Coley v. Hecker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 federal appellate · 67 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 87 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The phrase `slander of title' is a figure of speech in which the title is personified. In the instant case, the phrase seems to be an anomaly as applied to a situation which, strictly speaking, is a libel upon the title, inasmuch as the damage was accomplished by the recordation of a written document, and no spoken words were uttered. However, the term `slander of title' includes both spoken and written means by which the right of property may be invaded and a right of action exists, irrespective of the means by which the title is traduced. This is so because a property right has been invaded — an injury to real property has been sustained.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Howard v. Hudson · Kirsch v. Barnes

2. ““It is appellants’ contention that by the term ‘injury to property ’, as used in section 392, supra, it was intended to include only physical interference with, or physical injury to real property, such as waste, or some sort of physical trespass committed upon the lands, and that the term was not intended to be as broadly applied as its meaning would seem to imply. In addition to the construction which we feel constrained to place upon said section, and which is supported by the con straction given to practically the same language by the supreme court of Louisiana in Labarre v. Burton-Schwartz etc. Co., 126 La. 982 [ 53 So. 113 ]), to the effect that slander of title is an actual intrusion upon one’s property and is in the ‘nature of a trespass, a real action to protect property’, our conclusion is further fortified by eminent authority holding that a libel written or published in disparagement of title is in the nature of an action of trespass on the case. The term ‘injury to real property’ is in itself a wider and less technical term than ‘trespass to real property’. As applied to questions of venue, it has been declared to embrace every wrong which in legal contemplation is an injury to real property, not only the direct and forcible injury, but consequential injuries, and threatened injuries to land, and even a mere nonfeasance, as permissive waste. (40 Cyc. 74; 17 R. C. L. 454.) “The trend of the decisions of this court is generally in accord with the doctrine, whenever”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Strosnider v. Pomin

3. ““The first and principal point presented by appellants is that respondent having joined a real and personal action, to-wit, an action to quiet title to real property with an action to recover for a slander of title did thereby lose his right to hold the case in the county where the real property was situate. This contention is based upon the claim that an action for the recovery of damages for slander of title sounds in personal action and does not bring the venue within the purview of section 392, Code of Civil Procedure. Said section provides: ‘Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial, as provided in this code. “ ‘1. For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest and for the injuries to real property. . . . “ ‘3. For the foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real property. ’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Strosnider v. Pomin