J-A11007-24
2024 PA Super 178
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RYAN A. CASTANEIRA :
:
Appellant : No. 1481 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-21-SA-0000107-2023
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: AUGUST 12, 2024
Ryan A. Castaneira appeals from the $25 fine imposed following his
conviction of one count of unlawful activities, a summary offense in violation
of 75 Pa.C.S. § 4107(b)(2), relating to the window tint on his vehicle. We
affirm.
The trial court recounted the factual and procedural history of this
matter as follows:
On January 10, 2023, Officer Jonathan Dudek of the
Hampden Township Police Department was on patrol within the
bounds of his jurisdiction in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania,
when he encountered a 2017 Honda Accord driving on the
roadway. Officer Dudek observed that the vehicle in question had
a window tint which appeared to be darker than that permitted by
law, and he performed a traffic stop to further investigate the
matter. [The degree of tint did not completely obscure his ability
to see through the window.] After pulling over the Honda Accord,
Officer Dudek identified the driver as Appellant.
As part of the stop [and without obtaining a search warrant
or asking for permission], Officer Dudek performed a light
transmittance test of the tinted passenger-side front window,
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revealing that it allowed a light transmittance of 31%, which is
below the 70% light transmittance required by statute and
regulation. Officer Dudek informed Appellant of the nature of the
violation, and provided him with both a warning and the
opportunity to remove the offending window tint within five days
in order to avoid being cited. After being allowed to leave the
scene with the warning and grace period intact, Appellant called
Officer Dudek to inform him that he was not interested in
removing the window tint. That statement led to Officer Dudek
citing Appellant for violation of § 4107(b)(2).
The initial summary trial in this matter was held by the
magisterial district court on May 15, 2023, following which
Appellant was found guilty . . . . A timely summary appeal was
filed by Appellant on June 8, 2023, and the trial de novo was heard
by this court on September 18, 2023. . . .
Relevant to this appeal, Appellant was found guilty of
violating § 4107(b)(2) and sentenced to pay a $25 fine and the
costs of prosecution. Following his conviction . . . , Appellant filed
a motion for reconsideration, arguing that his conviction was
improper. Because reconsideration was not expressly granted,
there was no stay of the appeal period and Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal to the Superior Court on October 18, 2023.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/23, at 3-5 (internal footnotes omitted).
The trial court ordered Appellant to file a statement of errors pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and he complied. The court thereafter issued a
responsive opinion. Appellant presents the following six issues for our review,
which we have reordered for ease of disposition:
I. Whether the trial court erred by imposing a sentence under
[§ 4107(d)] when the Commonwealth failed to adduce any
evidence that Appellant was operating a motor carrier vehicle
or a bus?
II. Whether window tint that satisfies the exemption in
[§ 4524(e)(1)] is a legally sufficient, sole reason to initiate a
traffic stop?
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III. Whether window tint that satisfies the exemption stated in
[§ 4524(e)(1)] exempts one from prosecution under the theory
that the same window tint can violate a window tint regulation
promulgated by PennDOT under § 4524?
IV. Whether Table X referenced by 67 Pa.Code § 175.67 (Glazing),
promulgated under the authority of, inter alia, [§ 4524(e)], can
criminalize window tint that meets the exemption set forth
under § 4524(e)(1)?
V. Whether the charging instrument was insufficient as a matter
of law by alleging a violation of [§ 4107(b)(2)] by alleging only
“(PF) 31% LIGHT TRANSMISSION – FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
WARNING ISSUED ON 1/10/23”?
VI. Whether the lower court erred by holding that the
Commonwealth was not required to obtain a search warrant
prior to subjecting his window tint to an analysis using a light
transmission meter that must be placed on the inside of the car
if that same window tint meets the statutory exemption set
forth in [§ 4524(e)(1)]?
Appellant’s brief at 5-6 (cleaned up).
In his first claim, Appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence
of guilt because he was not operating either a motor carrier vehicle or a bus
at the time of the offense, and that he therefore could not have been
sentenced to pay a $25 fine. See Appellant’s brief at 13-16. We consider this
position mindful of the following well-settled standard of review:
When reviewing a [sufficiency] claim, we face a question of law.
Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the
verdict winner, and we draw all reasonable inferences therefrom
in the Commonwealth’s favor. Through this lens, we must
ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all of the elements
of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of
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wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, we may not weigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. Any
doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that,
as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221, 1223 (Pa.Super. 2023)
(cleaned up).
Appellant’s issue also requires us to interpret § 4107 and other
provisions of the Vehicle Code. This likewise presents a question of law, and
therefore our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.
See Vellon v. Dep't of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 292
A.3d 882, 890 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). Statutory interpretation is conducted
in accordance with the Statutory Construction Act:
Pursuant to that Act, “[t]he object of all statutory interpretation
and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). When
the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter
of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit. Id. § 1921(b). When, however, the words of
a statute are not explicit, a court may discern the General
Assembly’s intent by examining considerations outside of the
words of the statute. Id. § 1921(c). In addition, when construing
a statute, we must, if possible, give effect to all of its provisions.
Id. § 1921(a).
The Statutory Construction Act also instructs that, in ascertaining
the intention of the General Assembly in enacting a statute,
several presumptions may be used. Id. § 1922. Among those
presumptions is that “the General Assembly intends the entire
statute to be effective and certain.” Id. § 1922(2). We also may
presume that the General Assembly does not intend absurd or
unreasonable results. Id. § 1922(1). As this Court wisely stated
over sixty years ago, to avoid such results, we “must read
[statutes] in the light of reason and common sense.” Ayers v.
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Morgan, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (Pa. 1959). [Further], we may
presume that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the
Constitution of the United States or this Commonwealth. 1
Pa.C.S. § 1922(3).
Id. at 890 (citations altered). We additionally observe that our legislature has
directed that statutes that are in pari materia, i.e., that “relate to the same
persons or things or to the same class of persons or things[,]” must “be
construed together, if possible, as one statute.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(a), (b).
Appellant was convicted of violating § 4107 of the Vehicle Code, which
provides as follows in pertinent part:
(b) Other violations.--It is unlawful for any person to do any of
the following:
....
(2) Operate, or cause or permit another person to operate,
on any highway in this Commonwealth any vehicle or
combination which is not equipped as required under this
part or under department regulations or when the driver is
in violation of department regulations or the vehicle or
combination is otherwise in an unsafe condition or in
violation of department regulations.
....
(d) Penalty.--
(1)(i) [With exceptions not relevant here], a person who
operates a motor carrier vehicle or a bus in violation of
subsection (b)(2) commits a summary offense and, upon
conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $25 per
violation, except that the minimum fine for a violation not
related to driver’s hours of service which causes the driver
or the vehicle to be placed out of service under section
4704(c) (relating to inspection by police or Commonwealth
personnel) shall be $50 per violation. The maximum fine
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which may be levied on the basis of multiple charges filed
together shall be $500.
....
(2)(i) [With exceptions not relevant here], a person who
causes, permits, requires or otherwise allows another
person to operate a motor carrier vehicle or a bus in
violation of subsection (b)(2) commits a summary offense
and, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $50
per violation, except that the minimum fine for a violation
not related to driver’s hours of service which causes the
driver or the vehicle to be placed out of service under
section 4704(c) shall be $100 per violation. The maximum
fine which may be levied on the basis of multiple charges
filed together shall be $1,000.
75 Pa.C.S. § 4107.
By its plain language, § 4107(b)(2) makes it a violation to operate any
vehicle that is not in compliance with promulgated department regulations. A
vehicle is defined as “[e]very device in, upon or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices
used exclusively upon rails or tracks.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 102. As will be discussed
infra, the references to motor carrier vehicles and buses in subsection (d) does
not limit the applicability of subsection (b), but rather provides penalties
specific to operators of those types of vehicles.
Appellant’s citation arose due to the tint on his windows, which is
addressed in the following regulation concerning glazing for passenger cars:
(d) Obstructions. A vehicle specified under this subchapter shall
have glazing free from obstructions as described in § 175.80
(relating to inspection procedure).
....
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(4) A sun screening device or other material which
does not permit a person to see or view the inside of
the vehicle is prohibited, unless otherwise permitted
by FMVSS No. 205, or a certificate of exemption has
been issued in compliance with § 175.265 (relating to
exemption provisions). See Table X for specific
requirements for vehicles subject to this
subchapter. Passenger car requirements
relating to the rear window are delineated by
vehicle model year in Table X.
67 Pa.Code § 175.67(d) (emphasis added).
In turn, Table X states that with respect to passenger cars year 1998 or
newer, an acceptable light transmittance level for the front side
windows/wings, rear side windows/wings, and rear windows are all 70%. See
67 Pa.Code 175, Table X.
Also relevant to this issue is § 6502(b) of the Vehicle Code, which
provides for penalties and disposition of fines relating to summary offenses:
(b) Violations of regulations.--It is a summary offense for a
person to violate any provision of any regulation promulgated
under the authority of this title. A person convicted of violating
any provision of a regulation promulgated under the authority of
this title shall pay the fine established in the section of this title
on which the regulation is based or, if no fine is established in that
section of this title, the fine shall be $25.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(b).
With this background in mind, we now turn to Appellant’s argument. He
claims that he could not be sentenced for violating § 4107(b)(2) because he
was not driving either a bus or motor carrier vehicle at the time he was issued
the citation. See Appellant’s brief at 14. Appellant points to the penalty
provision in subsection (d), noting that it applies only when a person operates
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or causes another to operate one of those two types of vehicles. Id.
Additionally, he interprets § 6502(b) as requiring that any penalty arising from
a violation of § 4107 must be sentenced in accordance with § 4107(d), since
it establishes a specific fine therein. Id. Appellant concludes that as the
penalty provision does not apply to his conduct since he was driving a personal
vehicle, he therefore could not be fined pursuant to either § 4107 or § 6502.
Id. at 16.
In addressing this issue, the trial court reviewed the language of
§ 4107(b)(2), noting that it applies if a person operates “any vehicle . . .
when the driver is in violation of department regulations[.]” Trial Court
Opinion, 11/29/23, at 7 (emphasis in original). It reasoned that Appellant
was driving a “vehicle” as defined within the Vehicle Code, and that a plain
reading of the statute means that it would apply to Appellant while he was
operating his Honda Accord. Id. at 10. For its part, the Commonwealth adds
that the specific penalty provision found within § 4107(d) is not pertinent in
this case, so that we must default to § 6502, which generally permits
imposition of the $25 fine imposed upon Appellant for violating a promulgated
regulation. See Commonwealth’s brief at 11-12.
Upon review, we find that the evidence supports Appellant’s conviction
of unlawful activities. It is clear that Appellant was in violation of § 4107(b)(2)
because (1) he operated a vehicle and (2) the tint on his windows only
permitted light transmittance of 31%. This is not compliant with the
promulgated regulations, specifically 67 Pa.Code § 175.67, which incorporates
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Table X and calls for a minimum level of 70% light transmittance. Thus, to
the extent Appellant generally challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain his conviction, he is not entitled to relief.
Additionally, we conclude that the trial court appropriately sentenced
Appellant to pay a $25 fine for this violation. We reject Appellant’s claim that
he may only be sentenced if he was driving a bus or motor carrier vehicle.
Section 4107(b)(2) plainly prohibits a person driving any vehicle from doing
so in a way that violates a regulation. The penalty provision found within
subsection (d) is a targeted and enhanced penalty that applies in limited
circumstances, such as if the operator was driving a bus or motor carrier
vehicle. Were we to adopt Appellant’s interpretation of the statute, we would
render ineffective the General Assembly’s decision to use the words “any
vehicle” in § 4107(b)(2) and convert the offense into one that governs a
narrow subsect of drivers. This is an “unreasonable result” that we will not
endorse. See Vellon, 292 A.3d at 890.
Instead, we read § 4107 as a whole, enumerating a violation for conduct
and providing an enhanced penalty under certain circumstances, such as when
the conditions of subsection (d) are satisfied. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(a), (b).
As the Commonwealth suggests, when, as here, this penalty provision is not
triggered, we must apply § 6502(b), which authorizes imposition of a $25 fine
generally when a driver operates a vehicle in violation of a promulgated
regulation. This interpretation of § 4107 satisfies our duty to read statutes
“in the light of reason and common sense” and to give effect to the plain
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language of all its parts. See Vellon, 292 A.3d at 890. Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in either convicting Appellant of
violating § 4107(b)(2) or imposing the instant fine based on this claim.
We address Appellant’s next three issues together. Therein, he asserts
that Officer Dudek’s mere observation of a window tint did not give him an
adequate basis upon which to perform a traffic stop, and that Appellant could
not be convicted of § 4107 because he purportedly fulfilled exemptions
contained within other provisions of the Vehicle Code. See Appellant’s brief
at 16-25, 29-33. Although these claims involve different procedural postures,
they are connected by a common thread in that they all concern the interplay
between § 4107, 67 Pa.Code § 175.67, the regulation discussed above, and
§ 4524, a provision under which Appellant was neither charged nor convicted.
Since these issues again require us to interpret statutes, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review plenary. See Vellon, 292 A.3d at
890.
The relevant portion of § 4524 states as follows: “No person shall drive
any motor vehicle with any sun screening device or other material which does
not permit a person to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the
windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e).
The thrust of Appellant’s argument in these claims is that this subsection
specifically prohibits a window tint that does not permit a person to see into
the vehicle, and accordingly it overrides the more general provision found at
§ 4107, which relies upon a general reference to regulations. See Appellant’s
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brief at 16-18. In the same vein, he highlights a portion of the regulation at
67 Pa.Code § 175.67, noting that it “make[s] it clear that unless the threshold
condition of not permitting one to see or view the interior of the vehicle is not
met, the statutory proscription and regulation simply don’t apply, regardless
of a Table X.” Id. at 18. As such, for police to stop a driver and cite him with
respect to a window tint, it must be done in accordance with § 4524(e), or in
other words, when the officer cannot see through the window. Id. at 21.
Appellant correctly recounts that in this case, Officer Dudek’s testimony
established that he could see into Appellant’s vehicle. Id. Based on this,
Appellant concludes that the officer had no basis to stop him, and likewise that
his conviction cannot stand since his conduct did not violate either the
regulation found at 67 Pa.Code § 175.67 or § 4524(e).
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court noted that Appellant’s
contentions appear to rely in part upon the principle of the “general/specific
rule,” wherein a more specific statute trumps a more general one unless there
is express indication to the contrary from the legislature. See Trial Court
Opinion, 11/29/23, at 13. The court noted that this rule has been abrogated,
and instead our case law delineates that a person may be charged with
multiple violations of the Vehicle Code based upon a single act or series of
acts. Id. at 14 (citing Commonwealth v. Kriegler, 127 A.3d 840 (Pa.Super.
2015)). Therefore, it found that Appellant could be convicted of violating
§ 4107(b)(2), despite engaging in conduct that does not run afoul of
§ 4524(e).
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Additionally, the trial court, Appellant, and the Commonwealth all
discuss our decision of Commonwealth v. Brubaker, 5 A.3d 261 (Pa.Super.
2010), with respect to these issues. There, the Commonwealth charged the
defendant with violating § 4524(e) when the window tint measured 36.6%
light transmittance. The trial court found the defendant guilty, holding that
although the testifying officer could see into the vehicle, the level of tint
nevertheless violated PennDOT’s regulation. This Court reversed, concluding
that by its language, § 4524 did not make any reference to or otherwise
incorporate any regulations identifying light transmittance requirements,
including Table X. Accordingly, because the officer could see into the vehicle,
the Commonwealth did not prove one of the required elements of § 4524(e).
See Brubaker,
5 A.3d at 265-66. Although it did not expressly indicate so,
the Brubaker Court suggested that in order to rely upon PennDOT’s glazing
and window tint requirements, the Commonwealth would need to charge a
person with violating § 4107(b)(2), as it did in this case, not § 4524(e).
After careful review, we conclude that Appellant’s conviction withstands
his challenges herein. First, to the extent that Appellant’s claim asserts that
he could not be convicted of § 4107 simply due to the existence of another
provision addressing window tints, he is mistaken. As the trial court noted,
the “general/specific rule” has been abrogated and the Commonwealth may
charge Appellant with any and all applicable violations of the Vehicle Code,
even if they arise from a single act. See Kriegler, 127 A.3d at 844.
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Further, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s interpretation of 67
Pa.Code § 175.67, namely that it allows invocation of Table X only in the event
a person cannot see through a window tint. While that regulation does
expressly make it a summary violation for a vehicle to have a window tint that
does not permit visibility inside, just like § 4524(e), it does more. It
additionally states, “[s]ee Table X for specific requirements for vehicles
subject to this subchapter. Passenger car requirements relating to the rear
window are delineated by vehicle model year in Table X.” 67 Pa.Code
§ 175.67. Table X, in turn, articulates the specific light emittance
requirements for passenger vehicles, such as Appellant’s.
By its plain language, this regulation prohibits tints that either prevent
a person from seeing into the vehicle or do not comply with Table X. As this
Court alluded to in Brubaker, since § 4107(b)(2) references regulations and
thereby extends to Table X by incorporation, it is the appropriate mechanism
for charging violations for window tints that do not allow adequate light
transmittance. Thus, there was no error in the trial court finding Appellant
guilty of violating § 4107(b)(2), despite the officer being able to see through
the windows. The trial court likewise did not err in concluding that Officer
Dudek had sufficient justification to initiate a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle
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based on a perceived window tint violation, as the officer had reasonable
suspicion of the violation.1 No relief is due.
In his next issue, Appellant claims that “the charging instrument was
insufficient as a matter of law” pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 403.2 See Appellant’s
brief at 10. We have stated that “[t]he interpretation of and the application
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure present questions of law for
which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Kemick, 240 A.3d 214, 219 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation
omitted).
Rule 403 enumerates the requirements for citations issued as to
summary offenses. Pertinent to Appellant’s claim, the rule requires “a citation
of the specific section and subsection of the statute or ordinance allegedly
____________________________________________
1 As part of this claim, Appellant compares this case to Commonwealth v.
Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021), wherein our High Court determined that “the
odor of marijuana alone does not amount to probable cause to conduct a
warrantless search of a vehicle, [but] rather, may be considered as a factor in
examining the totality of the circumstances.” Appellant’s brief at 24 (citing
Barr, 266 A.3d at 44). Appellant contends that similarly, “the presence of
window tint alone cannot form the requisite probable cause to initiate a traffic
stop.” Appellant’s brief at 25. We find Barr inapposite since it concerned the
scope of performing a warrantless search of the interior of a vehicle after it
was otherwise stopped for a Vehicle Code violation, not the adequacy of the
basis for the initial stop.
2 As noted supra, the citation in question identified that charge as
§ 4107(b)(2) and stated within the confidential information section: “(PF)
31% LIGHT TRANSMISSION – FAILED TO COMPLY WITH WARNING ISSUED
ON 01-10-23.” Traffic Citation, Citation No. E0017978-2.
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violated, together with a summary of the facts sufficient to advise the
defendant of the nature of the offense charged.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 403(a)(6).
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth did not satisfy that rule,
particularly because:
Here, the citation alleges a light transmission value, without
reference to any standard, and failure to comply with a warning.
Crucially, having a light transmission value of 31% or being
noncompliant with a police warning notice are not manners in
which § 4107(b)(2) can be violated, according to the plain
language of the statute.
Without reference to Table X, or the regulatory language of 67
Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4) which references Table X, the citation
failed to: (1) provide actual notice of what Appellant was on notice
to defend, (2) protect him from further prosecution for the same
offense, and (3) provide the Court of Common Pleas the
appropriate standard under which to determine the sufficiency of
the prosecution’s case. For purposes of the intended charge, as
elucidated at trial, the relevant regulatory section or specific
regulatory standard must be alleged.
Appellant’s brief at 11-12 (citation omitted, cleaned up).
In contrast, the trial court noted that “the citation issued to Appellant
informed him that his vehicle’s windows did not meet the light transmittance
requirements necessary to safely operate the vehicle on Pennsylvania
roadways, and properly cited . . . § 4107(b)(2) in that regard.” See Trial
Court Opinion, 11/29/23, at 11. Further, the Commonwealth analyzed this
claim thusly:
Here, Appellant was issued a police warning notice, number
W3H6Z2PJPH5, by Officer Dudek on January 10, 2023, as a result
of the traffic stop. The police warning notice specified in the
comments section that passenger front window of his vehicle had
thirty-one percent (31%) light transmission and directed
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Appellant to comply with “Penndot Pub. 45 Table X (all windows
including rear).” . . . Additionally, Officer Dudek informed
Appellant that he needed to remove the window tint on his vehicle.
When Appellant failed to comply with the warning card, Officer
Dudek filed citation number E0017978-2 against Appellant for
Unlawful Activities, specifically citing [§ 4107(b)(2)], and listed in
the confidential information section that the passenger front
window had thirty-one percent (31%) light transmission and
referenced the police warning notice.
Commonwealth’s brief at 16-17 (some capitalization altered).
We find that the citation at issue was “sufficient to advise [Appellant] of
the nature of the offense charged.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 403(a)(6). It specifically
enumerated a § 4107(b)(2) offense, asserting that Appellant’s vehicle was
“not appropriately equipped.” Traffic Citation, Citation No. E0017978-2. It
also listed the measurement of his light transmittance, and Appellant could
then compare to the levels identified in Table X, which was referenced on the
initial written warning notice provided by Officer Dudek. Together, with the
description of the light transmittance percentage, this provided Appellant
adequate notice of the specific subsection charged and an adequate summary
of the facts to understand the nature of the violation.
Appellant’s belief that the citation was required to set forth every
element required to be proven by the Commonwealth is unfounded, as neither
Rule 403 nor any authority contains such a mandate. Further, while Appellant
contends that he was not put on notice of the specific violations because of
his belief that one cannot violate § 4107(b)(2) merely by not complying with
Table X, this argument again evokes his erroneous interpretation of § 4524(e)
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as overriding § 4107, which we have rejected above. Therefore, Appellant
has not convinced us that the citation in this case was insufficient.
Appellant’s remaining claim asserts that Officer Dudek violated his
constitutional rights by conducting a window tint check without first obtaining
a search warrant. See Appellant’s brief at 25-29. This appears to be an issue
of first impression within the Commonwealth. Since it “implicates
constitutional requirements and raises a pure question of law, our standard of
review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 209 A.3d 912, 919 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
individuals the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. See
Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa.Super. 2019). Likewise,
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[t]he people shall be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or
things shall issue . . . without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation
subscribed to by the affiant.” Pa. Const. art. 1, § 8.
Further:
Our Supreme Court has explained that the twin aims of Article I,
Section 8 are the safeguarding of privacy and the fundamental
requirement that warrants shall only be issued upon probable
cause. Nonetheless, no right is absolute, and the focus of search
and seizure law remains on the delicate balance of protecting the
right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures and protecting the safety of our citizens and police
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officers by allowing police to make limited intrusions on citizens
while investigating crime.
Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 747 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc)
(citations omitted).
The Vehicle Code grants authority for police officers to gather certain
information in furtherance of investigations as to any related violations:
Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of
checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a
violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a
vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the
vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle
identification number [(“VIN”)] or engine number or the driver’s
license, or to secure such other information as the officer may
reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of
this title.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).
As to this issue, Appellant relies upon the holding of our High Court in
Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020), that “warrantless
vehicle searches require both probable cause and exigent circumstances; one
without the other is insufficient.” See Appellant’s brief at 27 (citing
Alexander, 243 A.3d at 207). He contends that the Commonwealth offered
no exigent circumstances in this case, and thus was not permitted to search
his vehicle without a warrant, which it did when it utilized the window tint
meter on his window. See Appellant’s brief at 28. Appellant laments that if
the Commonwealth is free to conduct searches of every window with any level
of tint, it would destroy citizens’ enjoyment of privacy rights. Id.
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The trial court concluded that Alexander was inapplicable, instead
citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), for the proposition
that upon performing a lawful traffic stop, officers are “permitted to make
inquiries related to the mission addressed by that stop; namely, addressing
the underlying violation and attending to any related safety concerns.” Trial
Court Opinion, 11/29/23, at 15-16 (cleaned up). It further found that no
search was performed as the term is contemplated by our constitution, and
that rather, the officer was merely advancing his statutory authority to
investigate pursuant to § 6308(b). Id. at 16.
Likewise, the Commonwealth purports that application of the window
tint meter was “akin to securing a vehicle’s identification number or engine
number[.]” Commonwealth’s brief at 26. It further distinguishes Alexander
from this case, contending that “unlike the officer in Alexander, who searched
the interior of the vehicle, Officer Dudek merely applied a window tint meter
to the already partially down front passenger side window[.]” Id. The
Commonwealth posits additionally that Pennsylvania courts have not
determined that “a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy extends to
window tint, which is readily viewable to anyone in a public place, such as a
highway.” Id. at 27.
Upon review, we find that Officer Dudek’s use of the light transmittance
device, despite not being significantly intrusive, did constitute a search in this
instance. Certainly, it is as much a search as examining a vehicle from the
outside to obtain a VIN. See Commonwealth v. Grabowski, 452 A.2d 827,
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833 (Pa.Super. 1982) (external examination of a vehicle to obtain the VIN was
a reasonable search, and thus not in violation of the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights).
Nonetheless, application of the window tint meter here was not
unreasonable in light of the authority granted to officers pursuant to
§ 6308(b). It is true that performing this test may occasionally involve
manipulation of the glass to be tested; however, that is not materially different
than opening a car door in order to verify a VIN or raising a hatch to confirm
an engine number. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 119 (1986)
(concluding that opening a door to remove papers that were blocking a VIN
did not constitute an unreasonable search, as drivers lack an expectation of
privacy in the VIN). We find this search to be in the same class of others that
may be conducted without a warrant, if supported by reasonable suspicion,
such as canine sniffs. See Commonwealth v. Green,
168 A.3d 180, 185
(Pa.Super. 2017) (holding that a canine sniff is a “type of search [that] is
inherently less intrusive upon an individual’s privacy than other searches,”
requiring that police only have “reasonable suspicion for believing that
narcotics would be found in the place subject to the canine sniff.”). In short,
the window tint verification process is a far cry from the internal search of a
vehicle done by the officers in Alexander, and thus we agree with the trial
court that Alexander is distinguishable.
Moreover, despite Appellant having a privacy right to items within his
vehicle, he has not persuaded us that this right extends to his windows
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themselves. Indeed, in the same way that a person could not expect to have
a privacy interest in either the VIN of their vehicle or items that are in plain
view through windows, they should likewise not expect that the windows are
exempt from examination. See Class, 475 U.S. at 119; Commonwealth v.
Lutz,
270 A.3d 571, 576 (Pa.Super. 2022) (“There can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy in an object that is in plain view. There is no reason a
police officer should be precluded from observing as an officer what would be
entirely visible to him as a private citizen.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly,
Officer Dudek did not violate Appellant’s constitutional rights when he used
the light transmittance meter in this case without first obtaining a warrant.
He had reasonable suspicion of a violation of § 4107(b)(2), which gave him
the authority pursuant to § 6308(b) to advance his investigation.
Since Appellant has presented us with no issues warranting relief, we
have no cause to disturb his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/12/2024
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