J-A07004-25
2025 PA Super 162
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CLARISSA MARIE KIESSLING : No. 886 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered May 24, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-01-CR-0001015-2023
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SHERRI RENEE DEPASQUA : No. 887 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered May 28, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-01-CR-0001014-2023
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
STEVEN LEROY MURPHY : No. 888 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered May 28, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-01-CR-0001013-2023
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STABILE, J.
J-A07004-25
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JULY 28, 2025
The Commonwealth appeals from the order dismissing with prejudice
the criminal information filed against Steven Leroy Murphy, Clarissa Marie
Kiessling, and Sherri Renee Depasqua (collectively “Appellees”). We affirm.
The Commonwealth initiated the above-cited criminal cases following a
grand jury presentment (“Presentment”) returned by the Forty-Ninth
Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. That Presentment recommended that
Appellees be charged with two counts each of endangering the welfare of a
child (“EWOC”) in relation to two minor children, Z.M. (born August 2017) and
I.M. (born February 2019). As outlined in the Presentment, during the
relevant period between February 2019 and May 2020, Murphy, Kiessling, and
Depasqua were employed by Adams County Child and Youth Services
(“ACCYS”) as caseworker, supervisor and assistant administrator,
respectively. In that capacity, Appellees provided protective services to the
children in accordance with the Child Protection Services Law (“CPSL”), 23
Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6388.
The Presentment outlined the history of the case thusly:1
____________________________________________
1 The Investigating Grand Jury Act defines a Presentment as “[a] written
formal recommendation by an investigating grand jury that specific persons
be charged with specific crimes.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 4542. The trial court expressly
incorporated the Presentment into the certified record for all three cases.
However, it denied the Commonwealth’s request to further supplement the
certified record with two data storage devices, commonly referred to as thumb
drives, that included the testimony, exhibits, and documents presented to the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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I.M. was born at just 27 weeks with the presence of cocaine,
opiates, and THC in her system. As a result, a general protective
services referral was made. ACCYS commenced an investigation
and obtained emergency protective custody of I.M. on February
12, 2019. Upon I.M.’s discharge from the hospital, [Mother] failed
to adhere to a separate safety plan implemented by ACCYS
regarding her other daughter, Z.M. (DOB: August 24, 2017), who
was also taken into protective custody at that time. Dependency
cases were initiated in Adams County and ACCYS obtained legal
and physical custody of the children on February 28, 2019.
At the direction of ACCYS, the children were placed with
resource parents, or foster parents, through Family United
Network. The resource parents were Courtney and Kevin McCann
of Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County. Mrs. McCann had
previously been employed as a caseworker with Dauphin County
Children and Youth Services. Throughout placement, Mrs.
McCann was employed as a trauma social worker at Penn State
Hershey Medical Center.
....
After the children were placed with her family, and before
they were reunified with [Mother], Mrs. McCann had direct contact
with [Mother] on multiple occasions both in her own home and at
various visitations and appointments for the children. She
registered repeated concerns about [Mother] to Murphy, Kiessling
and/or DePasqua through email, in-person meetings and
submission of documents. The concerns expressed by Mrs.
McCann about [Mother] included perceived limited cognitive
functioning, anxiety, possible domestic abuse, an inability to
manage both children at the same time without assistance,
difficulty in maintaining a schedule of visits and appointments,
frequently missed or tardy appearances at medical appointments
for I.M., often followed by conflicting excuses given by [Mother].
In a memo from Mrs. McCann to ACCYS dated October 15, 2019,
Mrs. McCann outlined her frustration that [her] concerns were not
____________________________________________
grand jury. See Order, 6/21/24, at 1. The court made clear that it would
immediately provide the information upon the request of this Court. Id. at 1-
2. As discussed further in the body of this memorandum, it is unnecessary to
review the grand jury testimony because the existing record is sufficient to
affirm the trial court’s order dismissing and quashing the information.
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being taken seriously and that she was concerned about
reunification. She wrote, ‘‘As a professional in this field, I have
tried to look at the reunification efforts diplomatically and fair, but
have struggled to describe this work as anything else but shallow
and mediocre, setting these children up for failure and to return
to care. Mrs. McCann indicated that on most occasions, ACCYS
either failed to respond to her expressed concerns or was
dismissive of them.
Grand Jury Presentment No. 23, 6/29/23, at unnumbered 5-6.
Notwithstanding Mrs. McCann’s criticism of the ACCYS caseworkers
assigned to Mother’s case and her apprehensions regarding Mother’s
parenting ability, a view shared by various service providers that interacted
with the family, the dependency court reunited the family during February
2020. Significantly, as to Appellees’ failure to relay the various concerns to
the dependency court, the Presentment determined, “the concerns expressed
. . . to [Appellees] were either not provided to the court or minimized by
ACCYS representatives, particularly Murphy.” Id. at 9-10. (cleaned up).
Three months after the family reunified, ACCYS received a ChildLine
general protective service report concerning Mother’s alcohol intoxication at a
social gathering. The Presentment outlined the relevant facts and the ACCYS
investigation thusly,
The reporting source, who was anonymous, stated that on
May 16, 2020, she was present at a party attended by [Mother]
. . . and the children. The report indicated that in the presence of
the children, [Mother] was drinking moonshine or a clear alcohol,
became intoxicated and belligerent, vomited and eventually
passed out. It was reported that [Mother] did not know where
she was or how she got to the party. One of the children,
identified as a three year old, reportedly kept asking [Mother]
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what was wrong. Finally, it was reported that someone took
[Mother] and the children home.
An after-hours caseworker responded to [Mother’s] home
after receiving the report on May 21, 2020. The caseworker
indicated that at that unannounced visit, no alcohol was found at
[Mother’s] residence, [Mother] denied the allegations, and the
children appeared safe. [Mother] was not drug-tested at the time
of the unannounced visit.
DePasqua is listed as the supervisor on the May 21, 2020
referral. She listed several action items to be taken in response
to the referral. In the action items, DePasqua neither requested
an immediate random drug screen of [Mother], nor directed
Kiessling or Murphy to report the referral nor the May 16, 2020
incident to the Court at the review hearing scheduled to occur on
May 22, 2020. Both Kiessling and Murphy received a copy of the
ChildLine referral prior to appearing in court that day and
DePasqua had also been advised of the details of the referral prior
to her appearance at the May 22 proceeding. No one from ACCYS,
most notably Murphy or Kiessling, ever attempted to verify
through witness. . . interviews, other than [Mother], whether the
allegations contained in the May 21, 2020 referral were valid.
Grand Jury Presentment, 6/29/23, at 12.
During a prescheduled permanency review hearing the following day,
Appellees did not inform the trial court of the ChildLine report or their ensuing
investigation or request that Mother submit to a court-ordered drug and
alcohol screening. Accordingly, the children remained in Mother’s physical
custody with the trial court retaining supervision. Approximately seven days
later, Mother murdered fifteen month-old I.M. by shaking her and inflicting
blunt-force trauma. Again, the Presentment provides additional information:
[Mother] admitted to inflicting the injuries to I.M. by grabbing her
out of her crib by her arm, holding I.M. around her torso and
shaking her three or four times because [Mother] was frustrated,
upset and wanted a few minutes to herself. [Mother] admitted
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that the night before, she used marijuana, alcohol, Percocet and
Suboxone. [Mother] also tested positive for a constellation of
drugs and alcohol the same day when drug tested by a case
worker from ACCYS, who responded to [Mother’s] home. I.M. was
flown by medical helicopter to Penn State Hershey Medical Center
where she eventually died on May 31, 2020 from her injuries.
Medical records and an autopsy report indicated that upon
presentation to the hospital, L.M. was assessed to have multiple
bruises on her forehead, various parts of her face, upper lip, ears,
and right upper chest area near her clavicle. Various testing
revealed that I.M. suffered a fracture to her right clavicle, a right
frontal skull fracture, left hemispheric and right parietal subdural
hematomas (commonly known as brain bleeds), frank multiple
retinal hemorrhages of the right eye and multiple retinal
hemorrhages and retinal detachment in her left eye. Several
treating and consulting experts concluded that the constellation of
injuries were inconsistent with the account provided by [Mother],
would not have been the result of normal play, could not have
occurred as a result of a waist high drop of I.M. to the floor, but
were consistent with I.M. being subjected to multiple nonaccidental traumatic injuries such as shaken with force by adult
strength and combined with blunt force (sudden
acceleration/deceleration of the brain with impact).
Id. at 13-14.
As a result of the Presentment, on August 1, 2023, approximately three
years after the foregoing events, the Commonwealth charged Appellees with
two counts each of EWOC.2 Appellees each waived their rights to appear at a
____________________________________________
2 The affidavit of probable cause appended to the criminal compliant adopted
the Grand Jury Presentment as follows:
On 06/29/23, the 49th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury
("Grand Jury") issued Presentment No. 23 ("Presentment"). It
recommends that criminal charges be filed against Steven
Murphy, Clarissa Kiessling and Sherri Depasqua for violations of
the Crimes Code of Pennsylvania.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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formal arraignment, the charges were bound over for trial, and on October
23, 2023, the Commonwealth filed at each criminal action number both notice
of its intent to try the three cases jointly and the following two-count
information alleging that Appellees engaged in criminal behavior between
February 6, 2019 and May 29, 2020:
COUNT I:
ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN -(Felony I)
The Actor, being a parent, guardian or other person
supervising the welfare of female juvenile, I.M., a child under 18
years of age, knowingly endangered the welfare of said child by
violating a duty of care, protection or support, specifically by
failing to advise the supervising court of multiple concerns about
the female juvenile mother’s inability to parent safely and
therefore resulting in the death of female juvenile, I.M., in
violation of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, Act of December 6,
1972, 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4304(a)(I).
____________________________________________
The Presentment was accepted by the Honorable Richard A. Lewis,
Supervising Judge of the 49th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury
by Order dated 06/29/23.
Having read and reviewed the Presentment, and after having
participated in this investigation and considering all the facts and
circumstances, we are adopting the Presentment and
incorporating it fully into this Affidavit of Probable Cause (A copy
of the Presentment is attached hereto). Based upon our review of
the testimony given before the Grand Jury and the documents
produced for the Grand Jury, we believe that the testimony of the
various witnesses is accurately summarized in the Presentment
and that the records referred to in the Presentment are stated
accurately.
Affidavit of Probable Cause (Kiessling), 8/1/23 at 1. The Commonwealth’s
criminal complaints and supporting affidavits of probable cause against each
Appellee presented identical allegations of criminal conduct. For ease of
discussion, we cite for reference only those documents filed against Kiessling.
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COUNT 2:
ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN --(Felony I)
The Actor, being a parent, guardian or other person
supervising the welfare of . . . female juvenile, Z.M., a child under
18 years of age, knowingly endangered the welfare of said child
by violating a duty of care, protection or support, specifically by
failing to advise the supervising court of multiple concerns about
the female juvenile mother’s inability to parent safely and the
ongoing risk of serious injury or death to Z.M., in violation of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 1972, 18 Pa.C.S.
Section 4304(a)(I).
Criminal Information, 10/23/23 at 1.
Invoking the immunity provision outlined in 23 Pa.C.S. § 6318,
Appellees each filed motions to quash and dismiss the criminal information on
March 8, 11, 13, and 2024, respectively. The Commonwealth’s response
asserted that the immunity provision did not afford Appellees immunity from
criminal liability because, inter alia, they failed to provide services under the
CPSL by withholding critical information from the dependency court, i.e., they
failed to advise the court about Mother’s inability to parent safely.
The trial court disagreed, and on May 28, 2024, it entered a single order
granting Appellees’ requests for relief and “quashed and dismissed [the
information filed] against each of the three defendants, with prejudice.” Trial
Court Order, 5/28/24. Essentially, the court concluded that Appellees’
immunity from prosecution attached to the alleged conduct occurring during
the course and scope of their employment at ACCYS. See Trial Court Opinion,
5/28/24, at 3. It reasoned, in pertinent part, as follows:
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The primary [criminal allegations] against these three defendants
[does] not [concern] reunification, but what or wasn’t done as a
result of [the] ChildLine report of May 21, 2020. The report was
anonymous and not made until five days later [concerning]
allegations of intoxication of Mother on May 16, 2020. A
caseworker immediately made an unannounced visit to Mother's
home. Mother denied the allegation, the children appeared safe,
and no alcohol was located. Again, nothing mentioned in any way
was directed at the mother regarding physical abuse towards the
children. The hearing before the Dependency Judge was the very
next day, after the alleged report and in-house investigation by
the caseworker[.]
The bottom line here [is]: Are the three defendants at the points
between February 2020 and May 21, 2020, acting and providing
services as authorized by law? Yes. Were the acts by a
caseworker sent to the house on May 21, 2020, to investigate the
anonymous report of an alleged incident of May 16, 2020 an
employee providing services as authorized by law? Yes. Were
there any indications other than the mother's shortcomings, that
would indicate at that moment that the children were in danger of
physical abuse by the mother - No. Did both parents have a
lengthy history of drug or alcohol abuse- Yes. Had the parents
participated in D&A counseling, education and showed recent
clean results – Yes.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/28/24, at unnumbered 3-4 (cleaned up, some
punctuation altered).3
In anticipation of the ensuing appeal, the Commonwealth filed a motion
to supplement the record “with evidence that will allow the Superior Court to
engage in meaningful appellate review,” presumably the evidence presented
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3 The trial court also invoked the rationale employed by its sister jurisdiction
in Commonwealth v. Coyne, 23-MD-268 (Lackawanna County), which is
currently pending on appeal before this Court. However, that matter is
distinguishable from the case at bar insofar as it concerns the failure to report
child abuse as expressly mandated by the CPSL, a criminal charge that was
not filed against Appellees.
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to the grand jury. Motion to Supplement the Record, 6/14/24, at 2. As noted,
the trial court adopted the Presentment but declined to supplement the record
with the testimony and exhibits absent an order from the Superior Court.
Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed the instant appeal from the order
dismissing the criminal information and complied with the trial court’s directive
to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which it reiterates on appeal as follows:
I. Did the lower court err in finding Defendants were immune from
prosecution pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6318?
II. Did the lower court err in denying the Commonwealth’s request
to supplement the record?
Commonwealth’s brief at 6.4
At the outset, we address the Commonwealth’s assertion that the trial
court erred in denying its motion to supplement the certified record with all
the evidence adduced during the grand jury proceeding. It posits, “[A] just
determination of [Appellees’] hotly contested immunity claim would then
require consideration of additional relevant facts . . ., including those obtained
during the criminal investigation but not recited in the . . .[P]resentment.”
Commonwealth’s brief at 34 (footnote omitted). While the Commonwealth
frames its position as an alternative argument to be considered only if its
primary challenge fails, we confront this issue first and confirm that our review
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4 The Commonwealth filed the identical brief at each of the respective docket
numbers. Appellees filed a single, consolidated brief in this matter.
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is limited to the existing record as it is informed by the factual recitation in
the grand jury Presentment that was specifically incorporated into the
affidavits of probable cause and endorsed by the affiant as an accurate
summary of the grand jury testimony. Affidavit of Probable Cause , 8/1/23 at
1.
To address this aspect of the Commonwealth’s argument, we begin with
a brief primer outlining the composition, purpose, and authority of an
investigating grand jury. Pursuant to the Investigating Grand Jury Act, a
statewide grand jury is tasked with investigating organized crime, public
corruption, or both involving more than one county in the Commonwealth.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 4544. Once convened, the grand jury is empowered “to
issue a presentment with regard to any person who appears to have
committed within the county or counties in which such investigating grand
jury is summoned an offense against the criminal laws of the Commonwealth.”
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 4548. Should the grand jury determine upon the basis of
evidence presented to it that a presentment is warranted, the presentment
must be approved by a majority of the grand jury’s full membership, which is
typically twenty-three voting members, before it is submitted to the
supervising judge for its acceptance. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 4545, 4551(a).
Thereafter, the Commonwealth files a criminal complaint based on the
Presentment. 52 Pa.C.S. § 4541(e).
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Instantly, the Commonwealth proffered an array of evidence to the
grand jury, but the Presentment that forms the predicate probable cause in
the criminal complaint reflects only the portion of the evidence that garnered
the approval of at least one-half of the voting members of the grand jury.
Hence, as outlined in its “findings of fact” the Presentment constitutes the
body of the evidence that we are confident the jury accepted in exercising its
statutory authority to recommend criminal charges against Appellees based
upon their alleged failure to inform the dependency court of the potential risks
to the children’s safety. As it is beyond cavil that appellate courts do not
engage in fact-finding, there is no need to supplement the certified record
with evidence that the grand jury heard but did not affirmatively adopt. See
BouSamra v. Excela Health, 210 A.3d 967, 980 (Pa. 2019) (“[I]t is not an
appellate court's function to engage in fact-finding.”). Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in denying the Commonwealth’s motion to supplement the
record for this appeal.
Turning to the merits of the Commonwealth’s appeal, we note the
applicable standard of review. Generally, “[t]he decision to grant, or deny, a
motion to quash a criminal information or indictment is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only where there
has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Renninger, 269
A.3d 548, 556 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up)(citation omitted). When
reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss a criminal information, the
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appellate court accepts the Commonwealth’s averments as true, examining
the evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 244 A.3d 38,
41 (Pa.Super. 2020).
While we ultimately must assess the trial court’s exercise of discretion,
the crux of Appellees’ assertions requires us to interpret the CPSL to determine
whether Appellees are immune from prosecution by virtue of their
employment by a county agency. That issue presents a question of law, which
we review de novo. Renninger, 269 A.3d at 562 (“A challenge concerning
the application of a statute . . . presents a question of law for which our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.”). Statutory
interpretation is, of course, conducted in accordance with the Statutory
Construction Act:
Pursuant to that Act, “[t]he object of all statutory
interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. §
1921(a). When the words of a statute are clear and free from
ambiguity, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under
the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Id. § 1921(b). When, however,
the words of a statute are not explicit, a court may discern the
General Assembly's intent by examining considerations outside of
the words of the statute. Id. § 1921(c). In addition, when
construing a statute, we must, if possible, give effect to all of its
provisions. Id. § 1921(a).
The Statutory Construction Act also instructs that, in
ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in enacting a
statute, several presumptions may be used. Id. § 1922. Among
those presumptions is that “the General Assembly intends the
entire statute to be effective and certain.” Id. § 1922(2). We also
may presume that the General Assembly does not intend absurd
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or unreasonable results. Id. § 1922(1). As this Court wisely stated
over sixty years ago, to avoid such results, we “must read
[statutes] in the light of reason and common sense.” Ayers v.
Morgan, 397 Pa. 282,
154 A.2d 788, 789 (1959). [Further], we
may presume that the General Assembly does not intend to violate
the Constitution of the United States or this Commonwealth. 1
Pa.C.S. § 1922(3).
Id. at 890 (citations altered).
This case turns on the application of § 6318 in relation to the
Commonwealth’s wide-ranging allegations of criminality involving both the
investigation of suspected child abuse under the CPSL and the more routine,
but allegedly inadequate, provision of services over a fifteen-month period
between February 2019 and May 2020.
The CPSL extends immunity in the following situations:
§ 6318. Immunity from liability
(a) General rule.--A person, hospital, institution, school, facility,
agency or agency employee acting in good faith shall have
immunity from civil and criminal liability that might otherwise
result from any of the following:
(1) Making a report of suspected child abuse or making a
referral for general protective services, regardless of
whether the report is required to be made under this
chapter.
(2) Cooperating or consulting with an investigation under this
chapter, including providing information to a child fatality
or near-fatality review team.
(3) Testifying in a proceeding arising out of an instance of
suspected child abuse or general protective services.
(4) Engaging in any action authorized under section 6314
(relating to photographs, medical tests and X-rays of child
subject to report), 6315 (relating to taking child into
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protective custody), 6316 (relating to admission to
private and public hospitals) or 6317 (relating to
mandatory reporting and postmortem investigation of
deaths).
(b) Departmental and county agency immunity.--An official or
employee of the department or county agency who refers a
report of suspected child abuse for general protective services to
law enforcement authorities or provides services as authorized
by this chapter shall have immunity from civil and criminal
liability that might otherwise result from the action.
(c) Presumption of good faith.--For the purpose of any civil or
criminal proceeding, the good faith of a person required to report
pursuant to section 6311 (relating to persons required to report
suspected child abuse) and of any person required to make a
referral to law enforcement officers under this chapter shall be
presumed.
23 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (emphases added).5
The Commonwealth contests that immunity extends to Appellees. While
the Commonwealth’s main issue is composed of several sub-arguments, its
overarching position is easily reduced to two primary components: (1) the
plain language of § 6318(a) and (b) does not apply to Appellees’ alleged failure
to act; and (2) regardless of the statutory language, policy concerns weigh
against extending immunity to Appellees under the facts alleged. See
Commonwealth’s brief at 15-30. We address these assertions seriatim, and
reject both.
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5 The CPSL defines “county agency,” as used in subparagraph (b), as “[t]he
county children and youth social service agency[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303.
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The Commonwealth first asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing
the information against the respective Appellees based upon the application
of the immunity provision outlined in § 6318(a) because the grounds for their
criminal charges fall outside of the scope of activities delineated in
§ 6318(a)(1)-(4). See Commonwealth’s brief at 19-20. It continues that,
even if one of the § 6318(a) subparagraphs is applicable, Appellees’ alleged
conduct was so egregious that it precluded the presumption that they acted
in good faith, a position which necessitates an objective assessment of
Appellees’ actions. Id. 20-21. For the following reasons, we disagree.
To the extent that the Commonwealth’s prosecution is premised on
Appellees’ testimony in a proceeding “arising out of an instances of suspected
child abuse or general protective services,” e.g., failing to advise the
supervising court of the pending ChildLine investigation against Mother during
the May 2020 dependency hearings, Appellees are protected by the immunity
provision of § 6318(a)(3). In this regard, we also reject the Commonwealth’s
alternate assertion that, even if Appellees’ conduct is covered by
§ 6318(a)(3), their behavior objectively was so appalling that it rebuts the
presumption of good faith extended to mandatory reporters in § 6318(c) like
Appellees. Id. at 20-21. The Commonwealth contends, in pertinent part, that
Appellees failed to “provide the dependency court with information regarding
[Mother’s] parental shortcomings[.]” Id. at 21. It concludes, Appellees’
“knowing failure to perform [an] adequate and appropriate investigation and
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to inform the dependency court of vital information of which they were aware
bespeaks their bad faith and is sufficient to rebut [the] presumption of good
faith.” Id.
Notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s protestations of Appellees’ bad
faith in failing to provide testimony to satisfactorily inform the dependency
court of its investigation of Mother’s behavior, there is no indication in the
facts that the Commonwealth set forth in the Presentment, as adopted by the
criminal complaint, that Appellees’ omission objectively was so conspicuously
flagrant that it requires negating the good-faith presumption. Indeed, in
contrast to any bad-faith allegation, as outlined supra, the Presentment’s
findings relating to the Appellees’ investigation of the May 16th incident
indicated that a caseworker made an immediate, unannounced visit to the
residence and confirmed that the children appeared safe. See Grand Jury
Presentment, 6/29/23, at 12.
The Commonwealth does not address this aspect of the Presentment or
assert that the testimony the agency presented to the dependency court
regarding any aspect of suspected child abuse was perjurious, objectively
deceptive, or of such nature that rebuts the presumption of good faith.
Instead, it simply criticizes Appellees’ response to the ChildLine report and for
neglecting to advise the dependency court of its newly-initiated investigation.
As the Commonwealth specifically adopted the Presentment in filing the
criminal complaints, the foregoing findings of fact concerning Appellees’
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immediate investigation and confirmation that the children appeared safe with
Mother are fatal to its instant assertion of bad faith. See Lambert, 244 A.3d
at 41 (in reviewing motion to dismiss, appellate court accepts
Commonwealth’s averments as true.) Accordingly, this argument must fail.
More importantly, regardless of the Commonwealth’s contentions that
Appellees’ conduct did not warrant the presumption of good faith, Appellees
are protected under the broader immunity provisions outlined in § 6318(b),
which states, in pertinent part: “An official or employee of the department or
county agency who . . . provides services as authorized by this chapter shall
have immunity from civil and criminal liability that might otherwise result from
the action.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6318(b). Critically, unlike the narrow protection
afforded by § 6318(a), which is based expressly on the “agency employee
acting in good faith,” the statutory language extending immunity in § 6318(b)
simply does not implicate the good-faith requirement. Indeed, even in
challenging the applicability of § 6318(b) herein, the Commonwealth does not
assert, much less provide any legal authority, for the proposition that
immunity afforded pursuant to § 6318(b) is subject to rebuttal. See
Commonwealth’s brief at 21-25. Instead, as discussed at length, infra, the
Commonwealth maintained that immunity did not attach because Appellees
did not “provide services authorized by the CPSL” and if they did provide such
services, it would be contrary to public policy to extend immunity in this case.
Id. at 21, 25-30.
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Turning to the Commonwealth’s explicit challenge to the court’s
application of § 6318(b), we are not persuaded by the contention that the
criminal allegations against Appellees did not relate to the provisions of
services to the family.6 Specifically, we reject the groundless argument that
the criminal charges concerned “the provision of information to the
dependency court” (as opposed to a service to the family) and that Appellees’
“failure to furnish the court with all necessary and relevant information
amounts to an inaction that logically cannot be equivocated with the
affirmative act of ‘providing services.’” Id. at 23-24 (emphasis in original).
We begin by addressing the portion of the information that relates
specifically to Appellees’ response to the May 21, 2020 ChildLine referral, the
ensuing investigation, and the decision to forego either demanding a drug
screen from Mother or informing the dependency court of the days-old
ChildLine referral when the court fashioned its determination that the children
are safe in Mother’s care. As developed in the affidavit of probable cause, this
aspect of the criminal charges flowed from Appellees “failing to advise the
supervising court of multiple concerns about the female juvenile [M]other’s
inability to parent safely and the ongoing risk of serious injury or death”
Criminal Information, 10/23/23, at 1.
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6 The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association submitted an amicus brief
wherein it similarly asserted that § 6318(b) only protects caseworkers’ actions
rather than the omissions or failures to act that the Commonwealth alleged
herein. For the reasons explained infra, this argument is unconvincing.
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Section 6362(a) of the CPSL specifically tasks county agencies with the
responsibility of “receiving and investigating all reports of child abuse made
pursuant to” the CPSL. Here, the ACCY caseworker investigated the
anonymous ChildLine referral concerning Mother’s intoxication in the presence
of her children. There was no allegation of physical abuse. During the ensuing
unannounced in-home visit later that evening, Mother denied the allegation,
no alcohol was found, and the children appeared safe. Accordingly, the
caseworker did not demand a urine screening at that juncture or inform the
dependency court of the ChildLine report, the brief investigation, or its
ultimate assessment that the children were not at risk. As it is axiomatic that
Appellees’ decisions and actions relating to their response, investigation, and
assessment of the ChildLine referral fell within the scope of their risk
assessment obligations under the CPSL, it is equally obvious that the CPSL
extends to them immunity from prosecution for those services. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in concluding that Appellees are immune from
prosecution for anything that relates to their involvement in the May 2020
ChildLine investigation.
The larger question concerning Appellees’ general duties in the county
agency is more involved. The trial court concluded broadly that immunity
attached simply because Appellees were performing their jobs as agency
caseworkers. However, CPSL immunity does not attach as a feature of their
employment but as a characteristic of the functional nature of their
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performance. That is, immunity attaches where Appellees are “providing
services as authorized by this chapter,” i.e. furthering the purpose of the
CPSL.
Instantly, the Presentment, criminal complaint, and information allege
that Appellees engaged in criminal behavior that does, in fact, implicate the
provision of services authorized by the CPSL and the Commonwealth is
seeking to prosecute them for those precise actions. Indeed, the Presentment
notes that the children were placed in the protective custody of ACCYS
because of a general protective referral, the criminal complaint charged
Appellees with specific allegations of failing to advise the supervising court of
Mother’s inability to parent safely, and the information asserted that those
failures led to the death of I.M. and the continuing risk of death to Z.M. See
Criminal Information, 10/23/23 at 1. As all those assertions involved services
Appellees provided under the CPSL, we do not disturb the trial court’s
conclusion that immunity attached based on the Commonwealth’s theory of
criminal liability.
Next, having found that § 6318(b) affords immunity to Appellees in this
case, we turn to the Commonwealth’s several policy-based arguments that
challenge the extension of immunity notwithstanding the clear and
unambiguous language of § 6318(b). First, the Commonwealth asserts that
compelling policy considerations, such as Appellees’ “blatantly criminal acts
committed in the course of” providing services, preclude immunity.
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Commonwealth’s brief at 25. The Commonwealth supports this argument with
two concededly hyperbolic hypotheticals involving a caseworker sexually
assaulting a child or corrupting the morals of a minor during visitation. Id. at
25-26. It reasons, “the General Assembly cannot have intended to immunize
county agency employees who commit crimes while ‘providing services’ under
the CPSL.” Id. at 26. Relatedly, the Commonwealth contends that a plain-
language application of § 6318(b) conflicted with the intent of the general
assembly in enacting the CPSL insofar as it would grant immunity to a
caseworker who knowingly placed a child in a dangerous environment. Id. at
28-30.
These assertions fail for numerous reasons, the primary cause being
that, under our rules of statutory interpretation, we do not look to policy
consideration where the language is unambiguous.7 See, e.g., 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity,
the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit.”). Furthermore, the hypotheticals involving a caseworker’s misconduct
miss the mark because they conflate immunity from liability based on the
delivery of services under the CPSL with an independent criminal act that is
____________________________________________
7 For identical reasons, we reject the Commonwealth’s penultimate assertion
that the application of § 6318(b) immunity in this case is inconsistent with the
intent of the General Assembly to protect children from abuse because it
immunizes “actions or inactions [that] place children in danger.”
Commonwealth’s brief at 30.
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separate and distinct from the caseworker’s employment. As accurately
phrased by Appellees in highlighting the Commonwealth’s defective reasoning
as it relates to the instant case, “the actual providing of services--and whether
they were adequate-- is what is alleged to be criminal, not an independent
criminal act apart from Appellees’ performance of job duties.” Appellees’ brief
at 35.8
Similarly, in relation to the theoretical scenario that would apply
§ 6318(b) immunity to protect a caseworker who placed a child in danger
while providing services under the CPSL, the hard truth is that a vital public
benefit, such as encouraging caseworkers to report suspected child abuse,
frequently will guide the legislature to countenance granting immunity to a
wrongdoer in order to protect the blameless. The Third Circuit cogently
highlighted this principle in discussing “the purpose of according absolute
immunity to” criminal prosecutors,
Although conferring absolute immunity obliges courts to
sometimes deny relief to those with valid claims against dishonest
or malicious government officials, the underlying logic is that it is
ultimately better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty
to the constant dread of retaliation[.]
____________________________________________
8 The County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania and the
Pennsylvania Children and Youth Administration submitted an amicus brief
that articulated this principle thusly: “[T]he ‘hyperbolic examples . . . would
likely fall outside of the course of employment given they are different in kind
from that authorized by the CPSL[.]” Amicus brief at 10.
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B.S. v. Somerset County, 704 F.3d 250, 261 (3rd Cir. 2013) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). This same reasoning supports extending
immunity to the perpetrator outlined in the Commonwealth’s imaginary
scenario in order to shield an innocent caseworker from criminal liability.
Hence, the Commonwealth’s hypotheticals and policy arguments are
unconvincing.
In sum, § 6318(b) affords immunity from liability “that might otherwise
result from that action” to county agency employees who provide services
authorized by the CPSL. The criminal information asserted that Appellees
engaged in various behaviors over a fifteen month period that constituted
EWOC. Some of that conduct, such as the allegations concerning the reporting
and investigating suspected child abuse and providing protective services to
the children, clearly involved the provisions of services under the CPSL.
Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of § 6318(b), Appellees are
immune from prosecution for alleged crimes arising from the provision of
those services. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court order dismissing and
vacating the criminal complaint.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/28/2025
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