J-S28008-25
2025 PA Super 285
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ELIJAH GRIGGS :
:
Appellant : No. 1819 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0003763-2023
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 23, 2025
Elijah Griggs appeals from the judgment of sentence of six to twenty-
three months of incarceration and $9,685.08 in restitution. We affirm.
We glean the following background information from the certified record.
Appellant, who drove a dark-colored Chrysler 300, was employed at Diva
Logistics in York, Pennsylvania, as a truck driver with a route that took him to
Netcong, New Jersey, every weekday evening. The company’s transportation
manager, Michael Ward, repeatedly addressed Appellant’s tardiness with him.
In late January 2023, Appellant gave notice of his intent to resign at the end
of the following week.
On February 3, 2023, Appellant was scheduled to depart the facility at
5:15 p.m. Mr. Ward arrived at the workplace at approximately 4:00 p.m.,
leaving his personal Mitsubishi Outlander in the company’s front parking lot.
His vehicle had no damage to its quarter panel or windshield when he left it
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there. Within half an hour thereafter, Mr. Ward had completed his inspection
of the fleet of trucks located in the property’s other parking lot. None had any
cracked or shattered windows or other damage.
When Appellant failed to timely appear for his shift, Mr. Ward sent
another driver on Appellant’s route. Appellant telephoned Mr. Ward at roughly
5:45 p.m. to inquire where his truck was. Mr. Ward informed Appellant of what
had transpired and that he was accepting the resignation early. Appellant
became agitated and expressed displeasure that Mr. Ward had not informed
him of this turn of events earlier. At around 6:15 p.m., Appellant appeared in
Mr. Ward’s office to berate him in person, and left the building within ten
minutes. Mr. Ward went outside at approximately 10:45 p.m. to discover that
his personal vehicle and three of the company-owned trucks in the lot had been
damaged. Specifically, windows of the trucks had been chipped, cracked, or
shattered, while Mr. Ward’s Outlander sustained damage to its windows and
body.
Mr. Ward called the police, and Officers Brett Green and Alexis Haggerty
of the Northern York Regional Police were dispatched to Diva Logistics just
before midnight. They spoke with Mr. Ward and photographed the affected
vehicles, concluding that the damage was consistent with being stuck by
projectiles such as BBs, pellets, or marbles. All told, the cost to repair the
damage to the vehicles was just under $9,700.
Mr. Ward also provided the officers with surveillance footage of the
parking lots. The video depicted what Mr. Ward identified as Appellant’s
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Chrysler 300 arrive in the lot at 5:44 p.m. on the day in question. The car
remained in place for twenty minutes, until it pulled up in front of one of the
trucks that Mr. Ward found to be damaged, which was one Appellant used to
drive for the company. At that point, another employee arrived in the lot and,
after he had entered the building, Appellant’s vehicle backed out and stopped
in front of another truck Appellant used to drive, which also was among the
damaged vehicles. The Chrysler then pulled in between two trucks, one of
which was the third to sustain damage. At 6:11 p.m., Appellant’s car left the
lot and was recorded by a second camera a minute later entering the
company’s front lot where Mr. Ward’s personal vehicle was parked. Appellant
debarked from the car more than twenty minutes later and went in the front
door of the business. Appellant exited the building at 6:39, returned to his
car, and left the lot at 6:41.
During the course of the ensuing investigation, the officers contacted
Appellant by telephone. He admitted to being in the parking lots on the night
in question, and explained his movements that were captured by the
surveillance cameras as a deliberate attempt to show the company’s human
resources department, with whom he was speaking on the phone at the time,
that he was at the worksite. Appellant admitted to the officers that he had
been upset because he made a long drive to work only to be told to leave.
Based upon this evidence, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with
criminal mischief, graded as a felony of the third degree. He proceeded to a
jury trial wherein Mr. Ward and Officer Green testified to the above facts. The
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jury also viewed the surveillance footage, during which Officer Green
highlighted the appearance therein of the passenger window of Appellant’s car
being rolled down on that cold February night when it stopped near the affected
vehicles, at angles consistent with the use of a BB or pellet gun, and the visible
changes to the windows of the trucks occurred while Appellant remained in
place.1
Following the close of evidence, the trial court charged the jury as to the
elements of criminal mischief. It instructed them that, to find Appellant guilty,
it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he “intentionally
damaged real or personal property of another.” N.T. Trial, 7/30-31/24, at 203.
If and only if the jury so found, it then had to “determine beyond a reasonable
doubt the following additional element: was the value in excess of $5,000?”
Id. On the verdict slip, the jury indicated that it found Appellant guilty, and
circled “yes” next to the question: “Do you find that the defendant caused
pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000?” Verdict, 7/31/24 (comma added).
After ordering a pre-sentence investigation, the trial court imposed the
aforementioned sentence. Appellant promptly filed post-sentence motions,
which were denied without a hearing. This timely appeal followed. Both
Appellant and the trial court complied with their respective obligations pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises two issues for our review:
____________________________________________
1 The police did not recover evidence of the weapon or projectiles that had
caused the damage.
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[1.] Where the jury found that [Appellant] caused pecuniary loss
of more than $5,000—but not that he intended to cause pecuniary
loss of more than $5,000—does grading his criminal mischief
conviction as a third-degree felony constitute an illegal sentence
under Apprendi v. New Jersey[, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),] and
Alleyne v. United Sates[, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)]?
[2.] Did the [trial] court impose an illegal sentence in grading
[Appellant]’s criminal mischief offense as a third-degree felony
where, even assuming there was evidence that [Appellant]
intended to cause damage, there was no evidence that he
specifically intended to cause pecuniary loss in an amount
exceeding $5,000?
Appellant’s brief at 4 (cleaned up, emphasis in original).
Appellant’s issues implicate the legality of his sentence. 2 See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Seladones, 305 A.3d 83, 85 (Pa.Super. 2023) (“[A] claim
that the court improperly graded an offense for sentencing purposes implicates
the legality of a sentence.” (cleaned up)). He thus presents questions of law
subject to de novo, plenary review.
Id. In particular, when faced with
contentions that the sentence imposed exceeded that allowable by law, an
appellate court must “review the verdict slip and instructions as a whole to
establish the level of culpability the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
separate and apart from the challenged facet of the jury instructions. We then
____________________________________________
2To the extent that Appellant’s challenges were raised for the first time on
appeal, waiver pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) do not
apply. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Warunek,
279 A.3d 52, 54 (Pa.Super.
2022) (“A challenge to the legality of the sentence can never be waived and
may be raised by this Court sua sponte.” (cleaned up)).
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ascertain the maximum sentence that would have been imposable at that level
of culpability.” Commonwealth v. Dixon, 255 A.3d 1258, 1266 (Pa. 2021).
The criminal mischief statute states, pertinent to our discussion, as
follows:
(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of criminal mischief if
he:
(1) damages tangible property of another intentionally,
recklessly, or by negligence in the employment of fire,
explosives, or other dangerous means listed in
[§] 3302(a) of this title (relating to causing or risking
catastrophe);
(2) intentionally or recklessly tampers with tangible
property of another so as to endanger person or
property;
(3) intentionally or recklessly causes another to suffer
pecuniary loss by deception or threat;
(4) intentionally defaces or otherwise damages tangible
public property or tangible property of another with
graffiti by use of any aerosol spray-paint can, broadtipped indelible marker or similar marking device;
(5) intentionally damages real or personal property of
another; or
(6) intentionally defaces personal, private or public
property by discharging a paintball gun or paintball
marker at that property.
(b) Grading.--Criminal mischief is a felony of the third degree if
the actor intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000,
or a substantial interruption or impairment of public
communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or
other public service. It is a misdemeanor of the second degree if
the actor intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of $1,000,
or a misdemeanor of the third degree if he intentionally or
recklessly causes pecuniary loss in excess of $500 or causes a loss
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in excess of $150 for a violation of subsection (a)(4). Otherwise
criminal mischief is a summary offense.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3304.
With exceptions not relevant here, the maximum sentence for a third-
degree felony is seven years. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3). For misdemeanors
of the second and third degrees, the maximums are two years and one year,
respectively. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104(2)-(3). Meanwhile, a person convicted
of a summary offense may not be sentenced to more than ninety days in
prison. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1105.
In the case sub judice, Appellant was charged with and convicted for
violating subsection (a)(5) of the criminal mischief statute. The trial court
concluded that the jury’s findings that Appellant was guilty and that he caused
pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000 rendered his offense a third-degree felony.
Accordingly, it deemed it within its authority to sentence him to six to twenty-
three months of confinement and to pay restitution to Mr. Ward and Diva
Logistics.
Appellant does not challenge the Commonwealth’s proof that the victims
sustained pecuniary losses of $4,806.55 and $4,878.53, respectively. Rather,
Appellant questions whether the absence of a factual finding by the jury that
he not only intended to damage the victims’ property, but that he specifically
intended to cause losses totaling more than $5,000, renders his sentence
illegal.
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Appellant presents two distinct bases for a finding of illegality. The first
flows from Apprendi and its progeny, which mandate that any fact that
increases a defendant’s sentencing exposure is an element of the offense that
must be determined by the fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Appellant’s brief at 12-13. His second argument speaks not to whether the
sentence-enhancing fact was found by the jury, but whether the
Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to support the finding. In this vein,
Appellant asserts that, while “the Commonwealth presented evidence that he
intentionally damaged vehicles owned by his former employer and
supervisor[,]” and to show how much pecuniary loss resulted, it proffered “no
evidence, however, as to the amount of loss [he] intended to inflict—let alone
that such amount exceeded $5,000.” Appellant’s brief at 27.
The foundation of each of Appellant’s theories is his construction of
§ 3304(b) as requiring proof that he specifically intended his victims to sustain
losses of more than $5,000 before his § 3304(a)(5) conviction may be graded
as a third-degree felony. This is a matter of statutory interpretation to which
the following principles apply.
Our legislature has established that “[t]he object of all interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). It is axiomatic that “[t]he plain
language of the statute is the best indicator of the legislature’s intent. To
ascertain the plain meaning, we consider the operative statutory language in
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context and give words and phrases their common and approved usage.”
Commonwealth v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934, 942 (Pa.
2021). The provisions of the Crimes Code must “be construed according to the
fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing
constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in
[Title 18] and the special purposes of the particular provision involved.” 18
Pa.C.S. § 105. We presume that the legislature did not intend a result that is
absurd, unreasonable, or impossible of execution. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).
This Court must “interpret statutory language not in isolation, but with
reference to the context in which it appears.” Commonwealth v. Kingston,
143 A.3d 917, 922 (Pa. 2016). “[E]very portion of statutory language is to be
read together and in conjunction with the remaining statutory language, and
construed with reference to the entire statute as a whole.” Commonwealth
v. Glenn,
233 A.3d 842, 845 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up).
Where the words are clear, we interpret the statute in accordance with
its plain meaning without looking further than its text. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Strunk, 325 A.3d 530, 534 (Pa. 2024). It is only when a
provision, read in context, is susceptible to at least two reasonable
interpretations, or “raises non-trivial interpretive difficulties on its face,” that
we deem the language to be ambiguous. See Commonwealth v. Hardy,
337
A.3d 385, 409 n.113 (Pa. 2025) (cleaned up).
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Finally, while statutes are generally to be liberally construed, penal
provisions are strictly construed. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1), (c). However,
this rule of lenity does not require us to “give the words of a statute their
narrowest possible meaning, nor does it override the general principle that the
words of a statute must be construed according to their common and approved
usage.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 311 A.3d 1034, 1048 n.20 (Pa. 2024)
(cleaned up).
Mindful of these principles, we consider the interpretations suggested by
the parties. Appellant posits that when our legislature declared that a
conviction for criminal mischief may only be graded as a third-degree felony if
“the actor intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000,” it
unambiguously called for proof that the accused had a goal of inflicting at least
$5,000 of property damage when he engaged in his mischief. See Appellant’s
brief at 16. He reasons as follows:
A plain reading of the grading provision here shows it centers on
the amount of loss intended and not the amount of loss caused.
Indeed, for enhanced grading, the statute says quite simply that a
defendant must intentionally cause a certain amount of loss—not
just intentionally cause some loss. The former implicates grading
while the latter is more germane to conviction. Applying the
language of the statute as written and giving effect to its natural
meaning, only setting out to cause more than $5,000 in pecuniary
loss authorizes enhanced grading.
If the General Assembly had intended to base third-degree-felony
grading solely on the dollar value of the loss, it could easily have
done so by eliding the word “intentionally” from the clause stating
the requirements for such grading. In fact, the General Assembly
has accomplished as much in grading several other offenses. See,
e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. § 3903(a)(5), (a.2)(2), (b) (grading numerous
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forms of theft strictly on the basis of the amount of money taken);
18 Pa.C.S. § 4105(c)(1) (grading five forms of bad checks based
solely on the dollar amount of the check passed).
The inclusion of such language, where the General Assembly opted
to exclude it from the grading provisions of other criminal statutes,
represents a choice that should be given effect. The plain language
of the statute therefore requires proof that a defendant intended
to cause more than $5,000 of pecuniary loss in order to grade
criminal mischief as a third-degree felony. It is not enough that
more than $5,000 in loss was caused.
Id. at 16-18 (footnote and some citations omitted, emphasis in original).
The Commonwealth disagrees with Appellant’s interpretation, but
nonetheless contends that the statute is unambiguous. It advocates that
“[t]he only reasonable construction of [§] 3304 is that the defendant’s intent
applies to the act of causing damage, while the resulting monetary loss
determines the grade of the offense.” Commonwealth’s brief at 22. The
Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s construal is unreasonable in that it
“would create an impossible burden of proof for the Commonwealth and render
the felony grading provision a nullity[.]” Id. It expounds:
[Appellant’s] interpretation requires the Commonwealth to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant possessed the
conscious objective not just to cause damage, but to cause damage
exceeding a specific dollar amount. This creates an absurd and
nearly impossible evidentiary burden. The Commonwealth would
have to prove the defendant’s state of mind as to the monetary
value of the destruction he was about to cause. Short of a
defendant announcing his financial intentions on video or leaving a
detailed note, it is difficult to imagine what evidence could ever
satisfy this burden. For example, if a defendant intentionally steals
copper pipes from air conditioners at a commercial facility to sell for
$2,000 of scrap metal, and the cost of replacement of the air
conditioners is $600,000, the defendant can, at most, be sentenced
for a third[-]degree misdemeanor according to [Appellant]. Under
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[his] reading, unless the Commonwealth could prove he knew the
replacement cost of the air conditioners and specifically intended to
exceed the $5,000 threshold, a felony conviction would be
impossible.
Id. at 22-23 (citation omitted).
The Commonwealth insists that the reference to the intentional state of
mind in the grading portion of § 3304 was included not to require proof that
the defendant acted with the goal of inflicting a certain measure of loss, but as
a function of the fact that different mens reae can support a criminal mischief
conviction. It contends that our legislature’s chosen language indicates an
intent to qualify only the most culpable for felony grading:
The base offense of criminal mischief can be committed with
several different states of mind. For example, some forms of
mischief can be committed “intentionally or recklessly.” 18
Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(2), (3). Others, including the type [Appellant]
committed, require that the defendant act “intentionally.” Id. at
§ 3304(a)(5). This deliberate legislative choice directly impacts
the grading scheme in subsection (b). The third-degree[-
]misdemeanor grade, for instance, can be triggered by conduct
that is either intentional or reckless. In contrast, the higher
grades of a second-degree misdemeanor and a third-degree
felony can only be triggered if the actor “intentionally causes” the
requisite pecuniary loss. The legislature clearly intended a
combination of the actor’s mens rea and the amount of loss
actually caused to govern the seriousness of the offense.
Id. at 24 (some citations omitted, emphasis in original).
Upon careful consideration of the statutory language, we agree with the
Commonwealth’s reading, which we perceive to reflect the whole of § 3304’s
plain language in context, and find this interpretation reinforced, rather than
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contradicted, by Appellant’s references to the grading provisions of other penal
statutes.
In arguing that the reference to intent in § 3304(b) implicates the desire
to achieve a certain level of damage and not the thought behind the criminal
act, Appellant first referenced § 3903, which supplies the following value-
specific grading provisos for all theft offenses:
(a) Felony of the second degree.--Theft constitutes a felony of
the second degree if:
....
(5) The amount involved is $100,000 or more but less than
$500,000.
(a.1) Felony of the third degree.--Except as provided in
subsection (a) or (a.2), theft constitutes a felony of the third
degree if the amount involved exceeds $2,000, or if the property
stolen is an automobile, airplane, motorcycle, motorboat or other
motor-propelled vehicle, or in the case of theft by receiving stolen
property, if the receiver is in the business of buying or selling
stolen property.
(a.2) Felony of the first degree.--Except as provided in
subsections (a) and (a.1), theft constitutes a felony of the first
degree if:
....
(2) the amount involved is $500,000 or more.
(b) Other grades.--Theft not within subsection (a), (a.1) or
(a.2), constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree, except that
if the property was not taken from the person or by threat, or in
breach of fiduciary obligation, and:
(1) the amount involved was $50 or more but less than $200
the offense constitutes a misdemeanor of the second
degree; or
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(2) the amount involved was less than $50 the offense
constitutes a misdemeanor of the third degree.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3903.
What Appellant fails to appreciate is that each of the theft offenses to
which this grading statute applies requires proof of intentional acts. See 18
Pa.C.S. §§ 3921 (theft by unlawful taking), 3922 (theft by deception), 3923
(theft by extortion), 3924 (theft of lost property), 3925 (receiving stolen
property), 3927 (theft by failure to make required disposition of funds
received). Similarly, the statute he cites establishing various grades for the
offense of passing bad checks based solely upon the amount of the instrument,
does not involve more than one level of criminal culpability in defining the
crime. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4105. In these instances, there is simply no need for
the grading provisions to mention levels of culpability because the offense is
only committed upon proof of one particular mental state.
Unlike the theft and forgery offenses cited by Appellant, the multiple
definitions of the crime of criminal mischief stated in § 3304(a) incorporate
widely-varying degrees of criminal culpability, spanning the full gamut of states
of mind from intentional down to criminal negligence, the least culpable mens
rea that can support criminal punishment. Were the loss-based gradings listed
in § 3304(b) in the same manner as they are in the above-discussed statutes
cited by Appellant, a person would be punishable to the same extent for
causing more than $5,000 in damages to his neighbor’s car through the
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negligent use of fireworks as he would for intentionally setting fire to the
vehicle. Further, under Appellant’s reading of § 3304(b), two individuals who,
by committing the indistinguishable acts, intentionally damaged identical cars,
each causing losses in excess of $5,000, would nevertheless face wildly
disparate punishment based upon whether they had an established history of
knowing the prices of cars and car repairs.
Overall, we deem Appellant’s construction of the criminal mischief
statute to be unreasonable, when viewed in the context of the Crimes Code as
a whole, and one that is not required by the plain meaning of the language
employed by the General Assembly. We simply do not discern from the
language of § 3304 the legislative intent to make ignorance or lack of life
experience a sentencing boon in that people who commit the identical acts are
subject to different punishments, not because of any difference in what they
did, but because of what they knew about how much things cost.
Instead, we perceive the plain language of § 3304(b) to reflect a
legislative intent to: (1) reserve the third-degree-felony and second-degree-
misdemeanor gradings for individuals who intentionally cause damage, with
the differentiation between the two being the pecuniary value of that damage;
(2) provide the lesser third-degree-misdemeanor grading for intentional or
reckless acts causing a smaller amount of loss; and (3) establish that criminal
mischief achieved through mere negligence or resulting in minimal damage
shall be a summary offense.
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Consequently, the Commonwealth was not required to prove, and the
jury was not required to find, that Appellant damaged the company trucks and
Mr. Ward’s personal vehicle with the intent to cause more than $5,000 in
losses. The burden necessary to sustain Appellant’s § 3304(a)(5) conviction,
graded as a third-degree felony, was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he
intentionally damaged that property and that his intentional acts resulted in
losses exceeding $5,000. The Commonwealth offered evidence to sustain
each of those elements, and the jury found that it proved them all. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Kearney, 225 A.3d 590, 596 (Pa.Super. 2019) (vacating
sentence for criminal mischief graded as a third-degree misdemeanor because
the Commonwealth offered no evidence that the damage the defendant caused
to a windshield amounted to a loss of at least $500).
Since Appellant’s sentence is well within the lawful maximum, we have
no cause to disturb it.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/23/2025
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