¶1R. B. Cannon, Ft. Worth, Tex. (Weeks, Bird, Cannon & Appleman, Fort Worth, Tex., of counsel), for appellants.
¶2Walter Akerman, Jr., Special Asst. to the Atty. Gen., Ellis N. Slack, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank B. Potter, U. S. Atty. and R. Daniel Settle, Asst. U. S. Atty., Ft. Worth, Tex., Charles S. Lyon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry Marselli, Special Asst. to the Atty. Gen., for appellees.
¶3Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and RUSSELL, and STRUM, Circuit Judges.
¶5Brought under the section 272(a) (1) 1*462exception' to section 3653 I.R.C.2 against the Collector of Internal Revenue and his deputy, the suit was for an injunction, restraining them from making a levy, seizure, or distraint under the authority of purported but illegal deficiency3 assessments of income taxes for the fiscal year ended August 31, 1944, and requiring their expunging.
¶6The claim was that, contrary to the express provisions of the section, the commissioner had made the assessments and was proceeding to collect them without first having given the taxpayers the required 90 day notice.
¶7The defendants admitted in their answer the allegation in sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 111 of the complaint that the commissioner on his October 17, 1949, Special No. 8 list made an assessment of income taxes against plaintiffs in the amount of $5521.21 each, that notice and demand for same were duly made, and that the defendants are now demanding that plaintiffs pay the assessments so made.
¶8They denied, however, that the assessment so made was a deficiency assessment within the meaning of sections 271 and 272 invoked by plaintiffs and, invoking on their own account section 3653 prohibiting restraint of assessment or collection of taxes, they insisted that the Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
¶9On the issues thus joined, the cause proceeded to trial, and was quickly and briefly tried. Plaintiffs offered (1) their individual tax returns, (2) the admissions (a) that each had paid approximately $1700 on account of their tax liability for 1944, and (b) that no letter was mailed advising them that the commissioner was proposing to-make the assessments complained of.
¶10In addition, they pointed out that the principal amount of each assessment was in excess of the amount shown by the return. Then stating “the correct amount of liability and the proper amount of payments, etc. have been debated between the parties to-*463these assessments which we say were illegally made”, plaintiffs rested.
¶11Defendants then offered evidence to the effect that adjustments had been made and credits and debits entered in respect to amounts paid and claimed to have been paid by plaintiffs; and that this was the upshot of the controversy; that on request of one of the plaintiffs certain erroneously claimed over payments had been credited to his 1944 estimated tax for the fiscal year ended in August, 1S45; that later all erroneous credits were revised and assessment of income tax for the fiscal year ended August, 1944-, were made against each taxpayer for which notice and demand was made; but that no prior statutory notice of deficiency was given the taxpayers with respect to these assessments.
¶12The district judge, on this record, without making findings of fact or law, entered a judgment dismissing the action and providing for the appropriation to the payment of the assessments of the sum of $16,000, which, under the terms of a stipulation, referred to in the judgment but not found in the record, had been tendered into Court by plaintiffs.
¶13Appealing from that judgment, plaintiffs are here insisting: that the assessments which the judgment ordered paid were deficiency assessments made in violation of the express prohibitions of section 272(a) ; that they were not merely irregular but illegal ; and that their enforcement, instead of having been ordered, should have been enjoined.
¶14Appellees, on their part, insist: that the assessments were not deficiency assessments ; that if they were, taxpayers should be denied relief because their plight was brought about by their misrepresentation; and that since, but for these, the complained of assessments would not have been made, to grant the relief would be permitting them to take advantage of their own wrong.
¶15So insisting, they urge upon us that the judgment must be affirmed. We do not think so.
¶16We agree with the appellants: .that, upon the undisputed facts, the assessments were deficiency assessments; that in making them the commissioner violated the provisions of applicable Internal Revenue Laws; and that, under the express provisions of section 272(a) (1), appellants were entitled to the injunction they sought.
¶17There is nothing inequitable in the relief asked by the plaintiffs. It is the very relief accorded them by and under the precise terms of the statutes making a violation of its terms an express exception to the general prohibition of section 3653(a). An essential part of the whole statutory scheme of furnishing the taxpayer with an option either to pay and sue to recover back or to apply for relief to the Tax Court, section 272(a) (1), was not enacted as a mere idle gesture. The commissioner is as bound as the taxpayer is by its terms. This is made plain not only in the language of the statute but in the language of the cases construing and applying it, cited in note 1, supra, including particularly Peerless Woolen Mills from this Court.
¶18The judgment appealed from is Reversed and the cause is Remanded with directions to grant the injunction prayed for.