J-S35010-24
2025 PA Super 18
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NATHANIEL JOSEPH KIMMEL :
:
Appellant : No. 1751 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 8, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0001651-2020
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.
OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: JANUARY 24, 2025
Nathaniel Joseph Kimmel appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County following his
conviction of first-degree murder, and other related charges, at a non-jury
trial. Kimmel challenges the denial of his suppression motion, the
authentication of a written letter, and the weight of the evidence. After careful
review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant procedural and factual history.1
On August 30, 2020, April Mahmod (hereinafter, the
“Victim”) was brutally murdered in an attack that began in her
home . . . in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, and continued outside
onto the porch of the residence next door. The Victim was stabbed
sixty-one (61) times, several of said wounds were to vital parts of
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1 We discern the relevant procedural and factual historyfrom both the trial
court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion and opinion addressing Kimmel’s omnibus
pretrial motion. We commend the Honorable James P. Goodman for his
thorough opinions in addressing these matters.
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her body and at least seven (7) of the wounds would have been
life threatening and/or could have caused death.
On the date of the attack, [Kimmel] was charged with
various criminal charges related to the Victim’s death.FN3 On
November 25, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a Notice of Intent
to Seek the Death Penalty. . . . However, at a [s]tatus [h]earing
which was originally held on November 16, 2023, and continued
to November 20, 2023, the Commonwealth made a motion to
withdraw the death penalty, as a result of, [Kimmel] executing a
[w]aiver of [j]ury [t]rial. Said motion was granted by th[e trial
c]ourt.
FN3: By [c]riminal [i]nformation filed November 23,
2020, [Kimmel] was charged with the following
crimes: Count 1, Murder of the First Degree, 18
Pa.C.S. §§ 2501(a) & 2502(a); Count 2, Murder of the
Second Degree, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b); Count 3,
Murder of the Third Degree, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c);
Count 4, Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §
2702(a)(1); Count 5, Burglary, 18 Pa.C.S. §
3503(a)(1)(i); Count 6, Aggravated Assault with a
Deadly Weapon, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4); Count 7,
Criminal Trespass, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1)(ii); Count
8, Possessing Instruments of Crime, 18 Pa.C.S. §
907(a); Count 9, Simple Assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §
2701(a)(1); Count 10, Simple Assault with a Deadly
Weapon, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(2); and Count 11,
Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S. §
2705.
The non-jury trial began on November 20, 2023, with the
Commonwealth presenting testimony from Pennsylvania State
Police (“PSP”) Trooper Shawn Tray. Upon agreement of the
parties, the trial reconvened in progress on December []5, 2023.
Following the conclusion of the trial on December []8 2023, th[e
trial c]ourt found [Kimmel] guilty of Count 1 and Counts 4 through
11. [Kimmel] was sentenced that same day.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/24, at 1-2 (one footnote omitted).
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For his conviction of first-degree murder, Kimmel was sentenced to life
in prison. Kimmel did not file a post-sentence motion. He timely appealed. The
trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Kimmel raises the following issues for our review.
1. Did the trial court err in denying defense counsel’s motion to
suppress various [s]earch [w]arrants as being issued without
probable cause and upon unverified information?
2. Did the trial court err in allowing letter and testimony regarding
letter allegedly written by defendant admitted as exhibit 146 due
to improper foundation and authentication?
3. Was the verdict in this case against the weight of the evidence?
Appellant’s Brief, at 7 (suggested answers omitted).
In his first issue, Kimmel challenges whether probable cause existed for
the August 30, 2020, search warrant applications. These search warrants
pertained to his person, his vehicle, his residence, and his grandparents’
residence. The affidavits of probable cause for the August 30, 2020, search
warrants contained a misstatement that Kimmel was positively identified by a
witness as the attacker. This was not true as the witnesses only provided a
general description of the assailant.2 Kimmel argues that absent this
misstatement there was not probable cause for the issuance of the search
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2 Two witnesses saw the attack and the assailant flee. Both provided a similar
general description of the assailant as a male around six feet tall and weighing
about 200 pounds. Kimmel matched this general description.
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warrants because the warrants only included a vague description of a male.
See id. at 14-15. Kimmel’s argument is without merit.3
A search warrant may issue only upon a demonstration of
probable cause by an affiant. The existence of probable cause is
measured by examining the totality of the circumstances.
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within
the affiant’s knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in and of themselves to
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a search
should be conducted. A magisterial district judge, when deciding
whether to issue a search warrant, must make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all of the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit . . . including the veracity and basis of
knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place. Conversely, a court reviewing a search
warrant determines only if a substantial basis existed for the
magistrate to find probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1081-82 (Pa. 2017) (internal
brackets, citations, and quotation marks omitted). “If a search warrant is
based upon an affidavit containing deliberate or knowing misstatements of
material fact, the search warrant is invalid, unless probable cause exists
notwithstanding any deliberate omissions or misrepresentations of fact.”
Commonwealth v. Adorno,
291 A.3d 412, 417 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations
omitted).
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3 The trial court addressed this issue in its omnibus pretrial motion opinion
and order. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/21, at 9-11. The trial court did not
address this issue in its 1925(a) opinion because Kimmel did not raise this
issue in his concise statement. “[I]ssues not raised in a Rule 1925(b)
statement will be deemed waived for review.” Commonwealth v. Scott,
212
A.3d 1094, 1112 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). However, even in
addressing the merits we find that no relief is due.
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We agree with the trial court’s determination that absent the
misstatement probable cause still existed. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/21,
at 9-11. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record that indicates that the
misstatement was deliberate or intentional. Based on the crime scene, police
determined that the attack began inside the Victim’s residence and ended on
the porch next door. See id. at 10. Kimmel had a similar height and build to
the description of the perpetrator given by two eyewitnesses. See id. Kimmel
and the Victim had previously had a romantic relationship. See id. The Victim
was granted a PFA order against Kimmel which she withdrew about six weeks
before the murder. See id. Further, Kimmel told police that he was coyote
hunting during the time the incident occurred, and he went to his
grandparents’ house to shower and change his clothes that morning a few
hours after the murder was committed. See id. at 10-11. That same morning,
Kimmel was observed arriving at his residence in his vehicle. See id. It was
reasonable to conclude that Kimmel was searching for places to hide
contraband and clean up after committing the murder. Thus, based on the
totality of the circumstances, there was a substantial basis for the magistrate
to find probable cause and it was reasonable to conclude that evidence of the
crime would be found on his person, in his vehicle, in his residence, or at his
grandparents’ residence. Therefore, Kimmel’s argument is without merit.
Next, Kimmel claims that the trial court erred in admitting
Commonwealth Exhibit 146 into evidence because it was not properly
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authenticated. See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-16. Exhibit 146 was a letter
confessing to the murder which was purported to be signed and written by
“Bill Steaver.”4 At trial, Kimmel’s cellmate, Nathan Smithmyer, identified the
letter as being written by Kimmel. See N.T., 12/6/24, at 463-67. Kimmel
argues that Smithmyer’s testimony was inadequate to authenticate the letter
because it was not credible and Smithmyer was only able to say that he saw
the letter in Kimmel’s possession but never witnessed Kimmel write the letter.
See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-16. Kimmel’s argument is without merit.
“[T]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a). “A document
may be authenticated by circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v.
Sexton, 222 A.3d 405, 417 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “Proof of any
circumstances which will support a finding that the writing is genuine will
suffice to authenticate the writing.” Commonwealth v. Bowens,
265 A.3d
730, 759 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (citation omitted).
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4 “William Stever a/k/a Bill Stever, testified at trial that he met [Kimmel] for
the first time while they were both incarcerated at the [Schuylkill County
Prison (“SCP”)] in 2020. He denied authoring the Bill Steaver Letter, and
indicated that his name was spelled incorrectly in said letter. Additionally,
Stever further denied knowing the Victim or having anything to do with her
death.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/24, at 9 n.16.
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We discern no error in the trial court’s conclusion. The trial court
summarized the relevant evidence in authenticating Kimmel as the author of
Exhibit 146.
At trial, Smithmyer testified that he observed [Kimmel] writing
portions of the Bill Steaver Letter while they were cellmates, he
identified said letter based on its contents and he was familiar with
[Kimmel’s] handwriting because he observed [Kimmel] writing
other letter(s) and/or practicing cursive while they were
incarcerated. The testimony of CO Rodriguez and CO Oliver reflect
that they observed [Kimmel] trying to conceal the Bill Steaver
Letter in his waistband during the September 27, 2020 cell search,
and that they retrieved the letter, along with Commonwealth’s
Exhibit 147, from [Kimmel’s] bed. Further, Stever’s testimony
reflects that he did not author the Bill Steaver [L]etter, and that
he had no involvement in the Victim’s death. As such, we
determined that Smithmyer’s testimony properly authenticated
the Bill Steaver Letter and established that it was authored by
[Kimmel].
Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/24, at 12 (footnote omitted).5 Further, contrary to
Kimmel’s contention, it is not true that Smithmyer never witnessed Kimmel
drafting the Steaver Letter. Although Smithmyer testified that he did not
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5 The trial court also noted that
in comparing the Bill Steaver Letter with Commonwealth’s Exhibit
145, which contains a letter authored by [Kimmel] to his mother
that SCP correctional officers mistakenly gave to Smithmyer, and
the 5 letters that were read into the record by PSP Trooper Sean
Tray at trial, which were admitted into evidence without objection
to their authentication and/or that they were written by [Kimmel],
it is obvious that the distinct almost unreadable handwriting of the
aforementioned letters is identical to that of the Bill Steaver
Letter.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/24, at 12 n.22.
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witness Kimmel write it “word for word” he did observe Kimmel writing it. See
N.T., 12/6/23, at 470.
Following our review of the record, we discern no error with the trial
court’s findings and conclusion regarding the authentication of Exhibit 146
(the Bill Steaver Letter). The above quoted portion of the trial court’s Rule
1925(a) opinion correctly summarized the relevant testimony and analyzed
the issue. Thus, we affirm on that basis.
In Kimmel’s final issue he challenges the weight of the evidence.6
Kimmel argues that he could not be found guilty without the evidence that he
claims in his first two issues was illegally admitted.7 See Appellant’s Brief, at
16-17. He argues that the guilty verdict was based on speculation because
none of the eyewitnesses positively identified him, and he could not be
identified on the surveillance footage. See id. at 17. Further, he contends that
he could not be convicted because “[t]here were no fingerprints found at the
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6 The trial court noted that Kimmel failed to preserve a weight of the evidence
challenge by not raising it prior to appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/24,
at 4. However, the trial court still provided a thorough review of the evidence
and explanation for why Kimmel’s weight of the evidence challenge is without
merit. See id. at 4-10. We agree with the trial court that Kimmel waived this
issue. Regardless, Kimmel’s argument is without merit.
7 In his Rule 1925(b) statement and the statement of questions involved
portion of his brief, Kimmel clearly challenges the weight of the evidence; in
his actual argument he states that the there was insufficient evidence rather
than the evidence being against the weight of the evidence. See Appellant’s
Brief, at 16-17. Therefore, we address Kimmel’s claim as a weight of the
evidence claim. However, our review of the evidence also indicates that there
was sufficient evidence to convict Kimmel of first-degree murder.
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scene, no DNA found at the scene, no blood found in Kimmel’s vehicle, . . .
and no confession.” See id. Kimmel’s argument is without merit.
To convict a defendant of first[-]degree murder, the
Commonwealth must establish a human being was unlawfully
killed, the defendant was responsible for the killing, and the
defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. The
Commonwealth may use wholly circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden of showing the accused intentionally killed
the victim, and circumstantial evidence can itself be sufficient to
prove any or every element of the crime[.]
Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 841 (Pa. 2014) (internal citations
omitted).
A verdict is against the weight of the evidence only when the jury’s
verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
justice. It is well established that a weight of the evidence claim
is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and a new trial
should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony
or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a
different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial court is to
determine whether, notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts
are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give
them equal weight with all the facts, is to deny justice.
In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the
function of an appellate court is to review the trial court’s exercise
of discretion based upon a review of the record, rather than to
consider de novo the underlying question of the weight of the
evidence. Appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s
discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted
where the facts and inferences of record disclose an abuse of
discretion.
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 323 A.3d 744, 756-57 (Pa. 2024) (internal
citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
The trial court extensively detailed the evidence that supported the
guilty verdict for first-degree murder when it delivered its verdict and in its
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1925(a) opinion. See N.T., 12/8/23, at 756-62; Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/24,
at 5-10. At the conclusion of the trial the trial court recounted the evidence in
finding Kimmel guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court noted that it was
clear that the Victim was dead. N.T., 12/8/23, at 757. Further, the trial court
reasoned that the specific intent to kill and malice were established by the
perpetrator laying in wait and the “gruesome, brutal evidence of 61 stab
wounds[]” several of which would have been fatal. Id. at 757-58. The trial
court then addressed the evidence that supported its finding that Kimmel was
the perpetrator who killed the Victim. We now quote the extensive discussion
by the trial court:
So the issue before the Court is: Was [Kimmel] the one who
killed [the Victim] with the specific intent to kill and with malice?
So we look at the evidence. We start with the factual
witness. And Attorney Kirwan cites the testimony of Mr. Rosselli.
And I agree that Mr. Rosselli was a good witness. I also know
that Mr. Rosselli saw this incident in a split second (hand clap),
very quickly. He was getting off his porch.
His testimony was also that he didn’t—he thought the victim
was actually being punched by [Kimmel], so he was mistaken in
that until he actually started crossing the street and he realized
that the perpetrator was actually stabbing the [V]ictim.
And he described what [Kimmel] was wearing, the dark
clothes. And he also described as being 6 foot and 200 pounds;
and that’s consistent with the testimony of Richard Michalik.
And then the state police put together evidence of—video
evidence to show that [Kimmel] left his house at—seven videos
between 1:23 and 2:03 a.m. And it was clear that it was
[Kimmel’s] vehicle. It had the white box in the back.
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And that vehicle, through that video evidence, was traced
from the house of where [Kimmel] was staying with his
grandparents to the Boyer’s [Food Market parking lot] in
Shenandoah. And then there is also video evidence at 6:09 [a.m.]
to 6:58 [a.m.] of that same vehicle leaving the Boyer’s and going
back to that same scene. So that’s very strong evidence that
[Kimmel] was the driver of his vehicle.
So [Kimmel] had a statement [to police]. His statement was
that he was coyote hunting. In essence he said that he did leave
that house, [and] he came back[.] . . .
We heard the evidence from the phone calls with his mother.
...
First of all, in those phone calls, it says your calls are going
to be recorded. And I think in just about every call—and Attorney
O’Pake, the prosecution, presented all those calls. And the mother
says in the beginning of those calls, Nathaniel, don’t talk about
your case. She didn’t want him to talk about the case; but he
couldn’t stop going back to the case, and she got him off talking
about the case.
But just about at the end of every one of those phone calls
he says the same thing. He says, Mom, just read the letters, follow
the letters. So [Kimmel], it’s his—a lot of this is his evidence
himself, the letters themselves. And there’s one letter up there,
but all these other letters, they could have just as well. The letters
were basically covering up his lies.
It’s so obvious that as the evidence came in [Kimmel]
realizes that his truck was at the scene. Then he has to change
his story. He changes his story, and then he tries to get his family
to lie for him.
So the letters themselves, they might as well just have said,
Mom, I killed [the Victim]. In order to get away with it and have
my story make sense, this is what I need you to do. And—and
basically that’s what he was doing. He was giving instructions to
his family what they need to do to try to make his alibi make
sense. And it didn’t make sense.
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And as stated by the prosecution, the one letter, which the
time frame was pointed out, only the killer would know some of
the information that was in that letter, in the Bill Ste[a]ver letter.
And there was a[n] objection by defense counsel. But I
heard the testimony of the correctional officer. There’s no question
that that letter was in [Kimmel’s] possession and he tried to cover
up that letter. I mean, he first—they said he fumbled with it, tried
to stick it under his Bible, and then—then he tried to put it in his
waist. He tried to cover that letter up, and then it was put on the
bed. And the letter basically implicates him in the murder.
A lot of times in criminal cases you have eyewitnesses,
circumstantial evidence. In this case you have everything. And
you have DNA evidence and strong DNA evidence.
The burn pile. And the burn pile is consistent with the video
that was put together by the state police. And Attorney Kirwan
raises an issue as far as we don’t know what was in that burn pile.
We know what was left. I mean, there could have been a bandana
in there. There could have been stuff that was burned. I mean,
[Kimmel] obviously puts in his letters. He’s trying to cover up with
a bandana and gloves.
But [Kimmel] wasn’t with [the Victim] in months and his
DNA is on her fingers, on her fingernails. His DNA is on the water
bottle, and [the Victim’s] DNA is on the water bottle that are found
at the burn pit.
Just as the Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that [the Victim] is dead, they have also proven that
[Kimmel] is the one who killed [the Victim] and [Kimmel] killed
her with malice and he did so with a specific intent to kill. The
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Kimmel] is guilty of first[-]degree murder.
N.T., 12/8/23, at 758-62.
From our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s weighing of the evidence. Therefore, Kimmel’s weight of the
evidence claim is without merit.
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In sum, we conclude that Kimmel’s claims lack merit. Thus, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/24/2025
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