Arthur Appleyard v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

76 federal appellate · 30 district · 296 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 473 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"... [T]he simple inquiry must be whether the person whose surrender is demanded is in fact a fugitive from justice, not whether he consciously fled from justice in order to avoid prosecution for the crime with which he is charged by the demanding state. A person charged by indictment or by affidavit before a magistrate with the commission within a state of a crime covered by its laws, and who, after the date of the commission of such crime, leaves the state, — no matter for what purpose or with what motive, nor under what belief, — becomes, from the time of such leaving, and within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws of the United States, a fugitive from justice, and if found in another state must be delivered up by the governor of such state to the state whose laws are alleged to have been violated, ..."”

   13 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. James D. Perron v. Lisa Menard, Commissioner · 60 Okla. Crim. 50 - Ex Parte Foster

2. ““The constitutional provision relating to fugitives from justice, as the history of its adoption will show, is in the nature of a treaty stipulation entered into for the purpose of securing a prompt and efficient administration of the criminal laws of the several states * * *. [At page 227 of 203 U.S., at page 124 of 27 S.Ct.] “ ‘To be a fugitive from justice, in the sense of the act of Congress regulating the subject under consideration, it is not necessary that the party charged should have left the state in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, but simply that having within a state committed that which by its laws •constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process to answer for his offense, lie has left its jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another.’ * * * [at page 229 of 203 U.S., at page 124 of 27 S.Ct.] “In Hibler v. State, 43 Tex. 197 , 201, the Court said: ‘The words “fugitive from justice” as used in this connection, must not be understood in a literal sense, but in reference to the subject matter, considering the general object of the Constitution and laws of the United States in relation thereto. A person who commits a crime in one state, for which he is indicted, and departs therefrom, and is found in another state, may well be regarded as a fugitive from justice in the sense in which it is here used.’” [Emphasis a”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Donnell v. United States · United States v. Marshall

3. ““* * * Bassing was taken to -New York. He was there arraigned and pleaded to1 the indictment. After one or two continuances the district attorney moved to dismiss the indictment, stating orally, as a reason for his action (so Bassing testified in this case), that he had not sufficient evidence to hold the accused. The motion was sustained and Bassing returned to Rhode Island without, so' far as the record shows, any objection on the part of the New York authorities. Shortly thereafter a second indictment was found in the New York court against Bassing for the same offense as that charged in the first indictment, and this was made the basis of a second requisition upon the Governor of Rhode Island on the fourteenth of June, 1907. Upon that requisition the Governor of Rhode Island issued the warrant of arrest of which Bassing complained in his present petition for a writ of habeas corpus. “The question arises on these facts whether the Governor of Rhode Island was authorized by the Constitution and laws of the United States to issue a second warrant for the arrest of Bassing and his delivery h> the agent of New York, such warrant being based upon a second indictment for the same offense as that charged in the former indictment. We have not been referred to, nor are we aware of, any judicial decision covering this precise question. If the proceedings in the New York court, after the appearance there of the accused under the first requisition by the Governor of that state, had”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex parte Graham · Grogan v. Welch