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2025 PA Super 261
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RASHEED ROBINSON :
:
Appellant : No. 276 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 9, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000332-2024
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.
OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2025
Rasheed Robinson appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after his conviction of first-
degree murder, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on the
streets of Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime, for the
murder of Deja Monae Lewis.1 Robinson asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting evidence under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)
and he challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. After careful
review, we affirm.
We discern the following facts from the certified record. Robinson was
wanted for the August 8, 2021 killing of Bennet “Bennie” Drake, Lewis’s
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108,
and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a), respectively.
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stepfather. Prior to his murder, Drake and Lewis’s mother, Angela Shields,
went over to Lewis’s apartment to intervene in an argument between Robinson
and Lewis. At the time, Robinson and Lewis were in a romantic relationship.
During the argument, Robinson pulled out a gun and shot and killed Drake.
Lewis and her mother made statements to law enforcement about what they
witnessed. An arrest warrant was issued for Robinson for Drake’s murder, but
Robinson managed to evade law enforcement for over a year.
The instant appeal concerns the murder of Lewis. A month before
Lewis’s murder, when Robinson and Lewis were no longer in a romantic
relationship, Robinson stated in a text message to “Bey” that Lewis was a “rat”
and that he desired to get Lewis to change her story about Drake’s murder.
On October 7, 2022, between midnight and 4:00 a.m., Robinson called Lewis
49 times, 24 of which went to voicemail. The last cell phone communication
between them was an outgoing call from Lewis to Robinson at 4:22 a.m. that
lasted for five seconds. Additionally, cellular tower data placed Robinson in the
area of Lewis’s apartment at that time.
Shields was expecting to hear from and see her daughter on October 7,
2022. When she did not hear from Lewis, she suspected that something was
wrong. Shields’s son and Lewis’s eldest brother Haleem agreed to go check on
Lewis. Around 10:30 a.m. on October 8, 2022, Haleem went to Lewis’s
apartment. While Facetiming Shields, Haleem found Lewis’s apartment door
open and her body lying on the kitchen floor.
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On October 8, 2022, Philadelphia police responded to 2037 Napfle
Avenue, finding the body of Deja Lewis on the kitchen floor,
suffering from gunshot wounds of the abdomen, chest and thigh.
Ms. Lewis was pronounced [dead] at 11:40 a.m. Mr. Robinson was
arrested on October 11th at 232 Court Avenue in Upper Darby. At
the time of his arrest, police recovered an iPhone and
semiautomatic pistol from the ground outside the bedroom
window where he was apprehended. The fired cartridge casings
[from the crime scene] were compared with the recovered
handgun and found to be a match.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/25, at 3.
Robinson was charged with the first-degree murder of Lewis, carrying a
firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia,
and possession of an instrument of crime. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth,
over Robinson’s objection, filed a motion in limine to introduce evidence of
Robinson’s involvement in Drake’s killing.2 The trial court granted the motion
and ruled that such evidence was admissible as evidence of motive and res
gestae.
Robinson’s trial commenced on December 3, 2024. He was convicted of
all charges and sentenced to a mandatory life sentence. He filed a post-
sentence motion challenging, inter alia, the weight of the evidence, which the
trial court denied. Robinson timely appealed. Robinson filed a court ordered
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2 At the time of trial Robinson was being prosecuted in Delaware County for
Drake’s murder but had not yet stood trial. On March 7, 2025, Robinson was
convicted of the third-degree murder of Drake. Robinson’s appeal in that case
is currently pending before this Court. See Docket No. 2196 EDA 2025.
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concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the trial court filed
an opinion in support of its ruling.3 See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).
On appeal, Robinson raises the following issues.
[1.] Whether the court abused its discretion when it granted the
Commonwealth’s P[a].R.E. 404(b)(1)(2) Motion to admit into
evidence the alleged prior homicide of Mr. Bennie Drake who was
killed in Delaware County, PA 08/08/2021, all causing undue
prejudice to [Robinson], and preventing him from having a fair
and unbiased trial.
[2.] Whether the verdict was against the sufficiency of the
evidence when there was no eyewitness or forensic evidence
linking [Robinson] to the homicide of Ms. Deja Monae Lewis.
[3.] Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence,
which would shock the consciousness of mankind, when the crime
scene, Philadelphia, was void of [Robinson’s] latent fingerprints,
DNA, neighbors’ video, or eyewitness account of the homicide of
Ms. Deja Monae Lewis, and the recovered handgun in Delaware
County, PA did not have [Robinson’s] latent prints or DNA.
[4.] Whether the circumstantial evidence of the homicide of Ms.
Deja Monae Lewis rose to the level [of] proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to convict [Robinson].
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Robinson’s first issue implicates the admissibility of evidence under
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b). “The admissibility or exclusion of
evidence are subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard of review.”
Commonwealth v. Nabried, 327 A.3d 315, 321 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation
omitted). “The trial court abuses its discretion only if it misapplies the law, or
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3 We commend the trial court for aiding our review with its thorough opinion
that includes citations to the trial testimony.
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its exercise of judgment is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (citation omitted).
Robinson argues, without much elaboration, that evidence of him
shooting and killing Drake was unduly prejudicial because the evidence in the
case was only circumstantial and such evidence biased the jury against him.4
Appellant’s Brief, at 15. The Commonwealth argues, and the trial court
reasoned, that such evidence was admissible to show motive and the story of
the case and any prejudice to Robinson was cured by the trial court’s limiting
jury instruction. Appellee’s Brief, at 12-16; Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/25, at
12-17. We agree.
“It is axiomatic that evidence of prior crimes is not admissible for the
sole purpose of demonstrating a criminal defendant’s propensity to commit
crimes.” Commonwealth v. Grzegorzewski, 945 A.2d 237, 239 (Pa. Super.
2008) (citation omitted). However, under Rule 404(b), when offered for a
legitimate purpose, prior bad acts evidence may be admissible “if the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.”
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). “Unfair prejudice means a tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of
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4 In his brief, Robinson only argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
granting the Commonwealth’s 404(b) motion because the admitted evidence
was unduly prejudicial. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-15. He does not contest
the purpose, motive and res gestae, for which the evidence was admitted.
See
id. Thus, we only address whether such evidence was unduly prejudicial.
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weighing the evidence impartially.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 320 A.3d
140, 148 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).
Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the
defendant. This Court has stated that it is not required to sanitize
the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s
consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand
and form part of the history and natural development of the
events and offenses for which the defendant is charged. Moreover,
we have upheld the admission of other crimes evidence, when
relevant, even where the details of the other crime were
extremely grotesque and highly prejudicial.
Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa. 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). “Exclusion is limited to evidence so prejudicial
that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based on something other
than the legal propositions relevant to the case.” Commonwealth v. Conte,
198 A.3d 1169, 1180-81 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation and brackets omitted).
“When such evidence is admitted, however, the defendant is entitled
upon request to a jury instruction explaining to the jury that the specific
evidence is only admissible for one or more of the above-described limited
purposes.” Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 37 (Pa. 2008) (citation
omitted). “[W]hen examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary
jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hairston,
84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014)
(citations omitted). “The jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions.”
Commonwealth v. Anderson,
327 A.3d 273, 285 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation
omitted).
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After Shields testified about Robinson shooting Drake, the trial court
gave a limiting instruction that such evidence can only be used to show motive
and provide a complete story and context for the crimes. See N.T., 12/4/24,
at 149-50. The trial court again instructed the jury before deliberations. See
N.T., 12/6/24, at 167-69. When considered for the purposes that the trial
court instructed the jury, evidence that Robinson shot and killed Drake was
highly probative of Robinson shooting and killing Lewis, and any prejudice to
Robinson was ameliorated by the trial court’s instruction to the jury.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
Commonwealth’s Rule 404(b) motion and allowing evidence that Robinson
shot and killed Drake. Robinson’s argument to the contrary is without merit.
Robinson’s second issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
and brackets omitted).
Robinson does not specify which offense or for which specific element
there was insufficient evidence. See Appellant’s Brief, at 16-18. He argues
that the evidence was insufficient because there was no direct evidence, such
as video recordings, eyewitnesses, and DNA evidence, that placed him at
Lewis’s apartment when she was killed. See id.
We agree with the Commonwealth that Robinson’s failure to specify
which element of which offense lacked sufficient evidence results in waiver of
his sufficiency challenge. See Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 76
(Pa. Super. 2020). Nevertheless, even if his sufficiency challenge were not
waived, his argument that there was insufficient evidence to place Robinson
at Lewis’s apartment at the time she was killed is without merit.
The Commonwealth presented ample evidence for the jury to infer that
Robinson was at Lewis’s apartment at the time she was killed. The
Commonwealth presented testimony from an investigating detective and an
expert in the field of cellular analysis that between shortly after midnight to
around 4:00 a.m. on October 7, 2022, Robinson called Lewis 49 times, and
the last communication was an outgoing call from Lewis to Robinson at 4:22
a.m. that lasted for about five seconds. See N.T., 12/5/24, at 61-64; N.T.,
12/6/24, at 31-44. At 2:01 a.m. Robinson’s cell phone was utilizing a cellular
tower near Lewis’s apartment placing Robinson in the area. N.T., 12/6/24, at
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44. The Commonwealth presented two pieces of evidence from which it could
be inferred that Lewis knew her killer: there were no signs of forced entry and
Lewis was wearing only underwear and a t-shirt. N.T., 12/4/24, at 67; N.T.,
12/3/24, at 214-15. Further, the timing of Robinson’s presence at Lewis’s
apartment coincided with the medical examiner’s conclusion that Lewis had
been deceased for one to one and a half days at the time of her autopsy on
October 8, 2022. N.T., 12/3/24, at 205-06. Lastly, ballistics evidence
recovered at the crime scene matched the firearm found at Robinson’s aunt’s
house where he was apprehended. N.T., 12/5/24, at 50, 59. This evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient for
the jury to conclude that Robinson was the perpetrator. Thus, Robinson’s
sufficiency challenge fails.
Robinson’s third issue challenges the weight of the evidence.
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation
omitted). “To successfully challenge the weight of the evidence, a defendant
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must prove the evidence is so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict
shocks the conscience of the court.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Regarding the weight of the evidence, Robinson asserts the same
argument he raised for his sufficiency claim. See Appellant’s Brief, at 19-21.
Further, his challenge to the weight of the evidence relies on the exclusion of
evidence that he killed Drake. See id. at 19. As previously explained, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of Robinson killing Drake
and there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Robinson was
at Lewis’s apartment at the time she was killed and thus he was the
perpetrator.
The trial court explained its reasoning for rejecting Robinson’s weight of
the evidence claim.
[The trial] court applied the appropriate standards when reviewing
[Robinson’s] claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. Having reviewed the entire record, including a thorough
reading of the trial transcripts and admitted exhibits, [the trial]
court concludes that the verdict was not so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice, nor was it so tenuous,
vague and uncertain that it shocks the conscience of the [trial]
court. To the contrary, the evidence in this case was compelling
and substantial, and strongly supported the verdict. Accordingly,
[Robinson’s] claim [. . .] is without merit.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/25, at 12.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in rejecting Robinson’s challenge to the weight of the
evidence. We may not reweigh the evidence and assess the credibility of
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witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super.
2015). Further, Robinson fails to identify anything in the record that would
lead us to conclude that the evidence was “so tenuous, vague and uncertain
that his conviction shocks the conscience of the court.” Arias,
286 A.3d at
352. Accordingly, Robinson’s weight challenge fails.
In Robinson’s final issue he challenges the purported circumstantial
nature of the evidence. His briefing on this issue comprises only two
sentences. See Appellant’s Brief, at 22 (“The Homicide of Ms. Deja Monae
Lewis is not Direct evidence but rather a circumstantial evidence case. This is
argued supra in Arguments 2 and 3.”). Such inadequate briefing results in
waiver. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 314 A.3d 515, 523 (Pa. Super.
2024). Further, his argument is completely meritless as it is well-established
that the Commonwealth may wholly sustain its burden of proof with
circumstantial evidence. See Devine,
26 A.3d at 1145. Accordingly, Robinson
is not entitled to relief, and we affirm his judgment of sentence.
Order affirmed.
Date: 11/17/2025
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