State v. Bell

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

                        STATE OF UTAH,
                          Appellee,
                              v.
                        RANDI LOU BELL,
                          Appellant.

                            Opinion
                        No. 20230325-CA
                    Filed November 20, 2025

           Seventh District Court, Moab Department
               The Honorable Jeremiah Humes
                        No. 201700138

        Wendy M. Brown, Debra M. Nelson, and Benjamin
               Miller, Attorneys for Appellant
              Derek E. Brown and Tanner R. Hafen,
                     Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1     After failing to timely return her rental vehicle, Randi Lou
Bell was charged with theft of a rental vehicle, a second-degree
felony. Following a jury trial, Bell was convicted as charged. Bell
now appeals that conviction, arguing that her defense counsel
(Counsel) was ineffective in several respects, including by failing
to move for a directed verdict where the State presented no
evidence that her rental agreement contained notice of the
maximum penalties under state law for failing to timely return the
vehicle. We find this argument persuasive and accordingly vacate
her conviction.
                             State v. Bell


                          BACKGROUND

¶2     On June 13, 2020, Bell rented a vehicle from Enterprise
Rent-A-Car (Enterprise). Per the terms of the rental agreement,
Bell was to return the vehicle about one month later, on July 10.
An Enterprise employee instructed Bell that if she wanted to
extend the length of her rental past the one-month mark, she
would need to bring the vehicle back to an Enterprise branch for
a visual inspection and to “rewrite” the rental contract.

¶3     July 10 came and went, and Bell had not returned the
vehicle. Enterprise did not report the vehicle as stolen, however,
and instead gave Bell “the benefit of the doubt” until July 19, at
which point an employee called Bell. Bell did not answer.
Thereafter, Enterprise continued trying to contact Bell to no avail.
On August 11, thirty-two days after the original return date,
Enterprise reported the vehicle stolen.

¶4     Shortly after the vehicle was reported stolen, the chief
deputy with the local sheriff’s office contacted Bell via phone. He
told Bell that if she returned the vehicle to Enterprise within the
next ninety minutes he would not list the vehicle as stolen. Bell
arrived at Enterprise in the vehicle a few minutes before the chief
deputy’s stated deadline; nevertheless, he arrested her.

¶5      Bell was charged with theft of a rental vehicle, a second-degree felony. The case proceeded to a trial in January 2023. Bell’s
rental agreement, drafted by Enterprise, was admitted at trial. The
only notice related to the potential crime of theft of a rental vehicle
in that agreement was the following:

       Pursuant to Utah Code 76-6-410.5, failure to return
       Vehicle within 72 hours from the date and time
       stated on the Rental Agreement Summary may
       subject Renter to prosecution for theft punishable by
       the maximum penalties under Utah state law.




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                            State v. Bell


¶6    The jury convicted Bell as charged, and Bell timely
appealed.


             ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7      Bell argues that Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to move for a directed verdict. 1 “An ineffective assistance
of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a
question of law.” State v. Clark, 

, 

.


                            ANALYSIS

¶8     Bell contends that Counsel was ineffective for failing to
move for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case because
the evidence was insufficient to establish all the elements of the
charged offense. To prevail on this claim, Bell must satisfy the
two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 

(1984), by showing (1) “that [C]ounsel’s performance was
deficient” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” 

.

¶9      To demonstrate deficient performance, Bell must establish
that Counsel’s actions “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” 

. To that end, Bell must overcome the
“strong presumption that [C]ounsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 

.
Where the “challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy, it follows that counsel did not perform deficiently.” State
v. Scott, 

, 

 (quotation simplified). “But
the converse is not true.” State v. Ray, 

, 

. Bell raises three additional claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. But because our resolution of the directed verdict claim
is dispositive, we do not reach the merits of these additional
claims.


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                             State v. Bell


871. “[E]ven where a court cannot conceive of a sound strategic
reason for counsel’s challenged conduct, it does not automatically
follow that counsel was deficient. . . . [T]he ultimate question is
always whether, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s acts
or omissions were objectively unreasonable.” Scott, 

.

¶10 To satisfy the second Strickland prong, Bell must
“demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of . . . her
case would have been different absent [C]ounsel’s error.” Id. ¶ 43.
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 

. We address
each prong of this test below.

                      I. Deficient Performance

¶11 Bell asserts that the rental agreement did not include notice
of the “maximum penalties” possible under state law if the vehicle
was not timely returned pursuant to the terms of the agreement,
as required by subsection (3) of the theft of a rental vehicle statute.
See Utah Code § 76-6-410.5(3) (2020). 2 According to Bell,
subsection (3) constitutes an element of the crime of theft of a
rental vehicle and, thus, it was objectively unreasonable for
Counsel not to move for a directed verdict when the State failed
to put forth any evidence of this element at trial. For its part, the
State concedes Bell’s rental agreement did not contain the notice


2. Utah Code section 76-6-410.5 was materially amended in 2023,
after the commission of the crime at issue in this case. See Utah
Code § 76-6-410.5 (2023). Because “we apply the law as it exists at
the time of the event regulated by the law in question,” State v.
Clark, 

, 

, the 2020 version of the statute
governs here. We express no opinion on whether application of
the current version of the statute would change the outcome of
this appeal, and in any event, neither party argues that the current
version of the statue should apply.


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                            State v. Bell


she maintains is required. The State asserts, however, that this
omission is not material because “such notice is not an element of
the offense.” Given the State’s concession, we begin by
determining whether the interpretation of the statute advanced
by Bell is correct, that is, whether subsection (3) constitutes an
element of the crime.

¶12 At the time of the events giving rise to this case, the theft of
a rental vehicle statute read, in relevant part,

       (2) A renter is guilty of theft of a rental vehicle if,
       without notice to and permission of the rental
       company, the renter knowingly fails without good
       cause to return the vehicle within 72 hours after the
       time established for the return in the rental
       agreement.

       (3) If the motor vehicle is not rented on a periodic
       tenancy basis, the rental company shall include the
       following information, legibly written, as part of the
       terms of the rental agreement:

          (a) the date and time the motor vehicle is
          required to be returned; and

          (b) the maximum penalties under state law if the
          motor vehicle is not returned within 72 hours from
          the date and time stated in compliance with
          Subsection (3)(a).

 § 76-6-410.5(2)–(3) (emphasis added).

¶13 Based on this language, the legislature, through subsection
(2) of the theft of a rental vehicle statute, identified two
substantive elements of that offense: the renter knowingly failing
“to return the vehicle within 72 hours after the time established
for the return in the rental agreement” and the renter doing so



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                            State v. Bell


“without notice to and permission of the rental company.” 

§ 76-6-410.5(2).

¶14 But subsection (3) imposed additional requirements on a
rental company that must have been complied with before a
renter could be prosecuted for theft of a rental vehicle in instances
where the vehicle was not rented on “a periodic tenancy basis,”
see id. § 76-6-410.5(3)—which both parties agree Bell’s rental was
not, see Coleman v. Thomas, 

, 

 (“A
periodic tenancy . . . involves a continuous succession of periods
. . . and lasts for an indefinite time.” (quotation simplified)). For
these types of rentals, the rental company must have included
notice of the following as part of the rental agreement: (A) “the
date and time the motor vehicle is required to be returned” and
(B) “the maximum penalties under state law if the motor vehicle
is not returned within 72 hours from the date and time stated in”
the rental agreement. Utah Code § 76-6-410.5(3) (2020).

¶15 Construing subsection (3) as an element of the crime of
theft of a rental vehicle comports with our rules of statutory
interpretation. When we interpret a statute, our starting point is
the plain language of the statute. See Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ
Ranch P’ship, 

, 

. “But we do not view
individual words and subsections in isolation . . . .” Penunuri v.
Sundance Partners, Ltd., 

, 

. Instead, we
construe each part “in connection with every other part or section
so as to produce a harmonious whole.” 

 (quotation simplified).
We thus “interpret statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid
rendering portions of the statute superfluous.” 

 (quotation
simplified).

¶16 The attendant circumstances outlined in subsection (3) do
not appear in any civil statutes regulating lease contracts. See
generally Utah Code §§ 70A-2a-101 to -534. And subsection (3)
does not impose a penalty on the rental company for failing to
include the terms listed in that subsection. See id. § 76-6-410.5(3)



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                             State v. Bell


(2020). Thus, unless subsection (3) is construed as an element of
the crime of theft of a rental vehicle, it stands alone as a provision
in a criminal statute that otherwise imposes penalties for criminal
conduct. So viewed, subsection (3) would be without an
enforcement mechanism, and it would therefore lack any force. In
effect, this would render subsection (3) “superfluous”—an
outcome that we are to “avoid.” See Penunuri, 

(quotation simplified).

¶17 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that subsection (3)
constituted an element of the offense of the crime of theft of a
rental vehicle. As such, to convict Bell of this crime, the State had
to prove that Bell’s rental agreement included each notice listed in
that subsection. But the State did not—and indeed could not—
prove that Bell’s rental agreement included notice of “the
maximum penalties under state law” for failing to timely return
the vehicle, Utah Code § 76-6-410.5(3)(b) (2020), because although
the rental agreement referenced “maximum penalties,” it did not
state what those penalties actually were, see id. § 76-3-203(2) (2023)
(setting the potential term of imprisonment for a second-degree
felony as “not less than one year nor more than 15 years”); id. § 76-
3-301(1)(a) (setting the maximum fine for a second-degree felony
at $10,000). Thus, we next consider whether it was objectively
unreasonable for Counsel to not move for a directed verdict.

¶18 Bell acknowledges that no Utah appellate court has
interpreted subsection (3) and, thus, that the statutory
interpretation argument she advances on appeal is a novel one.
But this fact does not preclude a determination that Counsel
performed deficiently for failing to raise it. See State v. Silva, 

, 

 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has
never said that trial counsel is categorically excused from failure
to raise an argument not supported by existing legal precedent.”).
“The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Strickland
v. Washington, 

 (1984). Here, Counsel’s decision



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                            State v. Bell


to forgo moving for a directed verdict was unreasonable for two
primary reasons.

¶19 First, Bell’s proposed statutory interpretation rests on a
straightforward plain language analysis that is neither complex
nor confusing. Cf. State v. Squires, 

, 

 (concluding that counsel did not perform deficiently for not
requesting different jury instructions where the defendant’s
“interpretation of the statute [was] not dictated by its plain
language”); State v. Brocksmith, 

, 

 (concluding that counsel did not perform deficiently for
failing to raise an argument supported “largely with law review
articles and academic commentary”).

¶20 Second, “making the motion would have been risk-free.”
State v. Bell, 

, 

. Although there
was “no guarantee” that the district court would accept Bell’s
interpretation of the statute, see State v. Carter, 

,

; see also Strickland, 

 (stating that “the
idiosyncrasies of [a] particular decisionmaker” can enter “into
counsel’s selection of strategies and . . . may thus affect the
performance inquiry”), moving for a directed verdict would not
have “conflicted with any pursued line of defense, nor would it
have borne any potential for prejudice,” Bell, 

; cf. Carter, 

, ¶¶ 49–50 (concluding that counsel was
not ineffective for forgoing a directed verdict motion where doing
so could have “cause[d] him to lose the basis of his defense”). For
these reasons, it was unreasonable for Counsel not to move for a
directed verdict.

¶21 The State resists this conclusion. In addition to assailing
Bell’s proposed interpretation of the statute, it argues that “[e]ven
if [Counsel] had decided the statutory interpretation arguments
Bell makes now were reasonable, that would not compel him to
make them” because Counsel can “‘pick his battles.’” (Quoting
State v. Ray, 

, 

.) While it is true that



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                            State v. Bell


“Counsel could pick his battles,” that does not change the fact that
we must still assess Counsel’s decision in context and determine
whether the issue “was sufficiently important under the
circumstances that failure to [move for a directed verdict] was
objectively unreasonable.” Ray, 

. Given the
straightforward nature of Bell’s argument, as well as the low
risk/reward ratio, moving for a directed verdict was “a battle that
competent counsel would have fought.” 

¶22 In sum, we conclude that subsection (3) was a required
element of the crime of theft of a rental vehicle. And because the
State did not put forth evidence to prove this element, it was
unreasonable for Counsel not to move for a directed verdict and
seek dismissal of the charge. Therefore, Counsel’s performance
was deficient.

                           II. Prejudice

¶23 Bell must also demonstrate that she was prejudiced by
Counsel’s deficient performance. “To evaluate prejudice under
Strickland, we assess counterfactual scenarios—that is, what
would have happened but for the ineffective assistance. The
counterfactual analysis requires us to consider a hypothetical—an
alternative universe in which the trial went off without the error.”
State v. Garcia-Flores, 

, 

(quotation simplified).

¶24 Because the error at issue here is the omission of a motion
for directed verdict based on the interpretation of a statute—a
purely legal question—and we have determined that Bell’s
interpretation of the statute is correct, in the counterfactual
scenario in which Counsel moved for a directed verdict on the
ground that the plain language of the controlling statute dictated
that subsection (3) was an element of the crime of theft of a motor
vehicle, the district court would have been obligated to grant the
motion because the State failed to prove this element. See
Strickland v. Washington, 

 (1984) (“The assessment


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                            State v. Bell


of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the
decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially
applying the standards that govern the decision.”). “The
reasonable probability of an acquittal thus satisfies Strickland
prejudice.” Cedar City v. McCraw, 

, 

, petition for cert. filed, Sep. 11, 2025 (No. 20251082).


                         CONCLUSION

¶25 Because the State failed to present evidence that Bell’s
rental agreement contained notice of the maximum penalties
under state law for failing to timely return the rental vehicle, and
because such notice was an element of the crime of theft of a rental
vehicle, Counsel’s failure to move for a directed verdict amounted
to ineffective assistance. We therefore vacate Bell’s conviction.




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