Gunn v. Grice’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he Plaintiff's theory of the case ... is completely overwhelmed in our opinion by viewing the photographs taken at the scene and the testimony of the witness who arrived immediately after the accident and before the scene was subject to distortion by curious onlookers ... The plaintiff's theory at best admits of only a possibility, but it is highly improbable, and the mere possibility of the happening of an event has been held by this Court to be insufficient to sustain a verdict.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 475 So. 2d 428 - Johnson v. City of Pass Christian · 847 So. 2d 258 - Mississippi Dept. of Transp. v. Cargile

2. “In Mobile & O.R. Co. v. Johnson, 165 Miss. 397 , 141 So. 581 (1932), it is stated: ... The rule is that, laying aside and leaving out of view the testimony in behalf of defendant, if the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff is sufficient in law to establish the legal right of the plaintiff in issue and is not inconsistent with the admitted physical facts or with natural laws or common knowledge, and, so viewed, the plaintiff's testimony taken alone is such that reasonable men, acting reasonably, could reasonably believe the testimony and prudently act upon it, then a peremptory instruction for the defendant must not be given. When, however, all the testimony has been heard and all the arguments delivered and the verdict returned, if, upon a completed view of the entire case, the trial judge is then of the opinion that the verdict is against the overwhelming weight, or clearly against the great preponderance, of the evidence, his duty is, upon a motion for a new trial, to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. In the latter respect, and to the extent mentioned, the trial judge has a responsible part in the final determination of the issue upon the facts, and his duty of superintendence in that regard is one of his constitutional obligations. 165 Miss. at 403 , 141 So. at 582 . See also Gunn v. Grice, 204 So.2d 177 (Miss. 1967); Newton v. Homochitto Lbr. Co., 162 Miss. 20 , 138 So. 564 (1932); and Columbus & G. Ry. Co. v. Buford, 150 Miss. 832 , 116 So. 817 (1928).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 494 So. 2d 354 - Spradlin v. Smith

3. “We are aware of the delicate line of distinction between the court's overruling a motion for a peremptory instruction at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence and sustaining a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the former being decided upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of the plaintiffs' testimony within itself and the latter being decided upon the testimony of both the plaintiff and the defendant. In the event a peremptory instruction for the defendant is granted on the plaintiffs' testimony only, the plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial. On the other hand, if a verdict of a jury is found to be against the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to, and the trial judge may grant, two new trials (Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 1536 (1956)... . ( 204 So.2d at 185 )”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 288 So. 2d 723 - State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Stewart