Volume 205 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

Record does not support appellants' contention that they were not permitted to testify at trial, and testimony introduced at trial established by clear and convincing evidence that appellants had knowledge of appellee's trade secrets and were working for appellee's competitor in a position that is substantially similar to the position they held with appellee, such that the trial court's issuance of a permanent injunction was not an abuse of discretion.

Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of rape (under age 10/force), two counts of rape (under age 10), and two counts of gross sexual imposition (under age 13). Consistent with the parties' agreement, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 50 years to life, to be served concurrently with a 60-year prison sentence previously imposed in a federal case. Although the trial court only partially complied with the Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) maximum penalty advisement related to the registration and other requirements imposed by appellant's sexual offender designation, appellant does not assert, and the record does not reflect, that his plea decision would have been different if he had been provided a complete explanation of the sexual offender requirements. The trial court did not err by not merging Count II (rape of a child under 10) with Count III (rape of a child under 10 by force) the parties had agreed that the offenses would not merge. The record does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finally, the trial court did err by imposing post-release control on the rape counts. As to these counts, appellant was correctly sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after serving a required number of years. As such, appellant will be subject to life-time parole supervision if he is released from prison. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court so that the judgment entry may be amended to reflect parole supervision on the rape counts. (Donovan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

In an action by students against The Ohio State University ("OSU"), alleging OSU breached an implied contract by refusing to refund a portion of the student union fee when the student union was closed due to the pandemic, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court of claims to certify a class of students who paid the fee but were denied access to the facility. However, because the court of claims did not conduct a rigorous analysis of the evidence to determine whether questions of law or fact common to all subclass members predominated over question affecting individual subclass members, the court of claims abused its discretion when it certified a subclass of dental students who paid a clinical education support fee but were denied full access to the dental clinic in the spring and summer semesters of 2020. OSU's public duty defense does not present a question of subject matter jurisdiction. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded.

CRIMINAL LAW - rape gross sexual imposition victim is less than thirteen years of age force or threat of force amending indictment superseding indictment continuance reasonable opportunity to prepare defense case Crim.R. 7(D) R.C. 2945.02 relevant evidence Evid.R. 401 Evid.R. 402 insufficient evidence manifest weight of the evidence R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) sexual contact R.C. 2907.01(B) R.C. 2907.02 R.C. 2971.03 sexual conduct R.C. 2907.01(A) ineffective assistance of counsel polygraph.

JUVENILE COURT – DISCRETIONARY BINDOVER – WAIVER – R.C. 2152.12 – STANDARD OF REVIEW – ABUSE OF DISCRETION – AMENABILITY: A juvenile court's amenability determination under R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. While the state bears the burden of persuasion regarding a child's amenability to treatment in the juvenile system, it is not required to produce affirmative evidence of nonamenability. Where the juvenile court provided objective reasons for disregarding expert opinions that a child was amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the child was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system and in transferring jurisdiction of the case to the court of common pleas. [But see DISSENT: the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding that a preponderance of the evidence presented at the amenability hearing weighed in favor of a transfer of jurisdiction where the juvenile court arbitrarily disregarded the opinion of two experts that the juvenile was amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system and substituted its own assessment of the child's amenability for that of the experts.]

Defendant appeals kidnapping and domestic violence convictions. Batson challenge. Defendant failed to establish that the state violated his constitutional rights in exercising a peremptory challenge on a black juror. State had race-neutral basis for excusing juror. Limiting instruction. Defendant testified concerning his own character. State then questioned defendant concerning a specific accusation of domestic violence. Defendant argued court by failing to instruct jurors concerning the accusation. No plain error where the state's inquiry was proper under Evid.R. 405(A)(1). Counsel not ineffective for not having requested "safe-place-unharmed" instruction under R.C. 2905.01(C)(1). Defendant's defense theory inconsistent with safe-place-unharmed instruction.

CRIMINAL DAMAGING - RESTITUTION: The trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay restitution for damages to the victim's car relating to slashed tires and syrup in the gas tank where the defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to criminal damaging for running her car into the victim's rear bumper: those damages did not constitute economic loss because they did not flow as a natural and continuous consequence from the commission of the charged offense. [But see DISSENT: Competent, credible evidence supported the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court where strong circumstantial evidence, coupled with the lack of evidence that anyone else had caused the damage to the victim's tires and gas tank, supported the conclusion that defendant proximately caused those damages.] The trial court did not err in ordering restitution for damage to the side door of the victim's car where the complaint stated that defendant knowingly caused damage to the victim's car when she ran into it: the damage to the side door flowed as a natural and continuous consequence of the commission of the offense of criminal damaging and was a direct and proximate result of the defendant's commission of that criminal damaging.

Crim. R. 29/Manifest weight/Hearsay/Plain error

Service of process. Statute of limitations. Insurance policy. UM/UIM coverage.

Genuine dispute exists whether appellants' medical malpractice claims fall within the immunity provisions of Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, ("the Prep Act"), 42 U.S.C. 247d-6d(a)(2)(B). Dispute existed whether pressure ulcers/bed sores, and which developed during appellant's hospitalization, were caused by, arose out of, relate to, or resulted from the administration to or use of a covered COVID-19 counter measure. Judgments reversed and remanded.

Appellant could not appeal issues that she agreed to in the parties' settlement. Trial court and appellee's attorney complied with local rule governing proposed judgment entries, and entry accurately reflected the settlement and the court's judgment. Trial court considered necessary factors and did not abuse its discretion related to amount, duration, or payment of spousal support and award of attorney fees. Decree had a clerical error in the support schedule, which the appellate court modified

Trial court errs in denying motion to return seized property under R.C. 2981.11 where the property is no longer needed as evidence or for another lawful purpose.

R.C. 2743.48, statute of limitations, actual innocence, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56

summary judgment, negligence, duty, existence of duty is generally a question of law extent of duty is generally based on facts and circumstances moving party's initial burden under Dresher v. Burt