¶1dissenting.
¶2¶ 67 I agree with the Majority that the trial court erred by ruling that Cheche and Lubin had probable cause as a matter of law in Case II to maintain the WICP claim *519against Wolfinger solely because the court had denied Wolfinger’s cross-motion for summary judgment in that case. See ¶¶ 30-31, 39, supra. I part ways with my colleagues, however, when they decide that the trial court nevertheless properly entered summary judgment because the uncontested material facts demonstrated that Cheche and Lubin possessed probable cause to maintain the WICP claim. I therefore respectfully dissent.
¶3¶ 68 The Majority cites two reasons for deciding as a matter of law that Cheche and Lubin possessed probable cause in Case II to believe that Wolfinger lacked probable cause to sue Strojnik in Case I. First, the Majority gives undue weight to Judge Hilliard’s denial of Wolfinger’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of probable cause. See ¶ 46, supra. Second, they point to evidence demonstrating the weakness of Wolfinger’s case against Strojnik in Case I. See ¶ 48, supra. Neither factor establishes as a matter of law that Cheche and Lubin had probable cause to believe that Wolfinger lacked probable cause to bring and maintain Case I against Strojnik.
¶4¶ 69 Judge Hilliard’s denial of Wolfinger’s cross-motion for summary judgment bears little weight on the issue of probable cause to maintain Case II. At the same time Judge Hilliard denied the cross-motion, she denied a motion for summary judgment filed by Cheche and Lubin on the probable cause issue. In the joint ruling, the judge stated that no party was entitled to summary judgment because of disputed questions of material fact. In light of the denial of summary judgment to Cheche and Lubin, the simultaneous denial of Wolfinger’s cross-motion does not evidence that Cheche and Lubin possessed probable cause to maintain Case II. This conclusion is especially warranted in light of Judge Dunevant’s eventual entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of Wolfinger on the probable cause issue. Although the trial court’s denial of a dispositive motion in some cases may support a probable cause determination, Judge Hilliard’s ruling early in Case II was not sufficiently weighty to compel a finding as a matter of law that Cheche and Lubin had probable cause to maintain their lawsuit against Wolfinger.
¶5¶70 The weakness of Wolfinger’s claim against Strojnik in Case I likewise fails to demonstrate that Wolfinger lacked probable cause to bring and maintain that claim. Rather, as recognized by the Majority, see ¶ 29, supra, Wolfinger lacked probable cause only if he had no chance of success on the claim. Smith, 173 Ariz. at 297, 842 P.2d at 1310.
¶6¶ 71 Cheche and Lubin did not present any facts to Judge Sticht in their summary judgment papers suggesting that Wolfinger had no chance of success on his claim against Strojnik, relying instead on Judge Hilliard’s denial of summary judgment in Case II as evidence of probable cause to maintain the claim against Wolfinger. Moreover, the record contains evidence that Wolfinger had some prospect for success on the claim agáinst Strojnik. See ¶ 12, supra. For these reasons, Cheche and Lubin were not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of probable cause, and I would therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.