J-S31010-24
2024 PA Super 289
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
EDWARD E. RATLIFF :
:
Appellant : No. 910 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 14, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004411-2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.
CONCURRING OPINION BY BECK, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2024
I join the learned Majority’s opinion in full. I write separately to further
address Ratliff’s claim that he did not commit “second or subsequent” offenses
for purposes of the mandatory minimum sentencing provision set forth at 18
Pa.C.S. § 6111(h).
Ratliff’s argument ignores the statutory text in favor of a policy
argument. In advancing his claim, he attempts to invoke the “recidivist
philosophy,” which broadly holds that the applicability of enhanced penalties
for repeat conduct requires first that the offender had an opportunity to
reform. Ratliff maintains that this opportunity was lacking here because his
“actions constituted a single criminal episode as the two incidents were closely
related in time.” Ratliff’s Brief at 34. Relatedly, he characterizes the
underlying criminal conduct supporting his convictions as flowing from “one
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act – the filling out of the mandated forms[.]” Id. at 35. Ratliff cites two
cases interpreting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714, Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911
A.2d 988 (Pa. Super. 2006), and Commonwealth v. Shiffler,
879 A.2d 185,
196 (Pa. 2005), as analogous to section 6111(h).
The fundamental flaw in Ratliff’s presentation is the notion that there is
a global sentencing policy to follow when interpreting statutes calling for
enhanced sentences based on the existence of earlier criminal conduct and/or
convictions. “However, ‘[t]he recidivist philosophy, while a valid policy, is not
the only valid sentencing policy, nor is it a constitutional principle or mandate,’
and the legislature is free to enact a statute ‘which clearly expresses a
different application.’” Commonwealth v. Jarowecki, 985 A.2d 955, 961–
62 (Pa. 2009) (quoting Shiffler,
879 A.2d at 196). My review of the text of
section 6111(h) reflects that our General Assembly has done so here.
The Statutory Construction Act1 states that when interpreting a statute,
our task is “to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The key question is whether the statute is ambiguous.
Id. § 1921(b). If so, we may then look to the spirit or policy aims, such as,
for example, the purported goal to impose an enhanced penalty only if the
offender had an appreciable opportunity to reform, in ascertaining intent. See
id. § 1921(c). In the absence of an ambiguity, we must apply the letter of
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1 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991.
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the law and may not disregard it in pursuit of its spirit. Id. § 1921(b).
Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law, and our standard of
review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 304 (Pa.
2022).
The pertinent portion of section 6111(h) states: “A second or
subsequent violation of this section shall be a felony of the second degree. A
person who at the time of sentencing has been convicted of another offense
under this section shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence of
imprisonment of five years.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111(h)(1). The plain text clearly
conditions application of the statute on whether, “at the time of sentencing,”
the offender “has been convicted of another [section 6111] offense[.]” The
relevant question is thus whether, at the moment in time when the trial court
imposes a sentence for a violation of section 6111, the defendant has been
convicted of more than one section 6111 offense. In sequential terms, a
conviction at count one is the first violation, which triggers the mandatory
minimum sentence for all “second or subsequent” violations. The statute
therefore leaves no room to determine whether the separate violations could
be deemed to be part of one large criminal episode. The statute
unambiguously forecloses Ratliff’s argument, and he does not claim otherwise.
That this text straightforwardly means what it says is illustrated by
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 285 A.3d 599 (Pa. 2022). There, defendant
Demetrius Coleman fled from police and crashed into a vehicle, killing all three
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occupants. Coleman was convicted of three counts of homicide in the third
degree, and the Commonwealth sought a mandatory term of life imprisonment
pursuant to a statute stating, in pertinent part, that “any person convicted of
murder of the third degree in this Commonwealth who has previously been
convicted at any time of murder … shall be sentenced to life imprisonment[.]”
42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a).
Coleman argued that the statute did not apply because the deaths
occurred, at most, minutes apart and resulted from one single act. Coleman
also alleged that the statutory term “previous” must mean at a time other
than the criminal proceeding at which he was sentenced. The Commonwealth
offered that the plain language required the mandatory sentence since, at the
time Coleman was sentenced on the second and third homicide counts, he
had, in fact, been previously convicted of murder at count one.
The High Court agreed with the Commonwealth. “Indeed, through use
of the terms ‘at any time,’ the General Assembly made clear that there is no
limitation relative to a person’s previous conviction that would preclude
application of the sentencing enhancement insofar as it concerns Section
9715(a).” Coleman, 285 A.3d at 609. The Court “emphasize[d] that the
General Assembly spoke only in terms of convictions[.]” Id. It continued,
observing that the language differs from other statutes, such as the one
examined in Shiffler, wherein the General Assembly imposed enhanced
sentences only if the offender had previously been convicted “at the time of
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the commission of the current offense.” Id. at 610 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. §
9714(a)(1)).
As in Coleman, the statute here looks to the person’s status at the time
of sentencing. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111(h). As the Coleman Court explained:
The word “convicted” or “convict” means “to find or declare guilty
of an offense or crime by the verdict or decision of a court or other
authority.” … In view of these definitions, the first portion of the
key phrase in Section 9715(a) (i.e., “who has previously been
convicted”) dictates that the sentencing enhancement applies to
any person convicted of third-degree murder who has been found
or proven guilty of murder before in time.
Id. at 608 (some citations omitted).2
As my distinguished colleagues rightly conclude, “the existence of a
conviction is what matters … not the timing of when the conduct charged
occurred.” Majority Op. at 19. Accordingly, I agree he is entitled to no relief
on this claim.
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2 I recognize that section 6111(h) differs from the section 9715(a) statute
analyzed in Coleman in several respects, including the absence of the phrase
“previously been convicted” and the inclusion of the phrase “at the time of
sentencing.” In my view, there is no meaningful difference between “has
previously been convicted” and “has been convicted.” If anything, “has been
convicted,” being written in the present perfect tense, even more clearly
reflects legislative intent because it refers to an ongoing situation. See 1
Pa.C.S. § 1903(a) (“Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules
of grammar and according to their common and approved usage[.]”).
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