¶1also concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶2I agree with the majority that defendant has made a substantial showing that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence during defendant’s sentencing hearing. In agreeing with the majority on this point, however, I do not depart from the position taken in my dissent on direct appeal that the death penalty is inappropriate in this case. See People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 165-71 (1998) (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
¶3As I explained in detail in my dissent on direct appeal, the character of defendant and the circumstances of his crime simply do not warrant imposition of the death penalty. Defendant was 18 years old at the time of the offense and had a minimal history of criminal behavior. The murder which defendant committed, while unquestionably senseless and tragic, was not accompanied by torture or other exceptional brutality. Further, the murder was not the product of premeditation or planning, nor was it part of any murderous spree. Instead, the murder was an impulsive act, “committed at the instigation of a friend after seeing a film glamorizing carjacking.” Harris, 182 Ill. 2d at 169 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In sum, the record in this case establishes that defendant was “susceptible to a cohort’s influence, that he was immature, impressionable, and reckless” but that he is not a hardened criminal deserving of death. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d at 168 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The post-conviction exhibits cited by the majority in support of its decision to remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing (see 206 Ill. 2d at 323) serve only to confirm this conclusion.
¶4“The death penalty should be reserved for the most dangerous and incorrigible criminals — the ‘worst’ criminals. Foolishness, susceptibility to peer influence, immaturity, impressionability, and recklessness by an 18-year-old, taken individually or collectively, should not render a defendant one of society’s ‘worst’ criminals, for whom the death penalty is appropriate. The deterrent and retributive purposes of the death penalty are not served by its imposition in this case.” Harris, 182 Ill. 2d at 168 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I therefore dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which remands this cause for an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I would remand this case for the imposition of a sentence other than death.