In re P.M.

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

             STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF P.M.,
             A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.


                             M.M.,
                           Appellant,
                               v.
                   STATE OF UTAH AND O.D.M.,
                           Appellees.

                             Opinion
                         No. 20240242-CA
                      Filed October 23, 2025

      Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
                  The Honorable Aaron Flater
                          No. 1225905

           Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellant
         Derek E. Brown, Deborah A. Wood, and John M.
          Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee State of Utah
         Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke,
                      Guardians ad Litem

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
   in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and JOHN D. LUTHY
                         concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1     M.M. (Mother) and O.D.M. (Father) are the parents of P.M.
(Child). While traveling in Utah with Child, Mother was involved
in an incident that resulted in her involuntary commitment.
Father was not with Mother at the time of the incident, and Child
was taken into protective custody. The State filed a verified child
welfare petition alleging that Child was abused, neglected, or
                             In re P.M.


dependent as to both Mother and Father. Approximately seven
months after the petition was filed, the juvenile court held an
adjudication hearing on the petition, thereafter entering an order
adjudicating Child dependent as to Mother. 1

¶2     Mother now appeals the juvenile court’s dependency
adjudication, arguing that the court unlawfully delayed the
adjudication hearing and that the court abused its discretion in
admitting certain evidence during the adjudication hearing. As
part of both arguments, Mother asserts that her due process rights
were violated. We disagree and affirm.


                         BACKGROUND

¶3     Child was born in March 2023, in Idaho. At the time of
Child’s birth, Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) lived
together in Idaho.

¶4     On May 24, 2023, Father left Idaho for a short trip to Texas.
After he left, Mother felt threatened by people in her community,
so she decided to leave Idaho to get away from the situation.

¶5     On June 9, 2023, Mother arrived at the airport in Salt Lake
City, Utah, where she wanted to purchase a plane ticket to Texas
to meet Father. After speaking with an airport employee, Mother
was informed that she could not purchase a ticket for Child
because she did not have the necessary paperwork. Thereafter, the
employee called the police, and officers and a case manager
arrived on scene. None of the officers spoke Spanish—which is
the only language Mother speaks—although the case manager

1. Child was also adjudicated dependent as to Father based on the
same events giving rise to this case, and Father has separately
appealed the juvenile court’s adjudication order. See In re P.M.,

. In this opinion, we resolve only Mother’s
appeal.


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spoke Spanish. Based on her conversation with Mother, the case
manager believed Mother was in an abusive relationship with
Father and was fleeing from him. The case manager worked to
transfer Mother to a local shelter, but because all the shelters were
full, Mother was taken to a nearby hotel.

¶6     At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 10, two officers (Officer
1 and Officer 2) were dispatched to the hotel on a report that an
unknown female was having a “problem.” Neither officer spoke
fluent Spanish, although Officer 2 spoke “a bit.”

¶7     When the officers arrived at the hotel, they activated their
body cameras. They observed Mother standing in the hotel lobby
holding Child. Mother was “screaming or yelling at a high tone of
voice,” and she was not wearing a shirt, just a bra. A second
female was seated in a chair near Mother. She was holding an ice
pack to her face, and she alleged that Mother had hit her “in the
face for no apparent reason.”

¶8     After trying to ascertain what had happened in the lobby,
the officers decided it would be best for Mother to return to her
room. The officers asked Mother to do so, but she did not comply
with the request because, as the officers understood it, she
believed the room was “dangerous.”

¶9     Based on the “erratic behavior” the officers had observed,
they concluded that Mother was a danger to herself or others and
that she met the criteria necessary to involuntarily commit her to
the hospital. But when the officers attempted to take Mother into
custody, she “became combative” and would not allow the
officers to take Child. The officers quickly became concerned for
Child’s safety due to the way that Mother was holding her. Officer
1 saw that Mother “began to wrap her arm near [Child’s] neck
area and squeeze rather tightly.” He was concerned because this
grip can “ultimately stop the blood flow in the carotid arteries if
applied correctly” and, if held too long, it can lead to



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“unconsciousness” or “death.” And Officer 2 also realized that
Mother was holding Child “in an unsafe manner” by “pulling
[Child] tighter towards herself, almost by the crook of her neck.”
In light of the foregoing, Officer 1 used his taser to stun Mother so
that Child could be retrieved safely. After being removed from
Mother, Child was placed into temporary emergency protective
custody, and Mother was involuntarily committed to a hospital in
Salt Lake City.

¶10 The following day, June 11, Father arrived in Utah. Father
was not contacted regarding Child or Mother or their
whereabouts, so he left Utah approximately twenty-four hours
after his arrival and returned to the family’s residence in Idaho.
Once in Idaho, Father contacted the police and searched
“everywhere” for Mother. On June 12, Mother was released from
the hospital and moved into a local women’s shelter in Salt Lake
City.

¶11 On June 13, the State filed a verified child welfare petition
alleging that Child was abused, neglected, or dependent when
Mother was involuntarily committed and the Division of Child
and Family Services (DCFS) was unable to contact Father.

¶12 On June 16, the matter came before the juvenile court for a
shelter hearing. Mother and Father were present at the hearing.
During the hearing, Father informed the court that the family
resided in Idaho. Mother’s counsel (Counsel) stated that because
the family lived in Idaho and Child had no “ties or connection”
with Utah, Child’s home state for purposes of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) was Idaho,
and the Utah court “only ha[d] emergency jurisdiction.” See
generally Utah Code § 81-11-204(1) (“A court of this state has
temporary emergency jurisdiction if the minor child is present in
this state and the minor child has been abandoned or it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the minor child . . . .”).
Parents requested that the court return Child to their custody so



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that the family could return to Idaho. In the alternative, Mother
asked that the court order an expedited investigation and
determination under the Interstate Compact on Placement of
Children (ICPC) to determine whether placement with Parents in
Idaho was appropriate.

¶13 The State opposed Parents’ request that Child be returned
to them and asked the juvenile court to continue Child’s removal.
Regarding Father, the State explained that it had no contact with
him until the night before the hearing and that there had not been
adequate time to evaluate whether his home in Idaho was an
appropriate placement for Child. Moreover, the State noted that
Mother had raised domestic violence allegations against Father
that had not yet been investigated. The State indicated that it had
“no objection” to the court ordering an expedited ICPC
investigation for Father. In response, Father argued that he was
not subject to the ICPC because he is Child’s natural parent,
although he agreed that pursuant to Utah Code section 80-3-302
the court could order DCFS to visit his home and “check into his
background to make sure there [were] no violent felonies or
misdemeanors” before returning Child to his custody.

¶14 At the close of the shelter hearing, the juvenile court found
that Child’s initial removal was “[d]ue to an emergency situation
amounting to aggravated circumstances” and that the removal
was therefore “reasonable and appropriate.” The court then
determined that it was statutorily required to investigate Father’s
fitness to assume custody and to conduct a criminal background
check for Father. The court accordingly ordered DCFS to contact
Idaho and request a courtesy visit to Parents’ home. The court
continued Child’s removal pending that information, reasoning
as follows:

             And I’m being careful here, but I also have to
      find that there’s a substantial risk that [Child] will
      suffer abuse or neglect if [she is] not removed from



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       the custody of [her] parent or guardian. And I’m not
       sure that I’ve got any, other than the indication of
       domestic violence by [Father] against [Mother]. I’m
       not sure that I’ve got much . . . other information to
       believe that [Child] would suffer abuse or neglect if
       [she is] not removed from the custody of [Father] or
       perhaps even [Mother].

The court declined to rule on the applicability of the ICPC at that
time but nevertheless ordered an expedited ICPC investigation
“just to keep things flowing.” A pretrial hearing was set for June
28.

¶15 At the June 28 pretrial hearing, the State informed the
juvenile court that it had filed a report detailing DCFS’s efforts to
investigate Parents’ residence in Idaho. At the parties’ request, the
court then continued the hearing to August 2.

¶16 At the continued hearing on August 2, the State informed
the juvenile court that it believed Idaho was Child’s home state
under the UCCJEA and that Utah had only “emergency
jurisdiction.” The State requested to set the matter for a further
pretrial hearing in “about three weeks” to allow Idaho time to file
a petition. Counsel did not object and affirmatively stated that he
believed the request made “the most sense” given that Parents
resided in Idaho; Father’s counsel took “the same position.”
Following this, Father informed the court that Parents had moved
from Idaho to South Dakota. The pretrial review hearing was
continued to August 21.

¶17 During the August 21 pretrial hearing, the parties
discussed jurisdictional concerns caused by Parents’ move to
South Dakota. Because Parents were no longer living in Idaho,
Idaho had stopped working with the State. Ultimately, all parties
agreed that it was “inappropriate” to take further action until the
jurisdictional questions were resolved. Counsel told the juvenile



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court, “I think we need to figure out the jurisdictional issue first.
I’m hesitant to adjudicate on this case or anything like that until
we figure out if this case is staying here or going somewhere else
. . . .” And Father’s counsel stated that she “share[d] . . . the
perspective of” Counsel.

¶18 At a September 11 pretrial hearing, the parties discussed
UCCJEA issues. The State informed the juvenile court that an
ICPC investigation with South Dakota was pending, and all
parties agreed that South Dakota was the preferable jurisdiction
given Parents’ current location. In light of the pending ICPC
investigation, the court “emphasize[d]” that it was “very
important that [Parents] not move from their current location.”
Parents expressed frustration at how long the case was taking, but
Counsel told the court, “[T]here’s nothing that we can do until it’s
decided which Court is ultimately going to have jurisdiction.”
Father’s counsel stated that Father was “in a similar position” as
Mother.

¶19 On September 26, the juvenile court held a conference with
judges from South Dakota and Idaho to discuss the issue of
jurisdiction. See generally Utah Code § 81-11-109(2) (“A court of
this state may communicate with a court in another state
concerning a proceeding arising under [the UCCJEA].”). All states
agreed that South Dakota would be the most appropriate forum.
Father expressed that Parents wanted to remain in South Dakota
and had no intention of returning to Idaho. Father therefore
requested that the case be heard in South Dakota.

¶20 At a pretrial hearing on October 2, the State informed the
juvenile court that it was anticipating a petition would be “filed
shortly” in South Dakota. Counsel for Parents indicated that their
clients wanted the case transferred to South Dakota. Counsel
stated that he was “in favor of” continuing Child in DCFS custody
until the petition was filed in South Dakota. Father’s counsel told
the court, “We are in the exact same boat . . . .”



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                             In re P.M.


¶21 On October 27, Parents moved from South Dakota to Utah.
On November 3, the juvenile court held a pretrial hearing and
UCCJEA conference with the corresponding courts in Idaho and
South Dakota. Mother indicated that Parents were intending to
stay in Utah so that they could “be as close as possible to” Child.
Because Parents no longer resided in Idaho or South Dakota, they
asked the juvenile court to take jurisdiction of the case. Thereafter,
both Idaho and South Dakota declined to exercise jurisdiction,
which led the court to conclude that jurisdiction was proper in
Utah. See generally 

 § 81-11-201(1) (“[A] court of this state has
jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if
[certain conditions are met, including when] . . . a court of another
state does not have jurisdiction . . . or a court of the home state of
the minor child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that this state is the more appropriate forum . . . .”). A pretrial
hearing was scheduled for November 13.

¶22 During the November 13 pretrial hearing, all parties
agreed to attend mediation. Mediation was ultimately
unsuccessful, however, and on December 14, the parties asked the
juvenile court to set the matter for a one-day adjudication hearing.

¶23 That adjudication hearing took place on January 12, 2024.
At the hearing, the State sought to admit Officer 1’s and Officer 2’s
body camera footage—which included audio—of the July 10 hotel
encounter with Mother. The officers also testified as to what they
observed during that encounter. Although neither officer spoke
fluent Spanish, each was allowed to testify about his
understanding of what Mother had been saying in Spanish. Prior
to closing argument, the State withdrew the exhibits containing
the officers’ body camera footage.

¶24 The juvenile court adjudicated Child dependent as to both
Mother and Father. At a later review hearing on October 23, 2024,
Child was returned to Parents’ custody, and the court’s
jurisdiction was terminated.



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                             In re P.M.


            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶25 Mother now appeals, raising two primary issues for our
review. 2 First, she argues the juvenile court erred in applying the
UCCJEA, which she asserts led to an unlawful delay in
adjudication that violated her due process rights. Mother
acknowledges Counsel did not contest the court’s application of
the UCCJEA or raise concerns about due process below but asks
us to consider both parts of her argument under an exception to
our preservation rule. See generally State v. Johnson, 

, 

 (setting forth the exceptions of plain error
and exceptional circumstances); In re A.W., 

,

 (“Utah appellate courts will not review unpreserved
constitutional claims unless an exception to the preservation rule
applies.”).

¶26 Second, Mother takes issue with the language
interpretation at the adjudication hearing. She argues that the
interpretation was inadequate and that the admission of certain
evidence resulted in a deprivation of her due process rights. “We
will not reverse the juvenile court’s rulings on evidentiary issues
unless it is manifest that the juvenile court so abused its discretion
that there is a likelihood that an injustice resulted.” In re M.W.,

, 

 (quotation simplified).




2. Although this appeal is technically moot because Child has
been returned to Parents’ custody and the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction has been terminated, we agree with the parties that
this case satisfies the collateral consequences exception to the
mootness doctrine. See In re M.S., 

, ¶¶ 31–40, 

. We accordingly address the merits of the appeal.


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                            ANALYSIS

                     I. Delayed Adjudication

¶27 Mother presents two related arguments concerning the
timing of the adjudication hearing. First, she argues the juvenile
court erred in how it applied the UCCJEA, which resulted in the
unlawful delay of the adjudication hearing. Second, Mother
asserts the delayed adjudication violated her right to due process.
We address each argument in turn.

A.     Application of the UCCJEA

¶28 Mother contends the juvenile court erred in how it applied
the UCCJEA, which resulted in the adjudication hearing being
held after the sixty-day statutory deadline specified in Utah Code
section 80-3-401(2). See Utah Code § 80-3-401(2) (“The final
adjudication hearing shall be held no later than 60 calendar days
after the later of: (a) the day on which the shelter hearing is held;
or (b) the day on which the abuse, neglect, or dependency petition
is filed.”). Mother concedes that Counsel “seemingly did not”
preserve this issue for appeal and argues that Counsel
“acquiesced in the delay, and did not correct the Court’s
misinterpretation that [the] UCCJEA did not allow the Court to
adjudicate the Petition.” Nevertheless, she contends that Parents’
“repeated objections to delay” and requests to move the case
forward were sufficient to preserve the issue. In the alternative,
Mother asks us to review the issue under the plain error exception
to our preservation rule. 3 The guardians ad litem counter that we


3. Mother also argues the exceptional-circumstances exception to
preservation is applicable. See In re adoption of K.A.S., 

,
¶ 19, 

 (“Exceptional circumstances is a doctrine that
applies to rare procedural anomalies.” (quotation simplified));
accord State v. Johnson, 

, 

. According
                                                       (continued…)


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                             In re P.M.


cannot reach this claim because Mother invited any error related
to the delay in adjudication. 4 We agree with the guardians ad
litem.




to Mother, the “convergence” of the juvenile court’s acceptance of
the State’s “erroneous construction of the UCCJEA” and
Counsel’s “acquiescence in that misinterpretation” despite
Mother’s desire to regain custody constituted a rare procedural
anomaly. But Mother’s argument is merely a concession that
Counsel invited any error in the delay, and invited error does not
constitute a rare procedural anomaly. Cf. State v. Brown, 

, 

 (“Misstatements of law, far from
being a procedural anomaly, are an everyday occurrence in our
adversarial system. . . . A misstatement of law by one party, even
if erroneously accepted by the trial court, does not generally work
a manifest injustice on the other party such that the party is
excused from complying with preservation rules.”). Moreover,
Mother has not shown how “the effects of the anomaly” warrant
an exception given that custody has been restored. See Johnson,

.

4. Aside from their assertion that review of Mother’s claim is
precluded under the doctrine of invited error, the guardians ad
litem argue that plain error review is not available in this case. See
Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 

, ¶¶ 42
n.10, 44, 

 (holding that “plain error review is not
available in ordinary civil cases unless expressly authorized by
rule,” but leaving open the possibility that such review might be
available in civil cases that “involve significant interests on par
with those at issue in criminal cases, such as fundamental
constitutional rights”). We need not resolve whether plain error
review is available here, however, because even where the
exception could potentially apply, Mother has failed to establish
plain error, see infra ¶¶ 32–37, 39.


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                             In re P.M.


¶29 “Our doctrine of invited error is intended to prevent
parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to
preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.” State v. Biel,

, 

 (quotation simplified). “Under the
doctrine of invited error, we have declined to engage in even plain
error review when counsel, either by statement or act,
affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no
objection to the action taken.” State v. Ringstad, 

, 

 (quotation simplified).

¶30 Here, Counsel consistently urged the juvenile court to
delay adjudicating the matter while questions regarding
jurisdiction were resolved. Among other things, Counsel took the
following actions:

   •   At the June 28 pretrial hearing, Counsel asked the juvenile
       court “to set this case over” so that he could review
       discovery with Mother.

   •   At the August 2 pretrial hearing, Counsel agreed to set the
       matter for a further pretrial in “about three weeks” to allow
       Idaho time to file a petition. At the end of this hearing, it
       was revealed that Parents had moved from Idaho to South
       Dakota.

   •   At the August 21 pretrial hearing, Counsel told the juvenile
       court, “I think we need to figure out the jurisdictional issue
       first. I’m hesitant to adjudicate on this case or anything like
       that until we figure out if this case is staying here or going
       somewhere else . . . .”

   •   At the September 11 pretrial hearing, Counsel agreed that
       South Dakota was the preferable jurisdiction given
       Parents’ current location, and Counsel told the juvenile
       court that “there’s nothing that we can do until it’s decided
       which Court is ultimately going to have jurisdiction.”




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                              In re P.M.


     •   At the October 2 pretrial hearing, Counsel stated that he
         was “in favor of” continuing Child in DCFS custody until
         a petition was filed in South Dakota.

     •   At the November 3 pretrial hearing, Counsel confirmed
         that Parents had relocated from South Dakota to Utah on
         October 27 and asked the juvenile court to take jurisdiction
         over the matter.

     •   At the November 13 pretrial hearing, Counsel agreed to
         defer the adjudication hearing until the parties could
         attend mediation.

     •   At the December 14 pretrial hearing, Counsel requested
         that the matter be set for a one-day adjudication hearing.
         The hearing was scheduled for January 12, 2024.

¶31 In sum, Mother invited any error related to the delay in the
adjudication hearing when Counsel affirmatively represented to
the juvenile court that Mother wanted to delay the matter.
Because Mother’s ongoing requests created her claim on appeal,
Mother invited the error she now seeks to correct, and we are
precluded from reviewing Mother’s claim for plain error.

B.       Due Process

¶32 Next, Mother argues that holding the final adjudication
hearing after the sixty-day deadline set forth in Utah Code section
80-3-401(2) infringed on her procedural and substantive due
process rights. Notwithstanding that Mother invited any error in
the delay of the adjudication hearing, Mother cannot succeed on
her unpreserved due process claim because she has not
demonstrated plain error.

¶33 “To demonstrate plain error, [Mother] must establish that
(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.” State v. Johnson, 

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                             In re P.M.


76, ¶ 20, 

 (quotation simplified). Because all three
requirements must be met to establish plain error, “if we conclude
that the alleged error was not harmful we need not analyze
whether it was obvious.” State v. Popp, 

, 

. An error is harmful when “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for the alleged error, the outcome in the case
would have been different.” Johnson, 

 (quotation
simplified).

¶34 Here, we can easily dispose of Mother’s due process claim
for lack of harm. The only harm that Mother points to as
stemming from the delayed adjudication hearing is the depletion
of the limited amount of time she was afforded by statute to
reunify with Child. See Utah Code § 80-3-406(13)(a) (“The time
period for reunification services may not exceed 12 months from
the day on which the minor was initially removed . . . .”). But on
the facts of this case, this is not sufficient to demonstrate harm for
two related reasons.

¶35 First, Mother has successfully reunified with Child and
was able to do so before the statutory deadline. Thus, even if the
adjudication hearing had occurred earlier, the outcome of the case
would not have been different. See Johnson, 

.

¶36 Second, any delay in the adjudication hearing had no
bearing on the juvenile court’s decision to adjudicate Child
dependent as to Mother. The court’s findings were based on the
events at the hotel and had nothing to do with events that
occurred after Child’s removal. Put differently, Child would have
been adjudicated dependent as to Mother whether the hearing
had been held the day after Child’s removal, the date on which
the hearing actually occurred, or any other date in between. Thus,
Mother cannot show that but for the delay, the outcome of the case
would have been different. See 

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¶37 Because Mother cannot show that the delay of the
adjudication hearing harmed her, she cannot establish plain error.

                   II. Language Interpretation

¶38 Mother next faults the juvenile court for failing to ensure
there was adequate language interpretation during the
adjudication hearing. To that end, she contends as an evidentiary
matter that the court abused its discretion (1) by admitting
Officer 1’s and Officer 2’s body camera footage of the incident
involving Mother without an accurate interpretation of what was
being said, and (2) by allowing Officer 1 and Officer 2 to testify
about what Mother was saying in Spanish despite their limited
understanding of Spanish. Mother further contends that both
errors deprived her of due process, although she concedes that
her due process argument is unpreserved. Given all the evidence
presented at the adjudication hearing, we conclude that the
admission of the challenged evidence was harmless and is
therefore not grounds for reversal. See In re M.W., 

, 

.

¶39 “Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it
affected the outcome of the proceedings.” H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 

, 

 (quotation simplified). Here, even
without the challenged evidence, there was ample evidence
supporting Mother’s dependency adjudication. Wholly apart
from any specific Spanish statements by Mother, the officers
testified that when they arrived at the hotel, they found Mother
holding Child in the lobby. Mother was “screaming or yelling at
a high tone of voice,” she was not dressed appropriately, and she
had apparently assaulted another woman. This “erratic behavior”
troubled the officers and led them to conclude that Mother was a
danger to herself or others and should be involuntarily committed
to the hospital. But when the officers attempted to take Mother
into custody, she “began to wrap her arm near [Child’s] neck area



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                            In re P.M.


and squeeze rather tightly.” Officer 1 testified that this grip can
“ultimately stop the blood flow in the carotid arteries if applied
correctly” and, if held too long, it can lead to “unconsciousness”
or “death.” And Officer 2 agreed that Mother was holding Child
“in an unsafe manner.” Thus, even if Mother’s statements gave
rise to some initial concern on the part of the officers, it was
Mother’s subsequent conduct that caused the situation to escalate
and ultimately resulted in the officers’ need to use force. Because
of this, even if the body camera footage was excluded and the
officers had not been allowed to recount what they believed
Mother had said in Spanish during the encounter, there is no
reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different.
And because no harmful error exists, Mother’s related
unpreserved due process claim, which she raises under a plain
error argument, likewise fails. See State v. Ray, 

,
¶ 50 n.17, 

 (explaining that the plain error standard
for harm “mirrors” that of the harmless error doctrine).


                         CONCLUSION

¶40 Mother invited any error related to the juvenile court’s
delay in adjudicating the verified child welfare petition, and she
did not suffer harm due to the delay. And any error on the part of
the court in admitting the officers’ body camera footage or
allowing the officers to testify at the adjudication hearing was
harmless. Affirmed.




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