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206 Ala. 486

90 So 904

Stallings v. Savage

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided October 20, 1921

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1921-10-20

A. Steele, Judge.' Action by J. E. Stallings against H. J. Savage, doing business as the Etowah Motor Company, for damages for a breach of an agreement to equip an automobile. Judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals. Transferred front Court of Appeals under section 6, p. 450, Acts 1911.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“This constitutes the entire purchase contract.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Colafrancesco v. Crown Pontiac-GMC, Inc.

Relies on Vandegrift v. Abbott. · Thompson Foundry & Machine Co. v. Glass · Morningstar v. Querens

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1921-10-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently February 2006

7 state decisions

20192119301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

McCLELLAN, J.

¶1 The plaintiff, appellant, sued the appellee -for damages for breach of contract in the sale of a “secondhand” automobile, by the latter to. the former; title being retained by the seller until full payment of the purchase price. The plaintiff’s contention was that the defendant engaged to put lights on the car; to fix the self-starter; and to renew the battery. At the time of the sale an elaborate writing was signed by the plaintiff. In this writing it was stated, “This constitutes the entire purchase contract.” There was no provision in the writing imposing upon the seller the obligation to equip and repair the caías the plaintiff contended. The plaintiff sought to introduce parol evidence to support the asserted obligation to equip and repair the car. In view of the written contract, the court excluded such parol evi *487 donee; and, according to the brief for appellant, the application of the principle indicated constitutes the sole question presented on this appeal.

¶2 In its rulings on the proffered parol evidence, the court correctly applied the rule which precludes recourse to parol evidence to add to, vary, or contradict a writing defining the whole engagement or obligation of the parties. The matter of which plaintiff would predicate the breach asserted was not independent of and collateral to the sale and purchase of the automobile. Thompson Mach. Co. v. Glass, 136 Ala. 648, 634, 655, 33 South. 811, where the case of Vandegrift v. Abbott, 75 Ala. 487, is discriminated; and the discrimination there taken also illustrates the inapplicability of other cases cited on the brief for appellant.

¶3 If plaintiff's proffered testimony was designed, in one phase, to show that the verbal agreement to so equip and repair the car was made after the sale, such testimony was inadmissible, since there was no consideration shown for the thus asserted additional obligation. Morningstar v. Querens, 142 Ala. 186, 189, 37 South. 825.

¶4 The judgment is affirmed.

¶5 Affirmed.

ANDERSON, O. and THOMAS, JJ. J., and SOMERVILLE concur.
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