People v. Fields

     The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.


                                                                  SUMMARY
                                                            October 23, 2025

                                

No. 20CA1708, People v. Fields — Criminal Law — Sentencing
— Punishment for Habitual Criminals

     A division of the court of appeals applies, for the first time

since its announcement, People v. Gregg, 

, in which the

supreme court applied Erlinger v. United States, 

(2024), and held that habitual criminal adjudications under section

18-1.3-803, C.R.S. 2025, must be determined by a jury. After

determining that the trial court erred — because a jury must

determine whether a defendant’s prior convictions were separately

brought and tried and whether they arose out of separate and

distinct criminal episodes — the division, reviewing for

constitutional harmlessness, further concludes that the error in

this case does not warrant reversal.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                          

Court of Appeals No. 20CA1708
City and County of Denver District Court No. 17CR1872
Honorable Edward D. Bronfin, Judge


The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Troy L. Fields,

Defendant-Appellant.


                            JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

                                 Division VII
                          Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
                        Freyre and Schock, JJ., concur

         Prior Opinion Announced August 3, 2023, Vacated in 24-5460

                         Announced October 23, 2025


Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney
General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Sean James Lacefield, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1    A jury convicted defendant, Troy L. Fields, of kidnapping and

 sexual assault against the victim, J.C., as well as five habitual

 criminal charges.1 Based on the habitual criminal charges, and the

 fact that Fields had already been adjudicated a habitual criminal in

 a prior case, the court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of

 ninety-six years in prison for kidnapping and life in prison with the

 possibility of parole after forty years for sexual assault.

¶2    Fields appealed, arguing the trial court violated the Uniform

 Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), improperly

 instructed the jury on the elements of kidnapping, and admitted

 irrelevant victim impact evidence. He also challenged his

 adjudication as a habitual criminal and argued that his life

 sentence was illegal. We affirmed Fields’ convictions and sentences.

 People v. Fields, (Colo. App. No. 20CA1708, Aug. 3, 2023) (not

 published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Fields I).


 1 The kidnapping and sexual assault charges stem from events that

 occurred in 1994, when J.C. arrived home, unlocked the front door
 of her house, and was pulled in by a man waiting inside. The man
 held a knife to her throat, repeatedly threatened to kill her, moved
 her around the house, restrained her, and sexually assaulted her.
 The case had been cold for twenty-two years when detectives
 reprocessed DNA taken from J.C.’s vaginal swab and identified a
 match with a DNA sample taken from Fields.

                                     1
¶3    The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated

 our judgment in Fields I, and remanded the case for further

 consideration in light of Erlinger v. United States, 

 (2024). See Fields v. Colorado, 

, 

 (2025)

 (mem.). Erlinger held that, under the Sixth Amendment, whether a

 criminal defendant’s prior convictions were committed on different

 occasions from one another for purposes of the Armed Career

 Criminal Act is the sort of fact-laden inquiry that a jury must

 decide. 

. Fields argues that for purposes of

 Colorado’s habitual criminal statute, now codified at section 18-1.3-

 803, C.R.S. 2025, Erlinger also requires a jury to find whether a

 defendant’s prior convictions were separately brought and tried,

 and whether they arose out of separate and distinct criminal

 episodes.

¶4    Since this case returned to us, the Colorado Supreme Court

 issued its opinion in People v. Gregg, 

. It held that

 Erlinger applies to Colorado’s habitual criminal sentencing statute

 and “the question of separate and distinct criminal episodes

 demands a jury finding.” People v. Gregg, 

, ¶ 24.

 Applying Gregg, we conclude the trial court erred when it, rather


                                   2
 than a jury, decided the habitual criminal counts. But we conclude

 that the error does not warrant reversal of Fields’ convictions on

 those counts. The result of our analysis with respect to all other

 issues decided in Fields I remains unchanged. We thus affirm

 Fields’ convictions and sentences.

          I.   Jury Trial on Habitual Criminal Adjudication

¶5    Fields asserts that the trial court erred when it adjudicated the

 habitual criminal counts. He argues that the court’s failure to have

 a jury decide whether the prosecution proved that his prior

 convictions were separately brought and tried and that they arose

 out of distinct criminal episodes violated his statutory and

 constitutional rights. We see no basis for reversal.

                       A.    No Statutory Right

¶6    As to Fields’ statutory arguments, we discern no error. In

 1994, when Fields committed the underlying offenses, “a defendant

 was entitled to a jury trial on habitual criminal charges.” People v.

 King, 

 (Colo. App. 2005); see also § 16-13-103,

 C.R.S. 1994. But that right was limited to the right to have a jury

 decide the issue of identity. People v. Jones, 

 (Colo. App. 1997) (the defendant “was not entitled to have any other


                                   3
 issues determined by the jury”). And in 1995, the legislature

 amended the statute to allow a court to determine habitual criminal

 charges as a matter of law for “all informations filed on or after July

 1, 1995.”2 King, 

.

¶7    Although Fields committed the underlying offenses in 1994,

 the prosecution filed its complaint and information in 2017.

 Therefore, no jury trial was required. See 

 Nevertheless, Fields

 received a jury trial on the issue of identity — a greater protection

 than he was entitled to by statute. We are not persuaded by his

 arguments that King and Jones are inapposite. Instead, we follow

 their holdings and conclude that his statutory rights were not

 violated.

             B.   Sixth Amendment Violation Was Harmless

¶8    We reach a different conclusion with respect to Fields’

 constitutional arguments. We agree with Fields that Erlinger

 instructs that the jury should have determined whether Fields’ prior

 convictions were separately brought and tried and whether they


 2 The legislature has since amended the habitual criminal statute to

 once again require a jury trial on habitual criminal charges. See
 Ch. 344, sec. 1, § 18-1.3-803(1), (4), 

-67
 (effective June 2, 2025).

                                    4
 arose out of distinct criminal episodes. See Gregg, ¶ 24 (there are

 no material differences between the separate-offenses inquiry at

 issue in Erlinger and Colorado’s habitual criminal sentencing

 statute). Because both questions “require[] more than a mere

 determination of ‘what crime, with what elements, the defendant

 was convicted of,’” a jury determination was required. See 

 (quoting Erlinger, 

). Nevertheless, we conclude that

 the error was harmless.3

                       1.   No Structural Error

¶9    “Structural errors are constitutional ‘defects affecting the

 framework within which the trial proceeds,’ and they require

 automatic reversal because they defy analysis by harmless error

 standards.” People v. Washington, 

, ¶ 25. Fields

 argues that his habitual criminal convictions must be reversed




 3 In People v. Gregg, the supreme court was not required to address

 the appropriate remedy when a judge, not jury, makes the habitual
 offense determination. 

. Unlike Fields, the defendant
 in Gregg was never adjudicated a habitual criminal. Id. at ¶ 39.
 Because sentencing had not yet occurred, the supreme court only
 addressed whether double jeopardy precluded a second jury from
 deciding the habitual criminal counts. Because we conclude that
 Fields was adjudicated and sentenced in error, we review the error
 for constitutional harmlessness. C.A.R. 35(c).

                                   5
  because the court’s error was structural. We disagree. Erlinger

  applied Apprendi v. New Jersey, 

 (2000), Blakely v.

  Washington, 

 (2004), and Alleyne v. United States, 

 (2013) — all of which addressed a sentencing judge’s

  determination to increase the mandatory minimum sentence for a

  crime or to impose a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum

  sentence, based on facts not submitted to the jury and proven

  beyond a reasonable doubt. Error under each of these cases is

  reviewed for constitutional harmlessness. See Erlinger, 

 (describing Erlinger as “on all fours” with Apprendi and

  Alleyne); see also People v. Mountjoy, 

  (collecting cases and noting that both “a majority of the federal

  circuits” and “[m]any state appellate courts” have consistently

  applied harmless error review to Apprendi/Blakely errors), aff’d,

  

; Villanueva v. People, 

 (Colo.

  2008) (reviewing Blakely error for constitutional harmlessness).

¶ 10   Despite this longstanding precedent, Fields argues that

  structural error applies because the Erlinger Court quoted a

  structural error discussion from Rose v. Clark, 

  (1986). We are not persuaded that this citation supports a


                                    6
  structural error analysis. The Supreme Court quoted Rose in the

  context of emphasizing the requirement that a jury must decide

  whether prior convictions were committed on separate occasions,

  even if, in many cases, that inquiry may be straightforward.4 See

  Erlinger, 

 (“There is no efficiency exception to the

  Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”). Despite quoting this discussion,

  the Court has consistently held that “most constitutional errors,”

  including Sixth Amendment errors, “can be harmless.” Washington

  v. Recuenco, 

 (2006) (quoting Neder v. United

  States, 

 (1999)).

¶ 11   Fields also argues that, unlike the determination of a single

  element in an offense, the jury’s determination of whether prior

  convictions were separately brought and tried and arose out of

  separate and distinct criminal episodes is too multifaceted and

  unpredictable to be reviewed for harmlessness. We disagree.

  Instead, these questions “can be definitively established based on

  the judicial records introduced at the habitual criminal trial.”


  4 In fact, the dissent in Erlinger observed that because this inquiry

  is so straightforward, “[i]n most (if not all) cases,” Erlinger error “will
  be harmless.” Erlinger v. United States, 

, 859 (2024)
  (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

                                       7
  People v. Nunn, 

 (Colo. App. 2006). Accordingly,

  structural error does not apply.

         2.    Assuming Preservation, Any Error Was Harmless

¶ 12   Because we conclude that Erlinger error is not subject to

  automatic reversal for structural error, we must next decide

  whether reversal is appropriate under the applicable standard. The

  parties disagree about whether Fields preserved his constitutional

  arguments. But even if we assume preservation, reversal is not

  warranted.

¶ 13   We review preserved claims of constitutional error for

  constitutional harmless error. Hagos v. People, 

.

  These errors require reversal unless we can declare that the error

  was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 “In other words, we

  reverse if ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] might

  have contributed to the conviction.’” 

 (quoting Chapman v.

  California, 

 (1967)).

¶ 14   For a defendant to be adjudged a habitual criminal under

  section 18-1.3-801(2)(a)(I), the prosecution must prove beyond a

  reasonable doubt that the defendant, having been convicted of a

  felony, “has been three times previously convicted, upon charges


                                      8
  separately brought and tried, and arising out of separate and

  distinct criminal episodes.” People v. Williams, 

.

  “Charges are separately brought where they are ‘in separate

  informations, with separate docket numbers, arising out of separate

  criminal incidents.’” 

 at ¶ 38 (quoting Gimmy v. People, 

 (Colo. 1982)). “[A] predicate conviction can result from

  either a conviction following trial or a guilty plea.” 

 Convictions

  arising from guilty pleas satisfy the requirement of “separately

  brought and tried” when the underlying charges “would have been

  tried separately” if not for the guilty plea. 

 (citation omitted).

  Prior crimes arise from distinct criminal episodes where they are

  separated by enough time and have different victims and locations,

  such that “proof of neither could have formed a substantial portion

  of the proof of the other.” Marquez v. People, 

, ¶ 20.

¶ 15   At the close of trial and while the jury was still empaneled, the

  prosecution presented evidence of the following:

          • On September 12, 1988, Fields pled guilty to burglary

             and theft against a business for an offense occurring in

             Sedgwick County, Kansas, on January 30, 1987.




                                      9
          • On April 8, 1988, Fields pled no contest to burglary and

             theft against a residence for an offense occurring in

             Shawnee County, Kansas, on May 11, 1987.

          • On November 6, 1989, Fields pled no contest to forgery

             for an offense that took place in Shawnee County on

             November 30, 1987.5

¶ 16   The record contains charging documents for each of these

  offenses; they show different dates (separated by a span of months),

  different locations, different victims, and different case numbers.

  Given this record, we cannot imagine a scenario in which a jury

  could have found that Fields’ prior offenses occurred as part of the

  same criminal episode or that the prosecution might have brought

  and tried them together. Instead, based on this overwhelming


  5 The prosecution also presented evidence that Fields pled guilty to

  attempted drug possession for an offense occurring on December
  18, 1987, and to attempted drug possession for another offense
  occurring on September 20, 1989. Depending on the underlying
  facts, these convictions might or might not have been considered
  felonies if they had been committed in Colorado. See § 18-1.3-
  801(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (if a conviction occurred in another state, it
  must be for a crime that would be a felony in Colorado to be eligible
  to enhance a defendant’s sentence as a habitual criminal). But
  even without them, we conclude that there is overwhelming
  evidence to support Fields’ habitual criminal adjudication and
  sentence.

                                     10
  evidence, we conclude that any rational jury would have found,

  beyond a reasonable doubt, that Fields’ convictions were separately

  brought and tried and arose out of distinct criminal episodes. See

  Erlinger, 

 (“Often, a defendant’s past offenses will be

  different enough and separated by enough time and space that

  there is little question he committed them on separate occasions.”);

  see also United States v. Butler, 

 (5th Cir. 2024)

  (Erlinger error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the

  record clearly showed that the prior offenses spanned a range of

  months to years and involved different parties).

¶ 17   Because there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s

  error in failing to try the “separately brought and tried” and

  “separate and distinct criminal episode” elements to a jury might

  have contributed to Fields’ habitual criminal convictions, reversal is

  not warranted.

                            II.        Other Issues

                                  A.     UMDDA

                           1.      Applicable Law

¶ 18   The UMDDA provides that a prisoner “may request final

  disposition of any untried indictment, information, or criminal


                                         11
  complaint pending against him in this state.” § 16-14-102(1),

  C.R.S. 2025. Once the trial court and prosecution receive a

  UMDDA request, the prisoner must be brought to trial within 182

  days. § 16-14-104(1), C.R.S. 2025. A defendant invokes his rights

  under the UMDDA if (1) his request substantially complies with the

  statute’s requirements; and (2) the prosecution receives “actual

  notice,” which means “actual knowledge,” of his request. People v.

  McKimmy, 

. If a defendant invokes his rights

  but the trial court fails to comply with the 182-day deadline, the

  court loses jurisdiction, and the charges must be dismissed with

  prejudice. § 16-14-104(1).

¶ 19   In reviewing a denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the

  UMDDA, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings provided they

  are supported by competent evidence, but we review the court’s

  legal conclusions de novo. McKimmy, ¶ 19.

                         2.    Procedural History

¶ 20   The prosecution filed the underlying charges against Fields on

  March 24, 2017. On May 7, 2017, while Fields was represented by

  a public defender, Fields’ wife, Lisa Fields, sent a fax to the

  prosecutor and county court requesting final disposition of the


                                     12
  charges under the UMDDA and seeking removal of the public

  defender. On May 19, 2017, the county court issued a minute

  order noting that it had received these motions, but “[u]nless Lisa

  Fields is a licensed attorney said motions are null.” Fields himself

  filed a second UMDDA request, which was received on August 2,

  2017.

¶ 21   The case was moved to the district court, and a motions

  hearing was held on November 3, 2017. Representing himself,

  Fields argued that the county court misapplied the law by nullifying

  the May 7th UMDDA request and that his right to a speedy trial

  would be violated unless trial was held by the following day. The

  prosecutor argued that Fields did not file an effective notice of his

  rights because the prosecutor’s office never received the motion and

  she was not familiar with the telephone number to which the

  motion had been faxed.

¶ 22   The trial court deferred ruling on the motion and ordered the

  prosecutor to investigate whether the May 7th request was received

  and whether service by fax was sufficient.

¶ 23   At a subsequent hearing, the prosecutor argued that the

  county court properly exercised its discretion to nullify Fields’


                                    13
  UMDDA request. The trial court noted that while the record did not

  indicate why the county court rejected the May 7th filing “but

  accepted an almost identical filing . . . on August 2nd,” it was “not

  in a position to countermand what [the county court] did.” Because

  the May 7th request was nullified, the court denied the motion to

  dismiss.

                             3.    Discussion

¶ 24   Fields argues that the trial court improperly relied on the law

  of the case doctrine because the county court abused its discretion

  by nullifying the May 7th UMDDA request.6 We disagree. A

  criminal defendant is not entitled to hybrid representation — self-

  representation and representation by counsel — and a court is

  entitled to ignore pro se filings submitted by a represented

  defendant. See People v. Gess, 

 (Colo. App.

  2010). Moreover, Fields’ wife, a nonattorney, filed the request,

  which she is not authorized to do. People v. Adams, 

 (Colo. 2010) (nonattorneys may not engage in the unauthorized

  practice of law, including by preparing court pleadings). Because


  6 Fields does not appeal the timeliness of his trial as related to his

  August 2nd UMDDA request.

                                     14
  the county court properly nullified the UMMDA request filed by

  Fields’ wife, the trial court properly concluded that this request was

  void. See People v. Warren, 

 (Colo. App. 2002)

  (“Under the law of the case doctrine, prior relevant rulings made in

  the same case generally are to be followed.”); People v. Dyer, 

 (we may affirm on any ground supported by the

  record). Accordingly, we discern no error.

                      B.    Kidnapping Instruction

¶ 25   Fields next argues that the trial court reversibly erred by

  incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements of second degree

  kidnapping. The prosecution agrees that the instruction was

  incorrect but argues that reversal is not required.

¶ 26   Second degree kidnapping requires that the defendant

  knowingly “seizes and carries” a person “from one place to another”

  without lawful justification or the person’s consent. § 18-3-302(1),

  C.R.S. 2025. Though the elemental instruction correctly listed the

  elements, a separate definitional instruction said that “‘[s]eized and

  carried’ means any movement, however short in distance.” Between

  the time of trial and this appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court held

  that such an instruction is error. Garcia v. People, 

,


                                    15
  ¶¶ 20-21 (this instruction eliminates the seizure element and

  improperly changes the asportation element from carrying a person

  from one place to another to “any movement, however short in

  distance,” effectively lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof).

¶ 27   Because the error was unpreserved in this case, we reverse

  only if it was plain. See Hagos, ¶ 14. Plain error is error that is

  both obvious and substantial. 

 An error is substantial if it so

  undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious

  doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. 

¶ 28   Since our decision in Fields I, the supreme court has made

  clear that the obviousness of an error for purposes of plain error

  review must be judged at the time the error was made, not at the

  time of appellate review. People v. Crabtree, 

, ¶ 4. At

  the time of trial, the law was settled that the definitional instruction

  given here was correct. See People v. Bondsteel, 

, overruled by, Garcia v. People, 

; People v. Rogers,

  

 (Colo. App. 2008), overruled by, Garcia v. People,




                                     16
  

. Accordingly, because the error was not obvious, it was

  not plain error.7

                      C.    Victim Impact Evidence

¶ 29   Fields also argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on

  the improper admission of victim impact evidence. Specifically, he

  challenges J.C.’s testimony that she “never [again] lived” in the

  home where she was assaulted and J.C.’s mother’s testimony that

  J.C. “would never let [the mother] turn the lights off day or night”

  and “would never sleep by herself,” choosing to sleep with her

  mother “because she was so scared with the lights on day and

  night.”

¶ 30   Fields’ counsel did not object to this testimony at trial, so

  again, reversal is not required in the absence of plain error. Hagos,

  ¶ 14. We are not convinced that the testimony was irrelevant, as it




  7 We recognize that we analyzed this issue differently — albeit

  reaching the same conclusion — in People v. Fields, slip op. at
  ¶¶ 13-21 (Colo. App. No. 20CA1708, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published
  pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Fields I). In that now-vacated opinion, we
  concluded that even if the instructional error was obvious, it was
  not substantial based on overwhelming evidence, a conclusion to
  which we continue to adhere. Id. at ¶¶ 17-21. But People v.
  Crabtree, 

, is also now dispositive, and so we apply it
  as well.

                                    17
  had some tendency to lend credibility to J.C.’s testimony that the

  crime happened as she said it did. People v. Haymaker, 

 (Colo. 1986) (though state-of-mind evidence is to be

  viewed with skepticism, the evidence was not improper because it

  “substantiated the credibility of the victim” and was not so

  inflammatory or repetitive as to violate CRE 403). But even

  assuming that this testimony was improper, reversal is not

  required. Both J.C.’s and her mother’s testimony was brief, was not

  referenced in closing argument, and “conveyed relatively mundane

  information when compared with the graphic evidence otherwise

  admitted at trial.” People v. Dean, 

, aff’d, 

.

       D.    Applicability of Section 16-13-101(2.5), C.R.S. 1994

¶ 31   Finally, we are not persuaded by Fields’ argument that his life

  sentence for sexual assault is illegal. As it did in 1994, the habitual

  criminal statute requires life imprisonment for any person who was

  convicted and sentenced as a habitual criminal and “who [was]

  thereafter convicted of a felony which is a crime of violence.” § 18-

  1.3-801(2.5), C.R.S. 2025; § 16-13-101(2.5), C.R.S. 1994. Five days

  after the 1994 sexual assault, Fields committed a burglary. He was


                                    18
  convicted of burglary and adjudicated a habitual criminal in 1995.

  He was convicted of the charges in this case in 2019.

¶ 32   Fields argues that his life sentence is illegal because he

  committed the crime of violence (the sexual assault) before he

  committed burglary. Put another way, he argues that the burglary

  cannot serve as the predicate offense under the habitual criminal

  statute because it occurred after the sexual assault.

¶ 33   Despite Fields’ arguments, the statute’s plain language

  unambiguously provides that the sequence of convictions — not

  commission of the offenses — controls. See McCoy v. People, 

 (“If the statute is unambiguous, then we need look no

  further.”); see also People v. Woodside, 

 (a

  conviction is “prior” even if it is for conduct occurring after a second

  offense where the plain language of the applicable statute does not

  “contemplate the timing of the underlying conduct”). We therefore

  conclude that Fields was properly sentenced.

                             III.   Disposition

¶ 34   The judgment is affirmed.

       JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.




                                     19