J-S41026-24
2025 PA Super 57
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MONTE LOWREY :
:
Appellant : No. 1297 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0001289-2023
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED MARCH 12, 2025
Appellant, Monte Lowrey, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench trial
convictions for driving with a suspended license and the summary offense of
failing to use a turn signal.1 For the following reasons, we vacate the judgment
of sentence.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
October 20, 2022, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Richland Township Police
Officer Daniel Carr was on duty in a marked patrol vehicle. Officer Carr had
stationed his vehicle in the parking lot of a Wawa store on Route 309 in
Richland Township. From this location, Officer Carr observed a silver Saturn
Ion pull into the lot and park. Later, the Saturn backed out of its parking spot
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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1543(b)(1)(i) and 3334(a), respectively.
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and drove towards the exit of the parking lot leading to Route 309. As the
Saturn turned right onto Route 309, Officer Carr observed that the driver did
not use a turn signal.
Officer Carr followed the Saturn. Based upon the driver’s failure to use
a turn signal, Officer Carr initiated a traffic stop. 2 (See N.T. Suppression
Hearing, 1/23/24, at 11). The Saturn eventually pulled over on Hickory Drive.
Officer Carr obtained identification from the driver, who was Appellant.
Subsequent investigation revealed that Appellant was driving with a
suspended license.
On April 4, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information
charging Appellant with two violations of the Motor Vehicle Code (“MVC”):
driving with a suspended license and failing to use a turn signal. 3 On
December 29, 2023, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking to
suppress all evidence obtained because of the vehicle stop. In it, Appellant
argued that “law enforcement personnel did not have reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to stop and detain him.” (Suppression Motion, filed 12/29/23,
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2 Officer Carr testified that there is a stop sign at the exit to the parking lot,
and Appellant “basically rolled through the stop sign onto [Route] 309.” (N.T.
Suppression Hearing at 10). The officer, however, did not initiate the traffic
stop on this basis. Rather, Officer Carr unequivocally testified that he initiated
the traffic stop due to Appellant’s failure to use a turn signal.
3 The information contained an additional count for possession of drug
paraphernalia. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth sought leave to nol pros this
charge at the beginning of the suppression hearing. (See Suppression
Hearing at 6).
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at ¶24). The court conducted a suppression hearing on January 23, 2024. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Appellant’s motion. Appellant
immediately proceeded to a bench trial, and the court convicted Appellant of
driving with a suspended license and failing to use a turn signal. On April 3,
2024, the court sentenced Appellant to sixty (60) days of restrictive probation
and a $500.00 fine.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on May 3, 2024. On May 6,
2024, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule
1925(b) statement on May 21, 2024.
Appellant now raises one issue on appeal:
The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s omnibus pretrial
motion to suppress because the officer did not have
probable cause to conduct [a] traffic stop of Appellant’s
vehicle.
(Appellant’s Brief at i).
On appeal, Appellant contends that a police officer must possess
probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop based upon the non-investigable
offense of failing to use a turn signal. Further, relying upon the language of
Section 3334(a), Appellant asserts that he needed to be driving on a
“roadway” to have violated the statute governing the use of turn signals.
Appellant insists, however, that a parking lot is considered a “trafficway”
rather than a roadway for purposes of the MVC. Because Appellant was driving
upon a trafficway, and not a roadway, when he began his turn onto Route
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309, Appellant maintains he did not violate Section 3334(a). Appellant
concludes that the officer did not possess probable cause to support the traffic
stop at issue, and the court should have suppressed all evidence obtained
during the stop. We agree.
The following principles inform this Court’s review of a suppression
ruling:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the
denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we
may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and
so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, we are bound by these findings
and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. The suppression court’s legal conclusions are
not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to
determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below
are subject to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Phillips, 327 A.3d 1236, 1241 (Pa.Super. 2024) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Carey,
249 A.3d 1217, 1223 (Pa.Super. 2021)).
Regarding questions of statutory interpretation:
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, therefore our
standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is
plenary. In all matters involving statutory interpretation,
we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501
et seq., which provides that the object of interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the General Assembly.
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Generally, a statute’s plain language provides the best
indication of legislative intent. We will only look beyond the
plain language of the statute when words are unclear or
ambiguous, or the plain meaning would lead to a result that
is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.
Therefore, when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, if
the language is clear, we give the words their plain and
ordinary meaning.
Commonwealth v. Watts, 283 A.3d 1252, 1255-56 (Pa.Super. 2022)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Our analysis of the quantum of cause required for a traffic stop begins
with the MVC, which provides:
§ 6308. Investigation by police officers
…
(b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police
officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking
vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a
violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may
stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of
checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial
responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other
information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis added).
“[D]espite subsection 6308(b)’s reasonable suspicion standard, some
offenses, by their very nature, require a police officer to possess probable
cause before he or she may conduct a traffic stop.” Commonwealth v.
Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 823 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied,
635 Pa. 771,
138 A.3d 3 (2016). “For a stop based on the observed violation of the Vehicle
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Code or otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have probable
cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176
A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017). See also Commonwealth v. Feczko,
10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied,
611 Pa. 650,
25 A.3d
327 (2011) (stating mere reasonable suspicion will not justify vehicle stop
when driver’s detention cannot serve investigatory purpose relevant to
suspected violation).
Additionally, the MVC governs the use of turn signals as follows:
§ 3334. Turning movements and required signals
(a) General rule.—Upon a roadway no person shall
turn a vehicle or move from one traffic lane to another or
enter the traffic stream from a parked position unless and
until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor
without giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided
in this section.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334(a) (emphasis added).
The MVC defines the following terms:
§ 102. Definitions
…
“Highway.” The entire width between the boundary lines
of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is
open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.
The term includes a roadway open to the use of the public
for vehicular travel on grounds of a college or university or
public or private school or public or historical park.
…
“Roadway.” That portion of a highway improved, designed
or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the
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sidewalk, berm or shoulder even though such sidewalk,
berm or shoulder is used by pedalcycles. In the event a
highway includes two or more separate roadways the term
“roadway” refers to each roadway separately but not to all
such roadways collectively.
…
“Trafficway.” The entire width between property lines or
other boundary lines of every way or place of which any part
is open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel as a
matter of right or custom.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. The MVC’s provisions relating to the operation of vehicles
apply to “highways” unless otherwise stated:
§ 3101. Application of part
(a) General rule.—Except as provided in subsection
(b), the provisions of this part relating to the operation of
vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon
highways except where a different place is specifically
referred to in a particular provision.
(b) Serious traffic offenses.—The provisions of
section 3345 (relating to meeting or overtaking school bus),
Subchapter B of Chapter 37 (relating to serious traffic
offenses) and Chapter 38 (relating to driving after imbibing
alcohol or utilizing drugs) shall apply upon highways and
trafficways throughout this Commonwealth.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
Instantly, Officer Carr testified that Appellant did not use a turn signal
when making a right-hand turn from the Wawa parking lot onto Route 309.
(See N.T. Suppression Hearing at 10). Based on Appellant’s failure to utilize
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a turn signal, Officer Carr initiated a traffic stop on Route 309.4 (Id. at 11).
The suppression court considered this evidence and determined that Officer
Carr had probable cause to effectuate the stop based upon a violation of
Section 3334(a). The court emphasized that “the violation of [Section] 3334
occurred when Appellant exited the Wawa parking lot to turn onto Route
309,” such that “the violation did not occur solely within the parking lot[.]”
(Trial Court Opinion at 7) (emphasis in original). The court added:
The plain language of the statute requires activation of a
turn signal prior to entering the “traffic stream.” When
Appellant turned onto Route 309, he was entering the traffic
stream when exiting the parking lot. Thus, he was required
to use his turn signal under [Section] 3334 and Officer Carr
had probable cause to stop his vehicle when Appellant failed
to do so.
(Id.) (internal citation omitted).
Although the court attempted to engage in a plain language
interpretation of Section 3334(a), the court failed to reckon with the statute’s
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4 Specifically, Officer Carr testified that he initiated the stop “on Route 309 as
it goes through Park Avenue.” (N.T. Suppression Hearing at 11). Appellant
“ended up by turning left onto Park Avenue and eventually came to a stop on
Hickory Drive.” (Id.) Appellant utilized a turn signal when turning left onto
Park Avenue, but he did not use a signal when turning onto Hickory Drive.
(See id.) Thus, Officer Carr testified he observed Appellant fail to use a
required turn signal on two separate occasions: “when [the vehicle] was
leaving the parking lot and as it turned onto Hickory Drive.” (Id.) Despite
this testimony of a second occasion when Appellant failed to signal, we note
that Officer Carr had already initiated the traffic stop before Appellant’s failure
to signal the turn onto Hickory Drive. Thus, this second instance of failing to
signal could not have formed the basis for the traffic stop, which was already
in progress. See Ibrahim, supra.
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mandate that a signal must be used when driving “[u]pon a roadway.” See
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334(a). Here, Appellant entered the traffic stream on Route
309 by turning out of a parking lot. Pursuant to the Section 102 of the MVC,
a parking lot is a trafficway. We are bound by this definition. See
Commonwealth v. Smith, 136 A.3d 170 (Pa.Super. 2016) (reiterating that
when General Assembly defines words used in statute, those definitions are
binding). See also Commonwealth v. Proctor,
625 A.2d 1221 (Pa.Super.
1993), appeal denied,
535 Pa. 661,
634 A.2d 223 (1993) (explaining mall
parking lot was trafficway for purposes of defendant’s driving under influence
of alcohol conviction); Commonwealth v. Cozzone,
593 A.2d 860, 864
(Pa.Super. 1991) (stating condominium parking lot qualified as trafficway
within meaning of MVC statute prohibiting motorists from driving while under
influence of alcohol).
Moreover, we are mindful of the general rule stating that MVC provisions
relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of
vehicles upon highways unless otherwise stated. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
Section 3334(a), however, expressly refers to actions required while driving
upon a roadway. Section 3334(a) makes no mention of trafficways or
highways. Based upon the omission of any language in Section 3334(a)
requiring the use of turn signals while driving upon trafficways or highways,
we disagree with the suppression court’s interpretation of the statute. See
Commonwealth v. Ostrosky, 866 A.2d 423, 430 (Pa.Super. 2005),
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affirmed, 589 Pa. 437,
909 A.2d 1224 (2006) (explaining: “The maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, establishes the inference that, where
certain things are designated in a statute, all omissions should be understood
as exclusions”). We conclude that Section 3334(a) requires the use of a turn
signal only when a vehicle is upon a roadway. See
Watts, supra.
Given that Appellant did not violate Section 3334(a) under the
circumstances of this case, Officer Carr had no probable cause to initiate the
traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle. See Harris, supra; 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3334(a). Thus, the court should have suppressed the evidence obtained due
to the officer’s unlawful detention of Appellant. See Phillips, supra.
Accordingly, we reverse the suppression order and Appellant’s convictions,
vacate the judgment of sentence, and dismiss the charges against Appellant. 5
Judgment of sentence vacated; Appellant is discharged. Jurisdiction is
relinquished.
Date: 3/12/2025
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5 Consistent with past decisions from this Court, we again ask the legislature
to consider reviewing Section 3334 to determine whether, as a matter of
public safety, it should amend the statute to mention trafficways.
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