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2026 PA Super 49
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARCUS ROBINSON :
:
Appellant : No. 907 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 7, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000147-2023
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., OLSON, J., STABILE, J.,
KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and LANE, J.
OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 17, 2026
Marcus Robinson appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on
February 7, 2024, for his convictions of persons not to possess, use,
manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms, firearms not to be carried
without a license, and carrying firearms on public streets or public property in
Philadelphia.1 Robinson challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court provided the relevant factual and procedural history:
On May 25, 2023, [Robinson] litigated a motion to suppress
physical evidence, contending that “there was no reasonable
suspicion or probable cause for the police to stop, question, frisk,
or ultimately arrest [Robinson].” Following the hearing, the [trial]
court took the matter under advisement, and on June 27, 2023,
issued its ruling on the record denying [Robinson’s] motion. On
September 25, 2023, [Robinson] proceeded to a stipulated bench
trial before the [trial] court, which found him guilty of persons not
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106, and 6108, respectively.
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to possess firearms, firearms not to be carried without a license,
and carrying firearms on public streets in Philadelphia.
Sentencing was deferred pending a presentence investigation
(“PSI”). On February 7, 2024, upon consideration of the PSI report
and all relevant facts and circumstances of this case, the [trial]
court sentenced [Robinson] to 6 to 12 years’ incarceration and to
a concurrent term of 7 years’ probation.
On February 20, 2024, [Robinson] filed a motion for
reconsideration of sentence, which the [trial] court denied on
March 7, 2024. On March 19, 2024, [Robinson] filed a notice of
appeal to [this] Court. On March 20, 2024, the [trial] court
ordered [Robinson] to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of
matters complained of on appeal. Following an extension of time
granted by the [trial] court, [Robinson] timely filed his Rule
1925(b) statement on May 31, 2024.
At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth presented the
testimony of Philadelphia Police Officer Robert Heeney. Officer
Heeney testified that on December 19, 2022, he was on routine
patrol with his partner, Officer Grant[2], in the 22nd Police District
in North Philadelphia. The officers were patrolling in the vicinity of
the 2600 block of North Warnock Street, an area known for PCP
narcotic sales and shootings. Officer Heeney personally had
responded to at least 15 shootings in that particular area, where
he also had made 3 arrests for firearms violations. On said date,
at approximately 1:09 p.m., Officer Heeney and his partner were
traveling on the 1000 block of West Oakdale Street, when they
made a left turn onto the 2600 block of Warnock Street. As they
turned onto Warnock Street, Officer Heeney heard someone say
“Oh, shit” really loud. He looked to his left and observed
[Robinson] standing on the east sidewalk with his right hand
tucked under his left arm. [Robinson] “then began to blade his
body to the left, at which point he removed his right arm and kept
his left arm pinned to his left side.”
At that point, Officer Grant asked [Robinson] if he was okay, to
which [Robinson] responded “No” and “looked around nervously.”
Officer Heeney testified that he and his partner exited their vehicle
and approached [Robinson]. Officer Grant asked him if he had any
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2 Officer Grant’s first name does not appear in the certified record.
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weapons, and [Robinson] said, “No”—but his arm was still pinned
against his left side. [Robinson] then lifted up the right side of his
shirt, at which point Officer Heeney observed an object protruding
out the back left side of [Robinson’s] jacket. Officer Heeney told
his partner, “His left side.” [Robinson] took a deep breath and
said, “Okay,” and put his right hand up in the air as if he was
turning himself in. Officer Grant asked [Robinson] if he had a
permit to carry a firearm, to which [Robinson] responded, “No.”
Officer Grant asked [Robinson] to raise his left arm, at which point
a .45 caliber handgun fell to the ground. The officers then took
[Robinson] into custody. They secured the firearm—which was
loaded with one live round in the chamber and seven live rounds
in the magazine—and placed it on a property receipt.
[Robinson] testified on his own behalf. According to him, on the
date and time at issue, he was smoking outside, waiting for his
friend to come out of his grandmother’s house. [Robinson] was
“observing everything that was around him.” At the moment he
saw the police, he said, “Oh, shit”—however, it was not due to
their presence, it was because he burnt himself. [Robinson]
testified that the police then approached in their vehicle and asked
him if he was all right, to which he responded, “Yeah.” According
to [Robinson], the officers backed up and “engaged in some
conversation” with two other guys across the street—but then
pulled back up to him and exited their vehicle.
[Robinson] further testified that the police were more than one
hundred feet away from him and had the windows up when he
said, “Oh shit.” Thus, according to [Robinson], there was no way
they could have heard him. However, [Robinson] acknowledged
Officer Heeney’s testimony that he heard [Robinson] say, “Oh,
shit,” and further admitted that the officer asked him if he was
okay as a result:
Q. But you heard Officer Heeney testify here today
that he heard you say, oh, shit, right?
A. Yeah. He pulled up and said, are you all right?
N.T. [Suppression Hearing,] 05/25/23, at 29-31.
Upon careful consideration of the record and pertinent law, the
[trial] court denied [Robinson’s] motion to suppress on June 27,
2023.
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Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/24, at 1-4 (unnecessary capitalization, some record
citations, brackets, parentheses, headings, and footnotes omitted).
Before we turn to the merits of Robinson’s claim, we note that this Court
certified the case for en banc review to address whether a court can lawfully
impose a concurrent sentence of probation and incarceration. This case was
listed for oral argument consecutive with Commonwealth v. Jennings, ---
A.3d ---, 1128 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 14, 2026) (en banc). As this
Court found in Jennings that a court may lawfully impose a concurrent
sentence of probation and incarceration, we briefly address that issue and
then turn to Robinson’s suppression claim. See Jennings, --- A.3d at *12.
Both Robinson and the Commonwealth argue the court imposed a legal
sentence. We therefore turn to Jennings and the arguments made therein.
Jennings asserted the trial court did not have authority to sentence him
to probation concurrent with incarceration. See id. at *6. He believed that
probation may only be used either by itself when “prison is unnecessary, or
as a tail to aid reintegration” into society. Id. However, Jennings did not
challenge the constitutionality of the statute, nor did he argue its language
was ambiguous. See id. at *12.
This Court, after reviewing the relevant statutes and case law, held
“Section 9721(a) [of title 42] permits trial courts to impose concurrent terms
of probation and total confinement. As Section 9721(a)’s terms are ‘clear and
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free from all ambiguity,’ we may not disregard them ‘under the pretext of
pursuing’ the statute’s spirit.” Id. (citation omitted).
Because “the language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a) (sentencing generally)
clearly and unambiguously permits trial court to impose concurrent terms of
probation and total confinement[,]” we find no illegality in the sentence
imposed upon Robinson. Id. at *1.
We now turn to Robinson’s claim:
Did the lower court err in denying the motion to suppress physical
evidence and statements where police detained Mr. Robinson
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, by restricting his
freedom of movement and asking questions seeking incriminating
information which an ordinary person would not have felt free to
disregard?
Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
We begin with our well-established standard of review:
An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the
suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on the
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
of law of the trial court are subject to plenary review.
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Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a
ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress. Also, it is within the
suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.
Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citations, brackets, quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted).
Robinson argues he was subjected to an investigative detention when
“police used their bodies to pin [him] in.” Appellant’s Brief, at 15. Robinson
further asserts that because police “approached him from opposite sides,
[they] prevent[ed] his ability to walk away.” Id. Robinson claims this created
an investigative detention, and police did not have reasonable suspicion at the
time they pinned him in between them. See id. at 21.
Both “[t]he Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 326 A.3d 888, 896
(Pa. 2024) (citation omitted). “It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment
governs seizures of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station
house and prosecution for crime; whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person.”
Commonwealth v. Gibson,
333 A.3d 710, 717 (Pa. Super. 2025) (internal
quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis, and citation omitted).
We begin with a discussion of the three types of police-citizen
interactions:
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The law recognizes three distinct levels of interaction between
police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an
investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop, see
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [](1968); and (3) a custodial detention.
A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction
between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry
by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that
it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond, and therefore
need not be justified by any level of police suspicion.
In contrast, an investigative detention carries an official
compulsion to stop and respond. Since this interaction has
elements of official compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of
unlawful activity.
Finally, a custodial detention occurs when the nature, duration and
conditions of an investigative detention become so coercive as to
be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.
This level of interaction requires that the police have probable
cause to believe that the person so detained has committed or is
committing a crime.
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 1242, 1247-48 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(en banc) (some citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted).
A mere encounter can
escalate[] to an investigatory stop if a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave. When that happens,
for the stop to be proper the police must have reasonable
suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal
activity is afoot. … [A] proper reasonable suspicion analysis
considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop
and affords due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences
drawn from the facts in light of the officer’s experience. The
totality of circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when
taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
officer. Per se rules are incompatible with a totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry.
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Commonwealth v. Lewis, 343 A.3d 1016, 1028 (Pa. 2025) (citations,
brackets, and quotation marks omitted).
We have further elaborated:
No bright lines separate these types of encounters, but the United
States Supreme Court has established an objective test by which
courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to elevate the
interaction beyond a mere encounter. The test, often referred to
as the “free to leave test,” requires the court to determine whether,
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the
encounter, the police would have communicated to a reasonable
person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police and go about
his business. …
In applying this “free to leave” test, the focus is whether the
suspect has in some way been restrained by physical force or show
of coercive authority.
In considering whether a seizure has occurred, or whether a
reasonable person would feel free to leave, courts may examine
the following nonexclusive list of factors: The number of officers
present during the interaction; whether the officer informs the
citizen they are suspected of criminal activity; the officer’s
demeanor and tone of voice; the location and timing of the
interaction; the visible presence of weapons on the officer; and the
questions asked. Although no single factor controls our analysis,
both the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts have
held that the approach of a police officer followed by questioning
does not constitute a seizure. The circumstances must present
some level of coercion, beyond the officer’s mere employment
status, that conveys a demand for compliance or threat of tangible
consequences from refusal.
Commonwealth v. Joyner, 348 A.3d 230, 236 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations,
brackets, and some quotation marks omitted).
Notably, “a show of authority designed to stop a person, but which is
not accompanied by the use of physical force, is not a seizure unless the
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individual actually submits to the show of authority.” Gibson, 333 A.3d at 720
(citation omitted).
Based on the foregoing, we must first determine when Robinson was
seized: when the encounter turned from a mere encounter to an investigative
detention. Then we can evaluate what information the officer possessed at
that time and if that information qualifies as reasonable suspicion.
Robinson argues he was seized when the officers “pinned him in[.]”
Appellant’s Brief, at 10. The Commonwealth does not identify exactly when it
maintains the mere encounter turned to an investigative detention but notes
it could not have been until after the officers were already out of their vehicle
and noticed the bulge that they correctly believed to be a firearm. See
Appellee’s Brief, at 10-11.
The trial court found:
Police encountered [Robinson] in a high-crime area known for PCP
narcotics sales and shootings. Officer Heeney personally had
responded to at least 15 shootings in the area and had made 3
arrests for illegal firearm possession. When police encountered
[Robinson] in this high-crime area, he was acting increasingly
suspiciously. First, upon noticing the presence of police,
[Robinson] said, “Oh, shit,” which drew their attention to him.
[Robinson] then proceeded to tuck his right hand under his left
arm and blade his body away from the officers. After removing his
right arm, [Robinson] continued to pin his left arm against his
side. At that point, Officer Grant asked [Robinson] if he was okay,
to which [Robinson] responded “No” and “looked around
nervously.”
The above series of actions prompted the officers to exit their
vehicle and approach [Robinson]. Officer Grant asked him if he
had any weapons, and [Robinson] said, “No”—but he continued to
pin his left arm against his side. While speaking with [Robinson],
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Officer Heeney could see an object protruding from the left side of
[Robinson’s] jacket. Based on all the above circumstances, it was
reasonable for the officers to believe that [Robinson] was
attempting to conceal an illegal firearm. Accordingly, Officer
Heeney alerted his partner to [Robinson’s] “left side.” Prior to any
further activity, Officer Grant asked [Robinson] if he had a permit
to carry a firearm, to which [Robinson] responded, “No.” Officer
Grant then asked [Robinson] to raise his left arm, at which point
a loaded, .45 caliber handgun fell to the ground. Police recovered
the firearm and placed [Robinson] under arrest. In sum,
[Robinson’s] actions warranted a brief investigatory detention,
during which police determined that [Robinson] was not permitted
to carry a firearm prior to securing the dropped weapon or
arresting [Robinson]. Simply put, [Robinson’s] rights were not
violated in this case.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/24, at 7-8 (emphasis in original).
While the trial court does not explicitly state when the encounter turned
into an investigative detention, it appears to believe it was while the officers
were asking questions of Robinson, after they exited their vehicle. See id.
We agree with all parties that the initial questioning of Robinson was a
mere encounter. Robinson was free to leave at this point. When Robinson
answered “No,” he was not okay and looked around nervously, the officers’
suspicion was piqued.
At that point, the officers exited their patrol vehicle and went to speak
further with Robinson. The entire encounter with Robinson lasts just over one
minute from initial encounter to arrest. Upon viewing the officers’ body worn
cameras (“BWC”), there is no sound until the one-minute mark. See Exhibit
C-1 at 1:00; D-1 at 1:00.
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As is clear from viewing both BWCs, at no point was Robinson “pinned
in” as he tries to claim. See Exhibit C-1 at :28-:55; D-1 at :30-:55. Officer
Grant went to the side of the car Robinson is leaning against, while Officer
Heeney went to the other side. See Exhibit C-1 at :34. However, Officer
Heeney walked first behind a fence and looked around, then went to the back
of the car where he stood in the middle of the trunk area. See id. at 34-40.
The officers did nothing at this time to coerce Robinson to remain or to talk to
them; there was a clear path if Robinson chose to walk away, however,
Robinson did not do so. We therefore find Robinson was not subject to an
investigative detention while the officers were questioning him. See
Commonwealth v. Jones, 226 A.3d 1090, 1095 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“[W]ith
respect to the show of authority needed for a detention, the circumstances
must present some level of coercion, beyond the officer’s mere employment,
that conveys a demand for compliance or threat of tangible consequences
from refusal.”) (citation omitted).
The encounter turned investigative at the moment Robinson
“submit[ted] to the show of authority” by raising his “right hand up in the sky
as if he[ was] giving up.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/25/23, at 10; see also
Exhibit C-1 at :55; Gibson, 333 A.3d at 720 (“Under the Fourth Amendment,
a show of authority designed to stop a person, but which is not accompanied
by the use of physical force, is not a seizure unless the individual actually
submits to the show of authority.”).
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The next step, following the finding at what point Robinson had been
seized, is to determine whether the officers had reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity at that time.
Robinson initially argues that “[t]he classification of a neighborhood as
a ‘high crime area’ has been deemed legally irrelevant” in determining if there
is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Appellant’s Brief, at 18-19.
Robinson claims the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021), supports his belief. See
id. at 18. We disagree.
After Robinson filed his brief, our Supreme Court decided
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 343 A.3d 1016 (Pa. 2025). There the Court
considered “the quantum of evidence necessary to prove an area is high in
crime, such that a suppression court may properly consider that fact among
the totality of the circumstances when assessing whether reasonable suspicion
existed at the time of a stop.” Lewis, 343 A.3d at 1021. The Court noted:
[In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), the United
States Supreme Court] explained that officers are not required to
ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining
whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant
further investigation. [The Court] therefore held the fact that the
stop occurred in a high crime area was a relevant contextual
consideration in assessing reasonable suspicion[.]
At first blush, this principle seems unremarkable. If a proper
reasonable suspicion analysis considers the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the stop, then, logically, this might
include the location of the stop in some cases. After all, we have
recognized that prudent police officers on patrol pay close
attention to every detail of their surroundings and take their
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knowledge of the area into account when considering a stop. Thus,
for example, an officer observing a hand-to-hand transaction on
a street corner will naturally be more suspicious if he knows the
corner is a hotspot for heroin sales than if the corner has no
meaningful history of drug trafficking. It would be simply illogical
to expect officers to ignore those details, or to conclude that an
officer’s experience regarding them is not a relevant factor
informing reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 1030-31 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
The Court then considered Barr, where the defendant was stopped in
his vehicle for a minor traffic infraction, and explained that “[u]nder those
circumstances, the fact that the area where the stop occurred was generally
high in crime would have added nothing probative to the legal determination
of whether the police had probable cause to search the vehicle.” Id. at 1031.
Clearly, then, the type of interaction helps the courts determine whether the
area being high crime is relevant under the totality of the circumstances.
The Court held that whether an area is high crime is relevant in
assessing reasonable suspicion, but an officer may not simply intone “high
crime area.” Id. “The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving a high-
crime area is, in fact, high in crime, and the suppression court is free to
discredit the Commonwealth’s evidence when appropriate.” Id. at 1035
(citations omitted). The Court provided a nonexclusive list of factors to assist
in determining if an area is high crime: “the geographic scope of the high-
crime area; the nexus between the type of crime the area is known for and
the type of crime suspected on the day of the stop; the officer’s level of
familiarity with the area; the recency of the officer’s information; empirical
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data known to the officer; and the assignment of specialized police units
targeting high-crime areas.” Id. at 1036 (citation omitted).
Here, the suppression hearing was held before Lewis was decided, but
some of the factors were touched upon at the hearing. Officer Heeney confined
the “high crime area” to the 2600 block of North Warnock Street. N.T.
Suppression Hearing, 5/25/23, at 6-8. Officer Heeney responded to 15
shootings in that area “over the last couple years.” Id. at 7. He further has
made three illegal firearms arrests in that area. See id. Officer Heeney has
been working that area for approximately six years. See id. at 6. While “over
the past couple years” was not further defined, clearly the officer’s information
was fairly recent. Finally, we note there was no testimony provided regarding
empirical data or specialized police units in that area. However, we find the
information sufficient to qualify the area as high crime, just as the trial court
did. Therefore, the area being high crime was a relevant consideration in
determining whether the officers had reasonable suspicion.
As explained above:
[A] proper reasonable suspicion analysis considers the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the stop and affords due weight to
the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of
the officer’s experience. The totality of circumstances test does
not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that
clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of
innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further
investigation by the police officer.
Lewis, 343 A.3d at 1029 (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).
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The information the officers had before the encounter turned to an
investigative detention included: the area being known for shootings and
illegal firearms, i.e., high crime; Robinson loudly exclaiming “Oh, shit” upon
seeing the officers; Robinson responding he was not okay when asked and
looking around nervously; Robinson’s odd behavior of holding his hand under
his other arm, then removing it while keeping his arm pinned to his body and
turning his body so that arm (and the bulge from the firearm he was
concealing) would be out of the officers’ sight; and the officers’ belief that the
concealed bulge was a firearm. This information constituted sufficient
reasonable suspicion to subject Robinson to a pat down or frisk for weapons.
See Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 775 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc) (reversing a trial court’s order granting suppression because the
defendant turned his body to conceal a bulge in his jacket pocket in a high
crime area creating reasonable suspicion). However, a frisk was not required,
as the firearm dropped from Robinson as soon as he moved his left arm.
Robinson had already admitted that he did not have a permit to carry a
concealed firearm. Therefore, at the point when the firearm fell, the officers
had probable cause to place Robinson under arrest for illegal possession of a
firearm.
We therefore find the trial court did not err in denying Robinson’s motion
to suppress based on its finding the stop and arrest of Robinson was with the
requisite suspicion. As such, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 3/17/2026
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