review to be conducted by the district court
will depend upon the nature of the objections being raised. Rule 1-
053.2(H)(1)(b) . . . provides this flexibility but creates a presumption that
the hearing will consist of a review of the record rather than a de novo
proceeding. However, the court has discretion in all cases to determine
that a different form of hearing take place, including a de novo proceeding
at which evidence is presented anew before the court, or a hearing partly
on the record before the hearing officer and partly based on the
presentation of new evidence not before the hearing officer. The required
hearing need not always consist of oral presentations before the court.
When appropriate and sufficient to resolve the objections, the court may
rely on written presentations of the parties. See Nat[’]l Excess Ins[.] Co. v.
Bingham, 1987-NMCA-109, ¶ 9,
106 N.M. 325,
742 P.2d 537 (noting that
summary judgment motions may be resolved without oral argument “when
the opposing party has had an adequate opportunity to respond to
movant’s arguments through the briefing process”).
Rule 1-053.2 comm. cmt. (emphases added) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted).
{18} Like the committee commentary, Father relies on National Excess as support for
the proposition that oral argument is not required. For several reasons, we perceive a
conflict in applying our holding in National Excess to interpret Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b).
See State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 10 n.1,
135 N.M. 621,
92 P.3d 633 (stating that
“committee commentary is not binding authority” and will yield to controlling authority in
the event of a conflict). National Excess dealt specifically with a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 1-056 NMRA—a rule that contains no express requirement that
the district court conduct a hearing to resolve the motion. Thus, our holding that “the
court may, but is not required to, hold an oral hearing” posed no conflict with the rule
itself. Nat’l Excess Ins. Co.,
1987-NMCA-109, ¶ 9. And while we used the term “oral
hearing,” there is nothing in our holding to suggest that the district court’s review of the
parties’ written submissions somehow constituted a “hearing.” See
id. On the contrary,
the authority we relied upon for our holding recognizes that a local federal rule “permits
the trial judge to dispense with a hearing at his discretion.” Nolan v. C. de Baca,
603
F.2d 810, 812 (10th Cir. 1979); see also Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co.,
557 F.
Supp. 549, 556 (D.S.D. 1983) (“[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 56(c) does not
mandate a hearing, and one was not required when the file contains substantial legal
memoranda and discovery matters, and when no request for a hearing was made prior
to the ruling.”). Consequently, our holding in National Excess does not stand for the
proposition that a court can “conduct a hearing” by reviewing the written record; it
stands for the proposition that in some circumstances, a hearing is not required at all.
Given these distinctions, we are not persuaded that written objections filed pursuant to
Rule 1-053.2(G) can or should be given the same treatment as a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 1-056.
{19} Our own evaluation of the rule’s language leads us to conclude that Father’s
interpretation would lead to an absurd result. If we were to construe the second
sentence of Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) to mean that a district court “conducts a hearing” by
“conducting a review of the record,” then the mandatory language in that sentence—
“The hearing shall consist of a review of the record unless the court determines that
additional evidence will aid in the resolution of the objections”—would mean that the
district court cannot conduct anything other than a record review unless the court
determines that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. This limitation would prevent the
court from conducting more informal types of hearings where argument, but not
evidence, is presented. Put differently, this interpretation would foreclose parties from
appearing before their judge unless the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is
necessary. Such an interpretation runs counter to the flexibility envisioned by this Court
in Buffington, and we find no indication that our Supreme Court intended to curtail the
district court’s discretion in such a manner when it amended Rule 1-053.2(H).
{20} To be sure, interpreting Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) to always require a hearing also
constrains a district court’s discretion, but that interpretation better aligns with the
language and purpose of our holding in Buffington and the corresponding rule changes.
At bottom, the procedural changes articulated in Buffington were designed to ensure
that parties had an avenue to address objections to a hearing officer’s report and
recommendations with the district court. As this Court noted, hearing officers assist the
district court in determining the factual and legal issues presented in domestic relations
cases, but the core judicial function must always be performed by the judge. Buffington,
2004-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 30-31. Even so, by rule, domestic relations hearing officers may
perform any duties assigned by the judges of the district in domestic relations
proceedings, see Rule 1-053.2(A), and in practice, hearing officers may field all
hearings in domestic relations cases, up to and including the final merits hearing, as the
two-and-a-half-year record in this case demonstrates. Rule 1-053.2(C). When
Buffington articulated that parties have a right to raise objections to the hearing officer’s
recommendations with the district court, this Court also provided that the district court
must conduct a hearing on the objections, thus ensuring that the parties have an
opportunity to appear before the district judge at least once before the court reaches a
final decision on contested matters. This allows the parties to engage with the judge
directly during the final, critical stage of their case when the judge performs the “core
judicial function” required by Buffington.
2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31. This is not
inconsequential when the objections involve matters of fundamental concern, such as
custody of the parties’ children or long-term financial obligations.
{21} Viewed in this light, construing Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) to require a hearing, rather
than a file review, on objections to a hearing officer’s recommendations in domestic
relations cases is not unreasonable. Indeed, this sort of judicial session is precisely
what this Court described in Buffington when we said that “[t]he district court must then
hold a hearing on the merits” and that “the record of the hearing held before the district
court must demonstrate that the court in fact considered the objections and established
the basis for the court’s decision”—statements that indicate a party’s objections would
be addressed on the record in a judicial proceeding. 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31 (emphases
added). 1
{22} Ultimately, it is for the district court to determine the nature and the extent of the
hearing so long as the court ensures, at a minimum, that the parties are permitted to
appear on the record to address the merits of the objections. Buffington, 2004-NMCA-
092, ¶ 31. As the committee commentary makes clear, the district court has inherent
discretion to determine whether it will conduct the merits hearing de novo, whether new
evidence may be introduced, or whether the hearing will simply consist of a less formal
nonevidentiary, on-record proceeding. 2
1The dissent disagrees with this analysis, concluding that the plain language interpretation of the term
“hearing” is contrary to the intent and purpose of Buffington and imposes a “new requirement” that will
result in delay and waste of judicial resources. On the first point, this Court in Buffington and our Supreme
Court in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) used a specific and commonly understood term to describe the district
court’s duties after receiving objections—both Courts stated that the district court must “hold” or “conduct”
a “hearing.” If either Court had intended that a district court could rule based only on the parties’ written
submissions, they could have said so plainly using any number of other terms—such as that the district
court shall “consider,” “review,” or even “hear” a party’s objections—but they did not, and we must give
effect to the specific language chosen by our Supreme Court and used in the rule.
The dissent’s second point—that this Court is imposing a “new” requirement that will unduly burden the
district courts’ dockets—is grounded in the premise that district courts may not be conducting the type of
proceedings described in this opinion already. The fact is, we have no data beyond the record in this
case, and we are therefore in no position to determine whether the mandate in the current rule is
impractical for the system as a whole. In our view, that determination is best made through the committee
rulemaking process.
2Given our holding that a hearing is required by the rule itself, we need not address the parties’
arguments regarding whether a hearing is otherwise required by due process considerations.
III. The District Court Erred by Not Conducting a Hearing
{23} Turning to the proceedings at issue in this case, the parties do not dispute that
the district court’s initial final decree failed to comport with the requirements of Rule 1-
053.2. The final matter we address is Father’s contention that the October 1 hearing
and the amended final decree corrected the problem.
{24} The October 1 hearing was noticed to address Mother’s emergency motion for a
stay. Before turning to that motion, the district court stated that it wanted to make a
record with regard to the court’s adoption of the hearing officer’s recommendations. The
district court stated first that Rule 1-053.2 did not require a hearing. The court then
stated that it had reviewed the record, the hearing officer’s recommendations, Mother’s
objections, and Father’s response, and “made a determination that a hearing was not
necessary . . . to resolve anything.” The district court did not address the merits of
Mother’s objections or discuss the basis of its decision other than to say that “the
objections really were a disagreement with what [the] hearing officer . . . ruled” and,
more generally, that the court’s review of the record supported the hearing officer’s
recommendations. See, e.g., Buffington, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31 (stating that the record
of the hearing must establish the basis for the court’s decision). The district court
allowed Mother’s attorney to make a record of why he believed a hearing was
necessary but did not afford him the opportunity to substantively address the merits of
Mother’s objections.
{25} On the whole, the October 1 hearing did not function as a hearing on the merits
of Mother’s objections and was thus insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 1-
053.2(H)(1)(b) and Buffington, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31. Because the hearing requirement
is mandatory in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) and as a prerequisite to the court’s entry of a final
order, see Rule 1-053.2(H)(2) (“After the hearing, the court shall enter a final order.”
(emphasis added)), we reverse the district court’s entry of both the initial and amended
final decree.
{26} Further, because our holding on this issue is dispositive, we do not reach the
remaining issues raised in Mother’s appeal concerning the district court’s jurisdiction to
amend the final decree after Mother’s notice of appeal and whether Mother received an
adequate opportunity to object to the form of order. See, e.g., Living Cross Ambulance
Serv., Inc. v. N.M. Pub. Regul. Comm’n, 2014-NMSC-036, ¶ 1,
338 P.3d 1258.
CONCLUSION
{27} We reverse the district court’s entry of the initial and amended final decree of
dissolution of marriage and division of assets, debts, and custody and remand this case
to the district court to conduct a hearing on the merits of Mother’s objections.
{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge
I CONCUR:
SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
BOGARDUS, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
{29} Although I concur in the result of the majority opinion, I do so because I believe,
based on the specific facts at issue, that the district court did not comply with Rule 1-
053.2’s requirement that the district court consider a party’s objections and
independently determine them. See Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b), (c). I write separately
because I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the language of the
rule requires an in-person hearing every time a party files objections to a domestic
relations hearing officer’s recommendations. In my view, the majority misreads the rule,
gives little weight to the analysis in Buffington, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 31-32, and does not
give sufficient consideration to a district court’s broad discretion to manage its docket.
The majority’s construction of the rule in this case, a rule that has been in place for
many years, will result in wasted judicial resources, increased costs to litigants, and
cause needless delay in those cases in which a party’s objections can easily be
disposed of with review of the record without further oral argument by the parties. My
opinion is also informed by the nature of domestic relations cases where delay caused
by the necessity for an in-person hearing can be especially harmful in the context of
child custody issues and may encourage gamesmanship among the parties.
IV. Reversing and Remanding Is Appropriate in This Case
{30} As the majority’s opinion describes, the district court initially entered its order
adopting the hearing officer’s recommendations without comment and without reference
to Mother’s objections. There is no evidence in the district court’s final decree that it
considered and made an independent determination of Mother’s objections at that time.
After the hearing on Mother’s emergency motion to stay the enforcement of judgment,
the district court’s amended final decree acknowledged Mother’s objections but did not
adequately establish its reasoned basis for denying the objections, because the
amended final decree’s only addition was to state that it complied with the requirements
of Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b), without sufficiently demonstrating that the district court had
performed the necessary judicial function of reviewing the objections, the record, and
making an independent determination. See Lujan ex rel. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-
NMCA-036, ¶ 19, 135 N.M. 285,
87 P.3d 1067 (expressing “grave concern if . . . district
judges are presented with stick noted orders that they automatically sign” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Buffington,
2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31 (emphasizing
that a district court exercises its core judicial function by considering a party’s objections
to a hearing officer’s recommendations and establishing the basis for its decision before
signing an order based on those recommendations). The district court’s actions in this
case provide sufficient basis for reversing and remanding for further proceedings
because the procedure followed by the district court did not comply with the applicable
rule nor with the intent of Buffington. See Rule 1-053.2(H); Buffington,
2004-NMCA-092.
{31} The rule requires that the district court independently “review the
recommendations of the domestic relations hearing officer and determine whether to
adopt the recommendations.” Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(a). Although “[t]he nature of the
hearing and review to be conducted by the district court will depend upon the nature of
the objections being considered[,]” the district court must demonstrate that it reviewed
the objections and arrived at a reasoned basis for its decision. Buffington, 2004-NMCA-
092, ¶ 31. Because of the district court’s failure in this regard, demonstrated by its initial
lack of review and its cursory review in response to Mother’s motion to reconsider, I
agree with the majority’s conclusion that reversing and remanding for a hearing to
consider Mother’s objections is appropriate.
V. Rule 1-053.2(H) Does Not Require an In-Person Hearing in Front of a Judge
to Resolve a Party’s Objections to Recommendations by the Hearing
Officer
{32} My fundamental disagreement with the majority’s view is with its analysis of Rule
1-053.2(H)(1)(b), which, according to the majority, requires an in-person hearing to
resolve a party’s objections to a hearing officer’s recommendations. The rule
emphasizes that generally, once a party files timely and specific objections, the district
court has broad discretion to decide the nature of the hearing necessary to resolve a
party’s objections to a hearing officer’s recommendations. See id. (“[T]he court shall
conduct a hearing appropriate and sufficient to resolve the objections.” (emphasis
added)). The rule continues by specifying that the hearing “shall consist of a review of
the record[.]”
Id. The plain language of these two clauses establish that the hearing
must be “appropriate and sufficient,” yet does not require in-person attendance of the
parties.
Id. The rule then explains that such an appropriate and sufficient hearing “shall
consist of a review of the record unless the court determines additional evidence will aid
in the resolution.”
Id.
{33} The majority contends that the rule’s language restricts the district court’s
discretion so that an in-person hearing, for example, to entertain further legal argument,
is foreclosed unless additional evidence is necessary to make its determination. I
disagree that the clause is so limiting, when considered with the previous sentence that
establishes the court’s broad discretion to fashion the appropriate type of hearing
necessary under the circumstances to resolve the objections. In my opinion, the
limitation described by the phrase “shall consist of a review of the record” establishes
that district court’s review is limited to the record created by the hearing officer, that is,
the evidence and argument on which the hearing officer based the recommendations.
{34} This portion of the rule contains no language that prohibits the district court from
holding an in-person hearing, if it so chooses, to discuss the record before it and to
consider the parties’ arguments relating to the evidentiary record developed by the
hearing officer, even if the district court determines that additional evidence is not
necessary. This construction of Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) is also in harmony with another
section, Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(d), which grants the district court additional discretion to
accept, modify, reject some or all, receive further evidence, or send all or some of the
recommendations back to the hearing officer with instructions. In sum, Rule 1-
053.2(H)(1) is crafted to allow the district court maximum flexibility in handling
objections to a hearing officer’s recommendations, whether that means relying solely on
the parties’ written submissions, setting an in-person hearing to entertain additional
argument and/or obtain further evidence, modifying the hearing officer’s
recommendations, or by sending the recommendations back to the hearing officer for
further proceedings. The rule’s overall emphasis on judicial discretion is consistent with
my interpretation that an in-person hearing is not required.
{35} To read the rule as the majority does, that is, to require an in-person hearing in
front of the judge any time objections are raised to a hearing officer’s recommendations,
fails to give sufficient weight to the broad discretionary power granted in the first
sentence of Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) and in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1) generally. Such discretion
is vital in domestic relations matters in particular, given the reliance on hearing officers
to consider and make recommendations on a number of issues throughout the
progression of such cases, which typically have multiple, significant issues to decide. In
this case, for example, before making the final recommendations on child custody,
support, and property division, the hearing officer made recommendations to the court
regarding a motion for bifurcation and reserving legal issues for trial and regarding a
dispute over summer visitation. In even more complicated domestic relations cases than
this one, the hearing officer’s recommendations could be numerous and extensive,
raising the possibility that many in-person hearings will be necessary to resolve
objections, which will have an impact on the court’s docket and the timeliness of
scheduling hearings. Construing this rule as the majority does, in my view, is contrary to
the intent of the rules governing civil litigation. See Rule 1-001(A) NMRA (noting that the
rules of civil procedure are to be construed to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action”).
{36} My analysis of the rule is also consistent with the concerns raised and the
analysis provided in Buffington, which recognized that flexibility in application of this
portion of the rule is necessary when it noted that “[t]he nature of the hearing and review
to be conducted by the district court will depend upon the nature of the objections being
considered[,]” so long as the procedure used demonstrates to the parties “that the
issues have been decided by a judge vested with judicial power and an appropriate
record is made to allow for appellate review.” 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31. Interpreting Rule
1-053.2(H)(1)(b) to require an in-person hearing every time objections are raised is
contrary to Buffington’s support for a flexible procedure that should be tailored by the
court to the particular situation.
{37} The majority states that “[u]ltimately, it is for the district court to determine the
nature and extent of the hearing, so long as the court ensures, at a minimum, that the
parties are permitted to appear on the record to address the merits of the objections.”
Maj. Op. ¶ 22. Based on this interpretation, nothing prevents a district court, however,
from complying with this requirement by holding a very brief hearing, allowing the
objecting party a minimal opportunity to state objections, and then rendering its
decision. In that way, the new requirement created by the majority in this opinion would
be satisfied, with little additional benefit to the parties, but with the attendant delay,
expense, and use of resources associated with the requirement of holding an in-person
hearing.
{38} For these reasons, I concur in the result only and respectfully dissent from the
majority’s analysis.
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
