J-S40035-24
2025 PA Super 47
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
DOUGLAS JAMES : No. 2812 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered September 18, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0007352-2022
BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.
OPINION BY LANE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2025
The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting the suppression
motion of Douglas James (“James”). Upon the facts presented in this appeal,
we hold: (1) when a police officer possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion
to submit James to an investigative detention, the officer’s attempt to grab
James, and his subsequent chase of James, did not elevate the investigative
detention to the functional equivalent of a seizure requiring probable cause;
and (2) the doctrine of forced abandonment did not apply to a satchel
discarded by James during this chase. Accordingly, we reverse.
In September 2022, Philadelphia Police Officer Michael Duffy (“Officer
Duffy”) and his partner were on marked police bicycles patrolling the area of
500 Ritner Street, Philadelphia, when they responded to a person “screaming”
in nearby Mifflin Square Park. N.T., 9/18/23, at 8. A Spanish-speaking
woman “flagged [them] down,” became “excited,” and pointed to four men,
including James, who were exiting the park. Id. at 8-10. With her daughter
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interpreting, the woman stated they “just assaulted” her son. Id. at 10. The
woman’s son was not on the scene. Officer Duffy mounted his bicycle and
rode in the direction of the four men.
Officer Duffy observed three of the men run away from the park, but
James remained walking. When Officer Duffy pulled up to James, James
“bladed his body [sic]” away from the officer. Id. at 10-11. James was
wearing all black clothing and had a black Nike satchel around his shoulder.
Officer Duffy instructed James to stop several times, but James did not
stop. The officer reached out to “grab” James, but was unsuccessful. N.T.,
9/18/23, at 27. James ran away from the officer. Officer Duffy pursued James
on his bicycle, but did not turn on the bicycle’s lights or siren. Officer Duffy
did not draw his weapon prior to or during this chase.
After a pursuit spanning approximately thirty seconds, Officer Duffy
stopped James.1 James no longer had the black Nike satchel. Backup
responding officers secured James while Officer Duffy searched for the satchel.
Officer Duffy found it in a blue recycling bin. Officer Duffy believed the satchel
contained a firearm due to its weight and his experience, explaining “[i]t’s a
newer way that individuals are carrying firearms in . . . satchels.” N.T.,
9/18/23, at 17. Inside the satchel, the officer recovered a nine-millimeter
silver Taurus firearm with seven live rounds, three bags of marijuana, a debit
card in James’ name, and $50 cash. The Commonwealth charged James with
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1 Officer Duffy did not explain how he came to stop James.
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firearms not to be carried without a license and carrying a firearm in public in
Philadelphia.2
James filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the satchel and its
contents based on a theory of forced abandonment. The trial court held a
hearing, where Officer Duffy testified to the above events, and the
Commonwealth played a video recording captured by Officer Duffy’s body
camera.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Officer Duffy
initially conducted an investigative detention, and he possessed the requisite
reasonable suspicion to do so. The court reasoned “[t]here clearly was enough
information for the officer to investigate” the alleged assault. N.T., 9/18/23,
at 45. However, the court found his attempt to grab James was “coercive”
and “cross[ed] the line” into a detainment. Id. at 45-46. The trial court then
determined Officer Duffy did not have probable cause to attempt to grab, nor
subsequently chase, James. Thus, it concluded the doctrine of forced
abandonment applied, and granted suppression. The Commonwealth filed a
timely notice of appeal in compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), 3 and both it and
the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a)(1), 6108.
3 See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (providing that in a criminal case, “the Commonwealth
may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case
where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will
terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution”).
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The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review: “Did the
[trial] court erroneously suppress the firearm that [James] abandoned while
being pursued during a lawful investigative detention that was supported by
reasonable suspicion?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
We first consider the applicable standard of review:
When reviewing an order granting a defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence, we are bound by that court’s factual findings
to the extent that they are supported by the record, and we
consider only the evidence offered by the defendant, as well as
any portion of the Commonwealth’s evidence which remains
uncontradicted, when read in the context of the entire record. Our
review of the legal conclusions which have been drawn from such
evidence, however, is de novo, and, consequently, we are not
bound by the legal conclusions of the lower courts. Moreover, our
scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to the
evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing.
Commonwealth v. Barnes, 296 A.3d 52, 55 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures. See id. However, “[n]ot every encounter between a
law enforcement officer and a citizen constitutes a seizure warranting
constitutional protections.” Commonwealth v. Adams,
205 A.3d 1195,
1199 (Pa. 2019). As our Supreme Court has explained:
We have long recognized three types of interactions that
occur between law enforcement and private citizens. The first is
a mere encounter, sometimes referred to as a consensual
encounter, which does not require the officer to have any
suspicion that the citizen is or has been engaged in criminal
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activity. This interaction also does not compel the citizen to stop
or respond to the officer. A mere encounter does not constitute a
seizure, as the citizen is free to choose whether to engage with
the officer and comply with any requests made or, conversely, to
ignore the officer and continue on his or her way.
The second type of interaction, an investigative detention,
is a temporary detention of a citizen. This interaction constitutes
a seizure of a person, and to be constitutionally valid police must
have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
The third, a custodial detention, is the functional equivalent
of an arrest and must be supported by probable cause. A custodial
detention also constitutes a seizure.
No bright lines separate these types of encounters[.]
Id. at 1199-1200 (citations, quotation marks, and some punctuation omitted,
and paragraph breaks added).
This Court has stated:
An investigative detention may develop into a custodial
detention. The key difference between an investigative and a
custodial detention is that the latter involves such coercive
conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest.
The court considers the totality of the circumstances to determine
if an encounter is investigatory or custodial.
The numerous factors used to determine
whether a detention has evolved into an arrest include
the cause for the detention, the detention’s length,
the detention’s location, whether the suspect was
transported against his or her will, whether the police
used or threatened force, and the character of the
investigative methods used to confirm or dispel the
suspicions of police. . . .
Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 314-15 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Relevantly, this Court has considered the distinction between an
investigative detention and a custodial detention. In Commonwealth v.
Valentin, 748 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. 2000), a uniformed police officer on patrol
conducted surveillance in a location notorious for open drug sales. See
id. at
712. The officer observed a man handing money to Valentin, and Valentin
handing small objects to the man. See
id. The officer believed this was a
narcotics transaction and detained Valentin. See
id. In doing so, the officer
held Valentin by his clothing and directed him to place his hands on a nearby
car. See
id. at 714. Valentin told the officer he had “two bags of dope” in his
pocket.
Id. at 712. The officer’s partner removed packets of heroin from
Valentin’s pocket and placed him under arrest. See
id. Valentin moved to
suppress the physical evidence as well as the statements he made while
detained. See
id. The trial court denied suppression, concluding the officers
“had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop and that the drugs
were removed from Valentin’s person without illegal police conduct.”
Id.
On appeal, Valentin argued that the trial court erred by denying
suppression, as the detaining officers had neither the reasonable suspicion nor
probable cause to detain and search him. See id. at 713. After review, our
Court affirmed, determining that the officer’s holding Valentin’s clothing and
directing him to place his hands on a nearby car did not render the detention
the functional equivalent of an arrest. See
id. at 714. Pertinently, the
officers: “detained Valentin briefly on a public street[;] refrained from
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interrogation[; and] did not display their weapons, make any threats in
detaining Valentin, or transport Valentin against his will.” Id. Thus, this Court
concluded “that Valentin’s seizure was more analogous to an investigatory
detention [requiring reasonable suspicion] than to a formal arrest” requiring
probable cause.
Id.
In Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111 (Pa. Super. 2011), a
police officer responded to a robbery in progress conducted at “point of gun
and point of knife.”
Id. at 1114. The radio call described the suspects as two
Black men “wearing green hooded jackets with black coats over them.”
Id.
The officer observed Coleman matching this description, approached him, and
asked him if he had a gun. See
id. Coleman “responded ‘no,’ but at the same
time fumbled with his hands in his pocket.”
Id. Although the officer asked
Coleman to raise his hands, Coleman kept his hands in his pockets. See
id.
The officer thereafter brought Coleman to his police van while Coleman
resisted and continued “to wrestle with his hands in his pockets.”
Id. As the
officer attempted to pull Coleman’s hands out of his pockets and place them
against the police van, a struggle ensued, during which Coleman struck the
officer’s chest with his shoulders while repeatedly telling the officer “to get off
of him.”
Id. at 1118. After the struggle ended, the officer patted Coleman
down and felt a hard object in his pocket, which Coleman told the officer were
knives. See
id. at 1114. The officer then recovered two knives from
Coleman’s person. See
id.
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Coleman filed a motion to suppress the knives as evidence, but the trial
court denied this motion. See Coleman, 19 A.3d at 1114. On appeal,
Coleman argued that the trial court erred in denying suppression because the
officer initiated an investigative detention without the requisite reasonable
suspicion. See
id. at 1115. This Court disagreed, determining that the
“combination of the description of the robber along with [Coleman’s] refusal
to remove his hand from his pocket and his ‘fumbling’ in that pocket was
sufficient to justify an investigative detention and protective frisk of
[Coleman].”
Id. at 1117. Thus, this Court agreed that the officer’s grabbing
Coleman’s arm and transporting him to a police van against his will was an
investigative detention, and concluded the officer possessed the requisite
reasonable suspicion. See
id.
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Shivers, 305 A.3d 970 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(unpublished memorandum),4 two police officers were on routine patrol in
uniform and in an unmarked patrol car, when they went to a gas station. See
id. at *2. Upon arriving in the parking lot, the officers saw Shivers at the
front of the store, next to several men, two of whom the officers recognized
as gang members. See id. Once the officers exited their patrol car, Shivers
“started ‘backing away;’” as the officers approached the store, Shivers ran
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4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2) (stating that a non-precedential decision filed
by the Superior Court after May 1, 2019, may be cited for its persuasive
value).
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from the store with his hands in front of him, “in a manner consistent with . .
. ‘holding onto a firearm or holding their pants up.’” Id. The officers chased
Shivers on foot and attempted to grab him, but he broke free from the officer’s
grasp. See id. at *8. One officer then tackled Shivers to the ground. See
id. While Shivers was on the ground, one of the officers observed the outline
of a firearm in his pants pocket; the officer reached in the pocket and
recovered a .32 caliber handgun. See id. at *2.
The trial court denied Shivers’ motion to suppress the handgun,
reasoning that his “unprovoked flight in a high crime area gave the officers
reasonable suspicion to pursue and stop him.” Shivers, 305 A.3d 970
(unpublished memorandum at *2). On appeal, Shivers argued that the court
erred in denying his suppression motion. See id. at *3. Specifically, he
averred that the police officer’s tackling him amounted to an arrest requiring
probable cause. See id. at *7. Our Court disagreed, determining that the
officer’s act of tackling Shivers was merely an investigative detention. See
id. at *8. Pertinently, “Shivers’[] active resistance compelled stronger
restraint to allow the police to conduct the investigative detention[,]” which
was supported by adequate reasonable suspicion. Id.
Returning to the instant appeal, the Commonwealth challenges: (1) the
trial court’s finding that Officer Duffy’s attempt to grab James elevated the
encounter to a seizure requiring a showing of probable cause; and (2) its
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application of the doctrine of forced abandonment to suppress James’ satchel.
For ease of review, we address these issues separately.
We first review the Commonwealth’s argument that the trial court erred
when it determined Officer Duffy’s attempt to grab James constituted a seizure
requiring probable cause. While the Commonwealth agrees the trial court
properly found Officer Duffy had reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigative stop, it argues that the court erred in finding Officer Duffy’s
attempt to grab James elevated the encounter to a seizure requiring a showing
of probable cause. Instead, the Commonwealth maintains that Officer Duffy’s
approaching James, telling him to “stop,” and attempting to grab him were all
part of the initiation of a lawful investigative detention.
In response, James contends “Officer Duffy lacked reasonable suspicion
to engage [him, and] this was a mere encounter.” James’ Brief at 4 (quotation
marks omitted). Specifically, he argues that “Officer Duffy’s gathered first-
hand information, combined with his complete lack of follow-up [of the alleged
assault] made clear he had no ‘reasonable suspicion’ that an assault had been
committed nor ‘reasonable suspicion’ that [James] was identified as a
suspect.” Id. at 5.
In granting suppression, the trial court reasoned:
In the instant case, while the court agrees that Officer Duffy
had enough reasonable suspicion to investigate [James] and the
other males, . . . the officer did not have probable cause to chase
or apprehend [James].
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Officer Duffy testified that . . . he encountered a distressed
[woman who] pointed in the direction of four persons, [including
James], and expressed her concern about a possible assault.
While there was no specific inquiry nor any details about what the
incident was, Officer Duffy had enough probable cause [sic] to
approach the males to at least investigate further.
…
While Officer Duffy had the right to pursue an investigation, he
did not have probable cause to chase down [James] since the
woman [in the park] specifically did not identify him as the
perpetrator of the assault. In fact, she did not give any description
of the alleged attacker or attackers.
Per Officer Duffy’s body worn camera videotape, the officer
was seen in the video reaching out to grab [James] prior to
[James] running away from the encounter. Moreover, there was
no evidence presented that [James] was involved in any criminal
behavior that evening before encountering the officer.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Duffy
unlawfully escalated reasonable suspicion [sic] by attempting to
seize [James] during their encounter. Further, even though
proper investigatory grounds were present, Officer Duffy chose to
chase [James], who presumably felt forced to discard his satchel
and other personal items.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/21/24, at 4-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We note that during the suppression hearing, the trial court further
reasoned that “[h]ad the officer not said stop or tried to grab [James,] and
[James] ran from the encounter,” then the officer would have “had more than
enough reasonable suspicion[,] and at that point probable cause to pursue[.]”
N.T., 9/18/23, at 46.
After reviewing the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the
totality of the circumstances, and the relevant law, we conclude the trial court
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erred in determining that Officer Duffy’s attempt to grab James escalated the
investigative detention to a seizure requiring a finding of probable cause. We
reiterate that an investigative detention is a detention and seizure of a
person, albeit temporary and less coercive than a custodial detention. See
Adams, 205 A.3d at 1200.
Applying Valentin and Coleman to the instant case, we determine that
Officer Duffy’s failed attempt to grab James did not escalate the encounter
into a seizure requiring probable cause; pertinently, even if Officer Duffy
successfully grabbed James during this initial detention, both Valentin and
Coleman instruct that such an act would remain an investigative detention.
By applying Shivers, we determine that Officer Duffy’s brief pursuit of James
similarly did not escalate the seizure into one requiring probable cause, as the
officer’s reasonable suspicion permitted him to both chase, and tackle, James
under the circumstances presented. We observe that Officer Duffy’s actions
were more restrained than those of the officers in each of these three cases.
Accordingly, we conclude these actions were commensurate with that of an
investigative detention. Thus, although we do not disturb the trial court’s
finding that Officer Duffy had the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate an
investigative detention, we hold the court erred by finding that the officer’s
actions escalated the detention into a seizure requiring probable cause.
We next review the Commonwealth’s argument concerning forced
abandonment. Generally,
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[a] criminal defendant has no standing to contest the search and
seizure of items he has voluntarily abandoned. But Pennsylvania
law recognizes the concept of “forced abandonment” which holds
that when contraband is discarded by a person fleeing from a
police officer who possesses neither probable cause to arrest
nor reasonable suspicion to conduct [an investigative
detention], the contraband is the fruit of an illegal seizure.
Commonwealth v. Brockman, 167 A.3d 29, 35 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations,
some quotation marks, and punctuation omitted, and emphasis added).
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in applying the
doctrine of forced abandonment to the satchel. See Commonwealth’s Brief at
12. Specifically, the Commonwealth avers that because the trial court found
Officer Duffy possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion to submit James to
an investigative detention, Officer Duffy’s pursuit of James was lawful “[u]p
to and including the moment [James] discarded the satchel.” Id. Thus, the
Commonwealth contends James voluntarily abandoned his satchel during the
encounter, and the trial court’s “suppression order was erroneous.”
Id.
As stated previously, the trial court found that while Officer Duffy
possessed reasonable suspicion to submit James to an investigative detention,
the officer unlawfully escalated the encounter to a detainment while lacking
the requisite probable cause to do so. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/21/24, at
4-5. On this basis, the trial court concluded that James “felt forced to discard
his satchel,” and thus the court suppressed the satchel and its contents. Id.
at 5.
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However, because we conclude the encounter remained a lawful
investigative detention, for which Officer Duffy possessed reasonable
suspicion, we hold suppression under the theory of forced abandonment was
improper. See Brockman, 167 A.3d at 35 (stating that under the theory of
forced abandonment, discarded contraband is fruit of an illegal seizure when
“a person flee[s] from a police officer who possesses neither probable cause
to arrest nor reasonable suspicion to conduct” an investigative detention)
(emphases added). Thus, we reverse the trial court’s order granting James’
motion to suppress.
Order reversed.
Date: 2/26/2025
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