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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: 2022-NMCA-027
Filing Date: March 15, 2021
No. A-1-CA-37827
ELIZABETH WALLBRO, Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF
MARY Y.C. HAN, Deceased,
Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
KURT NOLTE, M.D., in his
official capacity as Chief Medical
Investigator of the Office of the
Medical Investigator,
Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
David K. Thomson, District Judge
Certiorari Granted, April 19, 2022, No. S-1-SC-38773. Released for Publication June
21, 2022.
Serra & Garrity, P.C.
Diane Garrity
Santa Fe, NM
Vega Lynn Law Offices, LLC
Rosario D. Vega Lynn
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Melendres & Melendres, P.C.
Paul Melendres
Linda Melendres
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
OPINION
MEDINA, Judge.
{1} In these consolidated appeals, Kurt Nolte, M.D., in his official capacity as Chief
Medical Investigator of the Office of the Medical Investigator (Respondent) appeals the
district court’s grant of a writ of mandamus directing Respondent to amend its manner
of death determination on a death certificate for decedent Mary Y.C. Han (Han).
Elizabeth Wallbro (Petitioner), sister and personal representative of the Estate of Han
(Han Estate), appeals the district court’s denial of attorney fees pursuant to the
issuance of the writ of mandamus. We reverse the district court’s grant of a writ of
mandamus and affirm its denial of attorney fees.
BACKGROUND
{2} In November 2010, personnel from the Albuquerque Fire Department and
officers of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) responded to a call and located
the body of Han in the driver’s seat of a vehicle inside the garage of her home. After
securing the garage, officers entered the house to ensure no other individuals were
inside and immediately noticed strong vehicle exhaust fumes throughout.
{3} The officers then spoke with Paul Kennedy who discovered Han inside her
vehicle and was still at the scene when they arrived. After speaking with Mr. Kennedy,
Officers took a visual inventory of the scene and then called a field investigator1 and
Respondent. Before the field investigator or Respondent arrived on scene, two other
officers arrived and began walking through the house and garage. More individuals—
including high ranking APD officers and civilians—arrived throughout the course of the
field investigation. In total, approximately fifty to sixty officers and civilians were on
scene and moving between the house and garage during Respondent’s investigation.
{4} After completing its field investigation, Respondent conducted an autopsy and
concluded that Han’s manner of death was suicide caused by inhalation of carbon
monoxide in the enclosed garage. On December 23, 2010, Dr. Ross Reichard, the
forensic pathologist who performed Han’s autopsy, certified that “[on] the basis of
examination and/or investigation, in [his] opinion,” the manner of Han’s death was
suicide. Wallbro, acting as personal representative of the Han Estate, disputed
Respondent’s manner of death determination and filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
requesting in part and in the alternative that the district court:
A. Issue a writ of mandamus requiring [Respondent] to conduct a proper,
fair, impartial and complete investigation into the cause and manner of
the death of . . . Han;
B. Order that the cause and manner of death of . . . Han be reopened,
reexamined and reevaluated
1Field investigators specialize in documentation and collection of evidence including taking photos and
processing the scene for fingerprints.
. . . . [or]
D. Order that the death certificate be amended to “undetermined” as the
manner of the death of . . . Han.
{5} The district court did not issue a writ. Instead, the court issued a summons.
Respondent in turn filed a motion to dismiss asserting that Petitioner failed to
demonstrate “(1) . . . standing to bring this action; (2) [that] Respondent has a clear
legal duty to perform what is requested; (3) the performance sought is ministerial and
not discretionary; and (4) a writ is an appropriate remedy.” Petitioner filed a response to
the motion to dismiss and Respondent filed a reply.
{6} The district court denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding that: (1)
“Petitioner does not have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law”; (2) “Petitioner is
beneficially interested based on the allegations contained in the [w]rit”; and (3) “there
exists a material question and a mixed question of law and fact as to what . . .
Respondent’s discretionary acts are as raised in the [p]etition.”
{7} Respondent subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that
mandamus cannot lie because there were no material issues of fact in dispute regarding
the discretionary nature of the relief sought by Petitioner. The district court denied the
motion, and in its order stated that questions regarding the nature of Respondent’s duty
and whether there exists an adequate remedy of law were issues of fact for trial. The
district court further stated that Petitioner’s experts’ opinions on Respondent’s protocols
and whether the protocols were followed during Han’s autopsy were also disputed
issues of fact for trial.
{8} The district court held two evidentiary hearings on the petition. The purpose of
the first hearing was to determine whether Respondent’s “actions or duties raised in the
[p]etition [were] mandatory and/or ministerial or whether they [were] discretionary.” Six
witnesses testified during the first hearing including Dr. Werner Spitz, Dr. David
Williams, Dr. Kris Sperry, Dr. Ross Zumwalt, Dr. R. Ross Reichard by deposition, and
Respondent.
{9} Petitioner presented the testimony of Dr. Spitz, who was accepted as an expert
in forensic pathology. Dr. Spitz testified that the word “opinion” in the certified statement
on Han’s death certificate meant that it was “the opinion of the person that sign[ed] this
document . . . what he or she believed, to the best of their knowledge, based on ground
rules, medical and forensic, to be the cause and manner of death.” Dr. Spitz noted that
there were deficits in the investigation such that, in his opinion, Han’s manner of death
should have been classified as undetermined. Of great significance to Dr. Spitz was
Respondent’s failure to collect and analyze Han’s computer. 2 According to Dr. Spitz,
“many times” people leave suicide notes or other information on their computers.
2At the scene, Mr. Kennedy described the laptop as his firm’s property and asked for its return. At the
direction of Deputy Chief Banks, an officer handed the computer to Mr. Kennedy who walked away with it.
{10} Dr. Williams testified as an expert in emergency medicine and carbon monoxide
toxicity as it applies to the clinical analysis of a manner or cause of death; he conceded,
however, that he lacked the credentials to offer an opinion as to autopsy procedure. Dr.
Williams explained why, after meeting with Respondent, he made a formal appeal of the
Office of the Medical Investigator’s (OMI’s) findings in this case. Specifically, he stated
that he found it odd that the autopsy did not reveal tissue or organ damage given the
level of carbon dioxide in Han’s system. Dr. Williams also described an instance in
which he identified the manner of death on a death certificate as accidental and natural
and affirmed that he refused OMI’s request to delete “accidental” because it was his
medical opinion that both applied. In addition, he confirmed that he would refuse a
judicial directive to change a manner of death determination if it was inconsistent with
his opinion.
{11} Dr. Sperry, accepted by the district court as an expert in forensic pathology,
disagreed with OMI’s determination of Han’s manner of death. Specifically, Dr. Sperry
took issue with deficits in the investigation such as the lack of investigation into Han’s
computer. He explained that forensic pathology relies on parallel investigations to
garner information beyond what is found through autopsy and toxicology. Still, Dr.
Sperry agreed that a forensic pathologist must use discretion when determining manner
of death and that cause and manner of death are statements of opinion.
{12} In addition to the experts testifying at trial, the deposition testimony of Dr.
Reichard was admitted as an exhibit. Dr. Reichard testified that he performed Han’s
autopsy and that his determination of suicide as the manner of death was a matter of
opinion rendered to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
{13} At the conclusion of the first hearing, the district court entered an order in which it
concluded in part that Petitioner is a beneficially interested party because the estate has
a quasi-due process right in Han’s body; 3 consistent with its regulations, Respondent
had a nondiscretionary duty to issue a death certificate for the cause and manner of a
person’s death; and “[a]t the very least [Respondent] has a ministerial duty to correctly
analyze and determine the cause of death based on alleged facts of death.” Having
found that Respondent’s determination of manner of death is a ministerial act, the
district court held a second hearing to determine whether Respondent determined the
manner of death in accordance with its ministerial duties.
{14} During the second hearing, APD officers described the investigative scene and
testified that members of the public as well as other high ranking APD and city officials
inundated the scene. Testimony revealed that some evidence was not collected during
the investigation and that the scene was otherwise compromised.
3The district court relied on Geiges v. Rosko, 49 Pa. D. & C.3d 61 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1987). In Geiges, the
Pennsylvania court acknowledged, “the special rights of the next of kin regarding a decedent’s remains.
These rights include custody of the body, control of the burial and the right to contest an exhumation
and/or autopsy.” Id. at *65 (citations omitted).
{15} Based on the evidence at both hearings, the district court concluded that
Respondent acted arbitrarily and capriciously and not in accordance with law because
substantial evidence did not support its conclusion as to manner of death and therefore
Respondent abused his discretion. In concluding that Respondent’s determination of
manner of death is a ministerial act, the district court relied on NMSA 1978, Section 24-
14-21(A) (1981), of the Vital Statistics Act to find that Respondent had a duty to “apply
the facts surrounding the death of Ms. Han in a manner and in accordance with
evidentiary requirements.” The district court then found that the spoliation of evidence at
the scene impacted Respondent’s ability to satisfy the evidentiary requirement of
Section 24-14-21(A). 4 The district court applied the standard of review for administrative
decisions and found that Respondent abused its discretion because “its conclusions of
manner of death lacks foundation, a reasonable basis in fact, and is arbitrary and
capricious.” 5 Having found that Respondent’s manner of death determination was
arbitrary and capricious, the district court ruled that “[a]pplication of [m]andamus is
appropriate due to the fact that a clear abuse of discretion has occurred.” The district
court ultimately determined that because of the evidentiary issues raised, “only a
conclusion of ‘undetermined’ is factually and legally supported.”
{16} Consequently, the district court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing
Respondent to “amend the [d]eath certificate for . . . Han to change the manner of death
from ‘suicide’ to ‘undetermined’ ” and denied Petitioner’s request for attorney fees.
Respondent and Petitioner each filed separate appeals, which we consolidated.
DISCUSSION
{17} Whether the district court appropriately granted the writ of mandamus directing
Respondent to amend the death certificate informs our review of Petitioner’s appeal of
the denial of attorney fees. For this reason we first evaluate the propriety of the writ of
mandamus and then the district court’s denial of attorney fees.
Mandamus
{18} Mandamus proceedings are technical in nature and strictly regulated by statute.
See Kerpan v. Sandoval Cnty. Dist. Att’ys Off., 1988-NMCA-007, ¶ 6,
106 N.M. 764,
750 P.2d 464 (observing that “[m]andamus proceedings are technical in nature”). The
statutes regulating mandamus proceedings can be found at NMSA 1978, Sections 44-2-
1 to -14 (1884, as amended through 1899). See § 44-2-1 (stating that a “writ of
mandamus is regulated as prescribed [by Chapter 44, Article 2]”). Section 44-2-5
4Section 24-14-21(A) states that “[t]he certificate shall be registered subject to evidentiary requirements
as prescribed by regulation to substantiate the alleged facts of death.” However, applicable sections of
the New Mexico Administrative Code do not set out specific evidentiary requirements. See 7.3.2.11 to .13
NMAC.
5As we understand the record, the district court applied its whole record review in part to determine
whether Respondent relied on sufficient evidence to overcome a presumption against suicide articulated
in Solorzano v. Bristow,
2004-NMCA-136, ¶ 10,
136 N.M. 658,
103 P.3d 582. In Solorzano this Court
considered suicide as a defense to a wrongful death claim. Id. ¶ 14. In that context this Court held that
suicide should be treated as an affirmative defense requiring some proof of intent. Id.
provides that a “writ shall not issue in any case where there is a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It shall issue on the information of the
party beneficially interested.”
{19} The purpose of mandamus is “to compel a public officer to perform an affirmative
act where, on a given state of facts, the public officer has a clear legal duty to perform
the act and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of the law.” Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 2006-NMCA-093, ¶ 11,
140 N.M.
168,
140 P.3d 1117. A writ of mandamus “may be issued to any inferior tribunal . . . to
compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office[.]” Section 44-2-4. A writ of mandamus, however, will not lie to control
discretion lawfully vested in the official functions of a state official. See Territory ex rel.
Castillo v. Perea,
1900-NMSC-026, ¶ 12,
10 N.M. 362,
62 P. 1094 (“It is not the
province of a writ of mandamus to control the discretion of an officer, where a discretion
is vested in him.”); El Dorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 1976-NMSC-
029, ¶ 5,
89 N.M. 313,
551 P.2d 1360 (holding that mandamus is not appropriate to
“direct the performance of the particular act from among two or more allowed
alternatives”). “Mandamus is a drastic remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary
circumstances.” Brantley Farms v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist.,
1998-NMCA-023, ¶ 12,
124
N.M. 698,
954 P.2d 763.
{20} There are two requirements for mandamus to issue: (1) “the petitioner must
establish a clear legal right to the performance of the duty sought to be enforced”; and
(2) “the act to be compelled must be ministerial constituting a nondiscretionary duty
which the respondent is required to perform.” Kerpan, 1988-NMCA-007, ¶¶ 9, 10. “A
‘ministerial duty’ arises only when the law directs that a public official must act when a
given state of facts exists.” Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co.,
2006-NMCA-093, ¶ 11. Acts
and duties performed by a public official “are no less ministerial because the public
official, upon whom the duty is enjoined, may have to satisfy himself as to the existence
of facts necessary to require his action[.]” El Dorado at Santa Fe, Inc.,
1976-NMSC-029,
¶ 5. However, when a public official refuses to act after such a determination is made,
mandamus is the proper remedy and mandamus will issue to compel acts committed to
their discretion if the law requires them to act.
Id. Conversely, “ ‘[d]iscretion’ . . . has
been defined as the power or right conferred upon an individual to act according to the
dictates of one’s own judgment and conscience.” Kerpan,
1988-NMCA-007, ¶ 14.
{21} “[T]he grant or denial of a petition for writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion.” State ex rel. Stapleton v. Skandera, 2015-NMCA-044, ¶ 5,
346 P.3d
1191. “A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is contrary to logic and reason,
or if it exceeds the bounds of reason, all the circumstances before it being considered.”
FastBucks of Roswell, N.M., LLC v. King,
2013-NMCA-008, ¶ 7,
294 P.3d 1287 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). “Within the abuse of discretion standard we
consider whether the district court’s ruling rested on its determination that [Respondent]
acted [outside of its] statutory authority and exercised [its] discretion under statute.”
Stapleton,
2015-NMCA-044, ¶ 5. “That issue presented requires the interpretation of
statutes. Thus, our review is de novo.”
Id.
{22} We distill Respondent’s arguments into two dispositive issues: (1) whether
petitioner had standing, and (2) whether mandamus can direct a particular discretionary
finding. We address each in turn.
Standing
{23} Respondent asserts that the district court erred in granting standing to Petitioner.
Specifically, Respondent argues that Petitioner is not a beneficially interested party in
the death certificate and New Mexico jurisprudence does not expand “a cause of action
based in tort, to encompass a quasi-due process right in the determination of manner of
death[.]” Petitioner responds that the district court properly determined that she had
standing because she has a quasi-property interest in Han’s body that extends to the
manner of death determination on Han’s death certificate and thus is a beneficially
interested party. We need not determine whether a quasi-property right in a dead body
creates standing to challenge the manner of death determination on a death certificate
because, even if we assume without deciding that it does, we hold that the district court
erred in concluding that the determination of manner of death itself was a ministerial
duty subject to mandamus. We explain.
Duty Clearly Enjoined by Law/Ministerial
{24} Respondent contends the district court erred in finding that determinations on the
manner of death are ministerial acts because such determinations are medical opinions.
In support of this position, Respondent directs this Court to the language on “the death
certificate itself” 6 and testimony adduced during the hearing.
{25} “In determining whether mandamus will lie, the court must look to the purpose of
the statutory scheme to discover whether the duty sought to be compelled is ministerial
or discretionary.” Kerpan, 1988-NMCA-007, ¶ 15. The Vital Statistics Act requires OMI
to investigate, determine, and certify causes of death. NMSA 1978, § 24-14-20(F)
(2009). It states in pertinent part “[w]hen death occurs without medical attendance . . .
the case shall be referred to the state medical investigator for investigation to determine
and certify the cause of death.” Id.
{26} The use of the term “shall” in Section 24-14-20(F) indicates that the Legislature
intended to impose a mandatory duty to refer deaths that occur without medical
attendance to OMI, which must then conduct an investigation to determine and certify
the cause of death. See N.M. Dep’t of Health v. Compton, 2000-NMCA-078, ¶ 11,
129
N.M. 474,
10 P.3d 153 (recognizing that “when the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, it must be given effect by the courts” and in general “ ‘use of the word
“shall” imposes a mandatory requirement’ ” (omission omitted)) (quoting Redman v. Bd.
of Regents,
1984-NMCA-117, ¶ 17,
102 N.M. 234,
693 P.2d 1266); see also NMSA
1978, § 12-2A-4(A) (1997) (“ ‘Shall’ and ‘must’ express a duty, obligation, requirement
6The certifying language on the death certificate states, “On the basis of examination and/or
investigation, in my opinion this death occurred at the time, date and place due to the cause(s) and
manner stated.”
or condition precedent.”); Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co.,
2006-NMCA-093, ¶ 11
(explaining that a ministerial duty arises only when the law directs that a public official
must act when a given state of facts exist).
{27} OMI’s own regulations incorporate the duty to investigate, determine, and certify
the cause of reportable deaths in 7.3.2.8 NMAC. Pursuant to this regulation of the
Administrative Code, OMI is required in part to:
A. receive all reports of sudden, unexpected or unexplained deaths;
B. respond to all sudden, unexpected or unexplained deaths;
....
F. conduct an investigation leading to the determination of the cause
and manner of death;
....
H. certify the cause and manner of death; forward written certification
to designated agencies;
....
P. maintain records of each official death investigation and provide
reports to official agencies.
7.3.2.8 NMAC (emphasis added).
{28} Regulation 7.3.2.13(B) of the New Mexico Administrative Code additionally
provides that:
The office of the medical investigator is responsible for the completion of
the certificate in all deaths reported to that office in which jurisdiction is
assumed. This certification is to the cause (the anatomic condition causing
death) and the manner (accident, suicide, accidental, homicide). The
cause and manner of death shall be finally determined by the designated
pathologist, in accordance with the findings and recommendations of the
district and deputy medical investigators.
{29} Based on the unambiguous language of Section 24-14-20(F) in addition to the
OMI’s own regulations, we agree that Respondent’s duty to investigate, determine, and
then certify the manner of death on a death certificate, is a ministerial one. Here, it is
undisputed that OMI responded to a sudden, unexplained death at the Han residence,
investigated, determined, and certified the cause and manner of Han’s death on the
death certificate. In so doing, we conclude that Respondent fulfilled the ministerial
duties identified in Section 21-14-20.
{30} However, the mandamus order in this case went beyond directing Respondent to
fulfill the ministerial duties of investigating, determining, and certifying the cause and
manner of death and ordered Respondent to change its medical opinion of the manner
of death from “suicide” to “undetermined.” This directive exceeded the proper bounds of
mandamus because Respondent’s conclusion as to manner of death is not a ministerial
act. Rather, based on the record before us, we hold that it is an opinion reached through
the exercise of discretion.
{31} For example, Dr. Spitz testified that when a medical examiner identifies a manner
of death on a death certificate, the examiner is not making a ruling but merely rendering
an opinion to the Vital Statistics Bureau as to how the death should be statistically
coded. Dr. Spitz explained that the classification of manner of death on a death
certificate represents what the signator believes, to the best of the person’s knowledge,
based on his or her education, medical training, experience in the field, and reasoning.
Similarly, Dr. Sperry testified that a forensic pathologist uses discretion when
determining manner of death and that cause and manner of death are statements of
opinion. Additionally, Dr. Williams noted that he once refused to change his manner of
death determination on a death certificate because he believed he had an ethical
obligation as a doctor not to change his opinion. And, Dr. Reichard testified that his
determination of Han’s manner of death was an opinion based on a reasonable degree
of medical probability.
{32} We previously considered the difference between determinations of the manner
of death and the cause of death when we addressed the admissibility of a death
certificate to prove cause of death in Corlett v. Smith, 1988-NMCA-067, ¶¶ 24-29,
107
N.M. 707,
763 P.2d 1172. This Court held that the cause of death determination in
death certificates is a factual finding and therefore admissible under the vital statistics
exception to the hearsay rule. In coming to the holding, we distinguished between
determinations of cause of death and manner of death, recognizing that “[m]ost
jurisdictions hold that death certificates are admissible as evidence of cause of death.
Courts will not, however, readily admit death certificates as evidence of the manner of
death, e.g., ‘suicide’ or ‘accidental,’ deeming that conclusion not a fact, but an opinion.”
Id. ¶ 26. Our discussion in Corlett acknowledges the distinction between a factual
finding and a determination that requires a degree of discretion, as was the case here.
{33} Based on the controlling statutory and regulatory language, further buttressed by
the testimony of the medical experts, we conclude that Respondent’s determination as
to the manner of death is a discretionary determination, in which mandamus cannot be
used to direct a specific outcome. See Perea, 1900-NMSC-026, ¶ 12 (observing that a
writ of mandamus will not control the discretion of an officer where a discretion is vested
in him or her); State ex rel. Castillo Corp. v. N.M. State Tax Comm’n,
1968-NMSC-117,
¶ 16,
79 N.M. 357,
443 P.2d 850 (stating that “the purpose of mandamus is to compel,
not control”); El Dorado at Santa Fe, Inc.,
1976-NMSC-029, ¶ 5 (observing that a writ of
mandamus cannot be used to direct the performance of a particular act from among two
or more allowed alternatives). Because New Mexico case law generally prohibits use of
mandamus to control or interfere with the valid exercise of discretion by a state official,
the issuance of the mandamus order in this case directing Respondent to change its
medical opinion as to manner of death was error.
{34} To the extent the district court relied on out-of-state mandamus authority to
review Respondent’s “suicide” opinion, contrary to our own New Mexico authority cited
previously, we conclude the district court erred in doing so. New Mexico’s writ of
mandamus relies on the New Mexico Constitution, state statute, and an abundance of
jurisprudence from our Supreme Court stretching back over one hundred years. It is not
for this Court to deviate from such clear direction. Given our New Mexico authority
instructing that mandamus is inappropriate to direct a specific determination where the
discretion to make that determination is vested in the public officer, we are reluctant to
adopt a new approach to mandamus. See El Dorado at Santa Fe Inc., 1976-NMSC-029,
¶ 5. However, we observe that legal avenues other than mandamus do exist to
challenge administrative decisions for being arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or
unsupported by substantial evidence, but we express no opinion as to whether a writ of
certiorari might have been appropriate in this case. See Rule 1-075 NMRA.
{35} Therefore, because Respondent’s determination of a decedent’s manner of
death is an opinion amongst more than two options, i.e., undetermined, suicide,
accidental, or homicide, there is no question the discretion to identify the manner of
death is vested in Respondent. See 7.3.2.13(B) NMAC. We therefore hold that the
district court abused its discretion in directing Respondent to amend the manner of
death from “suicide” to “undetermined.”
Attorney Fees
{36} Petitioner appeals the district court’s denial of attorney fees arguing in part that
this Court should apply a public policy exception to the American Rule dictating that,
absent statute or rule of court, parties are responsible for their own litigation costs.
Petitioner also argues that this Court should expand awards of attorney fees as
damages in civil litigation cases where public policy is at issue. However, Petitioner’s
arguments necessarily require that Petitioner be the prevailing party. Because we
conclude that the district court improperly granted mandamus in this case and reverse
the court’s peremptory writ, Petitioner is not a prevailing party; thus, we do not address
these arguments.
CONCLUSION
{37} For the foregoing reasons we reverse the peremptory writ of mandamus and
affirm the denial of attorney fees.
{38} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge
WE CONCUR:
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Judge Pro Tempore
