J-S47006-23
2024 PA Super 230
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
BRIANNA MAY SMITH : No. 1195 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered April 4, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No: CP-45-CR-0002074-2017
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 1, 2024
The Commonwealth appeals from the April 3, 2023, order dismissing its
petition for violation of special probation. Upon review, we vacate and remand
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On January 3, 2018, Appellee, Brianna May Smith, pleaded guilty to one
count of possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”). She was sentenced to a
period of two years of special probation, to be supervised by the Pennsylvania
State Board of Probation and Parole (“the Board”). See Order, 3/20/18. On
February 27, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a Petition for Violation of Special
Probation and asserted that Appellee committed technical violations of her
conditions of special probation. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the
Commonwealth’s petition, citing Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240
(Pa. 2019), for the proposition that she cannot be found to have violated
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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conditions of probation that were not imposed at the time of sentencing. See
Motion to Dismiss, 2/27/23, at 2 (unpaginated).
After a hearing, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion and dismissed
the Commonwealth’s petition for a probation violation. N.T., 4/3/23, at 28.
This appeal followed. Both the Commonwealth and the trial court have
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises two issues for our review:
A. Whether the trial court committed an error of law when it failed
to acknowledge that the requirement that a special probationer
follow the general conditions of special probation, contained in
the 37 Pa. Code § 65.1 which is a separate regulatory
requirement beyond a trial court’s statutory authority to
impose conditions of probation which includes abstaining from
unlawful possession or use of narcotics and/or controlled
substances?
B. Whether the trial court committed an error of law in its
application of Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa.
2019) as it relates to [Appellee] who was sentenced prior to
Foster on March 20, 2018 and who while on special probation
violated her probation by illegally ingesting a controlled
substance?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. As these issues are related, we address them
together.
Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an error of law or
an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Shires, 240 A.3d 974, 977 (Pa.
Super. 2020). The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred “by
failing to recognize the regulatory provisions for special probationers set forth
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in 37 Pa. Code § 65.1 which provide [Appellee] with notice of her requirements
of supervision.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. Amicus, the Department of
Corrections (“DOC”), argues that it has the power to supervise offenders
placed on probation by a trial court pursuant to Act 59 of 2021. 1 Amicus Brief
at 6. The DOC maintains that “by the imposition of special probation by the
Department of Corrections, both [Appellee] and her defense attorney were
informed of all of the general conditions of special probation as it is statutory.”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 14. We agree.
We begin our analysis with the law regarding the imposition of probation
by the trial court. An order of probation is among the sentencing alternatives
available to a court at time of sentencing. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721. In
imposing a probationary sentence, the trial court is required to “specify the
length of any term during which the defendant is to be supervised . . . and
the authority that shall conduct the supervision.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(a). 2
In addition, at the time of Appellee’s sentencing, the trial court was
empowered to attach reasonable conditions as authorized by law as it
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1 Previously, the authority was with the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6133 (effective October 13, 2009; repealed June
30, 2021). That authority transferred to the Department of Corrections
pursuant to Act 59 of 2021. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6172. The statutory language
of Section 6172 is substantially similar to Section 6133.
2 Section 9754, effective June 30, 1988, was amended on December 18, 2019.
As stated, Appellee was sentenced prior to the 2019 amendment. The 2019
amendments did not change a court’s duty to specify the length of any term
during which the defendant is to be supervised and the authority that shall
conduct the supervision.
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“deem[ed] necessary to ensure or assist a defendant in leading a law-abiding
life.” See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(b).3
In Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2019), our Supreme
Court held that the statutory language under Section 9754 must be strictly
construed to require all specific conditions of probation to be enumerated at
the time of sentencing. Id. at 1250. The defendant in Foster was sentenced
to four years of probation. The trial court found Foster violated his probation
because he was not taking probation seriously and did not attempt to “conform
to society’s expectations of its citizenry.” Id. at 1244. This Court found that
the trial court’s decision to revoke Foster’s probation was not an abuse of
discretion or an error of law. Our Supreme Court disagreed. It found that the
trial court “disregarded the statutory requirement that a court must first find
the defendant either committed a new crime or violated a specific condition of
probation in order to be found in violation.” Id. at 1251. In so holding the
Court held:
We find the language of the pertinent statutory provisions to be
clear and unambiguous. The law provides a general condition of
probation – that the defendant lead “a law-abiding life,” i.e., that
the defendant refrain from committing another crime. To [e]nsure
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3 In 2024, Section 9754(b) was amended to delete its reference to conditions
that will “ensure or assist a defendant to lead a law-abiding life.” Section
9754(b) now only references Section 9763. Section 9763 provides
enumerated conditions that the trial court may impose that it deems
necessary and which “provides the least restrictive means available to
promote the defendant's rehabilitation and protection of the public.” See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b). This change does not affect our analysis of the issues
presently before this Court.
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that general condition is met, or to assist the defendant in meeting
that general condition, the order must also include certain
“specific conditions” from the list enumerated in section 9754(c).
Only upon the violation of any of the “specified conditions” in the
probation order (general or specific) may a court revoke the
defendant’s probation. In other words, a court may find a
defendant in violation of probation only if the defendant has
violated one of the “specific conditions” of probation included in
the probation order or has committed a new crime. The plain
language of the statute does not allow for any other result.
Id. at 1250. Consequently, it vacated the order finding Foster in violation of
probation and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at
1251, 1254.
In Commonwealth v. Elliott, 50 A.3d 1284, 1292 (Pa. 2012), a case
pre-dating Foster, our Supreme Court analyzed the interplay between the
Board’s regulatory authority set forth in the Prison and Parole Code,
specifically 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6131 and 6151, and the trial court’s authority to
impose a sentence as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9751, 9754 and 9771. The
defendant in Elliott was sentenced to four and a half to nine years
imprisonment, followed by a consecutive five years of probation. Id. at 1285.
Elliott was adjudicated a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) and the trial court
imposed three specific conditions of probation: (1) sex offender registration;
(2) no contact, direct or indirect, with the victims; and (3) no unsupervised
contact with any minor child. Id. Due to Elliott’s SVP status, the trial court
requested that the Board supervise him as a special probationer 4 upon his
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4 "The board shall have exclusive power to supervise any person placed on
probation by any judge of a court having criminal jurisdiction, when the court
by special order directs supervision by the board." 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6133(a).
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release from prison. Id. He ultimately was provided, and signed, standard
special conditions for sex offenders provided by the Board. Id. at 1286.
The trial court found Elliott violated his conditions of probation, namely
no contact with victims and not being allowed within 1,000 feet of areas where
minors are likely to be present. Id. at 1287. This Court found that the Board’s
condition that Elliott was prohibited from contacting minors was incorporated
into the trial court’s condition that he refrain from contact with minors. Id. at
1288. However, this Court found that the Board’s condition that prohibited
Elliott from being within 1,000 feet of minors was not incorporated into the
trial court’s general no-contact requirement. Id. at 1288-89. Our Supreme
Court disagreed and found that the condition prohibiting Elliott from being
within 1,000 feet of minors was “derivative of the trial court’s condition of
probation that [Elliott] not have unsupervised contact with minors.” Id. at
1292. In reaching its conclusion the Supreme Court explained:
[T]he Board and its agents may impose conditions of
supervision that are germane to, elaborate on, or interpret
any conditions of probation that are imposed by the trial
court. This interpretation gives meaning to all of the statutory
provisions relevant to this case and thus: (1) maintains the
sentencing authority solely with a trial court; (2) permits the
Board and its agents to evaluate probationers on a one-on-one
basis to effectuate supervisions; (3) sustains the ability of the
Board to impose conditions of supervision; and (4) authorizes that
a probationer may be detained, arrested, and “violated” for failing
to comply with either a condition of probation or conditions of
supervision. In summary, a trial court may impose
conditions of probation in a generalized manner, and the
Board or its agents may impose more specific conditions of
supervision pertaining to that probation, so long as those
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supervision conditions are in furtherance of the trial court’s
conditions of probation.
Commonwealth v. Elliott, 50 A.3d 1284, 1292 (Pa. 2012) (emphasis
added).5
Foster and Elliott pertain to the general principles that govern a trial
court’s imposition of probation, the need for a trial court to identify any
conditions of probation, and the Board’s authority to impose conditions of
supervision that are germane to, elaborate on, or interpret any conditions of
probation that are imposed by the trial court. 6 “[A] probationer may be
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5 At the time Elliott was decided, Section 6131 permitted the Board to create
uniform standards for the supervision of offenders. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6131
(effective October 13, 2009 to February 17, 2020). That authority has moved
to the DOC. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6171(a)(11)(ii) (effective June 30, 2021).
Likewise, Section 6151 defined “conditions of supervision” as “[a]ny terms or
conditions of the offender’s supervision, whether imposed by the court, the
board or an agent, including compliance with all requirements of Federal,
State and local law.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6151 (effective October 13, 2009;
repealed June 29, 2021). That definition has moved to Section 6101 and now
states: “[a]ny terms or conditions of the offender’s supervision, whether
imposed by the court, the department or an agent, or promulgated by the
board as a regulation, including compliance with all requirements of Federal,
State and local law.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6101 (effective June 30, 2021).
Section 9771 governs modification or revocation of probation and states that
a court may increase the conditions of or revoke an order of probation “upon
proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9771(b).
6 Although the defendant in Elliott was placed on special probation, the
condition alleged to have been violated was not among the enumerated special
conditions imposed by operation of law under 37 Pa. Code § 65.4. The
condition alleged to have been violated was a specific condition of probation
imposed by the trial court.
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detained, arrested, and violated for failing to comply with either a condition of
probation or a condition of supervision,” as long as the condition of supervision
does not exceed the Board's authority to impose it. Id.
Foster and Elliott however are distinguishable from the present case.
Here, the trial court ordered special probation. “Special probation” is a type
of probation authorized by statute. See note 4, supra. When ordered by a
trial court, the DOC has “exclusive power to supervise any offender placed on
probation by any judge of a court having criminal jurisdiction when the court,
by special order, consistent with the regulations of the [DOC], directs
supervision by the [DOC].” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6172.7 When placed on special
probation, a special probationer is subject to the following general conditions
of special probation or parole, to wit:
A special probationer or parolee is subject to the following
conditions:
(1) Be under the supervision of a district office or suboffice and
not leave that district without prior written permission of the
parole supervision staff.
(2) Obtain the written permission of the parole supervision staff
before changing his residence.
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7 “Acceptance of a case for supervision or presentence investigation from a
county which, on December 31, 1985, maintained adult probation offices and
parole systems, is at the Board’s discretion.” 37 Pa. Code § 65.1. The amicus
DOC has represented that currently, all counties, except for Mercer and
Venango, have adult probation and parole systems. Amicus Brief at 10, n.4.
Consistent with applicable regulations, DOC has represented it “will ordinarily
accept a case for supervision if it is a felony conviction and a sentence to serve
a probationary term of at least two (2) years.”
Id. at 6 (citing
37 Pa. Code §
65.1).
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(3) Maintain regular contact with the parole supervision staff
by:
(i) Reporting regularly as instructed and following written
instructions of the Board or the parole supervising staff.
(ii) Notifying the parole supervision staff within 72 hours of
one of the following:
(A) Arrest.
(B) Receipt of a summons or citation for an offense
punishable by imprisonment upon conviction.
(iii) Notifying the parole supervising staff within 72 hours
of a change in status including, but not limited to
employment, on the job training and education.
(4) Comply with municipal, county, State and Federal criminal
statutes, as well as the Vehicle Code and the Liquor Code
(47 P.S. §§ 1-101—9-902).
(5) Additionally:
(i) Abstain from the unlawful possession or sale, of
narcotics and dangerous drugs and abstain from
the use of controlled substances within the
meaning of the Controlled Substance, Drug,
Device and Cosmetic Act (35 P.S. §§ 780[.]101—
780.144) without a valid prescription.
(ii) Refrain from owning or possessing firearms or other
weapons.
(iii) Refrain from assaultive behavior.
(6) Pay fines, costs and restitution imposed by the sentencing
court in accordance with the instructions contained in the
Conditions Governing Special Probation/Parole form.
37 Pa. Code § 65.4 (emphasis added). The Board has explained that "special
probation" is a type of probation imposed by a court having criminal
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jurisdiction which, by special order, directs the Board, pursuant to the Prisons
and Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6133, to supervise the offender.8 Coulter v.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 48 A. 3d 516, 517 n3 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2012). In a "special probation" case, the criminal jurisdiction retains
probation revocation authority.
Id. "Agents are in a supervisory relationship
with their offenders. The purpose of the supervision is to assist the offenders
in their rehabilitation and re-assimilation into the community and to protect
the public." Id.9 (citing 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6153 (effective October 13, 2009;
repealed and replaced by 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6182(a), effective June 30, 2021)).
In this case, while the trial court did not impose any conditions of
probation at the time of Appellee’s sentence, it did expressly sentence
Appellee to special probation. Its order provides as follows:
[I]t is the sentence of this [c]ourt that [Appellee] be placed on
special probation for a period of two (2) years to be supervised
by the Pennsylvania State Board of Probation and Parole.
The Clerk of Courts is DIRECTED to forward a copy of this
conviction to the Department of Transportation for license
suspension pursuant . . . Title 75 1532(4)(c).
[Appellee] is entitled to time credit of one day.
This sentence shall run consecutive to that imposed in Case No.
2375 Criminal 2017.
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8 As previously stated, the authority was transferred to the DOC. See note 1,
supra.
9 By comparison, probationers subject to “unsupervised probation” are not
subject to direct supervision, but still must comply with rules set by the court.
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N.T., Sentencing 3/20/18, at 11.
An order of special probation falls outside the general rule that a
probationer may only be found to have violated a specific condition of
probation if that condition is expressly made a part of the court’s probation
order. Rather, conditions of special probation under Section 65.4 are
mandatory. Properly enacted regulations have the force and effect of law.
See Eastwood Nursing v. Department of Public Welfare, 910 A.2d 134,
141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Under Section 6172(a), the DOC has exclusive
power to supervise special probationers consistent with regulations of the
DOC. DOC regulations expressly require that all special probationers abstain
from the unlawful possession or sale, of narcotics, dangerous drugs, and
controlled substances without a valid prescription. See
37 Pa. Code §
65.4(5)(i). We therefore agree that Appellee was informed of and bound by
the general conditions of special probation by operation of law simply by the
imposition of special probation in the court’s sentencing order.
Our review of the record leaves no doubt that the trial court in fact
intended the mandatory conditions of special probation to be a part of its
probation order. The trial court acknowledged that the conditions set forth in
Section 65.4 apply by law when it signed the Request for Special
Probation/Parole Supervision on March 11, 2019.10 Appellee was then
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10 “If the Pennsylvania [Department of Corrections] accepts supervision of this
case, the above-referenced offender must comply with the General
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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provided a written copy of the Conditions Governing Special Probation/Parole,
which she signed on March 13, 2019. By signing that document, Appellee
acknowledged “that I have read, or have had read to me, the foregoing
conditions of my probation/parole; I fully understand them and agree to follow
such conditions; and fully understand the penalties involved should I in any
manner violate them.” See N.T., 4/3/23, Exhibit 3, Conditions Governing
Special Probation/Parole. The record clearly indicates that Appellee received
notice of her conditions of special probation and was aware of such conditions
at the time the alleged violations occurred.
We therefore conclude the trial court erred in its reliance on Foster in
finding no violation of special probation upon the basis it believed no specific
conditions of probation were imposed at the time of Appellee’s sentence. As
we have explained, the order for special probation carried with it conditions
mandated by law. Moreover, we observe that the procedural posture of this
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Conditions of Special Probation or Parole as set forth in 37 Pa. Code § 65.4,
as well as any Special Conditions of Special Probation or Parole imposed by
this court. If this Request for Special Probation/Parole Supervision does not
meet [the Department’s] acceptance criteria as set forth in
37 Pa. Code §
65.1, or the above-referenced offender is not available for supervision, the
above-referenced offender’s supervision will remain with [the trial court]. It
is acknowledged that [the trial court] will place Special Conditions on the
above-referenced offender that are consistent with the [Department’s]
supervision practices. To the extent that [the trial court] does not place such
Special Conditions on the above-referenced offender, [the trial court]
acknowledges that the responsibility for the above-referenced offender’s
supervision will remain with or revert or revert to [the trial court], upon
written notice from the [Department] to [the trial court].” See N.T., 4/3/23,
Exhibit 1, Request for Special Probation/Parole (emphasis added).
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case was from the order dismissing of the Commonwealth’s petition for
violation of special probation. Due to that early dismissal, the trial court had
not yet conducted Gagnon I and Gagnon II11 hearings relative to the
Commonwealth’s petition for violation of special probation. Upon remand,
these procedural formalities first must be complied with before proceeding to
a revocation hearing.
Accordingly, we vacate the April 3, 2023, order dismissing the
Commonwealth’s petition for violation of special probation and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Order vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 10/1/2024
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11 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); see also
Commonwealth v. Ferguson,
761 A.2d 613 (Pa. Super. 2000) (explaining
when a probationer is detained based on an alleged probation violation, due
process requires a Gagnon I hearing to determine whether there is probable
cause that probationer committed a violation, followed by a second more
comprehensive Gagnon II hearing wherein the trial court determines
whether to revoke probationer’s probation.)
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