Slip opinions decided 2025 — Oklahoma Civil Appeals

¶1 Mary Kathryn ("Mary Kate") Walters married Ryan Walters in 2006 and filed for divorce in 2019. At trial, Mary Kate sought sole custody, authorization to permanently relocate out-of-state, child support, support alimony, and valuation of certain jointly owned assets. The district court granted Mary Kate each of these requests and found Ryan committed "domestic abuse" during the marriage. Ryan appeals these rulings. The court also granted, in part, Mary Kate's request for attorney fees. Ryan appeals from the attorney fee award, primarily arguing that it was erroneous to the extent it was based on a finding of domestic abuse. Mary Kate counter-appeals the attorney fee award, arguing that the court erred in significantly reducing the award. We vacate the provision related to Ryan's maintenance of life insurance to secure unpaid child support and support alimony and remand for the entry of a new provision consistent with existing precedent. As to the award of attorney fees and costs, we deny Ryan's appeal, but vacate the order pursuant to Mary Kate's appeal, and remand the case for the entry of a new award. In all other respects, the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage is affirmed.

¶1 In this action for breach of an oral agreement, fraud/misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, accounting, and removal of trustee, Plaintiffs/Appellees/Counter-Appellants, Jody Rae Kirtley, Personal Representative of the Estate of J. Ross Kirtley, deceased; Debra J. Kirtley, an individual; and Cara Coy, Personal Representative of the Estate of Sheryl J. Coy, deceased, sued Defendant/Appellant/Counter-Appellee, Patsy Kirtley, individually and as Successor Trustee of the Wendell J. Kirtley Revocable Trust dated May 30, 2006, as Amended; as Trustee of the Patsy Ruth Kirtley Revocable Trust dated May 30, 2006, as Amended, and the Patsy Kirtley 2016 Trust dated June 2, 2016, as Restated. Patsy and Wendell were married until Wendell's death August 5, 2015. They had no children together. At Wendell's death, he had three living adult children. All three of Wendell's children were the original Plaintiffs. Two of Wendell's children died during this proceeding. Patsy has one adult child who is not a party to this action. In 2015, Patsy and Wendell amended their revocable trusts to equally benefit their respective adult children upon both settlors' deaths. After Wendell's death, Patsy partially distributed Wendell's trust assets to herself and the children. In 2016, Patsy revoked her amended trust and disinherited Plaintiffs. Patsy's 2016 trust gifted her trust property to her son and granddaughter. Plaintiffs learned about the revocation and filed a petition which sought to enforce an alleged oral agreement between Patsy and Wendell made before the execution of the 2015 trust amendments. Plaintiffs claimed Patsy orally agreed not to change her trust after Wendell's death and to direct her trustee, at her death, to give an equal share of the Kirtley property to each of the couple's children. After a bench trial, the trial court held Wendell gifted valuable income producing property to Patsy; the oral agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds; Plaintiffs did not clearly and convincing establish an exception to the statute of frauds or the elements of fraud; and Plaintiffs failed to establish Patsy breached her fiduciary duty as trustee of Wendell's trust. The court found the terms of the trusts remained in full force and effect and denied the remainder of Plaintiffs' causes of actions and Patsy's counterclaims. Patsy applied for attorney fees pursuant to 60 O.S. 2021 §175.57 and enforcement of the no-contest clause in Wendell's trust. The trial court denied both of Patsy's applications and Patsy appealed from these orders. Plaintiffs counter-appealed from the trial court's judgment in favor of Patsy on Plaintiffs' causes of action. After reviewing the record, we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion, held contrary to the weight of the evidence, or held contrary to law when it denied Patsy's applications and granted judgment in favor of Patsy on all of Plaintiffs' claims. The trial court's orders and judgment are affirmed.

¶1 The Oklahoma Turnpike Authority appeals a judgment in favor of the Peggy Lu Vorel Revocable Trust dated February 18, 2016, entered on a jury verdict in this condemnation case. The dispositive issue is whether the district court correctly construed the allegations in the Authority's petition regarding the scope of the Trust's property taken by the Authority. The district court determined that the description of the property taken included all access from a portion of the Trust's property rather than just access to the limited access turnpike being constructed across the Trust's property. This was error. The judgment is vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 1

¶1 Lawrence J. Warfield, as bankruptcy trustee for Pamela McKinney, appeals an order of the district court approving the final account for the estate of Pamela's father, John Eddie McKinney. The final account invoked a no contest clause in the testator's last will and testament that disinherited Pamela. Upon review, we affirm the order of the district court, holding that the trial court properly enforced the no contest clause.

¶1 Defendant, City of Tulsa [City] appeals a jury verdict of $1,895,000.00 in this inverse condemnation case on the grounds Plaintiff, Rocket Properties, LLC [Rocket], failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and thus, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Further, Rocket counter-appeals the trial court's rulings of its award to Rocket of prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

¶1 Dr. Linh Stephens appeals the trial court's decision affirming the Oklahoma Board of Osteopathic Examiners' order of public reprimand issued to Dr. Stephens for violation of the Oklahoma Osteopathic Medicine Act, 59 O.S. § 620 et seq . Upon review, we reverse, holding that, on this record, Dr. Stephens could not have been reprimanded because she did not violate the portion of the act for which she was cited.

¶1 Defendant/Appellant, Cimarron Properties, Inc. ("Cimarron") appeals an Order on Plaintiff's Garnishment. Plaintiff/Appellee, Carl Parson, issued a garnishment to Cimarron in an attempt to satisfy judgments owed to him and to the estate of Hubert Leon Farley. Cimarron objected to the garnishment and a hearing was subsequently held approximately three years later at which time the trial court ordered Cimarron to comply and make monthly payments to Mr. Parson pursuant to the terms of a promissory note. After a review of the law, the record, and the Parties' briefs, we find that the Order of the trial court should be REVERSED. It was error for the trial court to enter a continuing general garnishment and it was error for the trial court to find that Cimarron should have been on notice that there was a fraudulent assignment of the promissory note.

¶1 Travis Lee Oakes (Claimant) seeks review of an order of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Commission. The Commission reversed an order of an administrative law judge (ALJ) on the issue of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The Commission found the ALJ erred in denying the City of Stillwater's motion to terminate TTD benefits. The Commission found that because Claimant -- who had previously resigned his employment with the City in order to work for a different employer out of state -- was released to light duty work, 1 the City did not have a legal obligation to offer Claimant light duty work, and the concomitant reestablishment of an employer-employee relationship, prior to terminating TTD benefits. The Commission otherwise affirmed the rulings of the ALJ. Based on our review, we sustain the Commission's order.

¶1 Three members of the Coves Master Association, Inc. appeal the dismissal of their petition in this derivative litigation. 1 Prior to filing this case, the Plaintiffs were required to and did make demand on the Association's Board of Directors to file the litigation they wanted the Board to pursue. However, their demand was inadequate in many respects and their Petition included more claims than listed in their demand. In addition, the Plaintiffs' Petition fails to state a direct claim against the Association's directors. Finally, although the Plaintiffs have sued various directors of the Association, the Plaintiffs propose through this litigation to overturn decisions by a majority of the Association's members rather than actions by the Board of Directors. For these reasons, the Plaintiffs' Petition was properly dismissed. However, on remand, the Plaintiffs shall be granted leave to file an amended petition consistent with this Opinion if they properly renew their request to do so with the district court.

¶1 Sherral McVea 1 , in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of Larry McVey, appeals the district court's denial of her motion to vacate a default judgment of forfeiture against the property of the late Larry McVey. On review we find that a personal representative was the only proper party to receive notice and an opportunity to raise claims and defenses that the deceased could have raised. No personal representative had been appointed at the time of notice, and the state did not use the 12 O.S. § 2025 procedure to substitute a personal representative for the deceased. As such, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶1 Special Energy Corporation appeals the judgment entered in favor of Territory Resources, LLC and Summit Resources Management, LLC. 1 Special Energy filed this action alleging various breach of contract and tort claims against Territory and Summit based on these defendants' alleged misuse of confidential and proprietary information to develop an oil and gas prospect in an area owned by Special Energy. Special Energy is the proper party to request adjudication of that claim. The district court's September 14, 2022 and March 24, 2023 Journal Entries are vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

¶1 Jessica Carter (Defendant/Appellant) has appealed the trial court's grant of a Protective Order finding Katrina Carter and two minor children, C.B.C. and D.K.M., (Plaintiffs/Appellees) were victims of harassment as defined by 22 O.S. § 60.1 (5). Jessica 2 alleged on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that she had engaged in a "course or pattern of conduct" sufficient to constitute harassment. We find no error in the trial court's grant of the Protective Order and, accordingly, affirm.

¶1 Plaintiffs SYL Oklahoma, LLC, and Sai Ying Lin appeal a trial court order granting the State of Oklahoma's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of standing. Our review on appeal entails whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting State's motion to dismiss. After review, we conclude it did not and affirm its decision.

¶1 Shawn and Heather Lawrence (the Lawrences) seek review of the district court's Judgment filed in May 2024 granting the motion for summary judgment of ClubCorp NV II, LLC, d/b/a Oak Tree Country Club (Oak Tree). Based on our review, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶1 Eric and Micah Proe and Micah's parents Bart and Shonna Patterson (collectively the Proes) appeal from judgments in favor of Glenn Dennis Emery (Denny Emery) d/b/a Diamond Homes and Mike Emery in this residential home construction dispute. The Proes alleged that the defendants breached the construction contract and were negligent in constructing their home. The case was tried to the district court without a jury. With respect to the Proes' breach of contract claim, the district court found in favor of the Proes against the builder, Denny Emery d/b/a Diamond Homes. That judgment was not appealed and is final.

¶1 This action arises from events at an indoor trampoline park. Defendants/Appellants CircusTrix, LLC, CircusTrix Holdings, LLC, and OKC Deny Gravity, LLC, d/b/a Sky Zone Indoor Trampoline Park, seek review of the district court's order denying their motion to compel arbitration. 1 Based on our review, we affirm.

¶1 Plaintiff/Appellant Randy White (White) appeals from the trial court's order finding, as a matter of fact, that Defendant/Appellee Service Oklahoma (SOK) had not revoked White's driver's license frivolously or without a reasonable basis. We disagree with the trial court. Although SOK has a duty, as the trial court noted, to revoke a driver's license upon receipt of (1) a written test report reflecting that the quantity of alcohol in the blood or breath of the arrested person exceeded legal limits and (2) a sworn report from a law enforcement officer stating that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, SOK also has a duty to notify the arrested person promptly and accurately that his or her driving privilege will be or has been revoked. In this case, White's license was revoked before he was provided notice of the revocation. Under these circumstances, the record supports a finding that SOK revoked White's license frivolously or without a reasonable basis. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

¶1 William Frye appeals the dismissal of his action filed in Oklahoma County to enforce a settlement agreement arising from litigation in a probate proceeding pending in Murray County, Oklahoma. Because venue for Frye's action was not proper in Oklahoma County, we affirm the district court's Judgment dismissing Frye's action.

¶1 Robert V. Wonsch appeals the denial of his motion to vacate the order quashing service of summons on fifteen defendants, including "Dr. Bowman." Bowman is alleged to have been the warden -- and the other defendants employees -- of the Lawton Correctional and Rehabilitation Facility where Wonsch was incarcerated at the time this action was filed. 1 When he filed his Petition, Wonsch also filed a motion for alternative service requesting that the sheriff or court clerk effect service of his Petition and summons on the defendants. Because that motion has not been resolved, we remand this matter to the district court to decide whether alternative service is warranted.

¶1 Trinity Springs Ranch, LLC (Defendant/Appellant), has appealed the trial court's Journal Entry entered on January 31, 2024, which found that Lana and William Mills (Plaintiffs/Appellees) were entitled to an easement for ingress and egress along an unpaved roadway traversing Trinity Springs' real property in Love County, Oklahoma. Trinity Springs argues the trial court erred in finding the Mills were entitled to an easement under any legal theory, while also contending the trial court erroneously enjoined any obstruction of the easement "in perpetuity." The Mills also filed a counterappeal, arguing the trial court erred by limiting their right to improve or alter the easement. We find the trial court correctly concluded the Mills were entitled to an easement by necessity and implication but find the trial court erred in its conclusion that the Mills had acquired an easement by prescription. As easements by necessity and implication cannot exist "in perpetuity", we find that the trial court erred in permanently enjoining Trinity Springs from obstructing the easement. Concerning the counterappeal, we find no error in the trial court's constraint of the Mills' future development or expansion of the easement. Accordingly, the trial court's Order is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

¶1 Petitioner Bonnie Lou Duvall (Claimant) seeks review of a Workers' Compensation Commission order which affirms the administrative law judge (ALJ)'s denial of her request for appointment of an independent medical examiner. After de novo review, we agree with the ALJ, the Commission, and Respondents Express Employment Professionals and AIU Insurance Co. (Employer). Title 85A O.S. 2021 §112 (C) does not mandate the appointment of an independent medical examiner anytime an employer or employee requests one. The ALJ may appoint an independent medical examiner to assist in determining any issue before the Commission. Id. , §112(B). If, upon an employer or employee's request for an independent medical examiner, the ALJ determines an appointment is warranted, the ALJ shall select the independent medical examiner within ten days. Id. , §112(C). The denial of Claimant's request for an independent medical examiner is not affected by error of law or clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantial competent evidence. Accordingly, we sustain.

¶1 Plaintiff/Appellant, Alexis Chamberlain, appeals the dismissal of her case against the Defendant/Appellee, Dayton Parts, LLC, d/b/a Eagle Suspensions ("Dayton"). Ms. Chamberlain was a temporary laborer and employee of LSI Staffing ("LSI"). LSI placed Ms. Chamberlain with Dayton and she was injured while working at the Dayton premises. She received workers' compensation benefits from LSI, but then sued Dayton for negligence, premises liability, and punitive damages. Dayton moved to dismiss on the ground that the workers' compensation benefits received by Ms. Chamberlain were the exclusive remedy for the injury she suffered. Dayton claimed that it was Ms. Chamberlain's statutory employer and entitled to immunity, pursuant to 85A O.S. § 5 . The trial court agreed and dismissed Ms. Chamberlain's case. We have reviewed the record and applicable law and find that, in this case, the resolution of whether Dayton is entitled to the immunity created by 85A O.S. § 5 , involves the consideration of facts outside the pleadings, necessitating compliance with the procedural mechanisms outlined in Knox v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company, 2024 OK 37 , ¶ 19, 549 P.3d 1260 . We, therefore, REVERSE the Order of the trial court dismissing Ms. Chamberlain's case and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

¶1 Plaintiff Mustard Seed Enterprises, Inc., appeals the trial court's order granting Defendant State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Department of Human Services' motion to dismiss. We consider this appeal without appellate briefing pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 1.36, 12 O.S.2021, ch. 15, app. 1. After review, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶1 Defendants/Appellants, Semi-Pro's, Inc. and Kevin Rowley, appeal the trial court's order awarding damages to Plaintiffs/Appellees, Devin Wormuth and Dan'niel McKnight, as well as the trial court's holding that each party bear its own attorney's fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's award of damages to Plaintiffs, and we reverse and remand the trial court's judgment regarding the issue of attorney's fees for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

¶1 Defendant/Appellant Garey Webb (Webb) appeals from the trial court's September 20, 2023 order confirming the sale of real property by the Wagoner County Sheriff on May 1, 2018. He also appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to reconsider and vacate the order confirming the sale. Webb argued the confirmation was erroneous because the foreclosure judgment underlying the sheriff's sale had gone dormant pursuant to 12 O.S. §735 . We agree with the trial court: there was no irregularity in the proceedings, and the court's decision to confirm the sale was consistent with the law and supported by sufficient evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion by confirming the sheriff's sale or by denying Webb's motion to reconsider or vacate. We affirm.

¶ 1 Jeannie Miller ("Miller" or "Appellant") has appealed the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of Teresa L. Davis ("Davis" or "Appellee"), arguing that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the real property at issue ("the Property") had not been properly conveyed from the decedent, Lorene Jones, to Miller. Davis utilized a Transfer on Death Deed to effectuate the conveyance. The issue in this case arose because the TODD had not been signed by Jones, but only by Miller who had been acting as an agent of Jones' under a Power of Attorney. The trial court ruled in favor of Davis, holding that the Property was an asset of Jones' estate after determining Jones had not expressly provided Miller with the authority to execute a TODD, as required by 58 O.S. § 3024 (A)(4). We find that the plain and unambiguous meaning of 58 O.S. § 1252 (A), demands that a TODD must be "signed by the record owner of interest" in order to effectuate the TODD. Thus, in the narrow context of an attorney-in-fact that is acting pursuant to a POA, § 1252(A), prohibits a TODD that is not signed by the "record owner". In this case, because Jones was the "record owner", the TODD was ineffective. Alternatively, we further find that the trial court correctly interpreted and applied the statutory guidelines of 58 O.S. § 3024 (A), because Miller's execution of the TODD constituted the "creation of a beneficiary designation" and, in light of the fact that Miller lacked a specific authority under the POA to do so, the TODD was invalid. Consequently, we affirm the result reached by the trial court and find that the TODD at issue here to be invalid.

¶1 Respondent/Appellant Michael Phillips (Phillips) is the putative father of M.R.P., a minor child born on August 3, 2023. Phillips executed an extrajudicial consent the day after M.R.P.'s birth waiving any legal interest or rights to the child and consenting to her adoption. Soon after, but outside of the fifteen-day window allowed by statute, Phillips sought to withdraw his extrajudicial consent, claiming he signed under duress. It also came to light that the form Phillips executed did not include the statutorily-required statement that Phillips was represented by counsel or had waived the right to counsel. After a hearing, the court denied Phillips' motion. It made no findings as to Phillips' claim that he signed under duress, but the court found the form Phillips executed was in substantial compliance with the statute because he had knowledge an attorney had been retained for him but chose not to consult with the lawyer. We find the court erred as a matter of law. "Where performance of statutory requirements is mandatory, there can be no 'substantial compliance' except in accordance with the particular provision." Barnes v. Transok Pipeline Co. , 1976 OK 27 , ¶15, 549 P.2d 819 , 822. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the court's order denying Phillips' motion and to enter an order acknowledging that Phillips' extrajudicial consent is invalid as a matter of law.

¶1 John Rutherford appeals the district court's order denying his petition to vacate a judgment cancelling a deed to real property. Because unresolved fact issues require an evidentiary hearing, we vacate that order and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

¶1 Swadley's Foggy Bottom Kitchen, an Oklahoma limited liability company, (Plaintiff, or SFBK) appeals from the district court's order filed in January 2023 dismissing a portion of SFBK's petition pursuant to the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (OCPA), 12 O.S. 2021 §§ 1430-1440, and certifying its order as final pursuant to 12 O.S. 2021 § 994. It also appeals from the district court's March 2023 order awarding attorney fees, costs, and a sanction pursuant to the OCPA. Moreover, Curt Breuklander (Defendant, or Mr. Breuklander) appeals from the district court's order filed in April 2023 denying his motion to dismiss SFBK's second amended petition. In May 2023, the two appeals were consolidated under Case No. 121,019 by order of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Based on our review, we affirm the district court's January 2023 and April 2023 orders; however, we reverse the district court's March 2023 order because it fails to contain a computation to support the award. We remand for further proceedings in a manner consistent with this Opinion.

¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, Respondent Clay R. Skoch (Father) appeals from the trial court's Journal Entry of Decree of Dissolution of Marriage (Decree) in which, among other matters, the court made a finding of domestic violence by Father against Petitioner Kamberly D. Skoch (Mother) and their minor children, awarded sole custody to Mother, and adopted Mother's sole custody and visitation plan. Father also appeals from the trial court's Order awarding attorney fees and costs to Mother pursuant to 43 O.S. 2021 § 112.6 . We affirm.

¶1 Plaintiff/Appellee Speake Land Holdings, LLC (Speake) sought to partition real property in Carter County, Oklahoma. Defendants/Appellants Lenora A. Colbert, Kimberly Brown, Melvin J. Stevenson, Pamela Shannon, Haile Shannon, Henry Shannon, Jr., Kiawana Lampkin, Phyllis Shannon, Rhonda Kimbel, Salina Shannon, Samantha Shannon, and Sammy Shannon, III (collectively, the Shannon Heirs) challenged the trial court's decision to confirm the commissioners' report. In an opinion dated June 27, 2025, we found the court's decision was not against the clear weight of the evidence or contrary to law and affirmed. Both Speake and the Shannon Heirs filed motions for appellate attorney fees pursuant to 12 O.S. 2021 §696.4 (C) and 12 O.S. 2021 §1515 . We grant both motions and remand with instructions for the trial court to determine "the costs, attorney's fees and expenses" that have accrued in this action and to "apportion the same among the parties, according to their respective interests[.]" See §1515.

¶1 Petitioner/Appellant Shane Nichlos appeals from an order denying his request to be removed from the Oklahoma Sex Offender Registry. Appellant argues that he met the statutory criteria pursuant to 57 O.S. § 583 (E), but that the trial court erred in denying his request. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶1 Appellant is the biological father of S.L.M.W. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner's application to adjudicate the minor child eligible for adoption without Father's consent. The Supreme Court has clarified that the trial court must consider the child's best interests when determining whether a child may be adopted without consent. Matter of Adoption of L.B.L. , 2023 OK 48 , 529 P.3d 175 . Here, the appealed order is silent as to the best interests of the child, and we are unable to conclude a best interest finding is inherent or implicit in the order. Id . at ¶12. Further, the transcript suggests the hearing may have been conducted under an assumption that the child's best interests was an issue solely relevant in a subsequent hearing. The order must be reversed for further proceedings.

¶1 Nexstar Media Group, Inc. ("Nexstar") appeals the trial court's December 3, 2024, Order denying Nexstar's Motion to Dismiss under the Oklahoma Citizen's Participation Act ("OCPA"). McCleary brought suit against Nexstar for defamation, after Nexstar undisputedly but mistakenly ran his photograph in a news segment concerning a different Christopher McCleary in Texas, who had been charged with sex trafficking. In its Motion, Nexstar asserted that McCleary failed to establish by clear and specific evidence the element of fault amounting to at least negligence to support his defamation claim, because McCleary had not presented expert testimony. The trial court found McCleary met this threshold showing and that the evidence presented raised questions of fact on the issue of Nexstar's fault. Based on our review of the briefs and appellate record, we affirm the trial court's Order.