Foard v. Snider’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 65 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"A question more difficult to answer, had the appellees relied on the point, would be whether Albert Foard did exercise the option within six months’ period specified in it. Time is of the essence in a unilateral contract, such as an option, both in law and in equity, whether expressly declared to be so or not. Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Sec. 853; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., Vol. 4, Sec. 1408; Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352 . Each such agreement must be scrutinized to see what it requires to be done within the specified time, either expressly or by necessary implication. Does it require completed performance, that is, actual payment, or does it require tender of the agreed price? Generally, there is contemplated only a notice of acceptance of, and a readiness and willingness to perform, the irrevocable offer which is an option. Whatever the option requires must be done. As in the case of all offers, revocable or irrevocable, the exercise must be unconditional and in exact accord with the terms of the option. For holdings that there must be a tender within the stated time, see Williston, work cited, Sec. 853, p. 2390; Pomeroy, work cited, Sec. 1407a (3), p. 1052; Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21, 28 . On the other hand, it has been held that: '* * * the option is a continuing offer to sell and, when duly accepted by the optionee, becomes a definite contract mutually binding and enforceable. * * * When an optionee duly signifies his purpose to accept an option”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Beckenheimer's Inc. v. Alameda Associates Ltd. Partnership · Schlee v. Bryant

2. ““The following grounds or any one of them have been declared to be sufficient to constitute a waiver of any defect in, or defense arising out of failure to duly give notice and proof of death: ‘A proposal to settle’ ; ‘an absolute refusal to pay on the merits’; ‘a denial of all liability’; ‘a negotiation with the insured, without making the objection of defective proof of death.’ Bliss on Life Insurance, sec. 268; Cooke on Life Insurance, p. 118. In its letter to the plaintiff the defendant, said: ‘The papers in themselves are correct enough, but the company has decided not to recognize the claim under this policy.’ Not a word here to indicate that its refusal to pay the plaintiff was because of want of seasonable proof of death. * * * It is true it subsequently relied upon this defence, but when it wrote the letter of the 15th of Feb. to him it neither directly nor indirectly placed its refusal to pay upon want of proper proof of death. The letter closed thus: ‘We think it might be well for you to see Mr. Thomas, and see whether Miss Dorsey is intending to enter suit as intimated in his letter. Until that matter is settled we are unable to give you any definite information in regard to this case.’ The information asked for by the plaintiff was to know if the proofs of death sent by Miss Dorsey were in due form, and if not what he should do to perfect his claim. If the defendant intended to rely upon the defence it now sets up it should have said so.” (Pages 149-150 of 88 Md.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company v. Van Buskirk

3. ““We do not decide whether a tender was essential * * * or whether the letter of October 19, Í950 would meet the test as an acceptance, because, as we see it, the appellees waived any defense they might have that the exercise of the option was not seasonably made or made in proper form. They chose to rely consistently, as they have done here, on their contention that the terms of the option agreement were too indefinite to be binding.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Eastover Stores, Inc. v. Minnix