Frederick Wuebker and Ruth Wuebkers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Citing the many objectives of the CRP, such as the reduction of soil erosion and the protection of the nation’s long-term food production capabilities, the * * * [taxpayers] assert, and the dissent agrees, that the government is “using” the land in question. We believe, however, that such an argument impermissibly stretches the plain meaning of the term “use,” especially in light of the narrow construction required of the rentals-from-real-estate exclusion. * * * Although it is true that the * * * [USDA] is seeking, and receiving, a public benefit by conserving lands enrolled in the CRP, the * * * [taxpayers] continue to maintain control over and free access to their premises. The dissent reasons that, because the government “greatly reduced the range of uses to which the * * * [taxpayers] could put their property,” it exercised a level of control akin to “use.” We remain unpersuaded, however, that the restrictions imposed by the * * * [USDA] on a farmer’s use of his own land somehow translate into “use” by the * * * [USDA] itself. The essence of the program is to prevent participants from farming the property and to require them to perform various activities in connection with the land, both at the start of the program and continuously throughout the life of the contract, with the government’s access limited to compliance inspections. Given this arrangement, we disagree with the Tax Court’s determination that the * * * [taxpayers’] maintenance obligations were legally insign”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Morehouse v. Commissioner

2. “[i]n imposing the above-described restrictions on the use of the land, the primary purpose of the CRP contract was to effectuate the statutory intention of converting highly erodible croplands to soil conserving uses. The services that petitioner was required to perform over the contract term included maintaining the vegetative cover, controlling weeds, insects, and pests on the land, and fulfilling certain reporting requirements. These service obligations were not substantial and were incidental to the primary purpose of the contract. Thus, the CRP payments represented compensation for the use restrictions on the land, rather than remuneration for petitioner’s labor. * * * [Id.']”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Morehouse v. Commissioner