¶1dissenting:
¶2On 7 May 2005, defendant was involved in an altercation with six men, including Ignacio Tolentino (“Ignacio”) and Santiago Aquino Rivera (“Santiago”). The altercation took place in part inside the home of Ignacio and Santiago. The following additional evidence, not all of which is included in the majority’s opinion, describing this altercation informs my decision to dissent.
¶3*241The relevant State’s evidence on the issue of self-defense is as follows: While defendant and Ignacio were fighting, Santiago walked down the hallway to the bedroom where Renaut and Julio were sleeping, whereupon he told Julio that defendant was hitting his brother. Julio called the police, locked the apartment door to prevent defendant from leaving, and beat defendant with the telephone while waiting for the police to arrive. Renaut retrieved a shotgun and pointed it at defendant. Defendant then let go of Ignacio. Renaut cocked the gun and defendant begged Renaut not to shoot him, stating, “Dear God, do not kill me.” Julio unlocked the door and looked outside to see if anyone had come with defendant, at which point defendant attempted to run out of the apartment.
¶4Defendant’s evidence tended to show the following: On 7 May 2005, at approximately 7:00 a.m., defendant was walking on the street near Santiago and Ignacio’s apartment building. As defendant neared the corner, Santiago and Ignacio began to point at him, and one of the men came out into the yard and began to argue with defendant. In order to defend himself, defendant swung and tried to hit the man that approached him. Defendant testified that he fought with the man in the yard, on the porch, and in the doorway of the apartment.
¶5While the men were fighting, someone hit defendant with an unknown object in the back of the head. The blow to the head caused defendant to close his eyes and left him dizzy. After being hit in the head, defendant put his hand on his pistol but did not pull the gun out of his pocket. When defendant opened his eyes, he saw a man holding and pointing a shotgun at his head. At this point, defendant, thinking that he was going to be shot, closed his eyes and listened to the gun click as the man pulled the trigger. The gun did not fire. Defendant, in an attempt to get away from the men, pulled his pistol and fired a shot at the man holding the shotgun but was unsure whether he shot anyone. As defendant attempted to leave the apartment, someone held defendant and kicked him, whereupon defendant fired another shot at the ground. The second shot hit the man in his leg who was holding defendant.
¶6After defendant shot both men, he ran from the apartment but was hit in the face with a two-by-four stick by one of the other men living at the apartment. Defendant hit this man with his pistol, breaking it into two pieces. The two men continued to hold and beat defendant until the police arrived. Defendant ran toward the police officer and complied with the officer’s instructions to stop and sit *242down. Defendant denies robbing or attempting to rob the men at the apartment.
¶7Based upon this evidence and the evidence cited in the majority opinion the trial court decided to give the perfect self-defense instruction. This decision, although reluctantly made by the trial court, was unchallenged by the State at trial and was not appealed. I do not question the correctness of the trial court’s decision to grant the self-defense instruction. However, I do question the trial court’s subsequent decisions implementing the consequences of the decision to instruct on perfect self-defense, once that decision had been made. Once a trial court decides that there is sufficient evidence to give the perfect self-defense instruction, it seems to me that the imperfect self-defense instruction should also be given pursuant to a duty under law and as a logical consequence of this initial decision. This duty has been recognized in our state by the leading commentators and our courts. See State v. Best, 79 N.C. App. 734, 737, 340 S.E.2d 524, 527 (1986), overruled on other grounds, State v. Maynor, 331 N.C. 695, 417 S.E.2d 453 (1992); State v. Rummage, 280 N.C. 51, 58, 185 S.E.2d 221, 226 (1971); see also John Rubin, The Law of Self-Defense In North Carolina 192 (Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 1996).
¶8Whether evidence is sufficient to warrant an instruction on self-defense is a question of law; therefore, the applicable standard of review is de novo. State v. Lyons, 340 N.C. 646, 662-63, 459 S.E.2d 770, 778-79 (1995). The trial court must instruct the jury on self-defense “if there is any evidence in the record from which it can be determined that it was necessary or reasonably appeared to be necessary for [defendant] to kill his adversary in order to protect himself from death or great bodily harm.” State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 160, 297 S.E.2d 563, 569 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Spaulding, 298 N.C. 149, 156, 257 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1979)), aff’d, 826 F.2d 1059 (1987). Moreover, the trial court must provide a self-defense instruction if the above criteria is met “even though there is contradictory evidence by the State or discrepancies in the defendant’s evidence.” State v. Revels, - N.C. App. -, -, 673 S.E.2d 677, 680 (citing State v. Dooley, 285 N.C. 158, 163, 203 S.E.2d 815, 819 (1974)), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 379, 680 S.E.2d 204 (2009). With regard to whether defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense, the trial court must consider the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Hughes, 82 N.C. App. 724, 727, 348 S.E.2d 147, 150 (1986).
¶9*243In the case at bar, the trial court instructed the jury on perfect self-defense, but refused to provide an instruction on imperfect self-defense. A defendant acts in perfect self-defense when the following four elements are present at the time of the killing:
“(1) it appeared to defendant and he believed it to be necessary to kill the deceased in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm; and
(2) defendant’s belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared to him at that time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness; and
(3) defendant was not the aggressor in bringing on the affray, i.e., he did not aggressively and willingly enter into the fight without legal excuse or provocation; and
(4) defendant did not use excessive force, i.e., did not use more force than was necessary or reasonably appeared to him to be necessary under the circumstances to protect himself from death or great bodily harm.”
¶10Revels, - N.C. App. at —, 673 S.E.2d at 681 (citation omitted). An instruction on imperfect self-defense should be given where a defendant “reasonably believes it necessary to kill the deceased to save himself from death or great bodily harm even if defendant (1) might have brought on the difficulty, provided he did so without murderous intent, and (2) might have used excessive force.” State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 52, 340 S.E.2d 439, 442-43 (1986). The doctrine of imperfect self-defense encompasses the first two elements of perfect self-defense; therefore, in a homicide case where there is sufficient evidence to warrant instructions on perfect self-defense, the trial court must also instruct on imperfect self-defense. See Best, 79 N.C. App. at 737, 340 S.E.2d at 527 (explaining “[i]t is difficult to imagine a homicide case in which the evidence supports an instruction on self defense but not an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based upon an excessive force theory”). In the present case, because the court instructed the jury on perfect self-defense, the evidence must have been sufficient to warrant an instruction on imperfect self-defense. See id.
¶11Viewing the evidence on record pursuant to the any evidence standard articulated in Bush, I would hold that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense. See Bush, 307 N.C. at 160, 297 S.E.2d at 569.
¶12*244A killing based on imperfect self-defense “is both unlawful and intentional, [however] the circumstances themselves are said to displace malice and to reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter.” State v. Herndon, 177 N.C. App. 353, 362, 629 S.E.2d 170, 176 (quoting State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 579, 247 S.E.2d 905, 916 (1978)), disc. review denied, appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 539, 634 S.E.2d 542 (2006). “ ‘[VJoluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing without premeditation, deliberation or malice but done in the heat of passion suddenly aroused by adequate provocation or in the exercise of imperfect self-defense where excessive force under the circumstances was used or where the defendant is the aggressor.’ ” Lyons, 340 N.C. at 663, 459 S.E.2d at 779 (quoting State v. Wallace, 309 N.C. 141, 149, 305 S.E.2d 548, 553 (1983)).
¶13Where a lesser included offense is supported by the evidence, the trial court must instruct the jury on that offense. “ ‘[T]he failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error that cannot be cured by a verdict finding the defendant guilty of the greater offense.’ ” State v. Bumgarner, 147 N.C. App. 409, 417, 556 S.E.2d 324, 330 (2001) (citation omitted). In State v. Wright, 304 N.C. 349, 351, 283 S.E.2d 502, 503 (1981), our Supreme Court noted that “[t]he sole factor determining the judge’s obligation to give such [a lesser included] instruction is the presence, or absence, of any evidence in the record which might convince a rational trier of fact to convict the defendant of a less grievous offense.” This Court considers the admissible facts in the light most favorable to the defendant when determining whether defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. State v. Coley, 193 N.C. App. 458, 467, 668 S.E.2d 46, 53 (2008), aff'd, 363 N.C. 622, 683 S.E.2d 208 (2009).
¶14Weighing the totality of all the evidence as required by our case law and for the reasons stated above, I would find the trial court’s failure to give the imperfect self-defense jury instruction requested by the defendant to be a prejudicial error and therefore dissent from the majority opinion.