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← 203 U.S. 543 - Mrs Camille Cahen v. John Brewster

Mrs Camille Cahen v. John Brewster’s Empirical Analysis

203 U.S. 543 · 1906

Citation profile

103
cited by 103 later decisions
20
cited 20 times by the Supreme Court
15
states following
September 1989
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 5 district · 52 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 103 later decisions (20 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 1989 · most notably Chase Nat Bank of City of New York v. United States (1929), Shwab v. Doyle (1922)

13 federal appellate · 5 district · 52 state decisions — followed in 15 states

420190619101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Barbier v. Connolly · Knowlton v. Moore · Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. · Gulf Ry Co v. Ellis · Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 103 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]hese definitions were intended only to distinguish the tax from one on property, and it was not intended to be decided that the tax must attach at the instant of the death of a testator or intestate. In other words, we defined the nature of the tax; we did not prescribe the time of its imposition. To have done the latter would have been to prescribe a rule of succession of estates and usurp a power we did not and do not possess. There is nothing, therefore, in those cases which restrains the power of the State as to the time of the imposition of the tax. It may select the moment of death, or it may exercise its power during any of the time it holds the property from the legatee. " It is not," we said in the Perkins case, "until it has yielded its contribution to the State that it becomes the property of the legatee."”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “But, as we understand, the supreme court [of Louisiana] made the validity of the tax depend upon the very fact which counsel attack as an improper basis of classification. The court decided that the property bequeathed was property the state could tax, `until it had passed out of the succession of the testator.' It was certainly not improper classification to make the tax depend upon a fact without which it would have been invalid. In other words, those who are subject to be taxed cannot complain that they are denied the equal protection of the laws because those who cannot legally be taxed are not taxed.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “to be collected on all successions not finally closed and administered upon, and all successions hereafter opened”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.