204 W. Va. 547 - State v. Hedrick’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

44 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “`In general, an abuse of discretion occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed but the circuit court makes a serious mistake in weighing them.'”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 213 W. Va. 569 - State Ex Rel. Leung v. Sanders · STATE EX REL. THRASHER ENGINEERING v. Fox

2. “Former Rule 46(e) had contained, since 1972, the provisions that before that had been designated Rule 46(f). Pursuant to the 2002 amendments, former Rule 46(e)(2) and (4) have been redesignated back to Rule 46(f)(2) and (4). Rule 46(f)(2) provides that a forfeiture may be set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if (A) the surety later surrenders into custody the person released on the surety’s appearance bond; or (B) it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture. Rule 46(f)(4) provides that after a judgment of default on a forfeited bond, the court may remit it in whole or in part under the conditions applying to setting aside a forfeiture. If forfeited bail has been paid into the Treasury, and a remission is later ordered, there is statutory authority for refund of the money. These provisions of Rule 46 give the court a freer choice than it had prior to their adoption. The former law had been that the only circumstance under which the surety could avoid forfeiture was a showing that the default of his principle had not been willful. The rule is not so limited, and a showing of lack of willfulness is no longer essential. Instead the court may now take into consideration the expense and inconvenience to the government in determining whether to allow a remission. If there has been no injury to the government, or there is a satisfactory explanation for the default, remission of the entire sum may be ordered. The expense and inconveni”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Beagle v. State

3. “(1) whether the applicant is a commercial bondsman; (2) the extent of the bondsman’s supervision of the defen dant; (3) whether the defendant’s breach of the recognizance of bail conditions was willful; (4) any explanation or mitigating factors presented by the defendant; (5) the deterrence value of forfeiture; (6) the seriousness of the condition violated; (7) whether forfeiture will vindicate the injury to public interest suffered as a result of the breach; (8) the appropriateness of the amount of the recognizance of bail; and (9) the cost, inconvenience, prejudice or potential prejudice suffered by the State as a result of the breach. That list is not exhaustive, and trial courts may consider other factors as interests of justice require.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Hann