concurrence">J. T. Hammond, J.,

(concurring). I concur entirely in everything said in the foregoing opinion.

I do, however, have a serious concern about an issue that was not raised, briefed, argued, or decided in Girard v Wagenmaker, 437 Mich 231; 470 NW2d 372 (1991). I am concerned with what happens if the Lee marriage goes on the rocks, as is statistically more likely than not, and one or *61another (or both) of the parties, in the course of the divorce action, brings a claim under Serafin v Serafin, 401 Mich 629; 258 NW2d 461 (1977), that Mr. Lee is not the father of Tessa Ann Lee. Suppose further that it is ultimately determined that Mr. Lee indeed is not the father of this child and therefore that this child, though born during the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Lee, is not a product of that marriage. Should that occur, either Mrs. Lee or Mr. Spielmaker or the Department of Social Services, if the child is a welfare recipient, may bring a paternity action.

If this were to occur, and Mr. Spielmaker is adjudicated the father, it would mean that Mr. Spielmaker might be utterly deprived of the opportunity to have any input into the upbringing of Tessa during her crucial formative years, but still be saddled with the obligation to support a child whose character is then fully formed and to whom Mr. Spielmaker is a total stranger.

In the meantime, if Mr. Lee is not the biological father and, more importantly, believes that he is not, he may be or become a father in name only, without any emotional involvement, and though we think that children do not recognize this, they do, and the damage at some point can become irreversible.

Counsel for Mrs. Lee, during oral argument before the Court of Appeals and in response to a question from the bench, expressed the opinion that Mr. and Mrs. Lee would be estopped to deny paternity of Tessa Ann Lee by Mr. Lee. I wish I could be that certain.

If it were possible to require Mr. and Mrs. Lee to expressly abjure any future claim that Mr. Lee is not the father of this child, I would feel much more at ease. The problem is that in this action Mr. Spielmaker tried to obtain a ruling that he *62was the father of this child — and now has lost on the standing issue — but, at the same time, there is not a judgment stating that he is not the father of the child. We are thus left with the pious assumption that Mr. Lee is the father, but arguably leave the matter open to be revisited any time either Mr. or Mrs. Lee decide to change their minds. This lack of finality is a rotten deal for Mr. Spielmaker, but he is not entitled to an awful lot of sympathy. What bothers my conscience more is that it is a rotten deal for Tessa.

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