J-S47021-25
2026 PA Super 45
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
HENRY BAYNARD :
:
Appellant : No. 605 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 7, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0013003-2009
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and BECK, J.
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILE MARCH 11, 2026
Appellant, Henry Baynard, appeals from the order entered February 7,
2025, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history
of this case as follows.
On August 13, 2010, following a jury trial before the Honorable
Carolyn Engel Temin, Appellant . . . was found guilty of
first[-]degree murder, violations of the Uniform Firearms Act
(“VUFA”) § 6106, and possession of an instrument of a crime
(“PIC”). On August 20, 2010, Judge Temin sentenced Appellant
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant
filed a direct appeal to t[his Court], which affirmed [Appellant’s]
judgment of sentence on May 31, 2012. [See Commonwealth
v. Baynard, 50 A.3d 253 (Pa. Super. 2012) (Table)
(non-precedential decision). Our Supreme Court denied
allocatur on September 25, 2012. See Commonwealth v.
Baynard, 53 A.3d 756 (Pa. 2012) (Table)].
On April 4, 2013, Appellant filed a timely pro se [PCRA]
petition[.] PCRA counsel was subsequently appointed and filed
an amended petition on April 25, 2014. In 2016, the matter
was reassigned to the Honorable Diana L. Anhalt due to Judge
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Temin’s retirement. Judge Anhalt dismissed [Appellant’s]
petition on July 30, 2018. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal to [this Court] on August 29, 2018.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/9/25, at 1-2. This Court remanded the PCRA appeal
because Judge Anhalt identified a “potential conflict warranting recusal.” See
Order, 7/23/2020.
Thereafter,
[o]n remand, the PCRA court recused and a new PCRA judge
was appointed. The new PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a)
opinion[] based entirely on the record as developed by the
original PCRA court and explaining the reasons why the original
PCRA court's denial should be affirmed. The record was then
returned to [this Court] for disposition.
In May [] 2020, it came to [this Court’s] attention that
Appellant's PCRA counsel had died and that no new counsel had
been appointed to represent him. Accordingly, on May 11,
2020, we issued an order withdrawing [Appellant’s former
counsel’s] appearance and directing the [PCRA] court to appoint
new counsel within [30] days. Unfortunately, while [this
Court’s] order was received and docketed in the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas, the PCRA court took no further action
and no counsel [was] appointed to represent Appellant.
Meanwhile, on May 28, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a motion
for remand, after it uncovered new evidence that it was
“ethically required” to turn over to Appellant. This was a
reversal of the Commonwealth's and original PCRA court's
position that Appellant was not entitled to post-conviction
discovery. Given the nature and scope of the evidence attached
to the motion, the Commonwealth also conceded that
Appellant's new counsel should be given the opportunity to file
another amended PCRA petition.
Id. Based upon the foregoing, on July 23, 2020, this Court vacated the PCRA
court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition in its entirety and remanded
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the matter for the appointment of PCRA counsel, as well as the filing of an
amended PCRA petition. Id.
On remand,
[The PCRA court appointed] Douglas Dolfman, Esq[uire,] . . . as
PCRA counsel. On August 19, 2020, [however,] David Santee,
Esq[uire,] entered his appearance as PCRA counsel. Attorney
Santee filed an amended [PCRA] petition on September 2,
2020. Following multiple continuances for further investigation,
Attorney Santee filed a second amended [PCRA] petition on
January 5, 2023. [In his most-recently amended PCRA petition,
Appellant alleged that, in post-conviction discovery, he received
records of misconduct relating to multiple law enforcement
officers who testified at his trial, namely, Detectives Ronald
Dove, Gregory Holman, and Nathanial Williams. Appellant
alleged that, if such evidence were available at the time of his
trial, he could have cross-examined the officers’ more
effectively and presented the issue of their credibility more fully
to the jury.] On November 1, 2023, Attorney Santee filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel. [The PCRA court] granted that
motion and appointed Daniel Alverez, Esq[uire,] on November
7, 2023. Attorney Alvarez filed a supplemental amended
petition on March 16, 2024. [In this petition, Appellant argued
that his mandatory life-sentence was unconstitutional as
applied to him because, at the time of the murder, he was 18
years and 25 days old].
On January 9, 2025, the Commonwealth filed its answer, in
which it did not concede that Appellant met the requirements
for granting a new trial based on [Appellant’s] after-discovered
evidence [claim] but nevertheless proposed granting relief and
permitting Appellant to enter a negotiated guilty plea to
third[-]degree murder with a sentence of 20 to 40 years of
confinement because[, in the Commonwealth’s view,] “there
[was] a reasonable probability that at some point, now or in the
future, a collateral review court could determine that
[Appellant] is entitled to a new trial. Retrying a case of this sort
after the passage of time presents obstacles that can be difficult
for the prosecution to overcome.” On February 7, 2025,
following a hearing, [the PCRA court] denied Appellant’s
petition[, concluding that it was] without merit. [This timely
appeal followed.]
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PCRA Court Opinion, 4/9/25, at 2 (paragraph breaks inserted).
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our consideration.
1. [Whether] the PCRA court erred in []dismissing [Appellant’s]
PCRA petition as the imposition of life without the possibility
of parole [is] unconstitutional as applied to [Appellant
because he was a] virtual minor [at the time of the
commission of the crime?]
2. [Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing Appellant’s
PCRA petition which alleged that he recently discovered
evidence demonstrating that multiple law enforcement
officers who were involved in his case engaged in misconduct
and/or have criminal histories which called into question
their credibility?]
See generally Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.
Our standard of review is as follows:
Our review of a PCRA court's decision is limited to examining
whether the PCRA court's findings of fact are supported by the
record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
error. We view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence
of record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. With
respect to the PCRA court's decision to deny a request for an
evidentiary hearing, or to hold a limited evidentiary hearing,
such a decision is within the discretion of the PCRA court and
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. The PCRA
court's credibility determinations, when supported by the
record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo
standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions[.]
Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015) (citations
omitted).
To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
resulted from “one or more” of the following:
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(i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
innocence could have taken place.
(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could
have taken place.
(iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances
make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to
plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent.
(iv) The improper obstruction by government officials of the
petitioner's right of appeal where a meritorious appealable issue
existed and was properly preserved in the trial court.
…
(vi) The unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory
evidence that has subsequently become available and would
have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced.
(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful
maximum.
(viii) A proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).
In his first issue, Appellant contends he is entitled to relief under Section
9543(a)(2)(i). More specifically, Appellant argues that his mandatory
life-sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment because, at the time
Appellant committed this offense, he was 18 years and 25 days old. Appellant
asks this Court to hold that his mandatory life-sentence is unconstitutional in
light of his status as a “virtual minor,” his history of brain trauma, and
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“child-like attributes” pursuant to the rationale of Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460 (2012). Appellant’s Brief at 24 and 30.
In Miller, supra, the United States Supreme Court determined that it
is unconstitutional for a state to sentence a juvenile homicide defendant to a
mandatory term of life-imprisonment if he or she was “under the age of 18 at
the time of their crimes.” Miller,
567 U.S. at 465. In Montogomery v.
Alabama,
577 U.S. 190 (2016), the High Court held that Miller applied
retroactively to cases on collateral review, notwithstanding the fact that the
Miller decision may have been filed after the judgment of sentence had
become final. Id. at 212.
This Court, however, has previously rejected claims like that of
Appellant’s which, in essence, asks us to apply the Miller/Montgomery
holdings to those who, like Appellant, were over the age of 18 at the time of
the commission of the murder. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 10
(Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc), allocatur denied,
218 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2019);
Commonwealth v. Montgomery,
181 A.3d 359, 366 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en
banc); Commonwealth v. Furgess,
149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016); see
also Commonwealth v. Hamilton,
2021 WL 2285507 *1, *3 (Pa. Super.
2021) (non-precedential decision). Miller, by its terms, is limited to those
individuals who committed murder while under the age of 18. This is the age
“our society has used . . . as the delineation between childhood and adulthood
for many purposes.” Hamilton,
2021 WL 2285507 at *3 (citation omitted).
While such a bright-line rule “has shortcomings,” it is “necessary for the
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orderly administration for justice.” Id. (citation omitted). We therefore reject
Appellant’s claim.
In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
dismissing his PCRA petition which set forth claims of after-discovered
evidence. Appellant claims he recently discovered evidence of misconduct on
the part of multiple law enforcement officers who, in his view, were “integral
witnesses at trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 47. In particular, Appellant points to
the following Commonwealth witnesses: Detective Dove, Detective Holman,
and Detective Williams. Id. Appellant contends that the aforementioned
officers’ misconduct constituted exculpatory after-discovered evidence which
entitled him to relief under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). In addition, on
appeal, Appellant claims that, in February 2008, before his trial, Detective
Dove “sent several harassing text[ual] messages to someone whom he
believed was romantically involved with his wife.” Appellant’s Brief at 52.
Appellant contends that Detective Dove’s behavior prompted an investigation
by Philadelphia Police Internal Investigations. Id. Appellant further avers
that this “evidence was in existence at the time of [Appellant’s] trial, was in
the sole possession of the Commonwealth, and was not discoverable by the
defense at the time of trial.” Id. at 53. Hence, Appellant argues that the
Commonwealth’s failure to turn over this information violated Brady v.
Maryland.
373 U.S. 83 (1963). We will address Appellant’s claims in turn.
To obtain relief based on after-discovered evidence, an appellant must
show that the evidence:
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(1) could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the
trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely
corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to
impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result
in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.
Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532, 537 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted). If after-discovered evidence is based upon an officer’s undisclosed
misconduct, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of establishing a direct
“nexus” between the undisclosed misconduct and the petitioner’s case.
Id. at
537-538.
A Brady violation, on the other hand, occurs if the prosecution, before
trial, suppresses “evidence favorable to the accused” and “the evidence is
material either to guilty or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 133
(Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). To prove a Brady violation, a criminal
defendant must demonstrate the following:
(1) the prosecutor has suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence,
whether exculpatory or impeaching, is helpful to the defendant,
and (3) the suppression prejudiced the defendant. Prejudice is
demonstrated where the evidence suppressed is material to
guilt or innocence.
Koehler, 36 A.3d at 133 (citation omitted). Importantly,
favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results
from its suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.
Id. (citation omitted).
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We initially conclude that Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim
fails – and does so for two reasons. First, Appellant admits that the evidence
of Detective Dove’s, Detective Holman’s, and Detective Williams’s misconduct
would be used solely to impeach their credibility. See Appellant’s Brief at 47
(“[T]he PCRA court erred in dismissing the PCRA petition as the integral
witnesses at trial were law enforcement, who, had grave credibility
issues.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 47-48 (claiming that Detectives
Dove, Holman, and Williams all “have grave credibility and misconduct issues,
none of which were presented at trial. Had it been presented before the jury,
there is a reasonable probability that [Appellant] would have been
acquitted.”). Second, Appellant failed to establish any nexus between his case
and the detectives’ misconduct. To the contrary, Appellant admits that the
relevant misconduct all took place after Appellant’s conviction and in matters
unrelated to Appellant. See id. at 53 and 55 (recognizing that most of
Detective Dove’s misconduct occurred between June 1, 2013 and June 3,
2013, as well as on December 3, 2013. Appellant also explains that the
misconduct at issue related to a witness in an unrelated criminal investigation
and Detective’s Dove’s girlfriend); id. at 58 (recognizing that Detective
Holman’s misconduct occurred on June 18, 2012 and in a matter relating to
Detective Holman’s wife); id. at 59 (recognizing that Detective Williams is
currently facing criminal charges for, inter alia, tampering with public records,
in a matter relating to Detective Williams’ family member). Hence, the PCRA
court properly concluded that Appellant failed to establish that the
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after-discovered evidence would likely result in a different verdict. See
Foreman, supra, at 538 (holding that because the misconduct occurred two
years after the appellant’s conviction, the appellant could not establish that
the evidence would compel a different result); see also Commonwealth v.
Wade,
2022 WL 3591015 *1, *3 (Pa. Super. 2022) (non-precedential
decision) (“Wade has failed to assert a meritorious claim of after-discovered
evidence because all of the [police] misconduct he cites has stemmed
exclusively from the cases of other criminal defendants in unrelated cases.”).
We also conclude that Appellant’s Brady claim fails, as it is waived.1
Appellant did not raise this issue in his PCRA petition. Appellant did not
present this claim to the PCRA court during the evidentiary hearing that
occurred on February 7, 2025. See N.T. Hearing, 2/7/25, at 22 (Appellant’s
counsel admitting that the “material misconduct did occur after the fact”)
(emphasis added). Because “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived
and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,” we are precluded from
addressing Appellant’s claim. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying
Appellant’s petition for collateral relief.
Order affirmed.
____________________________________________
1Appellant’s claim with respect to Detective Dove’s actions is raised under
Brady because the conduct at issue occurred before Appellant’s criminal trial.
See Appellant’s Brief at 52-53.
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Date: 3/11/2026
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