J-A19038-25
2025 PA Super 196
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
AUSTIN LOUIS KLINE : No. 229 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-11-CR-0000724-2023
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: September 5, 2025
The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting in part and denying
in part Austin Louis Kline’s (“Appellee”) motion in limine to exclude
introduction of gruesome photographs of the victim at trial. We vacate and
remand for further proceedings.
We offer the following summary of the Commonwealth’s allegations of
fact to support its charges against Appellee. At approximately 11:25 p.m. on
May 25, 2023, the victim’s son reported to the Pennsylvania State Police
(“PSP”) that his father had been missing for approximately seven hours. The
victim was last seen before he had traveled to Appellee’s property to complete
an excavation job that they had arranged through Facebook. Officers
proceeded to Appellee’s residence for an interview, and he consented to a
search of the property. PSP Trooper Donald Neisner noticed during his
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interactions with Appellee that he had a recent injury to his left hand, which
could have been consistent with a physical altercation. A K9 unit also alerted
in several areas on his property. When the K9 handler approached the
detached garage, he observed staining on the threshold of the door consistent
with human blood. The police ceased the search, secured the area, and
obtained a warrant the following day.
Upon execution, police discovered the victim’s severely mangled body
lying on the floor of the garage. He had been shot multiple times, both arms
had been amputated from his shoulders, the right side of his head was
smashed into the ground, and his neck was lacerated. Also located in the
garage were trash bags containing the victim’s severed arms. In an adjacent
debris pile, police found a landscape tamper covered in human blood and hair.
Officers located the firearm purportedly used to shoot the victim in Appellee’s
living room.
Based on the aforementioned events, Appellee was arrested and
charged with one count each of first-degree homicide, aggravated assault, and
abuse of a corpse, and five counts of tampering with or fabricating physical
evidence. The matter was scheduled for trial and proceeded to jury selection.
Appellee then filed the instant motion in limine to exclude twenty of the
photographs of the victim taken at the scene of the crime and the autopsy.
During the hearing on Appellee’s motion, the Commonwealth explained
that it needed imagery of each of the victim’s injuries to solidify the sequence
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of events and to prove that Appellee had the specific intent to kill. More
precisely, it informed the court that Appellee admitted to murdering the victim
during a police interview, which the Commonwealth intended to introduce at
trial. Appellee stated that he shot the victim, hit him in the head with a shovel,
and shot him again. While the victim was on the ground, he attempted to
stand, so Appellee shot him once more. Appellee then heard the victim
gurgling and proceeded to smash his head with a landscape tamper.
The Commonwealth explained to the court that since Appellee had
confessed to killing the victim, it anticipated a self-defense claim, noting that
there were also several “inconsistent statements [by Appellee] in this” case.
See N.T. Motion in Limine, 2/18/25, at 10. Thus, it believed photographs of
all the victim’s injuries were relevant to prove first-degree homicide and abuse
of a corpse, as well as to disprove self-defense. The Commonwealth also
planned to present PSP troopers and a pathologist to describe the extent and
nature of the victim’s injuries, utilizing the images for assistance. The
pathologist would further be able to testify, from visual evidence, as to when
and how the victim died, and whether certain wounds were pre- or post-
mortem.
After taking Appellee’s motion under advisement, the court issued an
order excluding fourteen of the images, several of which depicted, inter alia,
graphic detail of the victim’s smashed head, skull fragments, brain matter,
slashing to the neck, splattered flesh and copious amounts of blood on the
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garage floor, bruising to the body, shoulder sockets after amputation, and the
insides of the severed arms. However, the court admitted the following six
photographs in color, unless otherwise noted, subject to relevancy: P4 and
P8, depicting the bruising and wounds to the victim’s amputated arms; P11,
showing one side of the victim’s torso as he lay on the garage floor with his
head in the background, but cropped at the shoulders to omit his head and
neck; P13, of a gunshot wound to the victim’s buttocks; P17, in grayscale,
illustrating the victim’s back while lying face down on the autopsy table, with
his face turned away from the camera; and P20, depicting the victim’s torso
while lying face up on the autopsy table, but cropped at the shoulders to omit
his head and neck.
The Commonwealth timely appealed and simultaneously filed a concise
statement in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1 The court issued a responsive
Rule 1925(a) opinion. The Commonwealth now presents the following issue
for our determination: “Did the lower court commit an abuse of discretion
where it eliminated any and all photographic evidence of the massive,
traumatic head wound of the victim in this case, thereby unfairly prejudicing
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1 “In a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the
Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not
end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal
that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.”
Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). In its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth stated that the
court’s order substantially handicapped its prosecution of Appellee. See
Notice of Appeal, 2/20/25.
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the Commonwealth’s ability to disprove self-defense and to affirmatively
prove first-degree homicide?” Commonwealth’s brief at 7 (footnote omitted).
We begin with a survey of the applicable law. This Court reviews “a trial
court’s admission of gruesome photographs . . . for an abuse of discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255, 227 (Pa. 2015).
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if
in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the
judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or
the record, discretion is abused.
Commonwealth v. Bainey, 332 A.3d 66, 72 (Pa.Super. 2025) (cleaned up).
In determining whether to admit a photograph of a homicide victim, the court
must engage in the following two-part inquiry:
First, the trial court must examine whether the particular
photograph is inflammatory. If the photograph is not
inflammatory, it may be admitted if it is relevant and can serve to
assist the jury in understanding the facts of the case. If the
photograph is inflammatory, the trial court must determine
whether the photograph is of such essential evidentiary value that
its need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds
and passions of the jurors.
Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 494 (Pa. 2015). A trial court
may abuse its discretion where it “improperly weighed the probative value of
evidence admitted against its potential for prejudicing the defendant.”
Commonwealth v. Antidormi,
84 A.3d 736, 750 (Pa.Super. 2014) (cleaned
up).
The trial court first concluded, and we agree, that the photographs of
the victim are inflammatory. All depict the shocking and intense wounds that
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the Commonwealth contends that Appellee admitted to inflicting upon the
victim. Accordingly, the court was bound to determine whether the probative
value of the pictures outweighed the likelihood of prejudicing the jury. We
review the trial court’s analysis of this question with the following precepts in
mind.
Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. Evidence is excluded
if its probative value is outweighed by “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403. This Court has explained that “all relevant
Commonwealth evidence is meant to prejudice a defendant[,]” thus “exclusion
is limited to evidence so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a
decision based upon something other than the legal propositions relevant to
the case.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 112 A.3d 1232, 1238 n.6
(Pa.Super. 2015) (cleaned up).
Where photographic evidence of a murder depicts gruesome imagery,
“a trial court must not merely exclude [it] based on those qualities[.]”
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1069 (Pa. 2013). Our High Court
has explained:
While recognizing that photographs of a homicide victim can be
unpleasant, disturbing, and brutal, . . . there is no need to so
overextend an attempt to sanitize the evidence of the condition of
the body as to deprive the Commonwealth of opportunities of
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proof in support of the onerous burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 108 A.3d 692, 724 (Pa. 2014) (cleaned up). If
a trial court were to exclude photos based only upon their disturbing nature,
it “would result in exclusion of all photographs of the homicide victim, and
would defeat one of the essential functions of a criminal trial, inquiry into the
intent of the actor.” Commonwealth v. Walter,
119 A.3d 255, 286
(Pa. 2015) (cleaned up).
Further, even where non-photographic evidence can describe the nature
and extent of a victim’s injuries, our High Court has held that “the availability
of alternate testimonial evidence does not preclude the admission of allegedly
inflammatory evidence.” Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 393
(Pa. 2013) (cleaned up). This is because “the condition of the victim’s body
provides evidence of the assailant’s intent, . . . even where the body’s
condition can be described through testimony from a medical examiner[.]”
Commonwealth v. Wright,
961 A.2d 119, 138 (Pa. 2008).
A trial court may also take precautionary measures to decrease the
likelihood that an inflammatory photo would prejudice jurors, including issuing
curative instructions, editing the colors to black and white, and prohibiting the
photographs from entering deliberations. See Commonwealth v. Johnson,
42 A.3d 1017, 1034 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v. Ballard,
80 A.3d 380,
393-94 (Pa. 2013). Our High Court has also highlighted that “[i]t is a
fundamental precept of our criminal jurisprudence that the Commonwealth is
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entitled to prove its case by relevant evidence of its choosing.”
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 91 A.3d 47, 55 (Pa. 2014).
Appellee has been charged with, inter alia, first-degree homicide and
abuse of a corpse. To prove that Appellee committed murder in the first
degree, the Commonwealth must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
that he intentionally killed the victim. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502. “A jury may
infer the specific intent to kill based upon the defendant’s use of a deadly
weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body.” Commonwealth v. Anderson,
323 A.3d 744, 753 (Pa. 2024). To prove that Appellee abused the victim’s
corpse, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that he “treat[ed] a corpse in
such a way that he kn[ew] would outrage ordinary family sensibilities[.]” 18
Pa.C.S. § 5510. The Commonwealth also anticipates that Appellee may claim
self-defense. If so, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “did not
reasonably believe it was necessary to kill in order to protect himself . . .
against death or serious bodily harm, or that [he] used more force than was
necessary to save himself . . . from death[ or] great bodily harm[.]”
Commonwealth v. Kennedy,
332 A.3d 133, 141 (Pa.Super. 2025) (cleaned
up).
Considering the aforementioned principles, we turn to the trial court’s
analysis of the second prong of the inflammatory-photograph test. With
respect to the images that the court excluded or ordered to be cropped at the
shoulders to obscure the victim’s head and neck from view, although it found
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that the pictures were “relevant and probative[,]” and “certainly provide[d]
evidentiary value to the Commonwealth in proving first-degree homicide and
abuse of a corpse and disproving self-defense[,]” it nevertheless determined
that “the Commonwealth has a multitude of other evidence in addition to the
admitted photographs to establish the elements” of the crimes. See Trial
Court Opinion, 3/25/25, at 10. This evidence, the court explained, included
police reports, interview statements from Appellee, and testimony from PSP
troopers and a pathologist. Id. at 8-9. The court also proposed that the
Commonwealth illustrate the victim’s head wounds through drawings,
diagrams, skeletal models, and collected evidence, such as the landscape
tamper from the crime scene, which was covered in blood and hair. Id. at 9.
The court believed that the admitted photographs, none of which clearly
depicted the injuries to the victim’s head or neck, still “demonstrate the
multitude and severity of the injuries suffered[.]” Id. While acknowledging
that the Commonwealth has an “onerous burden of proof of establishing”
Appellee’s guilt, the trial court did not believe that the excluded or cropped
photographs were of “such necessity and of such essential evidentiary value”
to the Commonwealth to prove its case based upon its ability to describe the
injuries to the victim’s skull and neck through other means. Id. at 9-10. The
court ultimately held that “[c]onsidering the disturbing and gruesome nature
of the photographs displaying the [v]ictim’s smashed head, . . . the
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photographs would likely detract, confuse, and prejudice the jury in such a
way that [Appellee] would not be given a fair trial.” Id. at 9.
At the outset, the Commonwealth concedes that all imagery in this
matter is inflammatory. See Commonwealth’s brief at 12. However, it argues
that “the complete banning of any and all pictures of the victim’s head, as he
was discovered at the crime scene, amounts to an error of law that is
manifestly unreasonable.” Id. The Commonwealth explains that it “does not
believe this . . . Court should specify precisely what evidence should be
received and how it is presented to the jury, only reverse the complete ban
[of imagery of the damage to the victim’s head] imposed [by the trial court]
with appropriate instructions.” Id. at 10.
The Commonwealth contends that there are several ways that the trial
court could sanitize repugnant images of the victim’s head to balance the
potential prejudice to Appellee with its need to meet its high burden, including
limiting the time that the photos are on display, presenting them in black and
white format, and issuing a curative instruction. Id. at 12-13, 22. It asserts
that a picture of the victim’s head injuries would be relevant to prove first-
degree homicide and rebut a self-defense claim in that the severity of the
wounds would demonstrate a specific intent to kill. Id. at 18. Further, it
emphasizes that the mere fact that non-photographic evidence could describe
the damage does not negate the relevance of the images. Id. at 23.
In sum, the Commonwealth requests the following relief:
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[T]he Commonwealth seeks an order . . . remanding the matter
with instructions so that the [trial] court permits the
Commonwealth to present evidence that show[s] specific intent
and contradicts any potential defense arguments of self-defense.
The photos of the head wound are the best and clearest evidence
of [Appellee’s] intent and go to the very heart of the matter to be
decided in the pending jury trial. Removing all photographic
evidence of the head wounds[,] without caveat or qualification,
represents a clear abuse of discretion.
....
[T]he [trial] court’s order should be . . . remanded with the
instruction that the Commonwealth be permitted to admit the
photos in question in some form.
Id. at 24-25.
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to
adequately consider the Commonwealth’s right to utilize all potentially
relevant evidence to prosecute Appellee. The court misapplied the law in
determining that images of the victim’s head wounds were inadmissible based
upon: (1) the ability to describe the injuries through other means; and (2)
their appalling nature. Our law is clear that the fact that injuries could
potentially be described through other evidentiary means is not a basis for
exclusion. See, e.g., Ballard, 80 A.3d at 393. Further, the brutality of an
image cannot be the sole basis for its exclusion because it would render any
and all photographic evidence of a homicide inadmissible. See, e.g.,
Watkins,
108 A.3d at 724.
Although Appellee admitted to shooting and beating the victim, the
Commonwealth must still prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellee
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had the specific intent to kill him. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502. The trial court only
admitted photos of the gunshot wounds and damage to the victim’s torso,
back, buttocks, and arms. What is missing, however, is imagery of the
inflicted injuries to the victim’s face and neck. Even considering Appellee’s
confession, it remains unclear when the victim died, or which wounds killed
him. This is the precise reason the Commonwealth would introduce
photographic evidence of the mutilation to the victim’s skull and neck to allow
witnesses, such as a pathologist, to explain which injuries occurred pre- or
post-mortem and caused his death. The court failed to address whether
omitting all photos of the victim’s face and neck would substantially handicap
the prosecution in this manner. Rather, the court insisted that the
Commonwealth demonstrate the victim’s head wounds through other means,
which goes against the well-settled precept that the Commonwealth has the
right to prosecute its case with relevant evidence as it deems fit. See Hicks,
91 A.3d at 55.
In fact, caselaw demonstrates that ghastly images of a homicide victim’s
wounds have been found to be: (1) necessary for witnesses to adequately
describe the nature and extent of damage to a victim’s body, (2) highly
probative of a specific intent to kill, and (3) relevant to disprove defenses.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Haney, 131 A.3d 24, 38 (Pa. 2015) (holding
that disturbing images of a four-year-old child’s deadly injuries were
necessary to depict the severity of the defendant’s attack, rebut his assertion
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that the child’s bruises “were caused by accidental falls,” and “to prove that
[the defendant] beat [the child] with the necessary mens rea” for first-degree
homicide); Commonwealth v. Funk, 29 A.3d 28, 33 (Pa.Super. 2011)
(stating that “[s]pecific intent to kill can be established through circumstantial
evidence such as the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s
body[,]” and “[m]any assertions that Funk made about how the murder
occurred were disproved by expert testimony using the pictures” based upon
“the violence depicted”).
Moreover, the court did not discuss whether altering a photograph of
the victim’s face and neck without obscuring it could decrease the likelihood
of inflaming the jury’s emotions. The court admitted one photograph that
included the victim’s head, P17, which was edited to black and white. That
image, however, mainly depicts the victim’s back while he was lying face down
on the autopsy table, and his head is turned away from the camera. Although
his skull appears to be disformed, the injuries to his face and neck are
substantially shielded from the jury. The court neglected to consider whether
an admitted photograph such as P20, which portrayed the victim’s head and
neck wounds face up on the autopsy table, could be shown to the jury with
the same sanitizing efforts as P17. It failed to explain why it ordered P20 to
be cropped at the shoulders, and neglected to consider whether editing it to
grayscale to mute some of the gore would adequately balance the
Commonwealth’s right to utilize all relevant evidence to meet its onerous
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burden without prejudicing Appellee. See Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 750.
Furthermore, the court failed to weigh the prejudicial impact of such photos if
it were to issue cautionary instructions, limit the time the jurors may view the
photographs, or refuse to provide images during deliberations. See Johnson,
42 A.3d at 1034.
The violence of the acts allegedly committed by Appellee does not
render photographic evidence of such actions inadmissible. See Walter, 119
A.3d at 286; Lyons,
79 A.3d at 1069. To overly sanitize the evidence in this
case by prohibiting the jury from analyzing the traumatic wounds to the
victim’s face and neck would deprive the Commonwealth of highly probative
evidence and potentially reward Appellee for inflicting such brutal injuries.
See Watkins,
108 A.3d at 724.
Overall, the trial court abused its discretion when it misapplied the law
in conducting the two-part balancing test outlined above. Specifically, it did
not adequately weigh the Commonwealth’s right to prosecute its case to the
fullest extent, utilizing all relevant evidence, against the potential prejudice
against Appellee. Accordingly, we vacate the order insofar as the court
excluded all imagery of the victim’s head and neck injuries, and remand with
instructions for the trial court to admit some photograph evidence illustrating
the wounds to the victim’s head and neck. Since the Commonwealth was
vague in its request for relief and did not demand that a certain image be
admitted, we will defer to the court and the parties on that matter. However,
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we note that P20 is an example of a photo that clearly depicts the damage to
the victim’s head and neck, and could be admitted with special consideration
of censoring efforts, such as editing to grayscale, issuing jury instructions, and
prohibiting the image from entering into deliberations.
Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
DATE: 09/05/2025
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