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206 Ala. 174

89 So 523

Langston v. Phillips

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided June 9, 1921

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1921-06-09

K. McMorris, Judge. Assumpsit by Charles Phillips against J. M. Langston. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. The, court erred in rendering judgment on the facts, as the note was null and void. Section 232, Const. 1901; sections 3651-3653. Code 1907; 15 Ala. App. 675, 74 South. 701; 90 Ala. 549, 8 South. 42; 146 Ala. 513, 40 South. 0S7; 160 Ala. 370, 49 South. 319, 135 Am.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“whether the contract for the sale of the stock in question was made in Alabama, or in Delaware, where, of course, the law of this state had no effect.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Lee v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.

“the contract became operative and binding on defendant in this state.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Lee v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.

Relies on Chattanooga National Building Loan Association v. William H Denson E

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed and remanded · Decided 1921-06-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently August 1972

2 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

40192119301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

SAYRE, J.

¶1 Phillips sued Langston, declaring on a promissory note which defendant had given io the Pep-to-Lac Company of America and had been transferred to plaintiff. The defense was that the note was given to the Pep-to-Lac Company for shares of stock in that company, which had been sold to defendant in this state, and that said company, a corporation chartered under the laws of Delaware, had not paid its franchise tax, and had no license to do business in this state during the year in which the sale was made and the note given. Trial was had before the court without a jury on an agreed statement of facts.

¶2 All else being agreed upon, the sole issue presented by the pleading, and therefore the sole issue to be decided by the court, was whether, within the meaning of the statute (Code, §§ 3651-3653), denouncing as void all contracts made in this state by.foreign corporations without having first procured a *175 permit by the payment of a franchise tax (Code, § 3647), the issue to be decided was whether the contract' for the sale of the stock in question was made in Alabama, or in Delaware, where, of course, the law of this state had no effect.

¶3 The agent of the Pep-to-Lac Company, employed for that purpose, negotiated a sale of its stock in this state and took defendant’s note therefor, the note in suit. True, the sale was subject to approval by the company at its home office in Delaware, but the contract was negotiated and the note in suit executed and delivered in this state, and we cannot doubt that the negotiation of the contract and the acceptance of the note in. this state, though conditional, constituted the business of selling stock in this state within the meaning of the statute, supra, and if by reason of the company’s approval of the sale negotiated by its agent, though the determination to approve may have been reached in the state of Delaware, the contract became operative and binding on defendant in this state, notwithstanding there was never any delivery of the note — and the assignment of the note and this action both affirm the note to be binding on defendant — this, in our opinion, constituted a sale of the stock in this state within the meaning of the several pleas filed in this cause. Chattanooga Building & Loan Asso. v. Denson, 189 U. S. 408, 23 Sup. Ct. 630, 47 L. Ed. 870, where the court stated the effect of our decisions, saying that a discussion of the situs of contracts and by the law of what place their obligation is determined was not relevant to the consideration of the purpose of the statute, prohibiting the doing of any business in this state in the exercise of corporate functions unless and until the conditions prescribed by the statutes have been fulfilled.

¶4 It follows that the court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff.

¶5 Reversed and remanded.

ANDERSON, C. X, and GARDNER and HILLER, JJ., concur.
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