J-S18041-25
2025 PA Super 164
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DESTIN ANTHONY DORTCH :
:
Appellant : No. 185 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 4, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-25-CR-0000789-2022
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DESTIN ANTHONY DORTCH :
:
Appellant : No. 926 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 4, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-25-CR-0000791-2022
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DESTIN ANTHONY DORTCH :
:
Appellant : No. 927 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 4, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-25-CR-0000790-2022
J-S18041-25
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: July 29, 2025
In these consolidated appeals,1 Destin Anthony Dortch appeals from the
January 4, 2024 aggregate judgment of sentence of 77 to 154 years’
imprisonment imposed after a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder,
second-degree murder, robbery, burglary, and related offenses.2 After careful
review, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence with respect to count 2
(robbery) and count 4 (burglary) at No. CP-25-CR-0000790-2022, as well as
count 2 (theft by unlawful taking) and count 4 (receiving stolen property) at
No. CP-25-CR-0000791-2022, and remand this matter for resentencing on
these counts. We affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence in all other
respects.
A detailed recitation of the factual history of this case is not relevant to
our disposition and need not be reiterated in full here. In sum, Appellant was
charged in connection with the August 29, 2018 burglary of Calvin Isaiah’s
home in Erie, Pennsylvania, during which he entered the bedroom of Isaiah
and shot him in the chest, killing him. Less than one week later, Appellant
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Appellant’s appeals at Nos. 185 WDA 2024, 926 WDA 2024, and 927 WDA
2024 were consolidated by per curiam order of this Court on August 9, 2024.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 2502(b), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 3502(a)(1)(i),
respectively.
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conspired with several other individuals to enter the home of Philip Clark,
during which Clark was shot and killed during the ensuing burglary and
robbery.
The trial court summarized the procedural history of this case as follows:
[Appellant], and his codefendants, Christopher
Bridges and Raeshawn McCallum, were convicted
after a lengthy jury trial of numerous offenses,
including but not limited to, First Degree Murder,
Second Degree Murder, Robbery, Burglary, Criminal
Conspiracy, etc. [Appellant] was convicted of First
Degree Homicide, at Count 1 at Docket 789-2022. He
received a sentence of 40 years to 80 years. He was
convicted of all offenses at that Docket, but the
sentences for those other offenses were either
merged or were made concurrent to 40 to 80 years.
At Docket number 790-2022, [Appellant] was
convicted of Second Degree Murder. He was
sentenced to a period of incarceration of 35 years to
70 years, which was made consecutive to the
sentence imposed at Docket 789-2022. He was also
convicted of all offenses at Docket 790-2022, but
those sentences were also merged or were run
concurrent to the 35 to 70 years imposed at Count 1.
At Docket 791-2022, he was convicted of Burglary,
and related charges. The Court imposed a sentence of
24 months to 48 months for the Burglary charge which
was to be served consecutive to the sentences
imposed above. The other sentences at that Docket
were merged or were-to run concurrent to the 24 to
48 months imposed at Count 1. [Appellant] and his
co-defendants were sentenced on January 4, 2024.
Trial counsel filed a timely Post-Sentence Motion,
which this Court denied by Order of Court dated May
8, 2024.
Subsequent to the filing of the Post- Sentence Motion
by trial counsel, Attorney Bruce Sandmeyer, but prior
to the Court issuing its Opinion on May 8, 2024,
[Appellant], although still being represented by Atty.
Sandmeyer, filed a pro se Notice of Appeal to the
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Pennsylvania Superior Court. Pursuant to the directive
of the Superior Court, this Court then conducted a
status conference concerning these matters.
Thereafter, Atty. Sandmeyer was permitted to
withdraw as counsel, and current appellate counsel,
Atty. Jessica A. Fiscus, was appointed.
On July 29, 2024, Atty. Fiscus properly filed an
Amended Notice of Appeal at each of the dockets
referred to above. She properly attached the docket
entries for each Amended Notice of Appeal. This Court
then issued its initial 1925(b) Order on August 2,
2024, directing Atty. Fiscus to file a Concise
Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal within
twenty-five days from the date of that Order. Because
of the lengthy nature of the trial, and the
corresponding voluminous trial transcripts and
exhibits, Atty. Fiscus filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Concise Statement, which was filed on
August 22, 2024. This Court granted that motion and
allowed counsel to file a Concise Statement before
September 10, 2024.
In the interim, Atty. Fiscus had filed an Application to
Remand for Filing of Concise Statement with the
Superior Court on August 16, 2024. Pursuant to that
request, the Superior Court issued an Order, which
was filed on September 6, 2024, requiring her to serve
a Supplemental Concise Statement within twenty-one
days of the date of that Order.
Trial court opinion, 10/24/24 at 1-2 (internal quotation marks and some
parentheticals omitted).
Appellant filed a timely supplemental concise statement, in accordance
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), on September 25, 2024. Thereafter, on October 24,
2024, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
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1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it
denied appellant’s motion for a new trial on
weight of the evidence grounds at dockets 780-
2022 and 790-2022, as the verdicts, which
relied overwhelmingly on the corrupt and selfinterested testimony of Chinello Blaski, Nicholas
Grayson, and Michael Schuler, are so contrary
to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
justice?
2. Did the trial court err when it precluded the
defense from introducing evidence that a
cooperating witness, Chinello Blaski, had a prior
conviction for aggravated assault as Mr. Blaski
opened the door for its admission?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it
ordered Appellant, who was seventeen years of
age at the time of the crimes, to serve the
sentences at all three dockets consecutively, as
it resulted in a manifestly excessive aggregate
sentence of 77 to 154 years’ imprisonment, and
revealed the trial court inordinately focused on
the serious nature and number of offenses,
while only summarily acknowledging Appellant’s
age and lack of prior record, failing to
acknowledge the hallmarks of his age, and
incredibly suggesting the sentence does not
foreclose some future determination of
Appellant’s rehabilitative potential?
4. Did the trial court impose illegal sentences at
count two (robbery) and count four (burglary)
at docket number 790-2022 as those offenses
were predicate felonies for [Appellant’s]
conviction at count 1 ( second-degree murder)
and should have merged with count 1 for
sentencing purposes?
5. Did the trial court illegally impose separate
sentences at count 3 (conspiracy to commit
robbery) and count 5 (conspiracy to commit
burglary) at docket number 790-2022 as the
trial court cannot impose multiple sentences for
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conspiracies arising from the same agreement
or a continuous conspiratorial relationship?
6. Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence at
count 4 (receiving stolen property) at docket
number 791-2022 as this offense should have
merged with count 2 (theft by unlawful taking)
for sentencing purposes?
Appellant’s brief at 12-13 (extraneous capitalization omitted). For the ease of
our discussion, we have elected to address Appellant’s claims in a slightly
different order than presented in his appellate brief.
I. Weight of the Evidence
Appellant first argues that the verdicts for first-degree and second-
degree murder were against the weight of the evidence because they were
based largely on the testimony of Commonwealth witnesses Blaski, Grayson,
and Schuler, who were not credible. Appellant’s brief at 45-49.
This Court has recognized that “a true weight of the evidence challenge
concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions
which evidence is to be believed.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632,
643 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted), appeal denied,
183 A.3d 970 (Pa.
2018). “An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Galvin,
985 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
559 U.S. 1051
(2010).
[W]here the trial court has ruled on the weight claim
below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
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underlying question of whether the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review
is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused
its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to
hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate
court will give the gravest consideration to the
findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial
is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or
was not against the weight of the evidence and that a
new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by
the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a
new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a
trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he
term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not
exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the
foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
Discretion is abused where the course pursued
represents not merely an error of judgment, but
where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
where the law is not applied or where the record
shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and
emphasis omitted).
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Upon review, we find that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
in concluding that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the
evidence. See trial court opinion, 10/24/24 at 3-6. “[T]he trier of fact while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.Super. 2006)
(citation omitted), appeal denied,
926 A.2d 972 (Pa. 2007).
Here, the Commonwealth presented ample evidence and testimony at
trial that Appellant was involved in the shooting deaths of Isaiah and Clark.
The jury clearly found the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses
credible, and elected not to believe Appellant’s version of the events. We are
precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting our judgment for
that of the factfinder. Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055. Accordingly, Appellant’s weight
claim must fail.
II. Admissibility of Evidence
Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
precluding him from introducing evidence at trial that Commonwealth witness
Blaski had a prior conviction for aggravated assault in Mercer County in 2002.
Appellant’s brief at 49. In support of this contention, Appellant avers that he
should have been permitted to impeach Blaski with this prior conviction
because he testified about a propensity for non-violence and “opened the door
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for its admission.” Id. at 49-50, referencing notes of testimony, 10/23/23 at
4-9. We disagree.
“Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the court’s
decision on such a question absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 768 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation
omitted), appeal denied,
195 A.3d 166 (Pa. 2018). “An abuse of discretion
may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a
different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Bullock,
170 A.3d 1109, 1126 (Pa.Super.
2017) (citation omitted), appeal denied,
184 A.3d 944 (Pa. 2018).
It is well settled that “evidence of prior crimes is not admissible for the
sole purpose of demonstrating a criminal defendant’s propensity to commit
crimes.” Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1283
(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc); see also Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). Nevertheless,
“[e]vidence may be admissible in certain circumstances where it is relevant
for some other legitimate purpose and not utilized solely to blacken the
defendant’s character.”
Id. Specifically, evidence of other crimes or bad acts
is admissible evidence of other crimes may be introduced to show:
motive; intent; absence of mistake or accident; a
common scheme or plan; and identity. The evidence
may also be admissible to impeach the credibility of a
testifying defendant; to show that the defendant has
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used the prior bad acts to threaten the victim; and in
situations where the bad acts were part of a chain or
sequence of events that formed the history of the case
and were part of its natural development.
Commonwealth v. Reid, 811 A.2d 530, 550 (Pa. 2002) (citations and
numeration omitted), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 850 (2003); see also Pa.R.E.
404(b)(2). When offered for a legitimate purpose, evidence of prior crimes or
bad acts is admissible “if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
potential for unfair prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Hairston,
84 A.3d 657,
665 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
574 U.S. 863 (2014).
Instantly, the trial court concluded that Blaski’s prior aggravated assault
conviction did not constitute crimen falsi, and that his testimony that he and
his cohorts did not want to use a firearm on any of the drug dealers he
targeted for robbery did not in any way “open the door” for the admission of
his 21-year-old prior conviction. The trial court reasoned:
[N]othing in the statements of witness Blaski (during
direct and cross examinations) created the [false]
impression that he was an upright individual. Rather
than impression what was clearly established was his
intent or state of mind in committing the robberies
and burglaries with [Appellant] – that he did not want
to use firearms and that he wanted to rob drug dealers
only because they are criminals themselves who will
not likely call the police.
Trial court opinion, 10/24/24 at 17.
Upon review, we find that this decision was supported by the evidence
in the record and was fully within the sound discretion of the trial court; we
decline to disturb the court’s findings on appeal. In reaching this conclusion,
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we further note that the probative value of introducing Blaski’s prior conviction
from 2002 would not have outweighed its prejudicial impact to the jury. See
Hairston, 84 A.3d at 665. Accordingly, Appellant’s admissibility of evidence
claim must fail.
III. Legality of Sentence & Merger
Appellant’s next three claims concern the doctrine of merger and
implicate the legality of his sentence. See Appellant’s brief at 58-63.
The doctrine of merger is governed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765, which
provides as follows:
No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless
the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of
the statutory elements of one offense are included in
the statutory elements of the other offense. Where
crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may
sentence the defendant only on the higher graded
offense.
Id.
“A claim that crimes should have merged for sentencing purposes raises
a challenge to the legality of the sentence; therefore, our standard of review
is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 140
A.3d 713, 715 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted), appeal denied,
160 A.3d
791 (Pa. 2016). “A challenge to the legality of the sentence may be raised
as a matter of right, is non-waivable, and may be entertained so long as the
reviewing court has jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Leaner,
202 A.3d 749,
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784 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 216 A.3d 226 (Pa.
2019).
Preliminarily, we agree with both Appellant and the trial court that he
was improperly sentenced with respect to count 2 (robbery) and count 4
(burglary) at No. CP-25-CR-0000790-2022, as those offenses were predicate
offenses for his conviction at count 1 (second-degree murder) and should have
merged. See Appellant’s brief at 58-59; trial court opinion, 10/24/24 at 24-
25. The Commonwealth also concedes the merit of this issue. See
Commonwealth’s brief at 12.
It is well settled in this Commonwealth that “a sentencing court has no
authority to impose a sentence for felony murder as well as a sentence for the
predicate offense.” Leaner, 202 A.3d at 784; see also Commonwealth v.
Adams,
39 A.3d 310, 325 (Pa.Super. 2012) (vacating sentence imposed for
burglary conviction where it was predicate offense for second-degree murder
conviction), affirmed,
104 A.3d 511 (Pa. 2014). Based on the foregoing, we
vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence with respect to count 2 (robbery)
and count 4 (burglary) at No. CP-25-CR-0000790-2022, and remand for
resentencing on these counts.
We further agree with Appellant’s contention that count 2 (theft by
unlawful taking) and count 4 (receiving stolen property) at No. CP-25-CR-
0000791-2022 should have also merged for sentencing purposes. Appellant’s
brief at 62-63. This Court has repeatedly recognized the long-standing
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proposition that in situations where the theft by taking and theft by receiving
stolen property arise from a single criminal act with the same criminal intent,
as is the case here, “convictions for theft by unlawful taking and receiving
stolen property merge for sentencing purposes.” Commonwealth v.
Crawford, 254 A.3d 769, 781 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citations omitted), appeal
denied,
267 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2021). Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s
judgment of sentence with respect to count 2 (theft by unlawful taking) and
count 4 (receiving stolen property) at No. CP-25-CR-0000791-2022, and
remand for resentencing on these counts.
Appellant also argues that the trial court illegally imposed separate
sentences at count 3 (conspiracy to commit robbery) and count 5 (conspiracy
to commit burglary) at No. CP-25-CR-0000790-2022. Appellant’s brief at 59-
61. Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s determination that this
remaining sentencing claim warrants no relief, and adopt the following well-
reasoned rationale of the trial court as our own:
[T]he Court imposed a period of incarceration [at
Count 3] of 70 months to 140 months for the Criminal
Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, which was made
concurrent to the Robbery charge and also concurrent
to the sentence for Second Degree Murder.
The sentence at Count 5 — Criminal Conspiracy to
Commit Burglary was a period of incarceration of 30
months to 60 months. That was also made concurrent
to all of the other charges.
The Court acknowledges Counts 3 and 5 are basically
identical with regard to the averment that [Appellant]
and his co-defendants DID AGREE TO ROB THE
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VICTIM AT HIS HOME AND SCOUTED POTENTIAL
ENTRIES TO HIS HOUSE OCCURING AT 336 West 29th
STREET..., and that each of the Counts list the same
exact co-defendants. Therefore, the Court
acknowledges that these conspiracies were basically
identical in time to each other, that the goal to
conspiracy was similar and that the co-defendants
charged were identical to each Count. However, there
is obviously a difference between Burglary and
Robbery, which require proof of different elements,
even though the factual averments are identical, as
noted above.
Despite the similarity, there were two separate
Criminal Conspiracies for two separate criminal
offenses. More importantly, [Appellant] did not
receive any additional period of incarceration or even
supervision for either of the sentences for Criminal
Conspiracy. The sentence of 80 to 160 months was
made concurrent to the 35 to 70 years at Count 1. The
sentence of 30 to 60 months for Criminal Conspiracy
to Commit Burglary was also made concurrent to all
the other offenses, including the Criminal Conspiracy
to Commit Robbery. The Court did not, for all intents
and purposes, imposed ‘multiple sentences for
conspiracies arising from the same agreement or a
continuous conspiratorial relationship.’ Therefore,
those sentences should not be set aside.
Trial court opinion, 10/24/24 at 26-27 (emphasis in original).
IV. Discretionary Aspects of Sentence
In his final claim, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing a “manifestly excessive” sentence that “inordinately
focused on the serious nature and number of offenses, while only summarily
acknowledging Appellant’s age and lack of prior record,” nor his “rehabilitative
potential.” Appellant’s brief at 52. Appellant also takes issue with the fact
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that the trial court elected to impose his sentences at the three different
dockets consecutively. Id.
“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing
judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse
of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa.Super.
2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied,
117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015). Appellant
must “establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored
or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.”
Bullock,
170 A.3d at 1123 (citation omitted).
Where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence,
as is the case here, the right to appellate review is not absolute.
Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal
denied,
206 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2019). On the contrary, an appellant challenging
the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction
by satisfying the following four-part test:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether
appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether appellant’s
brief includes a concise statement of the reasons
relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether
the concise statement raises a substantial question
that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing
code.
Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(citations omitted).
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Instantly, the record reveals that Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal and preserved his discretionary sentencing claims in his January 12,
2024 post-sentence motion. Appellant has also included a statement in his
brief that comports with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). See
Appellant’s brief at 42-44. Accordingly, we must determine whether Appellant
has raised a substantial question.
“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d
932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied,
76 A.3d 538
(Pa. 2013). “A substantial question exists only when appellant advances a
colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either:
(1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Commonwealth v. Glass,
50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa.Super. 2012)
(citation omitted), appeal denied,
63 A.3d 774 (Pa. 2013).
This Court has recognized that “excessiveness claims premised on
imposition of consecutive sentences do not raise a substantial question for our
review.” Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa.Super. 2018);
see also Commonwealth v. Caldwell,
117 A.3d 763, 769 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(en banc) (stating, “[a] court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence
concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a substantial
question[.]”), appeal denied,
126 A.3d 1282 (Pa. 2015). Likewise, “a claim
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of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial
question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Crawford, 257 A.3d 75, 79
(Pa.Super. 2021) (citations omitted). In Caldwell, a panel of this Court
reiterated that, “ordinarily, a claim that the sentencing court failed to consider
or accord proper weight to a specific sentencing factor does not raise a
substantial question.” Id. at 769. In Commonwealth v. Cannon,
954 A.2d
1222 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied,
964 A.2d 893 (Pa. 2009), we further
held that a claim that the trial court failed to consider, inter alia, the
defendant’s rehabilitative needs and age did not present a substantial question
for review. Id. at 1228-1229.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s claims fail to raise
a substantial question for our review, and therefore, has not preserved his
challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing.
Alternatively, even if Appellant had raised a substantial question for this
Court’s consideration, we would find no abuse of discretion. As the trial court
properly noted in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, it thoroughly considered and
weighed numerous factors in fashioning Appellant’s sentence, including his
lack of remorse, demeanor at trial; the impact of his crimes on the community
and the victims’ families, his age, involvement in other serious felony offenses
involving guns prior to his arrest, and limited rehabilitative potential. See trial
court opinion, 10/24/24 at 20-24. The record further reflects that the trial
court was in possession of a presentence investigation (“PSI”) report and
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considered its findings. Id. at 23. Where the trial court has the benefit of a
PSI report, “we shall . . . presume that the sentencing judge was aware of
relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.
Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 761 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal
denied,
95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).
For all the foregoing reasons, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of
sentence with respect to count 2 (robbery) and count 4 (burglary) at No. CP-
25-CR-0000790-2022; vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence with respect
to count 2 (theft by unlawful taking) and count 4 (receiving stolen property)
at No. CP-25-CR-0000791-2022; and remand for resentencing on all these
counts. We affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence in all other respects.
Judgment of sentence affirmed in part, and vacated, in part. Case
remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judge Dubow joins the Opinion.
Judge Nichols concurs in the result.
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7/29/2025
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