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205 F.2d 644

Docket No. 253, Docket 22669.

Brayton v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued May 13, 1953.

Decided June 18, 1953.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1953-06-18

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Contrary to defendant’s contention, under New York decisions, (a) whether a written defamatory statement applies to a plaintiff is a jury question; (b) this fact may be proved by extrinsic evidence; and (c) the need for the introduction of extrinsic evidence for such a purpose — as distinguished from the use of such evidence to show that injury resulted from apparently innocuous language — does not convert a defamatory statement which would otherwise be actionable without proof of special damage into one for which recovery can be had only upon proof of such damage, (footnote omitted).”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 746 F. Supp. 378 - Naantaanbuu v. Abernathy

““Since jurisdiction here rests on diversity of citizenship, the New York conflict-of-laws rules govern. What ‘choice of law,’ under those' rules New York courts will make in such a ease is by no means clear. We need not, however, explore that question * *”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co.

Relies on Reporters' Ass'n of America v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n · Mattox v. News Syndicate Co. · Gross v. Cantor

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1953-06-18

How this case has been cited

Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently July 2007

2 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

50195319601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1See, also, D.C., 12 F.R.D. 325.

¶2*645Isaac W. Digges, New York City, Fordyce, Mayne, Hartman, Renard & Stribling, St. Louis, Mo. (Gilbert H. Weil, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees.

¶3Moynihan & McKeown, New York City (Arthur Moynihan and John M. Heck, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

¶4Before SWAN, Chief Judge, and L. HAND and FRANK, Circuit Judges.

¶5FRANK, Circuit Judge.

¶6Jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship. Plaintiffs claimed they were libeled by an article published in defendant’s publication, Collier’s Weekly. After a trial, the jury awarded plaintiff Carl Bray ton $100,-000. and the corporate plaintiff $37,500. The trial judge staled that he would grant defendant’s motion for a new trial unless the plaintiffs filed a stipulation consenting to a reduction by 50% of these respective amounts. On the filing of such a stipulation, the judge entered judgment for plaintiffs accordingly. From this judgment defendant appeals.

¶7The article not only dealt with flight-training schools in general but specifically referred by name to plaintiff Bray-ton Flying Service. It did not, however, specifically mention plaintiff Clyde Bray ton. But he introduced evidence that he completely controlled the corporate plaintiff and that numerous readers of the article understood it to charge him as well as the Bray-ton Flying Service with the improper conduct which the article denounced. On that basis, we have no doubt that the jury could reasonably infer that the article, read as a whole, was of such character as to make him an object of public contempt and to be therefore actionable without proof of special damage because libelous per se.

¶8Contrary to defendant’s contention, under New York decisions, (a) whether a written defamatory statement applies to a plaintiff is a jury question; (b) this fact may be proved by extrinsic evidence; and (c) the need for the introduction of extrinsic evidence for such a purpose — as distinguished from the use of such evidence to show that injury resulted from apparently innocuous language — does not convert a defamatory statement which would otherwise be actionable without proof of special damage into one for which recovery can be had only upon proof of such damage.1 Also contrary to defendant’s contention, under New York decisions a corporation has an actionáble claim for a libel per se, and need not allege and prove special damage, if the language “injuriously and directly affects its credit or the management of its business and necessarily causes pecuniary loss.” 2 We think that the publication here was of that kind, The evidence showed publication throughout the United States, *646and that Brayton, a resident of Missouri, was well known in many states. Since jurisdiction here rests on diversity of citizenship, the New York conflict-of:laws rules govern. What “choice of law,” under those rules New York courts will make in such a case is by no means clear.3 We need not, however, explore that question, for this reason: Both parties assumed, at the trial as on this appeal, that New York decisions, on intra-mural substantive and procedural questions alike, would control. Accordingly, neither plaintiffs nor defendant asked the trial judge to give instructions on any other assumption; consequently, we think it would be improper to disturb the verdict, even if it be true that, had either party so requested, the judge in his charge would have been obliged to instruct the jury to consider rules dissimilar in some respect or other to those in New York, applicable in several other jurisdictions.

¶9The issues of truth and fair comment were correctly left to the jury, and, on the basis of sufficient evidence, were by them decided against defendant. Certain pretrial interrogatories and defendant’s answer thereto were received in evidence over defendant’s objection. As this matter was relevant to the issue of the correct interpretation of the article, its reception was proper.

¶10Judgment affirmed.

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