J-A11008-24
2025 PA Super 29
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
STEVEN AHMAD WIGGS :
:
Appellant : No. 641 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-50-SA-0000026-2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 6, 2025
Steven Ahmad Wiggs appeals from the judgment of sentence of a $500
fine imposed after he was found guilty at a de novo trial of a summary offense
for having red and blue lights on his personal vehicle, which he used while
acting as a constable. We affirm.
On June 15, 2021, Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Trooper Jacob
Brown-Shields observed a “fully marked black and white [C]rown [V]ic[1] style
____________________________________________
1 We note that the Crown Victoria Police Interceptor was the iconic police
vehicle on the street and on the screen in the 1990s. As explained in an article
examining its importance in popular culture:
The Times recently reported that police departments are assigning
officers the last of the Ford Crown Victorias, thereby signalling the
end for one of law enforcement’s most iconic vehicles. Produced
by Ford from 1979 to 2011, the heavyset sedan is beloved by
police for its durability and muscle, and also, above all, for its
hulking yet stealthy silhouette. Anyone who has been pulled over
in the past twenty years is self-trained in spotting an unmarked
Crown Vic. Its distinctive profile was so synonymous with the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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constable vehicle” that was “equipped with a light bar on top.” N.T. Summary
Appeal, 4/3/23, at 7, 9. Having received a report of Appellant using a vehicle
with red and blue lights a couple of weeks prior, Trooper Brown-Shields
followed the vehicle, determined that it was registered to Appellant, and
initiated a traffic stop. Appellant, who was armed and in a self-styled uniform,
insisted multiple times that “constables are police officers” and he was
“allowed to have red and blue lights.” Id. at 9.
Since Appellant professed to being “embarrassed about being pulled
over” as a constable, Trooper Brown-Shields permitted Appellant to turn on
his lights. At a subsequent hearing, the trooper testified that he believed
Appellant took him up on this offer, and that in doing so visually confirmed
that the lights were red and blue. Id. Regardless of whether the lights were
in fact activated, Appellant conceded that the lights were red and blue when
he explained to Trooper Brown-Shields that the PSP had previously seized the
same vehicle and cited Appellant for having red and blue lights on it. After
the citation was dismissed for unknown reasons, the PSP returned the vehicle
to Appellant with the red and blue lights intact. Despite the PSP asking him
to remove the red and blue lights, Appellant told the trooper that he had
____________________________________________
police that flashing lights became secondary. The mere sight of
its outline was enough to frighten civilian drivers into compliance.
Sam Sweet, The Crown Vic Jumps its Last Curb, THE NEW YORKER, Sep. 3, 2013,
available at https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-crown-vicjumps-its-last-curb. In the instant case, Appellant’s black and white Crown
Victoria had yellow striping, an image of the Pennsylvania coat of arms, and
signage indicating “State Constable” and “Emergency 911.” See Exhibit D-3.
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refused to do so because he had won the case as to whether he could use
such lights. See Exhibit D-2 at 7:45-9:08.
As will be discussed at length infra, the Vehicle Code specifies at 75
Pa.C.S. § 4571(b)(1) the types of vehicles permitted to have red and blue
lights, which include police vehicles. Trooper Brown-Shields determined that
Appellant’s vehicle was not encompassed by the statute and cited Appellant
for violating § 4571(b)(1). See N.T. Summary Appeal, 4/3/23, at 12-14. A
Magisterial District Judge (“MDJ”) found Appellant guilty and he appealed to
the Perry County Court of Common Pleas. After litigating a pre-trial motion
challenging the legality of the stop and the deletion of the trooper’s mobile
video recording prior to discovery, Appellant proceeded to a de novo trial.
Trooper Brown-Shields testified, and Appellant introduced photographs of his
vehicle and a twenty-two-minute audio recording he had made of the stop.
At the conclusion, the court found Appellant guilty and imposed fines and the
costs of prosecution.
This appeal followed. Appellant complied with the court’s order to file a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion
addressing the issues raised by Appellant.2 In this Court, Appellant has refined
his arguments to the following four questions:
A. Statutory Construction: Does the Statutory Construction Act
lead to a holding that [Appellant]’s car was a “police vehicle,”
____________________________________________
2 We note that Appellant’s requests for this case to be heard before another
panel were denied.
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as that two-word phrase is used in the applicable statute, 75
Pa.C.S. § 4571 (through its definitions section, § 102)?
B. Void for Vagueness Doctrine: If the two-word phrase “police
vehicle” is interpreted as not including a constable’s marked
vehicle (of the particular type that is the subject of the instant
case), does convicting a constable (convicting him of an offense
for which having a “police vehicle” is a complete defense) cause
a due process violation (as applied to that particular type of
vehicle), under the “void for vagueness” doctrine, under either
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and/or
the Constitution of the United States of America?
C. Wrong Charge: When a person is convicted under the wrong
subsection of a statute, is that conviction void?
D. No Evidence: When the color of the allegedly red[ and ]blue
lights on a constable’s police car is an essential element of the
alleged offense, and when there is zero evidence of the color
of the lights in a light bar which is off, is that conviction void?
Appellant’s brief at 8 (cleaned up).
Appellant first challenges the court’s interpretation of the Vehicle Code
as prohibiting him from equipping his constable vehicle with red and blue
lights.3 His argument is simple: “A constable vehicle is a police vehicle; and
a constable is a police officer.” Id. at 11 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Therefore, because police vehicles are permitted to have red and blue lights,
he cannot be found guilty of a summary offense for having such lights.
____________________________________________
3 Although we refer to Appellant’s vehicle as a “constable vehicle,” we are
cognizant that the designation confers no particular status. See
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103, 108 & n.10 (holding that
constables are not employees of the Commonwealth, and noting that their
vehicles, which must be privately purchased and insured, are not government
vehicles and therefore not exempt from the Vehicle Code’s window tinting
prohibitions). Rather, when we refer to a “constable vehicle” within this
writing, we simply mean a private vehicle operated by an individual in his or
her capacity as a Pennsylvania constable.
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This issue requires us to interpret § 4571(b)(1) to determine whether
Appellant was prohibited from having such lights, or whether he was
authorized to utilize them on his constable vehicle. As this presents a question
of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.
See Vellon v. Dep't of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 292
A.3d 882, 890 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). Statutory interpretation is, of course,
conducted in accordance with the Statutory Construction Act:
Pursuant to that Act, “[t]he object of all statutory interpretation
and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). When
the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter
of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit. Id. § 1921(b). When, however, the words of
a statute are not explicit, a court may discern the General
Assembly’s intent by examining considerations outside of the
words of the statute. Id. § 1921(c). In addition, when construing
a statute, we must, if possible, give effect to all of its provisions.
Id. § 1921(a).
The Statutory Construction Act also instructs that, in ascertaining
the intention of the General Assembly in enacting a statute,
several presumptions may be used. Id. § 1922. Among those
presumptions is that “the General Assembly intends the entire
statute to be effective and certain.” Id. § 1922(2). We also may
presume that the General Assembly does not intend absurd or
unreasonable results. Id. § 1922(1). As this Court wisely stated
over sixty years ago, to avoid such results, we “must read
[statutes] in the light of reason and common sense.” Ayers v.
Morgan, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (Pa. 1959). [Further], we may
presume that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the
Constitution of the United States or this Commonwealth. 1
Pa.C.S. § 1922(3).
Id. at 890 (citations altered).
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Pursuant to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, where “a
section of a statute contains a given word, the omission of such word from a
similar section of the statute shows a different legislative intent.”
Commonwealth v. Collins, 286 A.3d 767, 774 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned
up). Stated another way, “[w]here a legislature includes specific language in
one section of a statute and excludes it from another, that language should
not be implied where excluded.” Id. (cleaned up). Finally, our legislature has
directed that statutes that are in pari materia, i.e. “relate to the same persons
or things or to the same class of persons or things[,]” must “be construed
together, if possible, as one statute.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(a), (b).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the statute at issue in the case
sub judice. Appellant was convicted of violating § 4571(b)(1) of the Vehicle
Code, which provides as follows in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.--Every emergency vehicle shall be equipped
with one or more revolving or flashing red lights and an audible
warning system. Spotlights with adjustable sockets may be
attached to or mounted on emergency vehicles.
(b) Police, sheriff, fire and coroner or medical examiner
vehicles.--
(1) Police, sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police
vehicles may in addition to the requirements of subsection
(a) be equipped with one or more revolving or flashing blue
lights. The combination of red and blue lights may be
used only on police, sheriff, coroner, medical
examiner or fire police vehicles.
(2) Unmarked police and sheriff vehicles used as emergency
vehicles and equipped with audible warning systems shall
be equipped with the lights described in this subsection.
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....
(d) Vehicles prohibited from using signals.--Except as
otherwise specifically provided in this section, no vehicle other
than an emergency vehicle may be equipped with revolving
or flashing lights or audible warning systems identical or
similar to those specified in subsections (a) and (b). A
person who equips or uses a vehicle with visual or audible warning
systems in violation of this section commits a summary offense
and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less
than $500 nor more than $1,000.
75 Pa.C.S. § 4571 (footnote omitted, emphases added). In § 102 of the
Vehicle Code, our legislature defined “emergency vehicle” thusly:
A State or county emergency management vehicle, fire
department vehicle, police vehicle, sheriff vehicle, ambulance,
advanced life support squad vehicle, basic life support squad
vehicle, emergency canteen support service organization vehicle,
blood delivery vehicle, human organ delivery vehicle, hazardous
material response vehicle, armed forces emergency vehicle, one
vehicle operated by a coroner or chief county medical examiner
and one vehicle operated by a chief deputy coroner or deputy chief
county medical examiner used for answering emergency calls, a
vehicle owned by or leased to a regional emergency medical
services council that is used as authorized by the Department of
Health to respond to an actual or potential disaster, mass casualty
situation or substantial threat to public health, a vehicle owned by
a county or regional police association and operated by a police
officer that is used for police transport or victim extraction, a
vehicle that is owned and operated by a county correctional
institution in a city of the first class and used to respond to an
emergency at a correctional institution in a city of the first class
or to escort an ambulance which is transporting sick or injured
prisoners in a city of the first class, any vehicle operated by a
special agent, special agent supervisor, narcotics agent or
narcotics agent supervisor while performing official duties as
employees of the Office of Attorney General, any vehicle owned
and operated by the Philadelphia Parking Authority established in
accordance with 53 Pa.C.S. Ch. 55 (relating to parking authorities)
and used in the enforcement of 53 Pa.C.S. Ch. 57 (relating to
taxicabs and limousines in first[-]class cities), a vehicle owned by
a city of the first class and operated by first judicial district
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certified armed probation officers, a vehicle owned and operated
by the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission that is used by an
emergency service responder as dispatched by the Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission’s traffic operations center, or any other
vehicle designated by the State Police under [§] 6106 (relating to
designation of emergency vehicles by Pennsylvania State Police),
or a privately owned vehicle used in answering an emergency call
when used by any of the following:
(1) A police chief and assistant chief.
(2) A fire chief, assistant chief and, when a fire company
has three or more fire vehicles, a second or third assistant
chief.
(3) A fire police captain and fire police lieutenant.
(4) An ambulance corps commander and assistant
commander.
(5) A river rescue commander and assistant commander.
(6) A county emergency management coordinator.
(7) A fire marshal.
(8) A rescue service chief and assistant chief.
(9) The chief or operations director of a county hazardous
materials response team.
(10) A police officer who is also a member of a county or
regional municipal special emergency response team which
is authorized to respond to emergencies under 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 8953 (relating to Statewide municipal police jurisdiction).
75 Pa.C.S. § 102.
Patently, our General Assembly did not include private vehicles utilized
by constables as one of the enumerated vehicles authorized to utilize red and
blue lights within the text of § 4571 or in the definition of “emergency vehicle”
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in § 102. Therefore, the plain language of the statute indicates that our
legislature did not intend to permit constable vehicles to be equipped with
such lights. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez-Frometa, 256 A.3d 440, 448
(Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up) (“Under the doctrine expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the inclusion of a specific matter in a statute implies the
exclusion of other matters.”).
Appellant nonetheless reasons that because a constable is a police
officer, a constable vehicle must be considered a police vehicle, which is one
of the vehicles that our General Assembly authorized to equip such lights
pursuant to §§ 4571 and 102. Our review of the Vehicle Code dictates
otherwise. Throughout the Vehicle Code, constables are deemed distinct from
police officers as they are consistently listed separately. See, e.g., 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 1376(b)(1), (5) (listing individually “[l]ocal police officers” and “[c]onstables
or deputy constables” as those who may be delegated the authority to seize
surrendered registration plates); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3102 (requiring compliance with
the traffic direction of “any uniformed police officer, sheriff or constable”); 75
Pa.C.S. § 6309, 6309.1 (discussing impoundment by “police officer, sheriff or
constable”).
In line with the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “this
Court has long recognized that as a matter of statutory interpretation,
although one is admonished to listen attentively to what a statute says, one
must also listen attentively to what it does not say.” Sanchez-Frometa, 256
A.3d at 448 (cleaned up). Consequently, Appellant’s equation of constables
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with police officers in one part of the Vehicle Code, when they are treated
separately in other in pari materia provisions, is contrary to expression unius
est exclusion alterius. We cannot simultaneously give the General Assembly’s
distinction between constables and police officers credit and conclude that it
neglected to list constable vehicles as one of the emergency vehicles because
it implicitly considers constables as police officers. If that were true, there
would be no need to list constables separately in §§ 1376(b), 3102, 6309, and
6309.1. Since we construe the entire statute to have meaning and the General
Assembly to have not intended absurd results, we conclude that constable
vehicles are not police vehicles.
Moreover, notwithstanding the insistence of Appellant and the dissent
to the contrary, a constable vehicle cannot be included within the purview of
a police vehicle because a constable simply is not a police officer. The term
“police vehicle” is not defined within the statute, but we reasonably surmise
that it is a vehicle equipped for use by a police officer. Section 102 of the
Vehicle Code defines a police officer as “[a] natural person authorized by law
to make arrests for violations of law.”4 75 Pa.C.S. § 102.
____________________________________________
4 We note that this is but one definition our General Assembly has set forth
for the phrase “police officer.” The Crimes Code defines a “police officer” as
“includ[ing] the sheriff of a county of the second class and deputy sheriffs of
a county of the second class who have successfully completed the
requirements under . . . the Municipal Police Education and Training Law
[(‘MPETL’)].” 18 Pa.C.S. § 103 (footnote omitted). The General Assembly
elaborated on the definition of police officer in the MPETL as any of the
following:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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____________________________________________
(1) A full-time or part-time employee assigned to criminal or
traffic law enforcement duties of any of the following:
(i) A police department of a county, city, borough, town or
township.
(ii) Any railroad or street railway police.
(iii) Any campus or university police department, including
the State System of Higher Education and its member
institutions.
(iv) The Capitol Police.
(v) The Harrisburg International Airport Police.
(vi) An airport authority police department.
(2) A deputy sheriff of a county of the second class.
(3) A security officer of a first class city housing authority or a
police officer of a second class city housing authority.
(4) A county park police officer.
The term excludes persons employed to check parking meters or
to perform only administrative duties and auxiliary and fire police.
53 Pa.C.S. § 2162. Unlike the traditional understanding of a police officer,
constables are not employed by police departments, or by any body for that
matter, because they operate as independent contractors. See In re Act 147
of 1990, 598 A.2d 985, 990 (Pa. 1991). Indeed, they are elected by the
citizenry or appointed in the event of a vacancy. See 44 Pa.C.S. § 7111-
7114.
More importantly, constables do not undergo the rigors of MPETL
training. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 2167(a) (“All municipalities of this Commonwealth
or groups of municipalities acting in concert and all colleges and universities
shall be required to train all members of their police departments pursuant to
this subchapter prior to their enforcing criminal laws, enforcing moving traffic
violations under Title 75 (relating to vehicles) or being authorized to carry a
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Our Supreme Court has interpreted this definition thusly:
[F]acially, the provision applies broadly to anyone with a power of
arrest. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 102. Under the Statutory Construction
Act, however, we presume that the General Assembly did not
intend unreasonable results. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922. In this
circumstance, a literal reading of the Vehicle Code’s definition of
“police officer” would invest enforcement authority in all citizens,
in light of their common-law arrest power. See generally
Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 242 A.2d 237, 239–40 (Pa.
1968) (referencing the citizens’ authority to arrest). It is
manifest, however, that the Legislature did not intend to
____________________________________________
firearm.”). The Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Commission
(“MPOETC”) has mandated that aspiring police officers demonstrate certain
physical fitness standards before entry into the training program. Once
admitted, trainees undergo 919 hours of classroom and practical instruction,
including forty hours on the operation of emergency vehicles and 124 hours
on firearms. Additionally, a trainee must pass with a score of at least 80%
various exams throughout the program, including a driving skills test, before
being eligible to take the 200-question certification exam to become a police
officer. See Physical Fitness, available at https://www.pa.gov/agencies/
mpoetc/programs/training/basic-police-officer-training/physical-fitness.html;
Municipal Police Officer Basic Training Program, 2024, available at
https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/mpoetc/documents/
training/basic-police-officer-training/curriculum_overview_2024.pdf);
MPOETC 2022 Basic Police Syllabus, available at https://www.pa.gov/content/
dam/copapwp-pagov/en/mpoetc/documents/training/basic-police-officer-training /basic%20police%20training%20syllabus.pdf.
Contrarily, constables undergo only eighty hours of basic training and
forty hours of firearms instruction, with the requirement that they achieve a
passing score of at least 70% on each written exam. See 44 Pa.C.S. § 7145
(“The Constables' Education and Training Program shall include training for a
total of 80 hours, the content of which shall be determined by regulation. The
training shall include instruction in the interpretation and application of the
fees provided for in section 7161 (relating to fees).”).; Constables’ Education
and Training, available at https://www.pa.gov/agencies/pccd/programs-andservices/training/public-safety-training/cetb-training.html. Therein, the only
training pertinent to the use of a vehicle is four hours of instruction about
prisoner transport and how to reduce the possibility of an escape. See
Constables’ Education and Training.
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denominate the citizenry at large as “police officers” or confer
vehicle-related enforcement authority upon it. Thus, we find that
the Legislature’s definitional reference to the authorization “by law
to make arrests for violations of law,” 75 Pa.C.S. § 102, refers to
some form of legal authorization beyond a mere common-law
power shared among Pennsylvania citizens.
Commonwealth v. Marconi, 64 A.3d 1036, 1041 (Pa. 2013) (citations
altered).
“It is well settled that when vesting a group with police powers and
duties, the Legislature does so with specificity.” Commonwealth v.
Frombach, 617 A.2d 15, 19 (Pa.Super. 1992) (cleaned up). Certainly,
constables possess the authority to effect certain limited arrests:
In addition to any other powers granted under law, a constable of
a borough shall, without warrant and upon view, arrest and
commit for hearing any person who:
(1) Is guilty of a breach of the peace, vagrancy, riotous or
disorderly conduct or drunkenness.
(2) May be engaged in the commission of any unlawful act
tending to imperil the personal security or endanger the
property of the citizens.
(3) Violates any ordinance of the borough for which a fine
or penalty is imposed.
44 Pa.C.S. § 7158.
Additionally, this Court has observed that “constables possessed the
power at common law to make warrantless arrests for felonies and breaches
of the peace.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 677 A.2d 846, 851 (Pa.Super.
1996). However, that arrest power was no greater than the “power exercised
by [all] private citizens since antiquity,” namely, “the power to make
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warrantless arrests for felonies.” Id. at 852. Hence, our ruling on the
authority of constables to make certain arrests did not enlarge their power,
but merely “avoid[ed] the anomalous situation of depriving constables of
powers possessed by the ordinary citizenry.”
Id. (cleaned up); see also Peter
J. Gardner, Arrest and Search Powers of Special Police in Pennsylvania: Do
Your Constitutional Rights Change Depending on the Officer's Uniform?, 59
Temp. L.Q. 497, 536 (1986) (“Constables, however, do not possess general
police powers and they have no statutory search powers. Despite their
statutory arrest powers, their historical role as law enforcement officers, and
the fact that they are more likely than private citizens to perform arrests and
searches, some question exists whether police powers possessed by
constables are any greater than the powers of private citizens.” (footnotes
omitted)).
Moreover, the statutory provisions governing constables confirm that
constables are not synonymous with police officers. Section 7132 (Police
Officers), sets forth the following pertinent conflict between the two positions:
(a) Constable employed as policeman not to accept other
fees in addition to salary.--Except for public rewards and legal
mileage allowed to a constable for traveling expenses, and except
as provided in subsection (b), it is unlawful for a constable who is
also employed as a policeman to charge or accept a fee or other
compensation, other than his salary as a policeman, for services
rendered or performed pertaining to his office or duties as a
policeman or constable.
(b) Exception.--Unless prevented from doing so by the operation
of 8 Pa.C.S. Ch. 11 Subch. J (relating to civil service for police and
fire apparatus operators), borough policemen who reside in the
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borough may hold and exercise the office of constable in the
borough, or in any ward thereof, and receive all costs, fees and
emoluments pertaining to such office.
44 Pa.C.S. § 7132 (footnote omitted). Clearly, and consistent with our
interpretation of the Vehicle Code, the General Assembly views constables as
distinct from police officers.
Based upon the foregoing, we hold that a constable is not a police
officer. This holding is based in part upon our interpretation that the
constable’s limited arrest power is not equivalent to the arrest powers
described within the definition of police officer in § 102 of the Vehicle Code.
Indeed, the authority of constables is inconsistent with the unqualified arrest
powers attributed to police officers in § 102. In point of fact, to include
constables within that definition, we would need to read it as “authorized by
law to make arrests for certain violations of the law.” Such a broad
interpretation would convert every citizen into a police officer, render every
vehicle a police vehicle, and permit every private vehicle owned by a citizen
to equip red and blue lights. See Marconi, 64 A.3d at 1041. Rather, a plain
reading of “police officer” in § 102, in conjunction with the presumption that
the General Assembly did not intend absurd results by its enactment, leads us
to the conclusion that it means only those natural persons who have a general
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authority to make arrests, i.e., those employed as police officers by police
departments.5 See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).
We would end our analysis here were it not for Appellant’s insistence
that the statute implicitly includes constable vehicles within the
characterization of police vehicles based upon our Supreme Court’s statement
that “[t]he constable is a police officer” in In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d
985, 990 n.3 (Pa. 1991). See Appellant’s brief at 19. Indeed, the learned
dissent rests his writing upon that same allegedly “unequivocal” statement.
See Dissent at 1. For the reasons that follow, we find this premise faulty.
First, it bears clarifying that the case from which this statement derives,
In re Act 147 of 1990, did not touch upon the limited issue before us in this
matter. Rather, in that case, the issue was where constables belonged within
our governmental system for purposes of oversight and accountability. Our
Supreme Court categorized constables as executive branch officials. Because
Act 147 had placed constables within the judicial hierarchy, the Court found
Act 147 unconstitutional.
Second, the Court’s statement that a “constable is a police officer” must
be considered in context. Notably, it appeared in a footnote as a reference to
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5 The dissent accuses us of improperly analyzing legislative intent despite a
lack of ambiguity in the statutory language. See Dissent at 5. We reiterate
that “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1921(a) (emphasis added). Presently, we discerned the General Assembly’s
intent not from an examination of the factors applicable to ambiguous
language and set forth in § 1921(c), but from the plain language of the statute
and the generally applied presumptions outlined by Vellon and § 1922.
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the comic opera, the Pirates of Penzance. In full, the phrase relied upon by
Appellant and the dissent appears thusly:
Simply stated, a constable is a peace officer.3 A constable is a
known officer charged with the conservation of the peace, and
whose business it is to arrest those who have violated it. By
statute in Pennsylvania, a constable may also serve process in
some instances. As a peace officer, and as a process server, a
constable belongs analytically to the executive branch of
government, even though his job is obviously related to the
courts. It is the constable’s job to enforce the law and carry it
out, just as the same is the job of district attorneys, sheriffs, and
the police generally. Act 147 is unconstitutional and violates the
separation of powers doctrine in our Constitution because it
attempts to place constables within the judicial branch of
government and under the supervisory authority of the judicial
branch. . . . At most, constables are “related staff” under the
Rules of Judicial Administration. They cannot, however, be made
part of the judicial branch under our Constitution. To attempt to
do so constitutes a gross violation of the separation of powers.
Personnel whose central functions and activities partake of
exercising executive powers cannot be arbitrarily made part of
another branch of government whose functions they do not
perform. To do so interferes with the supervisory authority of the
Supreme Court just as much as attempting to dictate how that
authority is to be exercised over personnel who are properly part
of the judicial system. In consequence, we find Act 147
unconstitutional and invalid.
______
3 The constable is a police officer. It would perhaps not
be remiss to recall Sir William S. Gilbert’s famous line from
The Pirates of Penzance, “When constabulary duty’s to be
done, to be done, a policeman’s lot is not an ‘appy one!”
In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d at 990 (cleaned up, emphasis added).
Despite determining that a constable cannot be placed within the
judiciary because that position constitutes an executive branch official, the
Court observed that “[a] constable is an elected official[,] . . . an independent
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contractor[,] and is not an employee of the Commonwealth, the judiciary, the
township, or the county in which he works.” Id. at 986 (cleaned up). In other
words, it is apparent that constables exist in a league of their own.
We do not extrapolate the High Court’s footnote and operatic allusion to
equate constables with police officers for all purposes, including in the
definition of police officers in § 102 of the Vehicle Code. Instead, we heed the
warning of our Supreme Court regarding “the necessity of reading legal rules—
especially broad rules—against their facts and the corollary that judicial
pronouncements should employ due modesty.” Tincher v. Omega Flex,
Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 378 (Pa. 2014). Our High Court adopted “the principle
that the holding of a decision is to be read against its facts” precisely because
“it is very difficult for courts to determine the range of factual circumstances
to which a particular rule should apply in light of the often myriad possibilities.”
Maloney v. Valley Med. Facilities, Inc.,
984 A.2d 478, 490-91 (Pa. 2009).
In doing so, the Court echoed the sentiment of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals that “[j]udicial opinions are frequently drafted in haste, with imperfect
foresight, and without due regard for the possibility that words or phrases or
sentences may be taken out of context and treated as doctrines.”
Id. (cleaned
up).
Consistent with this approach, we grappled with the import of In re Act
147 of 1990’s statement about the role of constables in Taylor:
The Supreme Court’s statement that “a constable is a peace
officer” was merely express recognition of a well-settled legal
principle. See e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)
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(defining “peace officers” to include “sheriffs and their deputies,
constables ... and other officers whose duty it is to enforce the
peace.”), and 6A C.J.S. Arrest, § 17 (“Justices, sheriffs, coroners,
constables and watchmen are recognized peace officers at
common law.”). Lastly, 16 P.S. § 1216, Peace officers; powers
and duties, expressly applies to constables.
Moreover, following its statement that “a constable is a
peace officer”, the Court inserted a footnote which provides, “[t]he
constable is a police officer.” In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d
at 990. Instantly, the Commonwealth asserts that this statement
constitutes Supreme Court recognition that constables possess
“the same authorities and duties” as police officers under all
circumstances. (Appellant’s brief at 10.) We flatly reject this
claim. Specifically, when read in the context in which it was
uttered, the Court’s statement indicates that the powers of
constables and police officers are coextensive in matters relating
to “conservation of the peace.” Id. Further, as the remainder of
the Court’s Opinion indicates, its notation that “[t]he constable is
a police officer” was intended as further support for the Court’s
ultimate conclusion that “a constable belongs analytically to the
executive branch of government.” Id. Therefore, since Act 147
did not involve the relative arrest powers of constables and police
officers, the Court’s statement cannot be taken as a blanket
endorsement of constable powers coextensive with those of police
officers under all circumstances. Finally, the Court’s finding that
constables are independent contractors, as quoted above, clearly
indicates that the Court did not consider constables and police
officers analogous for all purposes, since Pennsylvania law has
never characterized police officers as independent contractors.
Taylor, 677 A.2d at 847 n.6 (citations altered).
Stated simply, the In re Act 147 of 1990 Court was not considering
whether constables were police officers for purposes of the Vehicle Code.
Rather, it was contemplating under which branch constables fell, and
concluded that, as peace officers, they fell within the executive branch. As
such, we will not take the footnote of In re Act 147 of 1990 out of context
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and extrapolate it to fit Appellant’s desired outcome. See Maloney, 984 A.2d
at 490.
While In re Act 147 of 1990 certainly offers important background,
our interpretation of the unambiguous language of the statute is confirmed by
our Supreme Court’s related decisions in Commonwealth v. Leet, 641 A.2d
299 (Pa. 1994), and Commonwealth v. Roose,
710 A.2d 1129 (Pa. 1998).
We begin with Leet, wherein the High Court considered whether sheriffs
possess the authority to stop motorists for violations of the Vehicle Code.
Recounting the history of the sheriff, the High Court noted that “[i]t is a
commonplace that in times going back to the Magna Carta, the sheriff was the
chief law enforcement officer of the shire or county.” Leet,
641 A.2d at 302.
The Court concluded that “[u]nless the sheriff’s common law power to make
warrantless arrests for breaches of the peace committed in his presence has
been abrogated, it is clear that a sheriff (and his deputies) may make arrests
for motor vehicle violations which amount to breaches of the peace committed
in their presence.”
Id. at 303. Recognizing the need for those who enforce
the Vehicle Code to undergo training equivalent to that of “[p]olicemen, to
whom the legislature has given primary responsibility for enforcement of the
. . . [V]ehicle [C]ode,” the Court clarified that “a sheriff or deputy sheriff would
be required to complete the same type of training[.]”
Id. (footnote omitted).
Tellingly, our General Assembly included “sheriff vehicle” within the definition
of an emergency vehicle authorized to utilize the lights at issue in the case
sub judice. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 102.
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In Roose, the Court was tasked with determining whether constables
possess the authority to stop motorists for violations of the Vehicle Code.
Applying the same analysis as Leet, the Court held that constables do not
possess such authority. First, it noted, “the same sources referred to in Leet,
which provided a rich history of the common law development of the powers
of the sheriff, are silent with reference to the authority of the constable.”
Roose, 710 A.2d at 1130. Thus, the Court was “impressed with what appears
to be a significant difference between the duties of sheriffs and constables.”
Id. More importantly, the Court observed that constables did not develop in
the common law, but rather from statute:
Most relevant for our inquiry is the statutory basis for the powers
of constables in England. Unlike sheriffs, whose powers grew in
the common law tradition to include broad law enforcement
authority, the powers of constables were not developed as fully in
such a strong common law tradition, but were rather set forth in
a series of statutes. Thus it is not appropriate to follow the
analysis of Leet, wherein we reasoned that sheriffs, due to their
common law powers, had the authority to enforce the motor
vehicle laws unless contravened by statute; conversely, as to
constables, it seems proper to conclude that unless a statute
empowers them to enforce the vehicle laws, then they do not
possess the legal authority to do so.
We hold, therefore, that due to the absence of statutory authority
for constables to enforce the motor vehicle laws, they do not
possess such authority, as such authority cannot be derived from
the common law as was the case for sheriffs in Leet.
Id. (citations altered).
We observe that the Supreme Court affirmed our decision in Roose
based upon a comparison of constables and sheriffs, whereas the Superior
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Court panel focused on constables and police officers. Critically, the High
Court neither disapproved of nor reversed our conclusions regarding whether
constables are police officers and the scope of their authority to utilize red and
blue lights pursuant to the Vehicle Code. Indeed, this Court has continued to
rely upon our panel decision in Roose for the proposition that “the private
vehicles of Pennsylvania constables traditionally are not recognized at statute
as privileged, official vehicles.” Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103,
108 n.10 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted).6 Furthermore, implicit in our
Supreme Court’s ruling in Roose is the recognition that since constables do
not have the power to pull over vehicles, they have no need for red and blue
lights.7
____________________________________________
6 Similarly, our sister court has echoed the concerns expressed in our Roose
opinion, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s differing analysis in affirming
our decision. See Ward v. Com., Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Motor
Vehicles,
65 A.3d 1078, 1082-83 (Pa.Commw. 2013).
7 The dissent posits that constables require these lights to safely perform their
duties of directing traffic and issuing orders to motorists. See Dissent at 4
n.3. While we do not opine upon whether red and blue lights would make
such tasks safer, we question whether they are necessary, as school crossing
guards and traffic control flaggers regularly perform similar duties utilizing
visibility-enhancing safety gear other than red and blue lights. Interestingly,
the dissent notes that red and blue lights are critical for “signaling to a stopped
motorist that it is a police officer. . . who is approaching.”
Id. (quoting
Commonwealth v. Livingstone,
174 A.3d 609, 621 (Pa. 2007)). We agree
that the lights are one of the hallmarks of a police vehicle. However, a
constable vehicle is not a police vehicle, and a constable is not a police officer.
Therefore, such lights have no place on a constable vehicle.
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Accordingly, we deem it worthwhile to revisit this Court’s detailed
analysis in Roose, as it provides valuable context for the matter at hand, and
our rejection of the interpretation espoused by Appellant and the dissent:
Constables and deputy constables are not employees of any
municipal subdivision as police and sheriffs are. They are not paid
a salary by any municipal subdivision but rather are independent
contractors whose pay is on a per job basis. As independent
contractors, they are not acting for or under the control of the
Commonwealth and cannot be considered Commonwealth
employees in order to receive legal representation when sued in
connection with their duties. No one supervises constables in the
way a police chief supervises police officers or a sheriff supervises
deputies. No municipality is responsible for their actions in the
way a city, borough, or township is responsible for its police or a
county is responsible for its sheriff’s office. In fact, our Supreme
Court [in In re Act 147 of 1990] found unconstitutional
legislation which attempted to place constables under the
supervisory authority of the courts.
....
Training for police officers and constables is also vastly different.
Constables and deputy constables are required to have only
[eighty] hours of basic training, some of which is devoted to the
interpretation and application of the fee schedule. Conspicuously
absent from the curriculum of the basic training course is
enforcement of the Vehicle Code. Police officers are required to
take a course of 520 hours of study, [forty] hours of which are
devoted to the Vehicle Code.[8] Also mandatory for police officers
are minimum physical fitness standards, psychological evaluations
and background investigations to determine suitability for
employment as a police officer. This training must be
satisfactorily completed prior to actually enforcing criminal laws
and moving traffic violations. The definition of police officer in the
training act notably includes deputy sheriffs of second[-]class
counties and housing authority police of first class cities but does
not include constables or deputy constables, thus these
____________________________________________
8 As noted hereinabove, the MPOETC has since enlarged those requirements.
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requirements do not apply to constables or deputy constables.
Deputy sheriffs of second[-]class counties who have successfully
completed this training are included in the definition of “police
officer” in the Crimes Code. Neither constables nor deputy
constables are, however, included in this definition.
Roose, 690 A.2d 268, 269-70 (Pa.Super. 1997) (cleaned up).
Further, we hypothesized about the problems that could arise by
ascribing police powers to constables, including the very issue before us, i.e.,
using red and blue lights on their constable vehicles:
[I]s a citizen required to stop when signaled to do so by a
constable or deputy constable? The offense of fleeing or
attempting to elude a police officer by its very terms is limited to
police officers who are in a clearly identifiable police vehicle or, if
the vehicle is unmarked, the officer must be in uniform and
displaying a badge. Constables and deputy constables do not
have uniforms and they are not provided with municipal vehicles
but use their own private cars. By what means does a constable
or deputy constable signal a driver to stop? Under the Vehicle
Code, a constable’s private automobile does not fit within the
definition of an emergency vehicle, and is not within that class of
vehicles which may display flashing red or blue lights or use
sirens. If a constable or deputy constable violates someone’s
constitutional rights, is there “state action”? What if a constable
or deputy constable is injured or killed while making a traffic stop?
Since there is no employer, there would be no workers’
compensation coverage, leaving the injured constable to pay any
expenses.
A more serious problem with motor vehicle stops is the possibility
of pursuit. If the motorist refuses or fails to stop, will the
constable feel compelled to instigate a chase which might
endanger innocent bystanders? The General Assembly recently
passed legislation requiring each municipal police department to
establish policies and guidelines to be followed by officers when
engaging in motor vehicle pursuits as defined by the Vehicle Code.
The policies must include criteria for deciding when to initiate a
pursuit including the potential for harm to others, the seriousness
of the offense, safety factors posing a risk to the general public,
responsibilities of the various parties, including officers,
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supervisors and communications centers, pursuit tactics,
roadblock usage, and communications during interjurisdictional
pursuit. It is clear that these regulations contemplate that only
properly trained and supervised police officers would be involved
in such pursuits. This legislation evidences the legislature’s intent
to control high speed pursuits to provide for the safety of both the
participants and the general public who may simply be in the path
of the pursuit. Constables and deputy constables are not part of
any municipal police force and are not supervised in the manner
that this statute presumes. Yet if we grant constables and deputy
constables a common law right to stop vehicles, doesn’t this also
include allowing them to pursue a fleeing vehicle or at least allow
for the possibility that they will feel authorized to do so? Absent
explicit statutory authority from the General Assembly, we
hesitate to bestow such unbridled power on someone who is, as
discussed below, not trained to handle such a situation.
Id. (cleaned up, emphasis in original). Ultimately, we noted that the
constable in that case “was himself in violation of the . . . Vehicle Code for
using flashing lights and a siren on a vehicle which was not authorized as an
emergency vehicle under the [Vehicle] Code.”
Id. at 270 n.2.
Based on the foregoing, even if the Vehicle Code did not plainly provide
that constable vehicles are not one of the enumerated vehicles which may
equip red and blue lights, we would not be persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments to deviate from our concerns expressed in the panel decision in
Roose. Read “in the light of reason and common sense,” § 4571(b)(1)
intended to limit the usage of red and blue lights to those vehicles operated
by officials with either the authority to stop motorists or a particular
responsibility in responding to serious emergencies. See Vellon, 292 A.3d at
890 (cleaned up); 75 Pa.C.S. § 4571 (limiting the usage of red and blue lights
to “police, sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police vehicles”).
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Constables lack the authority to do either. Permitting constables to affix red
and blue lights would cause confusion to motorists and bystanders, blurring
the distinction between those who have the authority to act and aid as police
officers, and those who lack such authority but are operating in what purports
to be an authoritative vehicle. Thus, for purposes of § 4571, a constable is
not a police officer, and a constable vehicle is not a police vehicle. Accordingly,
Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first issue.
Appellant next argues that § 4571(b)(1) is void for vagueness because
it is subject to two “legally correct ways to read it[.]”9 Appellant’s brief at 30.
We review such a challenge de novo. See Commonwealth v. Davidson,
938 A.2d 198, 203 (Pa. 2007). The principles governing a void-for-vagueness
claim are well-settled:
Under the void-for-vagueness standard, a statute will only be
found unconstitutional if the statute is so vague that persons of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. However, a statute will pass a
vagueness constitutional challenge if the statute defines the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Due process requires that a criminal statute give fair warning of
the conduct it criminalizes. Furthermore, even if the General
____________________________________________
9 The Commonwealth avers that this issue is waived because Appellant did not
include it in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth’s brief at 7.
Rather than directing us to where in the statement he preserved it, Appellant
merely retorts that “he did.” Appellant’s reply brief at 1. While his concise
statement could have benefited from a clearer indication that he was
challenging the vagueness of § 4571, the trial court interpreted it to include
such a claim and addressed it. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/23, at
unnumbered 2-5. Accordingly, we decline to find waiver.
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Assembly could have chosen clearer and more precise language
equally capable of achieving the end which it sought does not
mean that the statute which it in fact drafted is unconstitutionally
vague.
Id. at 207–08 (cleaned up).
Here, the Vehicle Code clearly lists which vehicles may utilize red and
blue lights. As indicated, constable vehicles are not specified as one of those,
and while Appellant has interpreted the statute differently than this Court, the
trial court, the MDJ, and Trooper Bown-Shields, that does not mean that it has
two equally plausible readings. A commonsense interpretation of the plain
language of the Vehicle Code provides notice to lay individuals that, unless
they are operating one of the emergency vehicles explicitly listed, they may
not equip red and blue lights on their vehicles.10 The legislature was not
required to add language explaining which vehicles were prohibited when it
clearly delineated which ones were permitted. Since the statute is not vague,
this claim fails.
In his third issue, Appellant avers that he was convicted under the wrong
subsection of § 4571. See Appellant’s brief at 34. Specifically, he contends
that he was improperly charged with § 4571(a) and convicted of a violation of
§ 4571(b)(1), when he should have been charged and convicted of § 4571(d).
To refresh, these subsections provide as follows:
____________________________________________
10 We acknowledge that the dissent agrees with Appellant’s reading of § 4571.
While respecting our colleague’s reasoning and conclusions, we cannot join in
that interpretation, and we do not find that this difference in opinion renders
the statute vague.
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(a) General rule.--Every emergency vehicle shall be equipped
with one or more revolving or flashing red lights and an audible
warning system. Spotlights with adjustable sockets may be
attached to or mounted on emergency vehicles.
(b) Police, sheriff, fire and coroner or medical examiner
vehicles.--
(1) Police, sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police vehicles
may in addition to the requirements of subsection (a) be equipped
with one or more revolving or flashing blue lights. The
combination of red and blue lights may be used only on police,
sheriff, coroner, medical examiner or fire police vehicles.
....
(d) Vehicles prohibited from using signals.--Except as
otherwise specifically provided in this section, no vehicle other
than an emergency vehicle may be equipped with revolving or
flashing lights or audible warning systems identical or similar to
those specified in subsections (a) and (b). A person who equips
or uses a vehicle with visual or audible warning systems in
violation of this section commits a summary offense and shall,
upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $500
nor more than $1,000.
75 Pa.C.S. § 4571. In addition to the discrepancy between the charging
document and his conviction, Appellant maintains that he could only be
convicted of subsection (d) because that is the provision that prohibited the
relevant conduct. See Appellant’s brief at 35-37.
By way of background, Appellant was cited with a violation of subsection
(b)(1) and convicted at the same subsection following a de novo appeal.
Therefore, any complaint about the validity of his summary conviction before
the MDJ was nullified by his appeal to the Court of Common Pleas for a trial
de novo.
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As for whether Appellant should have been charged with § (d) instead
of (b)(1), we agree with the trial court’s explanation of the interplay between
the relevant subsections: “[I]t’s clear [§ 4571(d)] is what happens if you are
convicted or in violation of [§] 4571(b)(1).” N.T. Summary Appeal, 4/3/23,
at 44. Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in Appellant being charged
with violating § 4371(b)(1) as he equipped red and blue lights to a vehicle
that lacked statutory authorization. Having violated § 4571(b), the grading
of his offense and the parameters of his punishment were set forth in
§ 4571(d). No relief is due.
Finally, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
his conviction because he contends that there was no evidence that the light
bar, which was clear when not illuminated, contained red and blue lights. See
Appellant’s brief at 38-40. He maintains that the lights were never activated
and the trooper’s testimony indicated he was unsure whether he had observed
the color of the lights. Id. at 39.
We review a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant
to these well-established legal principles:
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner in order to determine
whether the jury could have found every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s
guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.
Additionally, this Court cannot re-weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. This presents
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a pure question of law and, as such, our standard of review is de
novo, and our scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 294 A.3d 482, 484–85 (Pa.Super. 2023)
(cleaned up).
While understandably not without some qualification due to the
intervening two years, Trooper Brown-Shields testified that it was his
recollection that he permitted Appellant to turn on his lights during the traffic
stop and that, when he did so, it confirmed that the lights were red and blue.
Additionally, the trooper attested that Appellant conceded the light bar
contained red and blue lights, and that he was permitted to have them.
Although it is unclear from the audio recording whether Appellant in fact
turned on his lights during the stop, the recording confirms that the trooper
gave him the option to turn on his lights so he would feel less embarrassed
about being pulled over in his constable vehicle. Nothing in the recording
contradicts the trooper’s testimony that Appellant opted to turn on his lights.
More importantly, though, the audio recording corroborated the
trooper’s testimony that Appellant himself conceded the color of the lights. As
noted at the outset, Appellant stated during his conversation with Trooper
Brown-Shields that the PSP had previously seized the same vehicle for having
red and blue lights. He explained that he was cited for a violation of § 4571,
but the citation was ultimately dismissed and the vehicle returned to him with
the red and blue lights still affixed. Appellant boasted that when asked to
remove the lights thereafter, he refused to do so because he had won the
case, thereby confirming that the lights were still the same red and blue ones.
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See Exhibit D-2 at 7:45-9:08. Indeed, Appellant reported that whenever
there is a disabled vehicle on the road or he observes a breach of the peace
and the troopers are not on scene, “my lights are on.” Id. at 21:20-21:35.
At no point did Appellant deny that his lights were red and blue. Rather, he
emphatically insisted throughout the encounter that he was entitled to have
red and blue lights on his vehicle because he was a police officer.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Appellant’s light
bar emitted red and blue flashing lights in violation of § 4571(b)(1).
Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency challenge fails.
In light of the foregoing, we discern no reason to overturn Appellant’s
summary conviction. Therefore, we affirm his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Murray joins.
Judge Stabile files a Dissenting Opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/6/2025
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