J-A18032-25
2025 PA Super 226
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KEYONA C. WRIGHT :
:
Appellant : No. 2800 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered October 2, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-0000588-2008
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and BECK, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED OCTOBER 3, 2025
Appellant, Keyona C. Wright, appeals from the October 2, 2023 order
entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas denying, without
prejudice, Appellant’s motion to modify restitution. After careful review, we
vacate the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
This case arises from Appellant’s April 2008 guilty plea to one count of
Forgery, relating to several counterfeit checks she cashed or attempted to
cash at Bryn Mawr Trust (“Bank”) branches in August 2003. On April 21,
2008, the court imposed a sentence of time served to 23 months of
incarceration, followed by two years of probation, and restitution of $3,684.05
to be paid to the Bank. The court imposed the restitution as part of her
sentence rather than as a condition of probation. Appellant did not appeal her
judgment of sentence.
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On January 16, 2015, the court revoked her probation and imposed a
new two-year probationary term, which included as a “specific condition” that
Appellant “make monthly payments to restitution first.” Gagnon II1
Judgment of Sentence, 1/16/15.
The trial court stated that “[o]n February 3, 2015, a civil judgment in
the amount of $4,802.05 was entered for fines, costs[,] and restitution
relating” to the instant criminal docket. Trial Ct. Op., dated 10/7/24, at 1.
The record, however, includes no documentation related to that judgment
other than a notation on the docket of a January 30, 2015 “Entry of Civil
Judgment.”
On February 14, 2017, the court found that Appellant again violated her
probation and sentenced her to a new two-year term of probation, ordering
her, inter alia, to make regular payments towards restitution as a specific
condition of probation. Gagnon II Judgment of Sentence, 2/14/17.
Similarly, on March 1, 2019, the court sentenced Appellant to a new
two-year term of probation, including as a “specific condition” that Appellant
make monthly payments toward restitution and indicating that her “case may
be closed” when her court costs and restitution are paid in full. Gagnon II
Judgment of Sentence, 3/1/19. Two years later, the court imposed another
two-year probationary sentence, including conditions similar to the 2019
sentence. Gagnon II Judgment of Sentence, 3/5/21.
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1 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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On April 12, 2023, in contrast to the prior Gagnon II hearings, the
court concluded that Appellant was not in violation of her probation based on
her failure to pay restitution in full because she “was otherwise compliant with
the terms of her probation” and “because a [c]ivil [j]udgment was entered on
January 30, 2015.” Order, 4/12/23. The court expressly found that
Appellant’s failure to pay “was not willful conduct on her part” but rather “due
to her indigence[.]” Id. The court terminated Appellant’s supervision, stating
that the “the civil judgment is hereby enforced.”
Id. (capitalization omitted).
The original 2008 judgment of sentence imposing restitution as part of the
sentence, however, seemingly remained intact.
In August 2023, Appellant filed a motion to modify restitution. She
sought to alter or amend the order of restitution claiming that the original
2008 sentence illegally imposed restitution in favor of Bank. 2 Appellant
requested that the court credit her previously paid restitution toward her costs
and fees. In so doing, Appellant emphasized that the Crimes Code provided
the court authority to alter the restitution order “at any time.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1106(c)(3).
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2 Specifically, Appellant relied upon the decisions in Commonwealth v.
Veon, 150 A.3d 435, 472 (Pa. 2016), holding that 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106
authorized restitution to be paid to “victims,” the definition of which
encompassed only human beings rather than government agencies, and
Commonwealth v. Hunt,
220 A.3d 582, 591 (Pa. Super. 2019), which
extended Veon to prohibit the payment of restitution to “corporate entities.”
In 2018, the General Assembly amended Section 1106 to permit restitution to
government agencies and business entities; the expanded definition,
however, does not apply retroactively to cases “that began before the effective
date of the legislation.”
Id. at 586.
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On October 2, 2023, the court denied the motion without prejudice. 3
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on October
27, 2023. In explaining its decision, the court recounted that it had
terminated Appellant’s supervision and that the “restitution was to be solely
enforced as a civil judgment.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2. As a result, the court
concluded that it did “not have jurisdiction to modify restitution once all
aspects of a sentence have been completed or vacated” and that it did “not
exercise authority over civil judgments[.]” Id.
Additionally, construing the motion as a Post-Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”) petition, the court held that Appellant did not have standing to file a
PCRA petition as she was no longer serving a sentence of imprisonment,
probation, or parole. Trial Ct. Op. at 2 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543).
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.4
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
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3 While the motion to modify restitution does not appear in the certified record
or as a docket entry, the court held a hearing on the motion on October 2,
2023 and denied it the same day in an order entered on the docket. Moreover,
Appellant included a copy of the motion in her supplemental reproduced
record.
4 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court found that Appellant had paid
$2,577.50 of the restitution and, thus, still owed $1,106.55 as of October 7,
2024. The court also indicated that it ordered a new payment plan for
Appellant’s restitution beginning in April 2024, despite Appellant’s instant
appeal to this Court. Id. at 1 n.1.
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1. Did the Honorable Trial Court erroneously conclude that
Appellant is ineligible for the requested relief because she is
no longer serving a sentence, as required by the [PCRA]?
2. Did the Honorable Trial Court erroneously conclude that it
lacked jurisdiction to modify illegal restitution because it is a
criminal court, and a civil judgment had already been entered
on the case?
3. Did the Honorable Trial Court erroneously fail to conclude
that the restitution on Appellant’s case is illegal?
Appellant’s Br. at 4 (issues reordered and answers omitted).
Appellant first asserts that the trial court erred in treating and dismissing
her motion as a PCRA Petition. Appellant’s Br. at 24-28. We review the denial
of a PCRA petition “to determine whether the record supports the PCRA court's
findings and whether its order is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Min,
320 A.3d 727, 730 (Pa. Super. 2024).
We agree with Appellant that the court erred to the extent it treated her
motion as an untimely PCRA petition. As this Court recently held, a challenge
to the legality of a restitution order is “outside the ambit of the PCRA” and
“not subject to its time constraints.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 340 A.3d
1053, 1058 (filed June 30, 2025), reargument denied (Sept. 3, 2025). In
Thomas, we explained that “motions to modify restitution orders imposed
pursuant to [Section] 1106 are not subject to typical post-sentence timeliness
constraints” of the PCRA; rather, Section 1106 “permit[s] a defendant to seek
a modification or amendment of the restitution order at any time directly from
the trial court[,]” and “creates an independent cause of action.”
Id. (citation
omitted).
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We next consider Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in
concluding that it did not have authority to address Appellant’s motion for
modification under Section 1106 due to the entry of the restitution as a “civil
judgment.” Appellant’s Br. at 15-24.
“In the context of criminal proceedings, an order of restitution is not
simply an award of damages, but, rather, a sentence.” Commonwealth v.
Atanasio, 997 A.2d 1181, 1182-83 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “[T]he determination as to whether the trial court
imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law[.]”
Id. at 1183 (citation
omitted). Additionally, Appellant’s question requires our interpretation of
Section 1106 and other statutory provisions addressing restitution.
Accordingly, as statutory interpretation poses a pure question of law, “our
standard of review is de novo[,] and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Hunt,
220 A.3d 582, 585 (Pa. Super. 2019).
“The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute
shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1921(a). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity,
the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”
Id. at 1921(b). When statutory language is ambiguous, courts may ascertain
the intention of the General Assembly by considering, inter alia, “[t]he
occasion and necessity for the statute[,]” “[t]he object to be obtained[,]” and
“[t]he consequences of a particular interpretation.” Id. at § 1921(c).
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Moreover, while we “listen attentively to what a statute says[,][we] must also
listen attentively to what it does not say.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 14
A.3d 798, 814 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court has held restitution provisions to be penal in nature.
Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1212 (Pa. 2013). Accordingly, we
must construe restitution provisions strictly, interpreting any ambiguity “in
favor of the defendant.” Hunt,
220 A.3d at 587 (citation omitted); see also
1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1). Additionally, when statutes or parts of statutes
“relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or
things[,]” we must construe them “together, if possible, as one statute.” 1
Pa.C.S. § 1932.
The General Assembly set forth detailed provisions related to restitution,
including Section 1106 of the Crimes Code, governing restitution for injuries
to person or property, and Sections 9728-9730.1 of the Sentencing Code,
addressing the collection and payment of restitution, as well as court costs
and fines. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9728, 9730, 9730.1.
Section 1106(a) provides that a court shall include restitution as part of
the sentence for cases where “property has been stolen, converted or
otherwise unlawfully obtained . . . as a direct result of the crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1106(a). Alternatively, the court may impose restitution as a condition of
probation under the Sentencing Code. See Clark v. Peugh, 257 A.3d 1260,
1268 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763(b)(10)). Moreover, as in
the instant case, when a court orders restitution as part of the sentence, the
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court may require compliance with the restitution as “a condition of such
probation[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(b).
As noted above, in Section 1106(c)(3), the General Assembly
established “an independent cause of action for a defendant to seek a
modification of an existing restitution order” from the trial court even after the
expiration of the time for modifying or appealing the original sentence.
Commonwealth v. Gentry, 101 A.3d 813, 816 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Specifically, Section 1106(c)(3) provides as follows:
The court may, at any time . . . alter or amend any order of
restitution . . ., provided, however, that the court states its
reasons and conclusions as a matter of record for any change or
amendment to any previous order.
18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(3) (emphasis added).
As noted, the trial court in the instant case reasoned that the entry of
restitution as a “civil judgment” resulted in the court no longer having
jurisdiction to amend the restitution order. Trial Ct. Op. at 2. This conclusion
implicates the General Assembly’s detailed procedures for the payment and
collection of restitution, including 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728, which provides for
restitution to be treated as a “judgment.”
Section 9728 first mandates that restitution shall be collected by the
county probation department or other designated agent. Id. at § 9728(a).
In so doing, the General Assembly clarified that restitution is a “part of a
criminal action or proceeding and shall not be deemed [a] debt[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.
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§ 9728(a)(1).5 After clarifying that restitution is part of criminal action, the
next sentence instructs that a sentence of restitution “shall . . . be a
judgment in favor of the probation department upon the person or the
property of the person sentenced or subject to the order .” Id. (emphasis
added). The statute additionally tasks the clerk of courts with “transmit[ting]
to the prothonotary certified copies of all judgments for restitution . . . ,” and
imposes a duty on the prothonotary to docket the judgment for restitution and
“index the same as judgments are indexed.” Id. at § 9728(b)(1).6 Notably,
in providing that restitution shall be a judgment, the General Assembly did
not revoke its prior express statement that restitution was part of a criminal
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5 In full, Section 9728(a)(1) provides as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b)(5), all restitution, reparation,
fees, costs, fines and penalties shall be collected by the county
probation department or other agent designated by the county
commissioners of the county with the approval of the president
judge of the county for that purpose in any manner provided by
law. However, such restitution, reparation, fees, costs,
fines and penalties are part of a criminal action or
proceeding and shall not be deemed debts. A sentence,
pretrial disposition order or order entered under section 6352
(relating to disposition of delinquent child) for restitution,
reparation, fees, costs, fines or penalties shall, together with
interest and any additional costs that may accrue, be a
judgment in favor of the probation department upon the person
or the property of the person sentenced or subject to the order.
Id. (emphasis added).
6 The statute clarifies that the entry of judgment may include “[t]he total
amount for which the person is liable . . . regardless of whether the amount
has been ordered to be paid in installments.” Id. at § 9728(b)(4).
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action or state that the judgment undermined the sentencing court’s
continued jurisdiction over the restitution portion of the sentence.
Moreover, other aspects of the procedure for collection and payment of
restitution indicate the continuing criminal nature of the proceedings,
regardless of the entry of judgment. For example, Section 9730(b),
addressing the payment of court costs, restitution, and fines, directs that
when a defendant defaults on payment of these amounts, the “issuing
authority, . . . may conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant is
financially able to pay” and to determine the appropriate next steps. Id. at
§ 9730(b)(1) (emphasis added).7 Similarly, “a judge of the court of common
pleas having jurisdiction over the defendant” has the authority to order
private collection agencies to cease collection efforts. Id. at 9730.1(c)(3)
(emphasis added). Moreover, the statutes task each county’s probation
department, rather than a civil entity, with tracking the restitution payments.
Id. at § 9728(b.1).
Thus, while the statutes do not expressly address whether a criminal or
civil court has jurisdiction over “a judgment” of restitution, we glean from the
detailed statutory procedure that the General Assembly intended for the
sentencing court to maintain jurisdiction over the restitution to perform the
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7 Similarly, Section 1106(f) provides that where a defendant has failed to pay
restitution, “the court shall order a hearing to determine if the offender is in
contempt of court or has violated his probation or parole[,]” which are fully
within the realm of criminal rather than civil proceedings. 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1106(f).
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statutorily mandated oversight of the collection process. Indeed, this court
previously explained the benefit of providing the original sentencing court with
modification authority as “a proceeding in the sentencing court allows the
defendant to appear before the court that originally imposed the restitution
and is familiar with the facts of the case and the relevant statutory
framework.” Clark, 257 A.3d at 1270.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that it did not have
jurisdiction based upon the entry of a “civil” judgment of restitution.
Moreover, we find that the court erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to
modify restitution because “all aspects of a sentence ha[d] been completed or
vacated.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Rather, the court in 2008 included restitution as
a direct part of the sentence, and there is no indication that this portion of the
sentence has been completed or vacated. We observe that the subsequent
violation of probation sentences merely included as a condition of the new
probationary terms a requirement that Appellant make payments on the
restitution. Thus, as the 2008 restitution order remains unsatisfied, the
sentencing court, under the plain language of Section 1106(c)(3), retained
the express authority to alter or amend the order of restitution “at any time.” 8
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8 We emphasize that the General Assembly did not provide a separate
timeframe in Section 1106 of the Crimes Code for the modification of a
restitution order in cases where the restitution has been entered as a
judgment pursuant to the Sentencing Code.
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Accordingly, we vacate the order and remand for the trial court to
address Appellant’s motion to modify restitution. 9
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 10/3/2025
____________________________________________
9 We do not address Appellant’s third question asserting that the court erred
in not concluding that the restitution was illegal. Rather, we remand for the
court to address this issue.
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