J-A19026-25
2026 PA Super 19
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
EDWARD GRAHAM :
:
Appellant : No. 1037 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 22, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0007219-2022
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED: February 2, 2026
Appellant, Edward Graham, appeals from the July 22, 2024, judgment
of sentence imposing five years of probation for unlicensed carry of a
concealed firearm (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1)). We affirm.
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion:
On September 8, 2022, Officer Justin DeSimone of the
Allegheny County Police Department initiated a traffic stop of a
vehicle driven by [Appellant] because the registration of the
vehicle had expired. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer
DeSimone encountered [Appellant], who was driving the vehicle.
[Appellant’s] girlfriend, Tiara Pannell, was the front seat
passenger of the vehicle. [Appellant] opened the driver’s side
window and Officer DeSimone smelled the faint odor of unburnt
marijuana coming from the vehicle. Ms. Pannell advised Officer
DeSimone that she was the owner of the vehicle. Officer
DeSimone asked her to exit the vehicle and she complied. Officer
DeSimone informed the occupants that he could smell marijuana
and Ms. Pannell advised that she had a medical marijuana card
but it was currently expired. She also advised that she had
smoked marijuana earlier in the day. Officer DeSimone asked if
he could search the vehicle and Ms. Pannell confirmed that he
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could. Officer DeSimone then asked [Appellant] to exit the
vehicle. Officer DeSimone searched the vehicle and located a
firearm inside a fanny pack that was on the rear seat of the vehicle
behind the driver’s seat. He also located a plastic sandwich bag
containing marijuana from the center console of the vehicle.
[Appellant] admitted that the fanny pack belonged to him. He
also informed Officer DeSimone that he did not possess a
concealed carry permit. [Appellant] was then arrested.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/25, at 1-2.
Appellant filed his motion to suppress the firearm on October 6, 2023.
In it, he claimed the investigating officer unlawfully prolonged a completed
traffic stop prior to discovering the firearm. He also claimed that the fanny
pack in which the firearm was discovered was not within the scope of Pannell’s
consent to search. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on October
12, 2023. Officer DeSimone was the only witness. After hearing, the trial
court requested briefs from both parties. The trial court denied the
suppression motion by order of February 20, 2024. On February 22, 2024,
Appellant filed a motion requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law, but
the trial court did not act on that motion. At the conclusion of a July 22, 2024,
stipulated bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty under
§ 6106(a)(1). The trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing, and this
timely appeal followed.
Appellant presents two questions:
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying suppression where
the police officer extended the otherwise completed traffic
stop but he lacked reasonable suspicion to believe criminal
activity was afoot?
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II. Whether the trial court erred in denying suppression where
the police officer searched the fanny pack found behind the
driver’s seat, but the driver’s consent to the search did not
include the search of any personal belongings?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
We conduct our review mindful of the following:
[O]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the factual findings are supported by the record and
whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
We are bound by the suppression court’s factual findings so long
as they are supported by the record; our standard of review on
questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is
appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider
only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the
evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our scope
of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression
hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.
Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (citations
omitted).
Appellant first argues that the basis for the vehicle stop—an expired
registration—was exceeded when Officer DeSimone began asking questions
about the smell of unburnt marijuana. The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect
people from unreasonable searches and seizures. “The Fourth Amendment
protects a fundamentally individual right—the right of each individual to be let
alone.” Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 937 (Pa. 2019). That is,
“the government may not target and seize specific individuals without any
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particular suspicion of wrongdoing, then force them to prove that they are not
committing crimes.” Id. at 942.
Our courts recognize three forms of interaction between police and
citizens: a mere encounter, an investigative detention, and a custodial
detention. Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 314 (Pa. Super.
2023).
A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction
between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry
by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that
it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond.
In contrast, an investigative detention, by implication,
carries an official compulsion to stop and respond, but the
detention is temporary, unless it results in the formation of
probable cause for arrest, and does not possess the coercive
conditions consistent with a formal arrest. Since this interaction
has elements of official compulsion it requires reasonable
suspicion of unlawful activity. In further contrast, a custodial
detention occurs when the nature, duration and conditions of an
investigative detention become so coercive as to be, practically
speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.
Id. at 314 (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones,
874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. Super.
2005)).
We discern whether a person is under an official compulsion to stop from
the perspective of a reasonable person. The court must determine “whether,
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the
police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was
not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Hicks,
208 A.3d at 927. To establish reasonable suspicion in support of an
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investigative detention, “a police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot.”
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2011). We discern the
presence of reasonable suspicion in light of the totality of the circumstances,
and we must “afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn
from the facts in light of the officer’s experience and knowledge and
acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit
the investigative detention.”
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown,
996
A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. 1999)). Though Article I, § 8 affords broader protection
from searches and seizures than does the federal constitution, its application
to investigative detentions is coterminous with that of the Fourth Amendment.
Hicks,
208 A.3d at 925.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the purpose of a traffic
stop is to investigate the infraction that the police officer observed; the stop
must not last longer than is necessary to investigate the infraction.
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). “Authority for the
seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably
should have been—completed”
Id. The seizure remains lawful only if
unrelated inquiries do not “measurably extend the duration of the stop.”
Id.
In Rodriguez, police stopped the defendant for driving on the shoulder
of the road. After checking the license of the vehicle occupants and issuing a
warning, the investigating officer asked permission to walk his dog around the
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vehicle. The driver declined, and the officer detained him and proceeded with
the search. The dog alerted and a search of the vehicle revealed
methamphetamine. The Rodriguez Court held that the canine sniff extended
the stop beyond the time necessary to address the underlying traffic violation
and that it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. As such, the canine
sniff was not constitutionally permissible. Id. at 356.
Instantly, as in Rodgriguez, Officer DeSimone investigated a matter
unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop—possible unlawful possession of
marijuana. Pennsylvanians may lawfully possess and consume marijuana
under the Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”), 35 P.S. § 10231.303. Thus, our
Supreme Court has held that the smell of marijuana does not, by itself, give
rise to probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search. Commonwealth v.
Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 41 (Pa. 2021). The smell of marijuana can “be a factor,
but not a stand-alone one, in determining whether the totality of the
circumstances established probable cause to permit a police officer to conduct
a warrantless search of a vehicle.”
Id. at 28, 41.
In Barr, police stopped the defendant’s car after the car failed to stop
at a stop sign. While approaching the stopped vehicle they smelled burnt
marijuana. Id. at 29. The investigating officer told the defendant and his
wife, who was in the car with him, that the smell of marijuana justified a
search of the vehicle. The defendant was initially uncooperative, but he
eventually got out of the car and produced a medical marijuana card.
Id. at
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30. Police proceeded with a warrantless search of the vehicle and found a
concealed firearm and a bag of marijuana. Id.
The Barr Court noted that, prior to the passage of the MMA, marijuana
was per se illegal and the plain smell of marijuana provided probable cause
for a warrantless vehicle search. Id. at 40. But under the MMA, dry leaf
marijuana is lawful to possess by those who are licensed, and it is lawful to
consume by vaporization (and the odor of vaporization is indistinguishable
from burnt marijuana).1
Id. at 32, 41. Because marijuana is no longer per
se illegal after the enactment of the MMA, the Barr Court concluded that the
smell of burnt marijuana does not, by itself, establish probable cause for a
warrantless search of a car.
Id. In so holding, the Barr Court “emphasize[d]
that the realization that a particular factor contributing to probable cause may
involve legal conduct does not render consideration of the factor per se
impermissible, so long as the factor is considered along with other factors
that, in combination, suggest that criminal activity is afoot.”
Id. at 41-42.
Our Supreme Court’s analysis in Barr built on that of Hicks, wherein
the Supreme Court held that police may not detain a person observed to be
in possession of a concealed firearm in order to determine if the person has a
carry license. That is, “the government may not target and seize specific
individuals without any particular suspicion of wrongdoing, then force them to
____________________________________________
1 As of the publication of Barr, there were more than 143,000 people in the
Commonwealth who could legally possess and obtain marijuana. Id. at 31.
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prove that they are not committing crimes.” Hicks, 208 A.3d at 942. In
Hicks, the defendant was stopped at a gas station convenience store after he
was seen concealing a firearm in his waistband. Police arrived as the
defendant was driving away and stopped him. They noticed alcohol on his
breath as they removed him from his car and handcuffed him.
Id. at 922.
The defendant had a concealed carry license and was not statutorily prohibited
to possess a firearm, and thus was not charged with unlawful possession of a
firearm. He was, however, charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.
As pertinent instantly, the outcome in Hicks turned on the validity of
the initial detention. “So long as the initial detention is lawful, nothing
precludes a police officer from acting upon the fortuitous discovery of evidence
suggesting a different crime than that initially suspected—such as the odor of
alcohol on the breath of a driver, as occurred in the instant case.” Id. at 927–
28. The Hicks Court concluded that the stop was not lawful, as the defendant
was detained for conduct “which hundreds of thousands of Pennsylvanians are
licensed to engage lawfully[.]”
Id. at 945. As such, police lacked reasonable
suspicion for the vehicle stop, and that the evidence of the defendant’s use of
alcohol should have been suppressed.
Id. at 951.
Appellant relies on this Court’s memorandum in Commonwealth v.
Lomax, 273 A.3d 1049, 470 MDA 2021 (Pa. Super. February 14, 2022)
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(unpublished memorandum),2 wherein a police officer investigated the smell
of unburnt marijuana after stopping the defendant’s car for broken taillights.
After ordering the defendant out of the car,3 the officer asked the defendant
if he smoked marijuana recently. The defendant denied it and presented a
valid medical marijuana card. The police officer returned to his police cruiser,
spoke to his partner, approached the defendant once again, and asked him
when he last smoked marijuana. The defendant claimed he smoked four hours
prior to the stop. The officer then performed field sobriety tests and arrested
the defendant for driving under the influence of marijuana. See id. at *1.
The officer acknowledged at the suppression hearing that there were no signs
of impairment in the defendant’s driving. Moreover, the defendant was calm
and cooperative during the stop. See id. at *2.
Relying on Hicks and Barr, the Lomax panel concluded that the
officer’s questions to the defendant about his smoking marijuana began a new
investigative detention without reasonable suspicion. The smell of unburnt
marijuana was not, by itself, evidence of impairment, and there was no other
evidence that the defendant was impaired. Thus, the Lomax Court affirmed
the trial court’s suppression order.
____________________________________________
2 Per Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished Superior Court memoranda filed after
May 1, 2019 may be cited for persuasive authority.
3 During the course of a valid traffic stop, police may order all of the vehicle’s
occupants out of the car. Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1109
(Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied,
237 A.3d 393 (Pa. 2020).
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Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Young, 305 A.3d 963, 1479 MDA 2023
(Pa. Super. September 5, 2023) (unpublished memorandum), the defendant’s
car was stopped after police observed three separate traffic violations. When
the defendant rolled down his window, the police officer smelled raw
marijuana. The officer also noted that the defendant was breathing heavily
and appeared to be nervous. The officer ordered the defendant out of the
vehicle and told him he smelled marijuana. As in the instant case, the
defendant admitted to smoking it earlier in the day. The police officer then
asked for the defendant’s permission to search the vehicle. After the
defendant resisted, the officer said he could have the vehicle towed and obtain
a search warrant. The officer did, however, tell the defendant that the
defendant did not have to consent to the search, and that there would be no
consequences for refusing consent. Police found a brick of heroin in the
defendant’s car and, in a search incident to the defendant’s arrest, a container
of raw marijuana in his hoodie. See id. at *1-2.
The officer “believed he had probable cause to obtain a search warrant
for [the defendant’s] car because of the odor of marijuana, [the defendant’s]
confession to smoking marijuana earlier that day, [and the defendant’s]
displaying deceptive behaviors[.]” Id. at *3. The Young panel affirmed the
trial court’s order of suppression, reasoning in part that the Commonwealth
did not “provide any meaningful argument to counter the court's conclusion
that reasonable suspicion was lacking in this case.” Id. at *7. “In particular,
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the Commonwealth [did] not discuss the cases relied on by the court in
reaching its decision, or cite any other legal authority to support its cursory
conclusion that the officers possessed reasonable suspicion[.]” Id.
Turning now to the instant facts, our review of the record confirms that
the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact. Officer DeSimone was
the only witness at the suppression hearing. As he approached the vehicle
after stopping it for the expired registration, he noticed the smell of unburnt
marijuana coming from the car. N.T. Suppression, 10/12/23, at 4, 8. He
asked Appellant and Pannell for their driver’s licenses and returned to his
service vehicle to confirm that Appellant, who was driving the vehicle, had a
valid license (Pannell’s license was suspended) and that neither of them had
an outstanding warrant. Id. at 5, 9. Upon returning to the vehicle, the
following occurred:
I returned to the vehicle and I asked Miss Pannell to exit the
vehicle to speak to me. She agreed. I made her aware of the
odor of marijuana. She told me she smoked marijuana earlier in
the day. I asked her if she had a medical marijuana card. She
said she did, but it was now expired. I then asked her if there
was any more marijuana in the vehicle. She stated no,4 and then
consented to a search of the vehicle.
Id. at 5. Officer DeSimone’s body camera footage reveals that he returned
to Pannell’s car, with her license and Appellant’s license in hand, and asked
____________________________________________
4 Pannell eventually did divulge that marijuana was in the car before Officer
DeSimone searched the car and found it. Id. at 10.
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Pannell to step out of the vehicle at 12:48:43 p.m.5 He informed her of a faint
odor of marijuana coming from the car at 12:48:59. Pannell began explaining
that she smoked before getting in the car at 12:49:02. Officer DeSimone
asked if he could check the car at 12:49:15, and Pannell consented
immediately thereafter. The interaction between Pannell and DeSimone, from
the time he asked her to get out of the car until she consented to the search,
was just over thirty seconds. At 12:49:24, Officer DeSimone asked Pannell if
she had an MMA card, and at 12:49:26-27, she said her card had expired.
After Pannell consented to the search, DeSimone asked Appellant to exit the
vehicle. Id. at 6. DeSimone found a plastic baggie with marijuana in the
center console, and a zippered-shut black fanny pack in the driver’s side back
seat that had the firearm in it. Id. at 6, 11. Appellant admitted that the fanny
pack was his and claimed he did not know it was in the car. Id. at 6-7.
As explained above, the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez,
held that seizures remain lawful only if an unrelated inquiry does not
“measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354.
Neither party disputes that Officer DeSimone’s inquiry about the odor of
marijuana was unrelated to the vehicle code violation that justified the stop.
So the question becomes whether Officer DeSimone’s investigation of the
marijuana measurably extended the duration of the stop. Officer DeSimone
____________________________________________
5 Officer DeSimone’s body camera was introduced as Defense Exhibit A during
the suppression hearing.
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asked Pannell to exit the vehicle upon returning to her car after running the
driver’s license checks from his patrol vehicle computer. This action is
permissible as part of a vehicle stop for a traffic violation. Wright, 224 A.3d
at 1109. Thus, all of Officer DeSimone’s actions up to this point were normally
attendant to a traffic stop. The odor of marijuana was the first thing Officer
DeSimone mentioned to Pannell after she exited the vehicle. As noted above,
Pannell immediately acknowledged that she smoked earlier that day, and she
immediately consented to a search of the vehicle when Officer DeSimone
asked. This interaction—from Officer DeSimone’s mention of marijuana to
Pannell’s consent to the vehicle search—took roughly 30 seconds. Within the
next 15 seconds, Officer DeSimone asked Pannell if she had an MMA card, and
Pannell said her card had expired. Thus, the interaction at issue spanned
roughly 45 seconds.
Appellant does not develop an argument for how long is too long for a
line of inquiry unrelated to the purpose of the vehicle stop. We observe,
however, that the dog sniff in Rodriguez extended the stop for “seven or
eight minutes” past the issuance of a written warning for the underlying traffic
violation. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 352. In Lomax, the defendant denied
smoking marijuana and presented a valid MMA card. The officer then returned
to his patrol vehicle, talked to his partner, and approached the defendant once
again and asked further questions. He then asked the defendant to perform
field sobriety tests. The stop in Lomax thus extended well beyond the extra
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45 seconds at issue here. In Young, the police officer persisted in his
attempts to persuade the defendant to consent to the vehicle search after the
defendant initially refused. Appellant has failed to provide any support for his
argument that the brief interaction at issue in this case measurably lengthened
the time of the stop to the extent that it became constitutionally
impermissible.
Regarding Appellant’s reasonable suspicion argument, Officer
DeSimone, by the end of his 45-second interaction with Pannell about
marijuana, was aware of several facts. There was an odor of marijuana
emanating from the car, Pannell disclosed that she smoked earlier in the day
(and smoking is not a lawful way to consume medical marijuana), Pannell
disclosed that she lacked a valid MMA card, and Pannell owned the car. These
are specific and articulable facts which, considered together, create a
reasonable inference that Pannell was unlawfully in possession of marijuana.
Thus, by the time Officer DeSimone asked for consent to search the vehicle,
he was proceeding based on reasonable suspicion which he had garnered
without unlawfully extending the stop for the traffic code violation.
In analyzing the applicable law, we first turn to Barr, which teaches
that, after the enactment of the MMA, the odor of marijuana does not, by
itself, give rise to probable cause for the search of a vehicle. But Barr permits
the smell of marijuana to be considered as a factor in whether criminal activity
is afoot. Instantly, the marijuana is one factor in deciding when reasonable
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suspicion arose. And the instant case is plainly distinct from Barr in that
Pannell consented to the search of her vehicle, whereas the police in Barr
conducted a warrantless search without consent.
Next, we consider Hicks, which teaches that an observation of activity
that is lawful if licensed—in that case the possession of a concealed firearm—
does not provide reasonable suspicion in support of a detention to check for a
valid license. In this case, unlike Hicks, police had a valid reason for the stop
independent of the smell of unburnt marijuana, the possession of which is
lawful with an MMA card. Pannell was not stopped solely for the purpose of
determining whether she had an MMA card.
The unpublished memoranda that Appellant relies on do not support his
case. This case is distinct from Lomax in that Pannell, unlike the defendant
in Lomax, did not deny smoking marijuana, nor did she claim to have a valid
card. Further, the officer in Lomax extended the duration of the stop for
further investigation of the defendant’s possible possession of marijuana after
the defendant’s initial denials. He returned to his patrol vehicle, spoke to his
partner, then asked the defendant more questions about his marijuana use.
Likewise, Young is distinguishable because the police officer, acting only on
the odor of marijuana and the defendant’s admission of smoking marijuana
earlier in the day, persisted with requests to search the defendant’s vehicle.
The officer went so far as to threaten to tow the vehicle and get a warrant for
it. The defendant in that case, unlike Pannell, did not readily divulge that he
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was not licensed under the MMA. Further, Young is an unpublished
memorandum and the panel reached its conclusion based, at least in part, on
the inadequacy of the Commonwealth’s argument in that case. And, as
unpublished memorandums, neither Lomax nor Young is binding here.
In summary, we conclude that Officer DeSimone did not unlawfully
extend the duration of the stop in this case, and that he had reasonable
suspicion to believe that Pannell was unlawfully in possession of marijuana by
the time he asked her to consent to the search of her car. For these reasons,
Appellant’s first argument fails. We now turn our attention to the second, in
which Appellant claims that Pannell’s consent was coerced.
We begin with several observations. First, as noted above, Appellant
was not the owner of the vehicle. He does not explain how he had standing
to challenge Pannell’s consent to the search of her vehicle. He does not
explain how he has a privacy interest in Pannell’s vehicle, nor does he argue
that he retained a privacy interest in the fanny pack, of which he claimed
ownership at the site. The Commonwealth, for its part, does not challenge
Appellant’s standing to raise this issue. Appellant argues that the search of
the fanny pack exceeded the scope of Pannell’s consent to search the vehicle
for marijuana because her consent did not extend to a search of personal
belongings within the vehicle. We confine our analysis accordingly. Assuming
arguendo that Appellant has standing to raise this issue, his argument is of no
merit.
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A police officer may search a car without a warrant or probable cause if
the owner consents. Commonwealth v. Yedinak, 676 A.2d 1217, 1220 (Pa.
Super. 1996), appeal denied,
693 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1997). Likewise, “the scope
of a search is generally limited to the areas where the object of the search
may be found, but the party consenting to a search may restrict authorization
to defined areas.”
Id. “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s
consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness—
what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange
between the officer and the suspect?”
Id. (quoting Florida v. Jimeno,
500
U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
Appellant argues here that Pannell would not reasonably have
understood that she consented to a search of belongings in the vehicle rather
than the vehicle itself. In other words, Pannell would not have understood
that the scope of her consent extended to a fanny pack in the back seat.
The record reveals that Pannell, after initially denying that marijuana
was in the car, divulged that she had a bag of marijuana in the car before
Officer DeSimone began his search. Appellant fails to explain why a bag of
marijuana would not be found within a fanny pack, or why an objectively
reasonable person consenting to a search of a car for marijuana would not
understand that the scope of the search would include containers that could
conceal marijuana.
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Appellant relies on this Court’s unpublished memorandum in
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 293 A.3d 588, 757 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Feb.
1, 2023) (unpublished memorandum), wherein this Court held that the
defendant’s general consent to search his car did not include consent to search
a zippered makeup bag found in the glove compartment. The makeup bag
contained two glassine bags of heroin. The police officer did not explain to
the defendant why he was searching the car or what he was searching for.
Id. at *2. The Sullivan panel found the Commonwealth’s challenge to the
suppression order waived, but the panel also concluded that it would fail on
the merits because a generalized consent to search a vehicle did not
reasonably include the contents of an “innocuous looking makeup bag that
was found inside of a glove compartment with no indication that he would find
anything criminal inside[.]” Id. at *8.
The holding in Sullivan is dicta contained within a non-precedential
memorandum, and it is easily distinguishable from the instant case. Here,
Pannell was aware that Officer DeSimone was searching her car for marijuana.
Marijuana could be concealed within a fanny pack. Appellant does not attempt
to argue otherwise. Appellant also fails to explain why the fact that Officer
DeSimone found a bag of marijuana in the front center console prior to
searching the fanny pack placed the fanny pack outside of the scope of
Pannell’s consent. Finding marijuana in one part of a car does not preclude
the possibility that more is present elsewhere within the same car. Appellant
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has failed to demonstrate that Officer DeSimone’s search of the fanny pack
was unlawful under the circumstances of this case.
Because we have considered and rejected both of Appellant’s
arguments, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
DATE: 2/2/2026
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